Afghanistan in Transition: Power Dynamics

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center held a discussion about “Afghanistan in Transition: Power Dynamics” with Nick Dowling and Mariam Atash Nawabi on May 16.

South Asia Center director Shuja Nawaz moderated the discussion.

“Afghanistan in Transition” focused on the importance of incorporating regional players, strengthening civil society, and increasing economic development to ensure a stable Afghanistan. Speakers discussed progress and challenges for US engagement in Afghanistan and the dynamics of US-Afghan relations for the next ten years.

Nick Dowling is a former National Security Council official under the Clinton Administration and the current president of IDS International (www.idsinternational.net), a “smart power” national security firm that trains US Army and Marines on complex operations. He leads an IDS team with a wide range of stability operations, interagency, reconstruction and regional expertise. Mr. Dowling is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Army Education Advisory Council.

Mariam Atash Nawabi
is an attorney and adjunct professor of Law at the University of La Verne College of Law and president of AMDi International. She has been a television anchor and host of Pul, a show produced by American Abroad Media broadcast in Afghanistan. Prior to these roles, she was senior advisor to the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce and Commercial Counsel to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC where she worked on policy issues, private sector development, women’s entrepreneurship, commercial law reform, and training and capacity building programs. 

Assessing Policies Between Governments and Transatlantic Muslims

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, held a discussion with Mehdi Hasan, senior editor (politics) at the New Statesman and author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. The session was moderated by Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center.

Mr. Mehdi Hasan, a prominent UK political writer, focused on the complex dynamic that exists between Muslim communities in Europe and the United States and the foreign policies related to their countries of origin.

Prior to joining the New Statesman, Mr. Hasan was with Channel 4 as editor, in the news and current affairs department. He was also the deputy executive producer for Sky TV’s Sunrise, as well as being a producer for BBC1’s the Politics Show.

Beyond OBL: Time for Bold Moves

What a difference a year makes! Today school children play cricket on the ground where a year ago Osama Bin Laden lived…and died. The sun is shining in Abbottabad. But clouds fill the horizon for the United States-Pakistan relationship.

It will take a bold move by President Barack Obama to restore that once promising partnership. Nothing less will assuage the hurt that Pakistan felt after the cumulative effects of events of 2011 that took its relations with the United States into a downward spiral. An apology for the November 26 attack on two Pakistani border posts is a risky venture in an election year but so is the possibility of a rupture in relations with Pakistan at a key stage in the Afghan war.

No matter what Obama does, the onus is also on Pakistan if it wishes to move forward. It is fighting a costly war inside its own borders and is inextricably linked to the war next door in Afghanistan. It has already paid a heavy price in terms of lives lost and the economic costs of being a partner in the Afghanistan conflict. Al Qaeda still likely has its headquarters inside Pakistan proper. Meanwhile the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) continues to fight the state. It would do well for Pakistan’s military and civil intelligence services to begin to work together to find and capture Ayman Al Zawahiri before the Americans do. For if the US gets to him first, there will be a reprise of the Abbottabad raid. Pakistan has the resources, if properly employed, to track down the leadership of the TTP and decapitate that organization. Why have they not shown results? For their own sake?

In the hinterland, a more serious threat remains from the Punjabi Taliban, which is neither controlled nor controllable and a constant obstacle to improved relations with neighboring India and now the United States. Legal authorities in Pakistan suggest that changes in regulations need to be made to allow the government to apprehend and proceed against the leaders of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant organizations. Changes in laws may take longer but are also necessary. The army reportedly sought such legal advice in the past year or two. Is the government also doing so and can the army and the government act in unison on this issue?

Meanwhile the National Counter Terrorism Authority still lies in limbo, inside the files of the Ministry of Interior. It is an opportunity that is being missed. A civilian-led and coordinated effort under the prime minister affords the best chance of establishing leadership in the battle for Pakistan that is going on in the streets and countryside of that embattled nation. It may also be time now to re-establish the National Security Council under strong leadership and supported by adequate staff and other resources so the government may benefit from its advice. And establish ownership of security matters. The streets of Karachi and Quetta are a daily battle ground this week. Tomorrow, it may be Lahore, Peshawar, or Islamabad. Will Pakistan continue to blame external forces for its inability to protect its citizens and serving as a safe haven for domestic and foreign criminals operating in the name of Islam?

Osama Bin Laden may be dead but the seeds of terror that he and misguided government policies of the past helped plant are sprouting all over Pakistan today. Who will lead the charge? 

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.

Shuja Nawaz on NPR to Discuss Drone Strikes in Pakistan

Highlight - Nawaz

Atlantic Council South Asia Center director Shuja Nawaz was interviewed on National Public Radio’s Morning Edition for a segment called “U.S. Considers Ways to Keep Drones in Pakistan.”

Pakistan’s Parliament has recommended that the U.S. be prohibited from launching drone missile attacks on Pakistani soil. The drone program has been successful in killing militants in Pakistan, many of whom were launching attacks against American troops in neighboring Afghanistan. Analysts say it’s unlikely the U.S. will agree to stop carrying out missile strikes from the unmanned aerial vehicles. The question is what happens now?

The Cruel Calendar

South Asia is still struggling for some semblance of stability following last year’s turmoil. The next two years promise little respite as the effects of clashing political and economic calendars threaten to create further vortices of violence and political battles in the region.

An immediate potential threat: the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s killing. Will Al Qaeda or its surrogates commemorate May 2 with a spectacular attack? And who will they target?

Elections also loom in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and their timetables may be affecting political action. If recent provincial elections portend the future, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will need to act fast if he is to leave a legacy of peace with his neighbors. Opening trade with Pakistan was a major step—and Pakistan reciprocated, though with some hesitation—but internal rearguard actions will likely continue to be fought by recalcitrant bureaucrats and intelligence agencies on both sides of the border.

What may seal the deal for Singh is a bold, altruistic move by India, as the bigger economic and military power. As an economist, Singh understands the transformative impact of the creation of a South Asian free trade zone. The regions of India that abut Pakistan would profit immediately and immensely from opening up the entire border to the movement of goods and people and from the creation of common infrastructure to manage transportation and share water and energy resources. Over time the rest of the hinterland on both sides will benefit. Business leaders are ready, willing, and able to go regional. But the window of opportunity is a narrow one. Will the politicians leap through it or dither?

In Pakistan, the very grudging assertion of parliamentary authority and the more rapid one of judicial authority appear to be a welcome shift in the balance of power between the military and the civilian administration. But the business of government is to govern, not to try to stay in power no matter what. With elections looming and the populist threat from new forces such as the Tehreek-e-Insaf rising, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led government will need to exhibit statesmanship at the national and regional levels.

Rather than feeding the base, rentier urges of local and ethnically-oriented politicians to garner support (e.g., by creating the private ATM of regional banks), the government will fare better electorally by solving the problems of food, water, and energy that have made life impossible for the bottom half of Pakistan’s 190 million people. This means convincing its own coalition about the need for structural reforms of the economy, and opening borders with both India and Afghanistan to boost jobs and opportunities from resultant transit trade. President Asif Ali Zardari’s creative thinking behind his pilgrimage to Ajmer should not be a one-off event. Concrete plans for thawing relations need to follow. Exactly what did he pray for at the Indian shrine, absolution or peace?

From the Siachen tragedy there is an opportunity for peace for both Pakistan and India by creating a hallowed ground in that frozen northern outpost as a memorial to the losses suffered by both over the years. Both countries need to act to vacate the region and cease their hostile posturing. Both could then take credit for waging peace. But the key will be how the two governments convince extremist elements in their own ranks and outside that the time for war is over. Again, the time available to both governments is running out. Much sage advice has come out of the pens of pundits and the mouths of politicians on this tragedy and its opportunity for changing mindsets in both Pakistan and India. If former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is prepared for unilateral action on Pakistan’s part and Gen. Ashfaq Kayani also favors disengagement and demilitarization of Siachen, then, in the interest of confidence building, India needs to respond positively. This is no time for a political chess game with human pawns on the world’s highest battlefield.

In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai appears to be crafting a new deal with the U.S. and may well try to find a way to deal with different parts of the Taliban collective. Talks are ongoing between Kabul and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. And if the Doha negotiations resume and Pakistan assists the process by releasing Taliban that Kabul wants to participate in the talks, there may well be a chance to create Afghan-led stability in Afghanistan. Otherwise, a disorderly withdrawal of Coalition forces may doom the region to senseless ethnic and sectarian violence again. Karzai is being tempted to accelerate the Afghan elections to unclutter the overfilled calendar for 2014 and create a smoother transition to Afghan sovereignty. But the question remains: does he wish to hand over to a new president or change the Constitution to win yet another term for himself? Afghanistan has many potential leaders from different ethnic groups. Will the richness of that political mosaic triumph over personal ambition?

Friends of the region—the U.S., Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia—can help by putting pressure on all sides and by providing the resources and advice that will help these protagonists overcome their worst fears and get over obstacles of history. Private moral suasion may be the key to getting results rather than public hectoring. The complex set of relationships in the region demand that simultaneous and unselfish actions be taken by different players. Solving this truly multivariate equation demands creativity and boldness. Will politicians in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan break out of the prison of their political and economic calendars and in the process become statesmen themselves?

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This piece was originally published on Newsweek.

Countries in Transition: Egypt

After landmark parliamentary elections delivered a landslide victory to Islamists, Egypt’s transition is still very much in progress as the country’s diverse political forces and movements propose competing visions for the new constitution and economic system.  With presidential elections looming in late May, the leading candidates are facing off on the campaign trail for control over the post-revolutionary Egypt.  

The Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and the Center’s blog, EgyptSource, will continue to provide breaking news coverage and analysis of Egypt’s unfolding transition. 

This page features a compilation of events, media appearances, EgyptSource blog posts and analysis from Egyptian contributors, and other publications on Egypt.

 

Publications

Events

Media Appearances

 

The Center’s blog EgyptSource follows Egypt’s transition and provides a platform for Egyptian perspectives on economic, political, legal, religious and human rights issues in the post-Mubarak era. 

Photo courtesy of The Guardian.

Rethinking the US-Pakistan “Friendship”

After a long wait following a request from a joint session of the Pakistani parliament in May 2011, the Pakistani parliamentary committee looking to reset relations with the United States has come out with its recommendations.

The Pakistan National Assembly begins debate on this issue today and will likely continue discussions for the next three days.  No major surprises in the report’s recommendations. In a decision that seems guided by domestic politics, the report and its current “debate” in the parliament will not produce better understanding among the people of Pakistan of what their country’s policy is toward the United States or what it should be. Rather, it seems destined for a marginal adjustment of issues that have bedeviled this tenuous “friendship” for years.

Pakistan seeks to stop drone attacks, renegotiate the terms under which the US and coalition troops can be supplied through the currently closed Ground Lines of Communications (GLOC) into Afghanistan and simplify the means of reimbursing Pakistan for deploying its troops in the border region. It also draws red lines regarding boots on the ground in Pakistan (translation: no more Osama Bin Laden-type raids). Underlying all these demands is the desire for mutual respect and understanding, beginning with an apology or a reasonable facsimile thereof from the United States for the attacks on Pakistani border posts. But is there a Plan B? As parliament convenes next week to “debate” this issue, we shall see what Pakistan really wants and what is attainable.

All this comes at a time when the coalition is preparing for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan faces the prospect of an unruly Afghanistan with its negative spillover effects: millions of new refugees if fighting breaks out in Afghanistan, and the scary prospect for Pakistan of reverse sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban and other anti-state actors. The Air Lines of Communication that allowed the coalition to continue to prosecute the war, though at much higher costs, remained open. Not a word on those from Pakistan, or the United States. Codependency seems to be working, to some extent.

The parliamentary review is a good sign of putting a civilian face on decision making in Pakistan, though the script may well have come from the military, as many suspect. But the review is silent on a number of issues. There is no word on why the Pakistani authorities, both civil and military, were mum for nearly a decade on the drone issue; in fact they abetted and encouraged them, according to Wikileaks, among other sources. There is also no word on why the government of President General Pervez Musharraf failed to get written agreement  on the understandings reached with the United States after 9/11 and hastily accepted a reimbursement scheme to receive Coalition Support Funds that made the Pakistani military an army for hire, on a marginal cost basis.

The basic assumptions of this “deal” were faulty. They seem to have miscalculated the length of the expected conflict, its effects on the tribesmen of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (resulting from the birth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan), and the real costs of the ensuing fighting for the Pakistani military and civil population. Now, after 36,000 deaths, along with the degradation of infrastructure, arms, equipment, and morale, Pakistan is seeking just recompense. Too little, too late. Even if they get the enhanced prices in the final stages of the Afghan conflict, the amounts will not adequately cover the real costs of the war to Pakistan, estimated at more than $60 billion. Who is going to be held accountable inside Pakistan for these miscalculations?

Pakistan is also missing an opportunity to cancel the CSF, something it should have done years ago, and replace it with a written agreement on U.S. military aid rather than a cash-for-services program that apparently became a bad habit the military leadership could not shed, until the U.S. Congress and Administration made it a weapon to castigate and penalize Pakistan. Pakistan never had the capacity to track and account for the detailed expenditures that the United States needs to justify payments. Why continue down that rocky path?

What if the hard line positions captured by the committee’s laundry list of demands fail to get immediate satisfaction? Who then will be responsible for Pakistan’s next move? Will it be the civilian government, the military, or parliament, the shield behind which the government seeks to hide most of the time? Pakistan does not seem to have a viable Plan B, unless its recent thaw with India becomes a permanent shift. China is a friend but will not go to the wall in a fight against the United States. Indeed, it has sought to work with the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia. The United States does not have a Plan B either.

Ideally, to keep the relationship going, the U.S. would need to work out some kind of joint approach to drone targets, using the Border Coordination Centers perhaps as a means of insulating targeting decisions from others in the Pakistani chain of command, and thus avoiding the past embarrassment of leaked information to targets. So long as fighting continues in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the United States giving up on drone attacks entirely. Pakistan will want greater controls on ground lines of communication. In addition to seeking additional payments to cover its real costs, it will need to regulate the traffic to avoid jams in its port and at the borders.

In other words, the transactional relationship becomes more tightly regulated. But the U.S. development approach to Pakistan also needs a huge shift, toward longer-term development projects and short-term efforts to win hearts and minds. Borrowing from the British playbook might be a good idea. Finally, and over time, the United States must end its primary focus on the military-to-military relationship, and make it subordinate to the political relationship with the government of Pakistan and a direct relationship with Pakistani civil society. That is what President Barack Obama promised in his December 2009 speech. Now he must deliver.

Don’t expect miraculous results from this review or its demands. Election fever is upon us in the United States. President Obama is in a difficult position on whether to accept wholesale the Pakistani demands. Whatever he concedes gives fodder to his opponents on the Hill and on the campaign trail. Inside Pakistan, an election may also be looming. The rising nationalistic forces of anti-Americanism will excoriate any politician who makes deals with the United States. Yet, a conflict between these two difficult allies is not what is needed in the volatile region at this time. It will take cool heads on both sides to emerge with reputations and egos unscathed. It is said that in Washington people eschew a Plan B since it very soon becomes Plan A. The same may be true of Pakistan. But both sides need that Plan B today, or they will risk the turmoil of the counterfactual. Time for a rapid rethink on both sides on how to move forward. Tardiness spells failure.

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within (Oxford 2008/9). This piece originally appeared on Foreign Policy’s The AfPak Channel.

Setting Boundaries on Transboundary Water Conflicts

On Friday, March 23, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and International Security Program hosted a session on preventing and resolving conflicts over freshwater resources shared across national boundaries.

Under the combined pressures of climate change, population growth, rapid urbanization, and greater food demands, many believe that water scarcity, and with it, the potential for international water conflicts, will inevitably increase.

PROGRAM

8:30 a.m. Registration and continental breakfast
9:00 a.m. The Role and Limitations of International Water Law
Joseph Dellapenna and Flavia Loures
10:15 a.m. The Role of Treaties and Trusted Third Parties
Kishor Uprety, Charles Lawson, and Russell Frisbie
12:00 p.m. Keynote Address
Aaron T. Wolf, followed by Q&A
1:00 p.m. Conclusion

 

FEATURING

Joseph Dellapenna
Professor
Villanova University
School of Law

Russell Frisbie
Special Assistant
International Boundary and
Water Commission

Charles Lawson
US Secretary
International Joint Commission

Flavia Loures
Senior Program Officer
World Wildlife Fund

Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

Magnus Nordenman
Deputy Director, International Security Program
Atlantic Council

Kishor Uprety
International Water Law Expert
and Senior Counsel
IBRD

Aaron T. Wolf
Professor
Oregon State University

A Hasty Retreat Would Add to the Huge Toll of the War

We have failed in Afghanistan. Failed to define tightly the original mission. Failed to see Afghanistan through its own eyes and through the eyes of its neighbors. And we failed to explain to the American people why we were there and why we need to remain a partner in the region even when the fighting ceases. Now we may be ready to fail in the manner we leave this “good war” that has brought death and destruction not only to the people of Afghanistan but also in neighboring Pakistan. After all, it was our war that spawned the insurgency in that country—an insurgency that will outlast the U.S. presence in the region and add to the costs of war in that benighted land. For Pakistan has paid a huge price for this conflict: over 36,000 dead, more than 6,000 of them military casualties. And economic costs ranging from $40 billion to 65 billion.

The continuing cost to the neighborhood will rise if Afghanistan is left in unseemly haste and resultant turmoil. Leave we must. But the departure ought to be orderly and clearly defined, according to the president’s original schedule. Not a hurried retreat–fueled by election-year politics–that some predict will be worse than Saigon.

We still have a chance to reconcile with most of the Pakhtuns inside Afghanistan and bring them into the national concord that is necessary for a balanced Afghan polity. This will reduce the leverage of the expatriate warriors.

Otherwise, the worst fears of the regional warlords and Afghanistan’s neighbors will be realized and further strengthen their view that they need to arm and protect themselves for the period after the United States leaves, yet again. Most of them recall vividly 1990 and the hasty disappearing act at the end of the war against the Soviet Union. Pakistan certainly fears the worst, with millions of potential refugees pouring across the border yet again if Afghanistan descends into chaotic warfare. And in the Pakhtun-dominated border region of Afghanistan that abuts Pakistan, the possibility of reverse sanctuary for the Pakistani and Punjabi Taliban remains a real threat. We must engage with the Pakhtuns on both sides of the border. Engage also with the Pakistanis so they understand and can support our efforts to leave a stable Afghanistan, not a cockpit for regional rivalries.

To do this successfully, we must scale back the drone attacks or share targeting decisions with Pakistan. Use local cease-fires strategically and remain firmly committed to a civilian and economic presence in Afghanistan after the guns are silenced. We have paid a huge price for this war and the Iraq conflict. Let us not add to that cost now with a hasty retreat.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. This piece was originally published on the U.S. News and World Report’s Debate Club.

Can Egypt Avoid Pakistan’s Fate?

Riot policemen in Egypt

One year after the revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military is closing down civil society organizations and trying to manipulate the constitution-writing process to serve its narrow interests. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, where the military has also held sway for more than half the country’s existence — for much of that time, with America’s blessing — a new civil-military crisis is brewing.

For the United States, the parallels are clear and painful. Egypt and Pakistan are populous Muslim-majority nations in conflict-ridden regions, and both have long been allies and recipients of extensive military and economic aid.

Historically, American aid tapers off in Pakistan whenever civilians come to power. And in Egypt, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both resisted pressure from Congress to cut aid to Mr. Mubarak despite his repression of peaceful dissidents.

It is no wonder that both Egyptians and Pakistanis express more anger than appreciation toward the United States. They have seen Washington turn a blind eye to human-rights abuses and antidemocratic practices because of a desire to pursue regional objectives — Israeli security in the case of Egypt, and fighting Al Qaeda in the case of Pakistan.

The question now is whether the United States will, a year after the Egyptian revolution, stand by and allow the Pakistani model of military dominance and a hobbled civilian government to be replicated on the Nile.

Pakistan and Egypt each have powerful intelligence and internal security agencies that have acquired extra-legal powers they will not relinquish easily. Pakistan’s history of fomenting insurgencies in neighboring countries has caused serious problems for the United States. And Egypt’s internal security forces have been accused of involvement in domestic terrorist attacks and sectarian violence. (However, Washington has long seen Egypt’s military as a stabilizing force that keeps the peace with Israel.)

The danger is that in the future, without accountability to elected civilian authorities, the Egyptian military and security services will seek to increase their power by manipulating Islamic extremist organizations in volatile and strategically sensitive areas like the Sinai Peninsula.

Despite the security forces’ constant meddling in politics, Pakistan at least has a Constitution that establishes civilian supremacy over the military. Alarmingly, Egypt’s army is seeking even greater influence than what Pakistan’s top brass now enjoys: an explicit political role, and freedom from civilian oversight enshrined in law.

Egypt’s army was once considered heroic for siding with peaceful demonstrators against Mr. Mubarak, but it has badly mishandled the country in the past year. The riot at a soccer match on Wednesday that killed around 70 people underscored the leadership’s failure to undertake badly needed police reform and restore security. The economy is teetering, peaceful demonstrators have been tried in military courts, anti-Christian violence has spiked and ministers appointed by the military have hounded civil society groups that advocate government accountability, budget transparency, human rights and free elections.

A dismayed Congress has attached conditions to future military assistance to Egypt (now $1.3 billion a year), requiring the Obama administration to certify that the military government is maintaining peace with Israel, allowing a transition to civilian rule and protecting basic freedoms — or to waive the conditions on national security grounds — if it wants to keep aid flowing.

The Egyptian military is clearly not meeting at least two of those three conditions right now. Consequently, the Obama administration should not certify compliance, nor should it invoke the national security waiver by arguing that Egyptian-Israeli peace is paramount and that Egypt’s military is the only bulwark against Islamist domination of the country — because both of these arguments are deeply flawed.

First, hardly anyone in Egypt favors war with Israel, and a freeze or suspension of American aid would not change that. Second, continuing support to an Egyptian military that is bent on hobbling a liberal civil society would only strengthen Islamist domination. Islamist groups won some 70 percent of seats in the recent parliamentary elections, but they will now face tremendous pressure to solve the deep economic and political problems that caused the revolution.

In Egypt, as in Pakistan, the ultimate solution is a peaceful transfer of power to elected, accountable civilians and the removal of the military’s overt and covert influence from the political scene. At a minimum, Egypt should establish the clear supremacy of the civilian government over the military and allow an unfettered civil society to flourish.

Washington should suspend military assistance to Egypt until those conditions are met. Taking that difficult step now could help Egypt avoid decades of the violence, terrorism and cloak-and-dagger politics that continue to plague Pakistan.

Michele Dunne, a former White House and State Department official, and Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within,” are the directors of the Middle East and South Asia centers, respectively, at the Atlantic Council. This article was originally published in The New York Times. Photo credit: Getty Images.