All posts by Shuja Nawaz

Atlantic Council

India-US Strategic Dialogue: Expanding Horizons of Bilateral Partnership

On May 30, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center held a public discussion on “India-US Strategic Dialogue: Expanding Horizons of Bilateral Partnership,” with H.E. Nirupama Rao, ambassador of India to the United States.

 Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center, Atlantic Council welcomed H.E. Nirupama Rao and Nelson W. Cunningham, managing partner and co-founder of McLarty Associates, who moderated the session.

The fundamental interests of the United States and India converge on most matters of strategic importance, placing the India-US partnership on a positive trajectory. This sustained, productive strategic partnership is based on shared prosperity, democratic values, and solving global and regional problems in an interconnected world. What are the key drivers of an expanding and multi-dimensional India-US partnership? Can the United States and India build on their partnership through increased trade, development initiatives, and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region? Ambassador Rao answered these questions among others, and addressed how this strategic partnership can be taken to a new level.

MEDIA MENTIONS

Mrs. Nirupama Rao assumed her responsibilities as ambassador of India to the United States in September 2011.

On completion of her University studies, and with a MA in English literature, she joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1973. In a diplomatic career spanning over three decades, she served in various world capitals, including Washington, Beijing and Moscow. She acquired extensive experience in India-China relations, having served in the East Asia Division of the Ministry at policy level capacities for several years, and later served as India’s first woman ambassador to China from 2006 to 2009. Her other ambassadorial assignments include Peru and Bolivia, and Sri Lanka (where she was India’s first woman high commissioner).

Mrs. Rao served in Washington as minister for press and cultural affairs at the Indian Embassy from 1993 to 1995. Shortly after, she also served in Moscow as deputy chief of mission from the Embassy of India. On return to New Delhi in 2001, she became the first women Indian foreign service officer to hold the post of spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs.

On completion of her tenures in Sri Lanka and in China, she was appointed foreign secretary, the highest office in the Indian Foreign Service, where she served a two-year term until July 2011.

Ambassador Rao was a fellow at the Centre for International Affairs (now the Weatherhead Centre) at Harvard University in the early 1990s. She was also a distinguished international executive in residence at the University of Maryland in 1999-2000.

Ambassador Rao is married to Sudhakar Rao, a distinguished civil servant and former member of the Indian Administrative Service who retired as the chief secretary of the State Government of Karnataka. They have two sons, Nikhilesh and Kartikeya.

Atlantic Council

Iran Nuclear Negotiations: What’s Next?

On May 29, the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force hosted an in-depth review of the Iran nuclear talks that took place in Baghdad on May 23.

These talks follow on discussions in Istanbul April 13-14, between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) that were relatively positive. Nevertheless, there are concerns whether a “step-by-step approach” to de-escalating the nuclear crisis with Iran can be achieved. Iran is looking to the international community to ease draconian sanctions, but US flexibility is limited, especially in a presidential election year. Additionally, Israel has a more restrictive view of the Iranian nuclear program than some in the United States and Europe. Panelists analyzed the converging and conflicting interest of the P5+1, Iran, Israel, as well as explore repercussions should negotiations fail.

A discussion with

David Albright
Founder and President
Institute for Science and International Security

Moderated by

Barbara Slavin
Senior Fellow, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

Introduced by

Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

David Albright is founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISSI) in Washington, DC. A physicist and former UN arms inspector, Albright has written numerous assessments of nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. He has co authored five books, including the 1992 and 1996 versions of World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, (SIPRI and Oxford University Press); Challenges of Fissile Material Control (ISSI Press, 1999); Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (ISIS Press, 2000); and Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (Free Press, 2010).

Barbara Slavin is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor.com, a new website devoted to news from and about the Middle East. The author of a 2007 book, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US and the Twisted Path to Confrontation, she is a regular commentator on US foreign policy and Iran on NPR, PBS, and C-SPAN. A career journalist, Slavin previously served as assistant managing editor for world and national security of The Washington Times, senior diplomatic reporter for USA Today, Cairo correspondent for The Economist, and as an editor at The New York Times Week in Review.

The Iran Task Force, co-chaired by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West. Please click here for more information about the Iran Task Force.

The Iran Task Force is generously sponsored by the Ploughshares Fund.

Atlantic Council

Afghanistan in Transition: Power Dynamics

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center held a discussion about “Afghanistan in Transition: Power Dynamics” with Nick Dowling and Mariam Atash Nawabi on May 16.

South Asia Center director Shuja Nawaz moderated the discussion.

“Afghanistan in Transition” focused on the importance of incorporating regional players, strengthening civil society, and increasing economic development to ensure a stable Afghanistan. Speakers discussed progress and challenges for US engagement in Afghanistan and the dynamics of US-Afghan relations for the next ten years.

Nick Dowling is a former National Security Council official under the Clinton Administration and the current president of IDS International (www.idsinternational.net), a “smart power” national security firm that trains US Army and Marines on complex operations. He leads an IDS team with a wide range of stability operations, interagency, reconstruction and regional expertise. Mr. Dowling is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Army Education Advisory Council.

Mariam Atash Nawabi is an attorney and adjunct professor of Law at the University of La Verne College of Law and president of AMDi International. She has been a television anchor and host of Pul, a show produced by American Abroad Media broadcast in Afghanistan. Prior to these roles, she was senior advisor to the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce and Commercial Counsel to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC where she worked on policy issues, private sector development, women’s entrepreneurship, commercial law reform, and training and capacity building programs. 

Atlantic Council

Assessing Policies Between Governments and Transatlantic Muslims

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, held a discussion with Mehdi Hasan, senior editor (politics) at the New Statesman and author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. The session was moderated by Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center.

Mr. Mehdi Hasan, a prominent UK political writer, focused on the complex dynamic that exists between Muslim communities in Europe and the United States and the foreign policies related to their countries of origin.

Prior to joining the New Statesman, Mr. Hasan was with Channel 4 as editor, in the news and current affairs department. He was also the deputy executive producer for Sky TV’s Sunrise, as well as being a producer for BBC1’s the Politics Show.

Atlantic Council

Beyond OBL: Time for Bold Moves

What a difference a year makes! Today school children play cricket on the ground where a year ago Osama Bin Laden lived…and died. The sun is shining in Abbottabad. But clouds fill the horizon for the United States-Pakistan relationship.

It will take a bold move by President Barack Obama to restore that once promising partnership. Nothing less will assuage the hurt that Pakistan felt after the cumulative effects of events of 2011 that took its relations with the United States into a downward spiral. An apology for the November 26 attack on two Pakistani border posts is a risky venture in an election year but so is the possibility of a rupture in relations with Pakistan at a key stage in the Afghan war.

No matter what Obama does, the onus is also on Pakistan if it wishes to move forward. It is fighting a costly war inside its own borders and is inextricably linked to the war next door in Afghanistan. It has already paid a heavy price in terms of lives lost and the economic costs of being a partner in the Afghanistan conflict. Al Qaeda still likely has its headquarters inside Pakistan proper. Meanwhile the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) continues to fight the state. It would do well for Pakistan’s military and civil intelligence services to begin to work together to find and capture Ayman Al Zawahiri before the Americans do. For if the US gets to him first, there will be a reprise of the Abbottabad raid. Pakistan has the resources, if properly employed, to track down the leadership of the TTP and decapitate that organization. Why have they not shown results? For their own sake?

In the hinterland, a more serious threat remains from the Punjabi Taliban, which is neither controlled nor controllable and a constant obstacle to improved relations with neighboring India and now the United States. Legal authorities in Pakistan suggest that changes in regulations need to be made to allow the government to apprehend and proceed against the leaders of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant organizations. Changes in laws may take longer but are also necessary. The army reportedly sought such legal advice in the past year or two. Is the government also doing so and can the army and the government act in unison on this issue?

Meanwhile the National Counter Terrorism Authority still lies in limbo, inside the files of the Ministry of Interior. It is an opportunity that is being missed. A civilian-led and coordinated effort under the prime minister affords the best chance of establishing leadership in the battle for Pakistan that is going on in the streets and countryside of that embattled nation. It may also be time now to re-establish the National Security Council under strong leadership and supported by adequate staff and other resources so the government may benefit from its advice. And establish ownership of security matters. The streets of Karachi and Quetta are a daily battle ground this week. Tomorrow, it may be Lahore, Peshawar, or Islamabad. Will Pakistan continue to blame external forces for its inability to protect its citizens and serving as a safe haven for domestic and foreign criminals operating in the name of Islam?

Osama Bin Laden may be dead but the seeds of terror that he and misguided government policies of the past helped plant are sprouting all over Pakistan today. Who will lead the charge? 

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council

Shuja Nawaz on NPR to Discuss Drone Strikes in Pakistan

Highlight - Nawaz

Atlantic Council South Asia Center director Shuja Nawaz was interviewed on National Public Radio’s Morning Edition for a segment called “U.S. Considers Ways to Keep Drones in Pakistan.”

Pakistan’s Parliament has recommended that the U.S. be prohibited from launching drone missile attacks on Pakistani soil. The drone program has been successful in killing militants in Pakistan, many of whom were launching attacks against American troops in neighboring Afghanistan. Analysts say it’s unlikely the U.S. will agree to stop carrying out missile strikes from the unmanned aerial vehicles. The question is what happens now?

Atlantic Council

The Cruel Calendar

South Asia is still struggling for some semblance of stability following last year’s turmoil. The next two years promise little respite as the effects of clashing political and economic calendars threaten to create further vortices of violence and political battles in the region.

An immediate potential threat: the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s killing. Will Al Qaeda or its surrogates commemorate May 2 with a spectacular attack? And who will they target?

Elections also loom in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and their timetables may be affecting political action. If recent provincial elections portend the future, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will need to act fast if he is to leave a legacy of peace with his neighbors. Opening trade with Pakistan was a major step—and Pakistan reciprocated, though with some hesitation—but internal rearguard actions will likely continue to be fought by recalcitrant bureaucrats and intelligence agencies on both sides of the border.

What may seal the deal for Singh is a bold, altruistic move by India, as the bigger economic and military power. As an economist, Singh understands the transformative impact of the creation of a South Asian free trade zone. The regions of India that abut Pakistan would profit immediately and immensely from opening up the entire border to the movement of goods and people and from the creation of common infrastructure to manage transportation and share water and energy resources. Over time the rest of the hinterland on both sides will benefit. Business leaders are ready, willing, and able to go regional. But the window of opportunity is a narrow one. Will the politicians leap through it or dither?

In Pakistan, the very grudging assertion of parliamentary authority and the more rapid one of judicial authority appear to be a welcome shift in the balance of power between the military and the civilian administration. But the business of government is to govern, not to try to stay in power no matter what. With elections looming and the populist threat from new forces such as the Tehreek-e-Insaf rising, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led government will need to exhibit statesmanship at the national and regional levels.

Rather than feeding the base, rentier urges of local and ethnically-oriented politicians to garner support (e.g., by creating the private ATM of regional banks), the government will fare better electorally by solving the problems of food, water, and energy that have made life impossible for the bottom half of Pakistan’s 190 million people. This means convincing its own coalition about the need for structural reforms of the economy, and opening borders with both India and Afghanistan to boost jobs and opportunities from resultant transit trade. President Asif Ali Zardari’s creative thinking behind his pilgrimage to Ajmer should not be a one-off event. Concrete plans for thawing relations need to follow. Exactly what did he pray for at the Indian shrine, absolution or peace?

From the Siachen tragedy there is an opportunity for peace for both Pakistan and India by creating a hallowed ground in that frozen northern outpost as a memorial to the losses suffered by both over the years. Both countries need to act to vacate the region and cease their hostile posturing. Both could then take credit for waging peace. But the key will be how the two governments convince extremist elements in their own ranks and outside that the time for war is over. Again, the time available to both governments is running out. Much sage advice has come out of the pens of pundits and the mouths of politicians on this tragedy and its opportunity for changing mindsets in both Pakistan and India. If former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is prepared for unilateral action on Pakistan’s part and Gen. Ashfaq Kayani also favors disengagement and demilitarization of Siachen, then, in the interest of confidence building, India needs to respond positively. This is no time for a political chess game with human pawns on the world’s highest battlefield.

In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai appears to be crafting a new deal with the U.S. and may well try to find a way to deal with different parts of the Taliban collective. Talks are ongoing between Kabul and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. And if the Doha negotiations resume and Pakistan assists the process by releasing Taliban that Kabul wants to participate in the talks, there may well be a chance to create Afghan-led stability in Afghanistan. Otherwise, a disorderly withdrawal of Coalition forces may doom the region to senseless ethnic and sectarian violence again. Karzai is being tempted to accelerate the Afghan elections to unclutter the overfilled calendar for 2014 and create a smoother transition to Afghan sovereignty. But the question remains: does he wish to hand over to a new president or change the Constitution to win yet another term for himself? Afghanistan has many potential leaders from different ethnic groups. Will the richness of that political mosaic triumph over personal ambition?

Friends of the region—the U.S., Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia—can help by putting pressure on all sides and by providing the resources and advice that will help these protagonists overcome their worst fears and get over obstacles of history. Private moral suasion may be the key to getting results rather than public hectoring. The complex set of relationships in the region demand that simultaneous and unselfish actions be taken by different players. Solving this truly multivariate equation demands creativity and boldness. Will politicians in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan break out of the prison of their political and economic calendars and in the process become statesmen themselves?

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This piece was originally published on Newsweek.

Atlantic Council

Countries in Transition: Egypt

After landmark parliamentary elections delivered a landslide victory to Islamists, Egypt’s transition is still very much in progress as the country’s diverse political forces and movements propose competing visions for the new constitution and economic system.  With presidential elections looming in late May, the leading candidates are facing off on the campaign trail for control over the post-revolutionary Egypt.  

The Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and the Center’s blog, EgyptSource, will continue to provide breaking news coverage and analysis of Egypt’s unfolding transition. 

This page features a compilation of events, media appearances, EgyptSource blog posts and analysis from Egyptian contributors, and other publications on Egypt.

 

Publications

Events

Media Appearances

 

The Center’s blog EgyptSource follows Egypt’s transition and provides a platform for Egyptian perspectives on economic, political, legal, religious and human rights issues in the post-Mubarak era. 

Photo courtesy of The Guardian.

Atlantic Council

Rethinking the US-Pakistan “Friendship”

After a long wait following a request from a joint session of the Pakistani parliament in May 2011, the Pakistani parliamentary committee looking to reset relations with the United States has come out with its recommendations.

The Pakistan National Assembly begins debate on this issue today and will likely continue discussions for the next three days.  No major surprises in the report’s recommendations. In a decision that seems guided by domestic politics, the report and its current “debate” in the parliament will not produce better understanding among the people of Pakistan of what their country’s policy is toward the United States or what it should be. Rather, it seems destined for a marginal adjustment of issues that have bedeviled this tenuous “friendship” for years.

Pakistan seeks to stop drone attacks, renegotiate the terms under which the US and coalition troops can be supplied through the currently closed Ground Lines of Communications (GLOC) into Afghanistan and simplify the means of reimbursing Pakistan for deploying its troops in the border region. It also draws red lines regarding boots on the ground in Pakistan (translation: no more Osama Bin Laden-type raids). Underlying all these demands is the desire for mutual respect and understanding, beginning with an apology or a reasonable facsimile thereof from the United States for the attacks on Pakistani border posts. But is there a Plan B? As parliament convenes next week to “debate” this issue, we shall see what Pakistan really wants and what is attainable.

All this comes at a time when the coalition is preparing for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan faces the prospect of an unruly Afghanistan with its negative spillover effects: millions of new refugees if fighting breaks out in Afghanistan, and the scary prospect for Pakistan of reverse sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban and other anti-state actors. The Air Lines of Communication that allowed the coalition to continue to prosecute the war, though at much higher costs, remained open. Not a word on those from Pakistan, or the United States. Codependency seems to be working, to some extent.

The parliamentary review is a good sign of putting a civilian face on decision making in Pakistan, though the script may well have come from the military, as many suspect. But the review is silent on a number of issues. There is no word on why the Pakistani authorities, both civil and military, were mum for nearly a decade on the drone issue; in fact they abetted and encouraged them, according to Wikileaks, among other sources. There is also no word on why the government of President General Pervez Musharraf failed to get written agreement  on the understandings reached with the United States after 9/11 and hastily accepted a reimbursement scheme to receive Coalition Support Funds that made the Pakistani military an army for hire, on a marginal cost basis.

The basic assumptions of this “deal” were faulty. They seem to have miscalculated the length of the expected conflict, its effects on the tribesmen of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (resulting from the birth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan), and the real costs of the ensuing fighting for the Pakistani military and civil population. Now, after 36,000 deaths, along with the degradation of infrastructure, arms, equipment, and morale, Pakistan is seeking just recompense. Too little, too late. Even if they get the enhanced prices in the final stages of the Afghan conflict, the amounts will not adequately cover the real costs of the war to Pakistan, estimated at more than $60 billion. Who is going to be held accountable inside Pakistan for these miscalculations?

Pakistan is also missing an opportunity to cancel the CSF, something it should have done years ago, and replace it with a written agreement on U.S. military aid rather than a cash-for-services program that apparently became a bad habit the military leadership could not shed, until the U.S. Congress and Administration made it a weapon to castigate and penalize Pakistan. Pakistan never had the capacity to track and account for the detailed expenditures that the United States needs to justify payments. Why continue down that rocky path?

What if the hard line positions captured by the committee’s laundry list of demands fail to get immediate satisfaction? Who then will be responsible for Pakistan’s next move? Will it be the civilian government, the military, or parliament, the shield behind which the government seeks to hide most of the time? Pakistan does not seem to have a viable Plan B, unless its recent thaw with India becomes a permanent shift. China is a friend but will not go to the wall in a fight against the United States. Indeed, it has sought to work with the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia. The United States does not have a Plan B either.

Ideally, to keep the relationship going, the U.S. would need to work out some kind of joint approach to drone targets, using the Border Coordination Centers perhaps as a means of insulating targeting decisions from others in the Pakistani chain of command, and thus avoiding the past embarrassment of leaked information to targets. So long as fighting continues in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the United States giving up on drone attacks entirely. Pakistan will want greater controls on ground lines of communication. In addition to seeking additional payments to cover its real costs, it will need to regulate the traffic to avoid jams in its port and at the borders.

In other words, the transactional relationship becomes more tightly regulated. But the U.S. development approach to Pakistan also needs a huge shift, toward longer-term development projects and short-term efforts to win hearts and minds. Borrowing from the British playbook might be a good idea. Finally, and over time, the United States must end its primary focus on the military-to-military relationship, and make it subordinate to the political relationship with the government of Pakistan and a direct relationship with Pakistani civil society. That is what President Barack Obama promised in his December 2009 speech. Now he must deliver.

Don’t expect miraculous results from this review or its demands. Election fever is upon us in the United States. President Obama is in a difficult position on whether to accept wholesale the Pakistani demands. Whatever he concedes gives fodder to his opponents on the Hill and on the campaign trail. Inside Pakistan, an election may also be looming. The rising nationalistic forces of anti-Americanism will excoriate any politician who makes deals with the United States. Yet, a conflict between these two difficult allies is not what is needed in the volatile region at this time. It will take cool heads on both sides to emerge with reputations and egos unscathed. It is said that in Washington people eschew a Plan B since it very soon becomes Plan A. The same may be true of Pakistan. But both sides need that Plan B today, or they will risk the turmoil of the counterfactual. Time for a rapid rethink on both sides on how to move forward. Tardiness spells failure.

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within (Oxford 2008/9). This piece originally appeared on Foreign Policy’s The AfPak Channel.