Following the reported death of Baitullah Mehsud from an American drone attack, Pakistan faces a number of challenges. Will it be able to take an offensive against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as it faces disarray? Will it be able to resist the US pressure to “do more” against the Afghan Taliban now that the United States has done Pakistan a big favor by removing Mehsud from the scene? Will it muster the troop strength and the resolve to move against the TTP in South Waziristan, or try using local surrogates again to do the job for it?

How the ruling troika of the president, prime Minister, and army chief resolve these issues will indicate the path of political development in Pakistan in the next fateful year. Each faces major hurdles. President Asif Ali Zardari can rightly take credit for cooperating with the U.S. in its drone attacks on targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. But will he do so publicly? And risk further depleting his dwindling support among the masses? A Gallup Pakistan and Al Jazeera poll released last week indicates his popularity at only 11 percent inside Pakistan. Yet, persistent complaints about the drone attacks by Pakistani officials fuel public anger against the United States. Some 59 percent of those polled consider the United States to be Pakistan’s major threat today, according to the same survey.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani appears to be increasingly asserting the position of his office and of parliament, as opposed to the de facto presidential system that Zardari inherited from former President Pervez Musharraf. But Gilani is not ready for prime time. At least not until he gets the nod from the army high command or unequivocal support from former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is holding back since he does not wish to upset the fledgling political system, allowing the army to step in again.

Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani continues to be the key to Pakistan’s political future for the time being. His every conversation and public appearance, including his recent meeting with politico and legal wizard Aitzaz Ahsan, is read by avid political observers with all the fervor of Kremlinologists examining photos of Soviet Union May Day parades. Yet, he too faces a deadline of sorts: In November he completes the second year of his three-year term. During his final year, the jockeying will begin for his succession and deals may be offered to him or to others in the higher command by the current appointing authority, the president. History indicates that each time an army chief has been given an extension or “promoted” to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in addition to being army chief, or a junior officer has been elevated to the highest rank in the army, the government has faced a coup d’etat in short order. Will Kayani buck history? The Gallup poll indicates only 8 percent support military rule. But army headquarters rarely follows polls. And only rarely do they follow the dictates of the United States.

The Army will be reluctant to open a front against the Afghan Taliban, who have been obtaining sanctuary inside FATA while avoiding conflict with the army. It will be equally reluctant to mount a large ground offensive in South Waziristan at a time when it is still mopping up in Swat and Malakand. The infighting among TTP factions may allow the army to use local rivals to neutralize the TTP to some extent.

But the death of Mehsud may open new fissures inside Pakistan, and between it and the United States, as Pakistani power politics take center stage once more. The scene is set for Grand Tactics yet again, leaving aside the strategic issues that Pakistan needs to be facing in the longer term.

One such issue is the economic challenge of a growing population, and exploding unemployment. The “youth dividend” that former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz used to talk about as benefitting Pakistan’s economy may become the ball and chain, dragging down the country if the youth bulge of Pakistan’s population cannot be educated nor given jobs. Pakistan’s government desperately needs to address these issues, especially in central and Southern Punjab where the militant Sunni franchisees of Al Qaeda and the TTP have their base and from where they have been recruiting jihadist militants with ease. Otherwise, the wave of fanaticism will be more than Pakistan’s overstretched army could handle.

What can the United States do? It must proceed to deliver rapidly and directly on its promised aid package and ensure that the benefits are spread throughout Pakistan. Aid aimed just at FATA would be seen as only serving US interests in Afghanistan. Nationwide distribution of US assistance will help the United States address the antagonism of the majority of Pakistanis. And it must seriously find a way to include Pakistan in the targeting decisions for the drone attacks. Or this will continue to be seen as America’s war and drag down Pakistan’s political leaders who side with the United States.

There are no easy choices. Nor any quick fixes. Pakistani politics will be in a state of turmoil in the months ahead, and come January the U.S. will be in a new election cycle. Despite his desire to think long term, President Obama then may be forced to make short-term compromises, including perhaps a deviation from Pakistan’s path toward democracy. The time to act is this summer, before the problems become too overwhelming and restrict the choices available to U.S. and Pakistani leaders.

Shuja Nawaz is the director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council.  This was the inaugural essay in ForeignPolicy.com’s Afpak Channel. 

After years of self-denial, Pakistani society and its government now face the reality of a dangerous – nay, existential – threat to their polity from a home-grown variant of the Afghan Taliban, a movement that was spawned by the U. S. invasion of Afghanistan and grew into a potent political force in the past three years.

The Islamist movement is headed by Baitullah Mehsud, a youthful third-tier Mehsud tribal leader at one time, and now the avowed leader of a regional rebellion against the Pakistani state. He has also declared war against the U. S. forces in Afghanistan, but in the main remains focused on asserting control over Pakistan’s largely autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and, through surrogates, over the nearby North West Frontier Province. The fear inside Pakistan and among Western allies is that, after consolidating control over these border areas, he may want to launch a takeover of the Pakistani state itself, along with its nuclear assets – a true nightmare scenario.

What makes this Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) especially dangerous is that it has managed to pull together a congeries of disparate tribal and regional malcontents, brigands, religious leaders and even the militant Sunni Punjabi groups that once were trained by the Inter-Services Intelligence Service of Pakistan (ISI) for use against India in Kashmir. The TTP and some of its components also have franchise arrangements with al-Qaeda. Indeed, suicide bombings, an import into the region by al-Qaeda’s Arab contingent, has become the hallmark of many attacks launched by the TTP.

Pakistan’s first instinct was to ignore the TTP. It tried the old British tactic of making deals with militants in the area of South Waziristan, bending even to garland rebel leaders and going to their territory to make peace: a sign of weakness in tribal culture. Such deals did not last long. Yet the government persisted. And even when a civilian government led by the Pakistan People’s Party replaced that of president Pervez Musharraf, this method of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban continued – with the same disastrous results. Some 14 deals have been made and broken over the past three years. It seems that the government has no other arrows in its quiver – except the military.

The Pakistani army recently entered into the FATA in force, with close to 120,000 troops of the regular army (since increased to over 150,000) and the paramilitary Frontier Force, trying to control the 3.5 million population of the FATA and the limited number of militants embedded within them. This was the first time since independence in 1947 that the Pakistan army entered FATA.

It soon felt itself as an alien force and was so regarded by the locals, with its predominantly Punjabi force structure unable to communicate with the local Pashto-speaking tribesmen. Moreover, a conventional force, trained for battles against India, found itself having to re-learn frontier warfare. The result was heavy losses: some 140 killed and many more wounded, and embarrassing surrenders to tribal fighters who took advantage of the hilly terrain to ambush unguarded convoys.

Pakistan’s government and army were slow to realize that the military was capable of addressing only the symptoms of the insurgency. The heart of the insurgency has been an attempt to impose a convoluted view of Islam in the name of shariah. The government has made no attempt to fight back using the language of Islam and thereby expose the invalidity of the horrific actions of the insurgents against their opponents, including attacks on girls’ schools and mosques and beheadings.

Nor has the new civilian government made an attempt to try to bring FATA into Pakistan’s political system or to upgrade the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations that imposed fines on whole tribes for individuals’ actions. Neither did it try to improve the justice system – until forced by the Taliban in the Swat region to press for a new Islamic system of justice, a step that led to the creation of an anachronistic system within Pakistani law.

What must be done?

Pakistan needs to stop making deals and ceding space to the Taliban. It needs to begin addressing the political and economic grievances of the people of the region by allowing greater autonomy for them and involving them in economic development decisions. It can physically and economically connect FATA to Pakistan proper with a network of east-west roads and start major infrastructure projects, including building river embankments and small dams and installing tube wells.

If Pakistan creates some 300,000 jobs, it will mop up the entire 17% “youth bulge” that currently characterizes FATA’s population profile. If this is done, the entire recruitment pool of the TTP will be eliminated.

As for the army, it must be used only for clearing the militants, and then must be supported by a paramilitary and local police force embedded in the community. The army is not equipped nor trained to hold areas besieged by local insurgents. Experience from around the world indicates that good governance, justice and strong police forces, not military, are best able to defeat such insurgencies.

The danger of keeping the army continuously involved has been proven by Pakistan’s own fractured history. Discontent among the military rank and file permeates the force, and as it reaches the upper levels often produces military coups d’etat.

Pakistan does not deserve another coup. Its civilian politicians must understand that this is not time for business as usual. They need to stop thinking for the short term and think about the future of Pakistan’s polity and its very existence as a state. Time is running out on them. And the Taliban are at the gates.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.  This essay was previously published in Canada’s National Post.

Shuja Nawaz, director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security.

  His remarks, “From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” outlined practical steps forward for U.S. security assistance to Pakistan.

Video:

Video courtesy of the U.S. Senate.

Testimony:

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator McCain, members of the subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today to share my thoughts with you on what works and what could work in Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better partner in building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a Pakistani but also as someone who has lived and worked in the United States since 1972.

While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, it is not hopeless. I remain optimistic. Yet there is cause for concern. As a friend of mine reminds me often: a pessimist is simply an optimist with experience.

Pakistan is a complex country, struggling nearly 62 years since independence to define its nationhood. Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military, have left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its military rulers have been matched by the incompetence and short-sightedness of its civil leadership. Most political parties are run as personal fiefdoms and family businesses, or on feudal patterns. Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerge. Ironically, only the major religious party, the Jamaat i Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and routinely elects new leaders from the rank and file.

I welcome President Obama’s and the US Congress’ moves to change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term commitment to the people of Pakistan, not an alliance with any single person, party, or institution.  In this season of bipartisan support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape US policy, I offer below some information and suggestions.

• First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of Pakistan: over 60 per cent of its population is below 30 years. Most of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the economy and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and vulnerable to the blandishments of their radical co-religionists, who have used a convoluted interpretation of Islam to attract Pakistani youth to their side.

• Yet, Pakistani society has strong sinews: when given the chance, its people work hard and do well. They have helped build Britain’s textile factories and help run the economies of the Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula. They remit about $6 billion a year to their homeland. A recent World Bank study showed that over 1980-2007, Pakistan ranked second only to China’s 9.9 per cent average GDP growth rate with its 5.8 per cent. All this, I maintain, in spite of government. Today Pakistan has a Middle Class of some 30 million with an average per capita income of $10,000 per year on a purchasing power parity basis.

• How do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can leverage its strengths and build a long lasting relationship with the United States?  Not by threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a proud people and do not respond well to the carrots and sticks approach. In any case, such an approach is not employed by most of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with another country? Rather, we need to build trust on the basis of understanding. A glance at the roller coaster history of US-Pakistan relations will prove this point. Whenever the US has pushed Pakistan to change without creating the environment inside Pakistan to favor change, the reaction has been negative and detrimental to friendship. Sanctions have not worked to deter Pakistan away from working on its nuclear capability, for example.

• Pakistan’s military now appears to have recognized that the internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence of a powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full training or the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the US talks of Counterinsurgency training it sounds to the Pakistanis that they must abandon conventional defense. We must clarify that this is not the case. Till Pakistan’s threat perceptions change, we must be prepared to support its military in creating a hybrid force ranging across a spectrum of capabilities. This will allow them to shift from COIN to conventional, as needed. Pakistan badly needs support that will allow it to move troops rapidly on either of its eastern or western borders and between them. It operates on the basis of the capability of India to the east to inflict damage, if it chooses. Yet, it cannot match India’s military might in numbers. Pakistan’s security demands the maintenance of a conventional force with a concurrent capability to fight an internal insurgency. But the latter needs to be accelerated to help it regain territory in the North Western part of the country.

How can the US become more effective?

1. USAID is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt, empowered; given the staff to strategize and manage its projects, develop relationships inside Pakistan, and effectively deliver aid where it is needed. USAID is aptly named: most of its aid money stays in the United States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop being a contract management agency and become again a powerful partner of US diplomacy, working directly with local counterparts to solve local problems. The model of the Office of Transition Initiatives, involving working with recipients of aid on the ground and crafting projects that meet urgent needs in a manner that empowers the locals seems to be working. USAID as a whole might want to move faster toward that model. In Pakistan OTI has had successful pilot projects as has the Narcotics Assistance Section of the US Embassy there. It is not a question of absence of information or experience. Congress should try to move USAID away from wholesale outsourcing of its work to a select few Washington-based organizations with political clout to aid recipients and local NGOs.
2. We must also find better ways to coordinate assistance, so DOD, State, Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE and other agencies work together rather than autonomously or at cross purposes.  Congress needs to support the Special Envoy’s work in this regard.
3. Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically difficult moves such as a Free Trade Agreement and removal of quotas on textiles imports would allow Pakistan to help itself. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics of Pakistan’s textile trade with the United States supports this idea. But, we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder toward manufactures, if it is to stay ahead of the population growth curve.
4. A related issue is the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. These can be useful as a temporary though subsidized salve, not a permanent solution. China’s experience indicates that ROZs need to be near major population centers and communications hubs. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA are too remote a location to give the ROZs long-term viability. There is also the danger of carpetbaggers from other provinces coming in to take advantage of tax holidays and leaving when those facilities disappear.
5. There is a better and faster way to create jobs immediately in FATA. A calculation by ex-World Bank economist Khalid Ikram, melds with my own thinking on this topic. We can employ the young males in the 17 per cent youth bulge in FATA’s 3.5 million population by launching major infrastructure projects: major roads linking FATA to Pakistan, small dams and tube-wells to help irrigate cash crops, would help mop up the roughly 300,000 Pakhtun youth who are now the target of Taliban recruitment efforts. Detailed recommendations along these lines were recently made by us in the Atlantic Council’s Task Force Report on Pakistan and in my paper for the CSIS on FATA. In my own meeting with 23 Maliks in North Waziristan last year, they were looking for help in building the irrigation infrastructure so they could produce cash crops and process them for export to the Gulf. Locals also appreciated greatly a boat bridge over the Tochi River that reduced travel times by hours. Such civil works would create immediate employment for youth in FATA. And roads linked to Pakistan proper would produce their own spin-off benefits, as tea houses, hotels, repair shops etc. would create an informal sector for more employment of locals.
6. On retraining the military, we must recognize that the Pakistan army also needs help in keeping up its conventional force, even while we build up its mobility and ability to fight militants in rough terrain on its western borders. Mr. Chairman, four helicopters will not do the trick. The US can and should divert larger numbers of helicopters and other COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan, as it replaces the fleets of European allies, for example. Pakistan badly needs heli-lift capability to fight a mobile militant force in its mountainous north. For its eastern border as well, it needs to be able to move troops rapidly to meet any Indian threat. Mobility would also help reduce a large standing and immobile army and over time reduce the strain on the budget.
7. We must also replace the Coalition Support Funds with regular foreign military funding, with milestones and benchmarks proposed by Pakistan’s military and agreed to by the United States. This will help transform the current patronage relationship from an army for hire to an army fighting Pakistan’s own war. In my conversations with army officers in FATA I found great resentment up and down the ranks for the payment of monies by the US to compensate Pakistan for sending troops into FATA. Even more galling were the requests for detailed accounting of all expenses, especially when over time a larger proportion of those expenses were challenged or denied in succeeding years. This has not won any friends inside the Pakistan army. Direct military aid with agreed benchmarks would be a better way to handle this situation. And coupled with enhancing Pakistan’s capacity to track expenditures, would allow Pakistan to make better use of these monies while meeting Congress’ desire for accountability.

How do we track aid monies and make their use transparent?

I believe in accountability and responsible use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does not have the ability to track its civil or military expenditures effectively. We must help Pakistan create these systems so it can better manage its resources. A comprehensive financial tracking system in the Ministries of Finance and Defence should help not only management but also improve civilian control of military spending, while increasing transparency. It is in Pakistan’s interest to set up strong management of aid programs and independent monitoring entities to prevent misuse of aid by bloated bureaucracies. The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such efforts. On its part the US government must make transparent all its aid and defense contract awards so both the US and Pakistani populace can track the use of aid monies.

Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity of Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic challenges. Understanding its regional insecurities, the US must work behind the scenes to understand Pakistan’s security concerns and to alleviate them. India is a key player in the region. Fro the first time in years, a strong central government has been elected in India. The US must use its new influence with India to show, in the words of my friend Peter Jones, “Strategic altruism”. Confidence building measures need to be picked up and the Track II channels that brought the two countries close to solutions of at last three of their major four issues of contention two years ago need to be revived. Both India and Pakistan must leap frog the hurdles of historical distrust and conflicts to fight the common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism. There is no acceptable alternative to this direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 

SHUJA NAWAZ:  Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.  My name is Shuja Nawaz; I’m the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.  On behalf of Fred Kempe, the president of the council, I’d like to welcome all of you to our very special ambassadorial discussion today on the challenge of militancy for the Pakistan army.

We are delighted that we have here General Jehangir Karamat, the former chief of army staff as well as the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the Pakistan army – and, more interestingly, a former ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, a man who straddles the world of diplomacy and the military with ease and who is now, I’m glad to say, joined the rank of think tankers because he now has his own research institute called Spearhead Research in Lahore, Pakistan.

Just a few words about General Karamat:  He is a graduate of the Pakistan military academy, but he also is a graduate of the Command and Staff College of Pakistan as well as the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.  He has held many key posts in the Pakistan military apart from his operational commands at all levels he was director general of military operations and involved with a lot of very key issues dealing with India during his tenure.

Then he headed a corps and was then promoted and brought to army headquarters at the chief of general staff and then took over from General Abdul Waheed as the chief of army staff.

To his credit, he is the only army chief in Pakistan’s history who actually resigned on a matter of principle after having put forward his views on a number of issues which did not sit well with the prime minister of the time, Mr. Nawaz Sharif.  And rather than doing what other army chiefs have done in the past, which was to effect a coup, he decided that it was in the interest of the army and Pakistan that he would resign and thereby General Musharraf was elected by Prime Minister Sharif and the rest, as you know, is history.

Today, because of General Karamat’s very special experience and because of knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations as well as the fact that he has been based in Pakistan and has been observing at close quarters exactly what is going on within the polity as well as within the Pakistan military as it faces a huge insurgency inside its borders.

We are very fortunate to have him talk to us about the kinds of changes that he sees within the polity as well as within the Pakistan army.  So I’d like to welcome General Karamat.

GENERAL JEHANGIR KARAMAT:  Thank you, Shuja, with that very generous introduction.  I am very glad to be here; I’d like to start by thank Shuja Nawaz for inviting me and look forward to our interaction today.  I really don’t have a script so I am just going to make a few opening remarks, speak for a few minutes, and then we can take this discussion wherever you want it to go because there are so many things you may be interested about Pakistan or the region in general.

I mean, with an audience like this which is so well-informed on our region and international affairs in general, I don’t have to go into the details of what has brought us to where we are.  So what I’ll do is flag some events just to give perspective and to highlight the evolutionary process which has brought us to the situation we are in today.

You know, of course, about the Kashmir problem with India, Pakistan and India, which has been there for 60 years, and really its impact in the protracted nature of the situation that has gone on and the various phases this has passed through – conflict, a war, a freedom struggle inside Kashmir, support from outside Kashmir of that freedom struggle, organizations coming up specifically to support that struggle, then pressures to seal borders, end outside help and so on.

I just mentioned this because all this has an impact on what has come about now because of the Kashmir problem and the fact that it has not been resolved until today.  On our other border it’s Afghanistan, which again has been through a protracted period of ups and downs and we need to just understand that Afghanistan, when it was a Soviet satellite, its close relationship with India, two or three intelligence agencies working together there, the problems with Pakistan with that time.

Then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and what that set in motion and how it attracted a jihadi or an Islamic fighter element into the region, into the area and that whole process right up to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and then the civil war after that, the Taliban emerging in that area, al-Qaida taking over and turning it from a domestic a regional and an international situation.

It’s irrelevant because that’s what led up to 9/11 and the post-9/11 action, which again, over a period of time, has gone through various phases and has had different types of impact on the situation leaving us where we are today.

Then there were other events like the revolution in Iran and I mention that only because the situation is still playing out in Iran.  There’s the nuclear fear also there – but I mentioned the revolution in the context of its sort of – the religious surge that it started in the area but continued for a long time and which at one period in our history was given a push through a process of Islamization that Pakistan was put through.

I mention it only in that context.  Now, all these events led to policies which basically either sought to secure Pakistan against a perceived threat or they led to policies which have really taken advantage of any opportunities that were being offered by the situation.  And at that time of course there was an obsession with security; there was a security-centric situation in the Pakistan policy-making circles, so that’s how we ended up with various kinds of policies at various times in this whole evolving scenario.

This whole process, of course, had an effect on Pakistan’s domestic situation.  It had an effect on the regional situation, South Asian, on the extra-regional situation around us in the Middle East, Central Asia and so on.  And of course it had almost international implications particularly after 9/11 when the U.S. came into Afghanistan and then into Iraq.

I won’t say any more about this unless you want to discuss it later, but this is the sort of development or evolutionary trend that has brought us to where we are today.  And now I’d like to just discuss that part where we are today and what is happening.

Now, what started off as a counterterrorism venture against terrorism by Pakistan after 9/11 is now basically an insurgency situation that Pakistan is faced with and it has to be seen from that point of view that Pakistan is actively responding to a full-blown insurgency within its own borders on the western border with Afghanistan.

The thing that we have to remember is how this insurgency came about.  We can discuss that if you want, but the more important thing is that this process that I talk to has brought on the ground in Pakistan militant organizations, some of them oriented towards the eastern border with India, particularly Kashmir because that’s where they’ve been operating in the past until Pakistan as a policy brought that to an end.

They have at various times gone into welfare activities, charity; they’ve worked on earthquake situations and so on, but they are there.  They are there.  On the western side, again, it started with Afghan Taliban seeking sanctuaries on the Pakistan side because that is the only area southern Afghanistan situation could have expanded and there is no other place – ethnically, culturally, historically, geographically.  It was the eastward expansion which could take place after the U.S. started thrusting south and attacking the Taliban.

So that came about and from sanctuaries when the U.S. started a policy of doing away with those sanctuaries, drone attacks and so on, the retaliation came on Pakistan.  That retaliation led to Pakistan’s advent into the tribal FATA areas where the sanctuaries were and that then led to this insurgent movement within Pakistan which is loosely operating on what it calls the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

And there is a leader there, and there are 26-odd groupings of small and big organizations which have informally or formally come under his influence and banner.  The danger here is – in the present environment – that this insurgency along the western border has established linkages with the earlier organizations deeper in the country.  And we’ve seen that ever since we’ve been making a response to this insurgency in the West, there have been suicide bombings, attacks, gunfights taking place in our urban areas.

So they have developed a retaliatory capability, a linkage of sorts which is dangerous for Pakistan.  And I think I might also mention that from the Taliban point of view a great success would be if they could distract the army to its rear by internally destabilizing the situation or creating a situation on the India-Pakistan border or between Indian and Pakistan.  And it is in that context that we should see the non-state actors’ role especially in incidents like Mumbai which can take things back and create a situation which they can then exploit.

So this linkage then is a dangerous situation for Pakistan.  In recent months it has played out with the attacks in our urban areas, on the Sri Lankan theme; on the police academy; on an intelligence headquarters in Lahore and so on – I won’t go into the details.  But we have seen this retaliation taking place and it’s an ongoing thing.

Now, as far as our response to the insurgency is concerned, this came about after a lot of backtracking and forward movement and so on.  And I think the Swat operation which went in was the 15th military operation that Pakistan undertook.  And the earlier 14 had all ended in some kind of peace agreement or decision to end hostilities.  And every time there was a peace agreement, all 14 of them, on the government side it was pushed as a – on the Pakistan side it was pushed as a great event, an end to the problem and the beginning of a new era in the area in the South.

Unfortunately, on the other side, on the Taliban side, on the insurgent side, these agreements weren’t seen quite in that light.  And they used each opportunity to expand, spread terror, widen their sphere of control and generally consolidate themselves.

So when this peace agreement in Swat was being negotiated, I think – I don’t speak for the government or the military – but I think the idea was that for once we should see whether they stick to this agreement, do what they are saying, and then we can take it from there.  And it didn’t take long for them to throw off any cloak and come out with their intentions, which were very clear.

They refused to lay down their arms which was part of the agreement.  They declared the rest of Pakistan infidels; they denounced the constitution of Pakistan; they started committing unspeakable atrocities, which videos are very difficult to stomach and generally created a situation where there was no option but to go in.

Fortunately, this time, because of the exposure that they got and what they came out with themselves, there was a change in public opinion.  There was a change in the media.  The political resolution came out very strongly.  So the military operation which went into Swat and which is ongoing in other areas had the full backing of the media, the political institution across the board, the public opinion firmly behind it, and except for one or two odd people on the fringe, everybody is pushing for an end to this situation.

I think the political and military aim of the operation is to sideline the Taliban as a force which can ever challenge the merit of the government.  And Swat was chosen because that’s where the agreement was violated and that’s where the expansion had taken place; also because it had started to threaten some vital Pakistani communications in that area.

And it’s not restricted to Swat; in fact, Swat was tackled last, in the periphery, the Malakand division, Bajaur, Mohmand division – those were the areas which were tackled first to create a situation of strangulation.  And then finally Swat had to be cleared physically, resulting in a large number of displaced persons who we hope will go back eventually.

After this sort of northern extremity of the tribal areas has been tackled, the other area which was creating a threat and which again was not a central area from the insurgent point of view, again on the periphery, this was the southern extremity of the federally administered tribal areas where the Taliban had created a really potent threat by bombings and attacks in the area of towns like Bannu, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan – Dera Ismail Khan particularly because there had been a number of attacks there.

So that is the second phase which the army went through and this time they got the support of one of the major tribes in the area and were successful in establishing themselves in the southern extremity of FATA.  That left the central area and the main area – sort of Waziristan: South Waziristan, North Waziristan, which over the years has become a stronghold, a major center for training activities of all sorts by the Taliban of rigging vehicles and suicide bombers and so on.

A lot of trade in weapons and vehicles takes place there.  It has commercial importance for the Taliban.  It’s their headquarters of the TTP, the umbrella organization I mentioned.  So this is the area that is now being tackled.  And here again the military has the support of the Wazir tribe, which is the major tribe in the area and the one tribe which is really isolated is the Mehsud tribe.

It is the largest area, it’s a difficult area terrain wise, historically it’s never been under anybody’s control.  But this is a situation which the military has to go through because there’s no option and I think they are doing it well.  So this is the sort of strategic plan that the military had and has in the way it’s operating.

There is infrastructure there in the form of cantonments, bases, airfields.  Some disused airfields from the British days and other facilities have been activated so it’s not as if they’re sitting on mountaintops and operating from there.  They’ve got bases; they’ve got lines of communication.

There have been reverses – because this has been a learning process for the military.  There have been reverses; they have suffered casualties.  In Swat alone I think over 600 were killed and Pakistani public for the first time is seeing in their homes on television, daily funerals and coffins coming back in their own area in a fight who are basically their own people.

But since they’ve chosen the insurgent part, it is being accepted that the sacrifice will have to be made and as far as I could see, there has been no wavering of resolve in either the media, public opinion, the political support for the military operation and so on.  It’s just going.

The other fallout has been the internally displaced people who’ve come out of Swat.  Sometimes you get exaggerated figures, but the actual figure is also quite large – it’s 2 million-plus, definitely.  And almost 70 to 80 percent of looking after of those people is being done by the military.  And enormous quantities of the militaries resources and rations are being diverted – about 60, 70 tons a day to the displaced people in that area.

But still, it’s a problem, and it’s a problem which will have to be resolved by sending them back.  And very briefly, on the post situation in this area, if we do achieve the political and military objective that the army’s been given or has set for itself, then I don’t foresee a complete transformation of the area into a peaceful environment.

There are going to be sporadic attacks or events taking place, but I think those can be taken in our stride.  The more important thing is that the military may have to stay for a considerable period as a transitional sort of administrative force in that area.  And it will have to articulate itself accordingly because the old methodology of clearing an area or carrying out a punitive strike and then handing over to the frontier corps and coming back is not going to work anymore because the situation has gone far beyond the capabilities of the frontier corps to handle.

So the frontier corps is going to be part of the military eventual articulation which comes about for a more permanent stay in the area to secure and hold that area till rehabilitation has taken place and the area has been fully secured and a civil administration has come in with capacity to take care of the situation – which means police forces, judicial element, health care and all that which actually has been missing in the past, almost very weak, and actually led to this insurgent – of course, one of the factors for this insurgent situation.

Now, with this kind of point at which we are, the other areas where we might have or do have simmering situations – one is Baluchistan.  And there is a lot of talk of Baluchistan being a sort of logistic area for Afghan Taliban and so on.  And action has been taken in that area to curve that activity but from our point of view the more troublesome aspect of the situation is the sort of nascent; they are calling themselves the liberation movement in the Baluchistan area, which may be getting external support and existing on that.

The leaders are definitely outside Baluchistan who are operating this.  But so far it’s low key and I think in my opinion it’s a matter which needs to be handled politically.  And we have a political government there – federal, provincial – and the provincial government is entirely Baloch themselves; so they should be able to bring that satisfactorily to an end and some of the grievances which those people have actually do need to be addressed.  They’ve been festering for a long time.

Southern Punjab, which I mentioned in the context of Kashmir and the past activities there, has come up on the Bahawalpur, that area, as a sort of stronghold of these militant organizations who were formerly operating in Kashmir or supporting the freedom struggle in various ways in Kashmir.

For the time being it’s quiet and again with the political government and with enough capacity it can be tackled and there are – it’s not necessarily a military operation that would clear that but there are other ways of doing which we could discuss.  But I think it’s a political solution that they have to find to that problem.

Karachi has had ups and downs.  Its history is sectarian, ethnic.  There is a large Pashtun population there who really control the labor on the dock.  They control the transport, the mass transit in Karachi, and then there’s the other ethnic group which is the government, the MQM.   I think, again, there is political capacity to handle that situation.  The MQM has demonstrated that a number of times that they are capable of handling it, and to be fair to them I think a lot of work has been done in Karachi by the MQM and the person responsible for Karachi, he has put in a lot of effort there to improve the situation.

The only other point I’d like to touch is that while fighting this insurgency and while hoping for a political and law-and-order end to the other problems in Pakistan, its political stability becomes extremely important and we are going through a painful process of bringing about political stability.  This time around the president is in a strong constitutional position; he is elected.

The government is elected; it made a national showing in the last elections, the largest body with maximum votes (it’s in par ?).    He’s put together a good coalition with the government in the frontier – Baluchistan and Sindh which are functioning.  Unfortunately, street power led to the restoration of the judiciary, but since that has happened that is another positive development and the judiciary is in the process of now reforming itself.

The only thing I think which perhaps needs attention now in terms of political stability is the discussion between the opposition and the ruling party on division of powers between the president and parliament and some other issues which are unresolved.  I think they are moving towards discussion and at some point they will have to (get us all ?) if they really want political consensus and a political stability in the country.

The economic situation has been very critical – it’s improved marginally.  Not just because of the worldwide economic recession because I don’t think that had such a big – it had an impact but not a critical impact on Pakistan.  It’s more to do with the power sector in Pakistan and with business activity, inflation and so on.

So that is something else that the government is trying to tackle and to be fair to them, soon after elections they did inherit a massive set of problems which they are trying to cope with and develop capacity.  The drawback is that while all this is happening with fighting insurgency and political stability, economy, governance is suffering and it’s badly needed.  And I think as we move to a more stable civil-military relationship and we get more and more of the militant militaries’ institutional strength behind the democratically elected government we should see governance improve.  It needs to improve – let me put it like that.

The media and public opinion have talked about so far they are very supportive, very positive and I hope it stays that way.  But whichever way you look at it – with the insurgency going to stretch out for some time, with the military remaining involved there, with India-Pakistan relations so far on a hold and not moving forward – we are in for a long haul as far as stability and the environment as a concern in Pakistan.

But I think we are well on the way.  There is enormous support from the United States, in fact not only the United States but I think this is a – even though  it’s a crisis situation, it’s still a  great opportunity for Pakistan because the whole world is ready to help Pakistan if it can get its own act together and come up with a proposal and structures of how it’s going to use the world’s help.

I’ll stop there.  Thank you.

MR. NAWAZ:  Maybe if you could come down here and I can see if we can get some questions going.

I just want to make a request – when you’re recognized if you wouldn’t mind please waiting for the microphone and then identifying yourself before launching your question.  So we’ll start here.

Q:  Al Milliken, AM Media.  Do you have familiarity with the role chaplains play in the United States Army and military and how would you compare them with spiritual support that is given to those in the Pakistan army and military?  Are there any restrictions or controls on how spiritual and religious matters are dealt with in Pakistan’s army and military?

GEN. KARAMAT:  Yes, I am familiar with the excellent work the chaplains do in terms of guidance and support.  In the Pakistan military we have – battalion upwards, a religious leader who leads the prayers, who advises them, supports them; they go to him with their problems.  It’s an adjunct to the command channel because a lot of things they can tell that person are maybe they don’t talk about that to their commanding officers and their other officers.

So it’s been an extremely useful institution and is a very useful institution in the military.  The only other thing I’ll say is we have a very strong regimental system, and in my regiment for example the religious leader or the more religious imam as we call him is fourth generation.  His father, grandfather, and great grandfather were all with the same regiment.  And it’s true of many of the regiments.

So one, they enjoy enormous respect.  The troops have confidence in them and they play a great role in terms of helping people.  It’s an established institution for years and years.

Q:  General Karamat, you have a wonderful delivery and thank you so much for your painstakingly crafted general overview which is so reassuring.  Unfortunately, many of us don’t feel really so reassured.  You remind me of General Jones who has – our national security advisor – a very good delivery.

If I might ask a question about something that I think troubles a lot of us, or at least I should probably just say myself:  Is the degree to which the courts are basically letting extremists go free – and you know the most recent examples of this have to do with Sufi Muhammad, Red Mosque, and also Hafiz Saeed of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah.

After what appears from an awful lot of internationally available information, a rather clear connection between him personally and the organization and the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the events in Mumbai last year.  In terms of dealing with extremism, can you talk to us about how the courts, how the legal system, how the laws themselves may need to be adjusted and what would be the ways forward with that?  Or if that’s not possible, why?

GEN. KARAMAT:  Thank you, Rodney.

Q:  Sorry, I should’ve introduced myself.

GEN. KARAMAT:  Yeah, I know.

Q:  You know me.  United States Institute of Peace, sorry, Rodney Jones.

GEN. KARAMAT:  I’m very flattered that you’re sitting through the second talk of mine.  (Chuckles.)  But you’re right, there has been a problem.  Let me put it this way – first, there is a problem with the whole prosecution system in Pakistan and the way that prosecution can put a case before the judge to get a conviction.  That is a weakness that is being taken care of, but it involves a lot of other capacities to be built up – forensic, ballistics and a lot of law and order stuff which they show in that film.

So all that has to come in before prosecution can build up a case on which the judge can take a judgment.  So that is one aspect of not only this cases but many other cases.  The other is that in both these cases the Sufi Muhammad I think is out on bail – he hasn’t been acquitted as is the other person.  And they haven’t been acquitted, the cases still stand.

It is for lack of evidence and particularly the evidence which is being going to and fro between India and Pakistan on the Mumbai event.  Pakistan, I think from initial hard position has moved to a very cooperative position with India.  There has been a lot of exchange of information and I think these cases will go forward as more evidence comes in and they can proceed.

Actually everybody’s learning a big lesson.  We’ve had laws in the past which eventually turned out to be draconian: special terrorist codes and so on.  And they didn’t help.  India has a lot of very harsh laws, TADA and so on, which they invoke.  We haven’t gone into those, but I this weakness persists, you might have to have special arraignments for special offences.

MR. NAWAZ:  I’m going to move around the audience, so if I don’t take you in the order in which you raised your hands I hope you will excuse me.  So if we could have a question from there this would allow us to spread it a little bit.

Q:  General, thank you very much.  My name is Alex Gliksman, I’m with a consulting firm AGI Consulting.  The United States, when it recognized it had a problem in how it was prosecuting the war in Afghanistan switched to one general officer, McKiernan, to another, McChrystal.

Fortunately for the United States, we also had not only a change of generals but also an alternative capability in which we fought, meaning we had this special operations capability which is fairly extensive.  My question too, in terms of Pakistan’s prosecution of the war – one is the current Pakistani army capable of switching tactics from its conventional focus to account for insurgency focus and secondly does it have the capacity, even if it wanted to, to change given its focus on conventional means and conventional training?

GEN. KARAMAT:  You know there’s been a lot of talk on the army’s training and its capability and its orientation towards India and not being able to switch forces from the eastern border with India to the western border and difficulties and so on.  I’d just like to tell you that the chief of army staff backed by his operational staff can move forces anywhere inside Pakistan.

He doesn’t have to ask the government, he doesn’t have to do anything.  It has to do with his perception of the threat, where the threat is at the moment and amount of force he needs to combat that threat and if any other area needs to be taken care of before he takes away forces.  And that’s a pretty established practice in Pakistan.  This capacity to move – move rapidly when required.

Pakistan has also been using extensively aviation forces in that area, heli-born operations and so on.  It has a very sizable capability in terms of special forces, which were originally raised by the U.S. in the 1950s.  And over a long period of time, they’ve trained here and in other places and in various environments.  They have been used and, I guess, are being used in the operations in those areas.  So – and wherever there was a gap, which we learned the hard way, that has been taken care of, in terms of training.

We have training support from the U.S. – we’ve always had that – and many of us have trained here and gone to schools here.  So that’s – I don’t think there’s a problem of capacity within the army.  In fact, I don’t think there’s a problem of capacity in Pakistan.  I think it’s capable of tackling everything if it puts its mind to it and orchestrates the capacity that it has to combat these threats.

MR. NAWAZ:  I’m going to ask for the microphone over there, to Harlan, please.

Q:  I’m Harlan Ullman.  General, thank you for comments that were both comprehensive and had refreshing clarity to them.  My question really relates to outside support and assistance.  As you well know, Pakistan requires many billions of dollars more in aid, and especially economic assistance, that’s likely to flow from the outside world.  There’s a school, as you also know, on Pakistan, and a school that’s readily developing here, that argues that perhaps it’s better that U.S. aid be very, very limited.

Pakistan has to do this on its own, and more involvement and engagement by the United States is negative.  And there’s obviously another school here that says we have to do more.  How do you come out on that debate between providing Pakistan the tools that it really needs or allowing Pakistan to do it on its own?

GEN. KARAMAT:  We’ve had this discussion with the United States for a long time, and Christina is sitting here – (chuckles) – so what I’m saying is that I think there’s a strong lobby here – stronger lobby here for support to Pakistan than the other lobby of not supporting Pakistan or limiting support to Pakistan.  And right from what it says in the 9/11 Commission onwards, there’s been this drive to build capacity in Pakistan, because it was seen as the key to – and is being seen as the key to the problem in Afghanistan.

Now, in Afghanistan, of course, the U.S. and NATO and everybody is tackling the most difficult situation is Afghanistan, which is Southern Afghanistan.  It’s the heart of the problem.  And the Taliban, of course, obviously, possibly after the surge or election, may start exploiting areas where they sense a softness or a weakness.  So that’s why, this surge taking place and with what Pakistan is doing in the tribal areas becomes extremely important at this point in time.  And I think, at this point, holding back capacity-building or any other kind of support that would flow to Pakistan would be counterproductive.

And the U.S. and Pakistan are, I think, quite capable of sitting down across the table and discussing the worries about money not going where it should be and what kind of monetary monitoring should take place, or the U.S. asking for specific requirements on the basis of special programs that Pakistan needs to put in place.  So there are a lot of ways of working around the U.S. concerns over giving aid to Pakistan.  But the basic point that Pakistan’s capacity should be built up, I think, should not be in doubt.  And I’m glad the Kerry-Lugar bill is in the process of going through.  I hope it goes through; it will be a beginning.

Of course, there’s no end to the demands and Pakistan is saying that it has suffered far more than this aid can do for it, and it needs much more.  But then, the U.S. has also been very supportive in international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and in the donor conferences.  So a lot of things are in the pipeline; I just hope they come through.  And you should write more and push them.

(Laughter.)

Q:  Of course.

Q:  Thank you, Mr. Karamat and Mr. Shuja Nawaz – excellent panel.  My question was more –

MR. NAWAZ:  Could you please identify yourself?

Q:  Oh, Bilad Baluch, from the Transnational Crisis Project.  My question has more to do with something you touched upon earlier, about Baluchistan and other areas of Pakistan, which could be dealt politically.  Certain reports suggest – certain research that we’ve done at the Crisis Project – shows that there are infiltrators within the IDP from the Taliban that are shaving their beards off and going into Pakistan.

How far that’s true requires more research.  But granted that if that is the case, is it viable to suggest that only a political solution can address the problems in the rest of Pakistan, particularly Baluchistan, which has been quite volatile for some years, and perhaps poses a larger threat?

GEN. KARAMAT:  Yes, well, that could be happening.  In fact, they don’t have to shave their beards.  They can even enter Pakistan with beards; there are plenty of beards – (chuckles) – and they will merge into those beards.  So yes, they may be doing that.  They would use every vulnerability offered – every opportunity offered.  But they have instituted a process of checks in those areas, registration.  There were some double registrations, which are being taken care of.  So a whole process is in place to prevent, to the extent possible, this happening.  But I don’t discount the possibility of people sneaking in and doing things, because they are our own people and they don’t need passports or anything to move around.  That is the danger – that is one.

And you can’t tell just by looking at somebody that he’s a Taliban or he’s not a Taliban.  So that’s another problem.  But as far as Baluchistan is concerned, you know, some time back we came very close to resolving this issue with the political, parliamentary committee drawing up 29 points which needed to be addressed in Baluchistan to resolve it politically.  That got sidelined in the tumultuous events which took place after that, with the judiciary and the change of government and the election and so on.

So when – I didn’t say it’s only the political solution, but I said the political solution is the preferable part, because using the military repeatedly in your own areas is not a good idea.  And in fact, the best counterinsurgency operation – and I’m not sure if General Petraeus has said that – (chuckles) – but the best counterinsurgency operation starts when you anticipate that there’s going to be an insurgency in this area, and not get in the middle of a full-blown insurgency when it’s already in your face.  So that is the situation we have in Baluchistan, and if we can take care of it politically, it would be a great thing.

MR. NAWAZ:  We have a question here and then one at the back.

Q:  Thank you.  Paulo von Shiraq, Shiraq Report.  General, thank you very much for this very broad picture that you’ve given us.  If I could bring you back a little bit again to your general presentation, and you talked somewhat optimistically about the fact that, you know, now, you have a legitimate government – elections, everything according to the rule of law – that indeed, there is public opinion and public support behind the counterinsurgency operations that you have described.

Now, the question is – this is going to be a complicated and long-drawn affair, and you know, going back to something that has already been asked, in terms of both the capabilities of the Pakistani military to conduct, effectively, counterinsurgency operations, you expressed, a moment ago, optimism, saying the capabilities exist, they had been created a while ago, et cetera.  A year ago, people here in Washington would have said no way; the Pakistan army has no such capabilities.  If called upon to fight, they won’t fight, and if they will fight, they will be, you know, defeated on the ground simply because counterinsurgency is too complicated and they really don’t know how to handle it.

Now, lo and behold, it’s turned out to be quite different.  But the questions still remains as to the staying power.  That is, given the enormous costs and displaced population, which you yourself mentioned is – you know, we’re talking about 2 million-plus people, the cost of administering, delivering aid – all those things.  Long term, in consideration, it is very difficult to predict an insurgency.  You are, I assume, based on what you said, you are confident that there is the staying power to go forward and to do it for as long as it takes to defeat the various areas of insurgency.  So I don’t know if you can elaborate – and it’s difficult to predict, of course – but on the political will and the stamina to go on, given all the political cost and the human cost involved.

The last point is about the transporter drone attacks led by the U.S., which were extremely politically contentious point until not too long ago.  Now we don’t – although these things still go on – we don’t hear much about them as a political, contentious point.  Is there now a degree of coordination?  I mean, are these things plotted together by the U.S. and Pakistani forces?  I mean, how is it evolving, or do you predict there will be more of these?  And how are they politically received, regardless of the military impact and successes that these drone attacks may cause?  Thank you.

GEN. KARAMAT:  Those are good questions.  And the first one, on whether we can go on and sustain this initiative and this momentum, which has developed over a period of time, I’m glad you said that the previous fears and concerns have gone.  And the army is not only fighting; it’s fighting a very determined battle and delivering in terms of results.  But as I said and you said also, it’s a long haul and we have to sustain political resolve, we’ve got to sustain public opinion; we’ve got to sustain media support – all those things.  Yes, it is going to be difficult.

But then, from Pakistanis’ point of view, they were up against two options: either to give in and let this thing take its course or combat it and finish it.  Now, nobody wants a long, drawn-out struggle in your own area because of the resources and all those things that you mentioned.  So I guess that they will try and conclude it as soon as possible, but that’s not really in their hands; a lot of other factors come in.  But they will try, definitely.

Once they’ve overcome the main strength of the Taliban or push them out or sideline them, then it’s more a question of articulating commands and positioning troops in those areas for maximum effectiveness and staying there.  And I said that there is – basic infrastructure exists in the form of cantonments and logistic bases and everything.  It’s not as if we are out of everything.  So with that, they should be able to stay.

Now, we’re not looking at – of course, if it goes on for years and years, it’s going to become a massive problem.  But a transitional period – one year, two years – and then a civil administration coming in for effective governance – and here, I don’t know what the thinking is on the government side because I’m not privy to that.

But I think there should be thought also of the future of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, the frontier regions, the frontier crimes regulation and that whole structure, which the British created, we inherited, we worked it for a long time, and now, it has been overtaken by events and somebody needs to think about an alternative to that, which I hope will be done, because that’s the only way you will extricate out of this, or else, otherwise it’s going to be a problem.

Your other question on the drone attacks, I don’t know – the U.S. is very sensitive to criticism.  And very sensitive to – I know that public opinion is against Pakistan and there is hostility to Pakistan and hostility to the U.S. and so on.  Yes, there is public opinion of all kinds in Pakistan.  There have been things happening against the drone attacks.  People have voiced their thoughts.

But there hasn’t been any real major upheaval against the U.S.  Nobody has jumped around on the streets or done things which you could say is a public outpouring of anger against the U.S.  That hasn’t happened.  And I think that hasn’t happened because there is a basic understanding of the problem that we face at the moment – that threat that we face – and our orientation towards that threat.

Sometimes the orientation on the ground, and in terms of responses, takes place quickly and mindsets take a little longer to change.  And that may be the case in our relationship with India; it may be the case with our relationship with the U.S., and so on.  But I think that there is a realization that what needs to be done has to be done one way or the other.

Q:  General, I’m Paul Hughes from the U.S. Institute of Peace.  And thank you for your talk.  It was a wonderful overview of the strategic situation in Pakistan.  As you have indicated – and truth has been seen through the history of counterinsurgencies – when they’re successful, these tend to fundamentally reshape societies.

And in the case of Pakistan, there will be a need to re-jigger, if you will, national priorities, to the things that you have mentioned here, and proved to governance, rule of law, economic situations and whatnot.

Yet Pakistan has a rather robust nuclear arsenal and a nuclear program.  Reports are suggesting that there are two new nuclear reactors being built by Chinese contractors that have no electrical grid connected to them, which suggests, then, proliferation activities.

In your view – your personal view – do you think that Pakistan will reassess its role vis-à-vis the nuclear world, and whether it will continue to pursue new nuclear weapons?  Or is it satisfied with what it has right now?  Would it take new steps to, perhaps, join the comprehensive test ban treaty family?  Your thoughts, please.

GEN. KARAMAT:   I’m here with this Global Zero group.  We’re working to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2030.  Go to zero.  And I’ve been supporting that strongly.  (Chuckles.) Everybody else in Pakistan should be supporting that.  And everywhere else, too.

But, your question, I mean, South Asia is a region, perhaps, the only one – or one of the very few – where fissile material production, delivery system improvement, is an ongoing process.  Pakistan, on its part, starting from its early proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone, which nobody even looked at, has lately pushed for a strategic restraint regime.  It did so earlier; it has done so again on a bilateral basis with India to bring about the cessation of fissile material production and for the testing and so on.

India links that to its broader threat perception – China, and so on.  So it becomes a tri-lateral process.  Even the tri-lateral process is being discussed on a track-two channel, I think.

So there is work going on on changing the situation from such an active ongoing thing to a more restrained thing.  But as far as Pakistan is concerned, its advent into the nuclear field was in response to the earlier 1974 test by India.  Then Pakistan didn’t want to test.  1998, our hand was forced; we tested – it’s an India-centric thing; or a threat-centric thing – let me put it like that.

And Pakistan is working on a threat-reduction strategy with India.  Admittedly, it’s on pause right now because of the Mumbai incident.  And there’s enormous momentum for a resumption of dialogue.  And nuclear things should figure in it at some point in time in terms of restraint and so on.

As far as FMCT, CTBT and other things that concern, I think if, regionally, this starts getting negotiated, Pakistan would have no objection to coming.  And it’s already very strongly conforming to the global regime.  I don’t know about those two reactors – maybe they’re connecting them to the grid later.

(Laughter.)

Q:  Sir, thank you for your time.  My name is Ravi with the Department of Defense, but my comments are my own.  You actually pre-empted one of my questions when you spoke about the future of the FATA and the conversation that needs to be had regarding that.

But I wanted to go back to questions that were asked by this gentleman earlier about the Southern Punjab, Baluchistan and Karachi, and really, would you be willing to theorize what a political situation – since there is an emphasis on the political situation – what a political situation in these areas would actually look.  And so now we look at the, you know, DAWM newspaper and there’s talk about a new province in the Southern Punjab.  Is that what we’re leading towards or are you seeing other solutions to these problems?

GEN. KARAMAT:  I haven’t seen the DAWN thing, but that’s been on the table and people have talked about increasing the number of provinces for a long time.  It hasn’t really gone anywhere as far as the political institution is concerned.

But I was hopeful, optimistic, on the political thing because we have an elected government now and we have a government in Baluchistan which is that there is a Baloch governor, a Baloch chief minister – the ministers are all Baloch.

Also we’ve had similar arrangements in the past, but this time, it looks more durable, more sustainable.  And you also have a good fix on the grievances which the other side has in terms of job opportunities that go report; in terms of education and facilities, in terms of royalties for the gas which is being pumped from the Baluchistan province; infrastructure development – all those are on the table.  And – as the question was here – that you have to do a major orientation after facing this kind of insurgency.

I think it’s the biggest wakeup call a country can get – going through a prolonged insurgency situation – which, if left, unchecked, can assume some kind of class struggle situation or a major social upheaval in the country.

So that’s why I said it’s very important for the political institution to start thinking long-term about how they’re going to ward off this threat in the future.  And take care of many of the weaknesses and problems which exist, which may give rise to those situations.  And Karachi is a big city.  Something could happen there. Baluchistan – there are other areas which just need to be looked at.

And the political institution is the best prepare to do that.  If the local government system is not working, you have to improve it to deliver.  If there’s a problem between the local government system and the political provincial governments you have to take care of that problem, not live with it.

Maybe you could live with a lot of things in the past and sort of pen them – that we’ll do it later.  But now, you are in a situation where you cannot pen things.  You cannot put off things.  And you’ve got to start tackling them.

Q:  Thank you, General Karamat.  My name is Haseeb Humayoon and I work for the Institute for the Study of War.  My question relates to Swat.  You have the 2005 earthquake.  After that, there’s documented evidence that militants, or semi-militant organizations used the situation to either fundraise or to build sympathies in the IDP population.  And now you have the current IDP situation with 2 million people.

Is the relief effort better fitted or is the army, the political institutions – are they aware of that, and what is being done?  Is there any better mechanism in place to control against militant organizations or even other problematic organizations doing the relief work?

GEN. KARAMAT:  I’ve heard that.  I’ve had this question before.  And I know this is a concern.  After the earthquake, we now need to go there and see what has been the result.  Who’s done the rehabilitation?  Who’s helping the people out?  Because the emergency aid which came in and all these organizations rushed to set up centers were actually a basic humanitarian effort.  And a sense of, in those organizations, to establish themselves as other than militant organizations – capable of humanitarian work – and many of them have done that.  And they have done some good work because of the accessibility they had in those areas, the funds they had at their disposal and so on.

But the bulk of the effort was undertaken by the civil/military combination – U.S. helicopters and those heavy-lift helicopters which operated in those areas almost around the clock.  So those were marginal efforts which they were making, but within their little capabilities.

Now, with the IDPs, again, I don’t know if they are active or not, but as I said that the army – I think left an (Indian ?) general in charge, is handling 80 percent of what needs to be done there.

An enormous tonnage of food is being provided by the military and we, of course, are acting the civil to take over.  And they’re doing their best.  But that’s where we are, so I think that’s a marginal issue.  We should not get hung up on these things.

Q:  Thank you, General.  My name is Damien Tomkins and I’m an intern here at the Atlantic Council.  My focus is China.  I’m just wondering if you could just comment on the status of Pakistan and Chinese relations.  Is there a difference between the military relationship with China and civilian government?  Any thoughts, thank you.

GEN. KARAMAT:  We’ve had a long relationship with China.  It’s been a military relationship in the sense that we have procured equipment from China in the past and we have joint production of fighter aircraft and our main battle tank underway with Chinese collaboration in Pakistan.

I think on the civilian side, China has been offered incentives and encouraged to come in on the economic side in Pakistan.  Right now, they’ve come in not strongly, but they have come in in the telecommunications sector.  They have a big telecommunications outfit operating there – Zong, or something.

And they’ve come in on the Gwadar port development, which has been a joint massive project.  There’s some infrastructure project and there’s some mining and other projects on which they are – actually the civil government and the military both have been pushing for greater collaboration with China.  And the effort on the civil side has been to bring China more and more into the economic field.

We haven’t really had a problem with China.  And minor issues like the ETIM operating somewhere in the (moderate ?) areas was taken very seriously and settled bilaterally between China and Pakistan.  In fact, I saw, later, a subsequent report that China is coming in to build capacity on the counterterrorism front in Pakistan.  So it’s a good relationship that we have with China.

MR. NAWAZ:  If I may ask a question, General, you talked about the fact that Pakistan has the capacity – you said that the government and the military has the capacity to deal with insurgency.  But there are obviously gaps in the equipment.  And could you talk a bit about what Pakistan needs and what is the prospect of getting the tools that it needs from the United States?  And if not from the United States, from some other sources?  What are the possibilities?

GEN. KARAMAT:  Yes, the operations have been very hard on aviation – particularly helicopters.  We did not and do not have a large fleet of helicopters which can operate in those areas.  And we’ve had to divert aviation from other areas where the support is needed, like the operations at high altitude in the Siachin areas and so forth.

Also, with some of the helicopters – I won’t mention the name or make – we had a problem of the operation at certain terrain, conditions, in that particular area.  So that’s one field where we need support from the U.S.  And I think there’s agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan that the MI-17 has performed particularly well.  And that we should, perhaps, be in the market for that helicopter.  We have them already; we are operating them.

The others are minor items like night vision capabilities, which are not enough.  There’s body armor which is not enough to go around and troops have been exposed, from their point of view.  There is communication equipment on the other side because of the drug money available, though the weapons which they are using are the highest.  There’s a rocket-propelled grenade – nothing heavier than that.

And on our side, of course, we have the full range of weapons available – artillery, aircraft jets, F-16 – whatever you want is available.  But there are little gaps which Shuja mentioned, which need to be filled up and we are in constant communication with the United States to fill in those gaps.  But there are bureaucratic procedures you have to fight through and then other procurement difficulties and so on, but everybody’s working through that.  And some requirements have been met – some, perhaps, still need to be met.

Q:  Thank you for the presentation.  My name is Kashyap Husney; I’m here from the RAND Corporation.  Since you have given a very comprehensive snapshot of Pakistan, giving insights into the economic situation and military affairs and everything.  One thing which constantly come in the news, and I just wanted your feedback, was about the water issues between India and Pakistan, and, in general, South Asia.  If you can comment on that a little bit.

GEN. KARAMAT:  It’s a big issue, and it’s an issue which is going to come up more and more.  We’ve tried very hard to harness water resources within the country.  There’ve been political difficulties in doing that because provinces have not always agreed to what the federation has proposed in terms of major dam construction.

And one particular dam which has gone through feasibility which seems the best thing to do is not being approved across the board politically.  So there is a problem which, if not tackled now – in fact, it should have been tackled yesterday – but if not tackled now, can create a problem for the country.

The other is the water problem with India.  There is a treaty – a World Bank pact – which exists, which we’ve invoked from time to time whenever there’s been a violation – in our perception – a violation by India.  And the methodology has worked well in the sense that the World Bank appoints a neutral technical expert intermediary who goes and inspects the site, tells everybody yes, you’re right or you’re wrong, and either corrective action is taken, or so on.

The last such thing was, I think, this year or last year when India had the Baglihar Dam project in Kashmir.  And our objection was that the – (inaudible) – edge is too much and needs to be reduced.  And I think the World Bank agreed and the design has been modified to accommodate that.

But that’s just one issue which has been resolved.  There are going to be other issues with India.  That’s why I said that every time running to the World Bank and going through this whole process of experts coming and examining and – there needs to be bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan, which has been a difficult process – not only a bilateral dialogue – the composite dialogue that we had – but maybe a backchannel dialogue also has sometimes helped very much in resolving these issues.  So you’re right, it’s going to be an issue in the future.

MR. NAWAZ:  We have experience from across the border in India that counterinsurgency operations tend to last a long time, particularly when they are internal to a country and you have 10 to 15 years – up to 25 years.  We just spoke about bilateral relationships.  Is there a possibility that the Indian and Pakistani armies could begin talking to each other, to learn from each others’ experience?

GEN. KARAMAT:  (Chuckles.)  We’re a long way from that, yet I think it’s going to take a very long time in the resolution of issues before we get started on that kind of progression.  But you’re right, India has insurgency problems in its northeast, which have been there for years, and are particularly bad right now in two or three states.  And it’s living with those problems and constantly fighting the situation there with resources – military, police and so on.

That’s why I said that the political and the military aim of the operations here should not be to end the Taliban or finish it.  That would be very ambitious – nobody’s been able to do that in insurgent situations for a very long time.  We still have to see what happens in Sri Lanka later, what happens in Iraq – already you have long blasts coming up – what happens in Afghanistan post-settlement; where it goes from there, reverts to civil war or what because there is an alienated Pashtun population in Afghanistan.  And the major thrust has always been southern Afghanistan, so you’ll have to see what the impact is.

But Shuja is right in the sense that these things take a long time to resolve, even after the military operations are over.  And you have examples of the Malayan insurgency, I think, going for 15 years.  And others which have gone for 10 or 12 years.  But we are already in the sixth year – (chuckles) – so let’s hope it finishes.

MR. NAWAZ:  Any other questions from the group?  There’s a follow-up from Mr. Husney.

Q:  Since Shuja has asked three, I can ask at least two.  Can you just pinpoint or list us, like, three main CBMS – like, confidence-building measures – between India and Pakistan which we can take up to improve the relationship.  The mistrust which we have, as you just mentioned, what we can learn from each other militarily or economic-wise between the governments, what we can do – only three major CBMs.

GEN. KARAMAT:  I think one good one would be to de-militarize the Siachin and the Kashmir area.  They are the two areas where the militaries are actually deployed and in a state of readiness for actual conflict on the line of control and the line of contact in Siachin.  Not only would that ease the situation there, but bring in the factor of longer response times in getting to a conflict situation.  I think that’s one that should happen.

The second one, again, could be a restraint regime which starts building trust and reassurance between the two.  And, perhaps, in the sphere of creating non-deployment zones closer to the border.  Other things like that which could be worked out, and, perhaps, extending into the nuclear field whenever feasible.

And the third, I think, a good thing would be political interaction between the two counties, which has not been there to the extent that it should be there.  I know you have all the parliamentarians visiting and so on, but proper political interaction between the two countries – we could learn from India.  They have more experience of coalition politics.  We are just entering – (chuckles) – that phase.  And it would build up trust.

MR. NAWAZ:  I think that would be a good and a hopeful point at which for me to thank General Karamat.  And as I promised you at the beginning of today’s gathering, with a guest like him, who easily moves between military and political and economic and social commentary and now, of course, as part of the think-tank community, I didn’t think we expected anything less than what we got today.

So on behalf of the Atlantic Council, I’d like to thank all of you for coming, and especially thank General Karamat for a really exciting and stimulating discussion today.  Thank you, General.

(Applause.)

Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.

Back to General Jehangir Karamat Event Page

 

FRED KEMPE:  This is terrific.  There are more stars and bars in this room than we usually have.  Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Atlantic Council, I’m Fred Kempe, president and CEO.  And welcome to this evening’s commander series with the commander of the United States Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating.

I know many of you have attended our commander series on a regular basis.  Let me just say a couple of words about what this series has been about.  We have created with this – and I must say, it’s been one of the most popular things we’ve introduced – a public platform for senior U.S. and global military leaders to share their views and concerns with a Washington audience.

The program has become an authoritative opportunity for military leaders to shape the security debate in Washington and beyond.  Since the beginning of this series we’ve had the commanders of EUCOM, NORTHCOM, the vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chief of staff of the Army, and two of the most recent commanders in Afghanistan.  It is a flagship program for the Atlantic Council and I want to think Saab AB and Ambassador Henrik Liljegren, board member of the Atlantic Council, for Saab’s support of this series.

I’m also delighted with the turnout today, which says a lot, as well, about the popularity of the series.  Now, Admiral, I do have to mention one thing.  Some people ask me, why is the Atlantic Council floating its boat in the Pacific?  The answer is pretty simple: it’s a matter of history, it’s a matter of mission and it’s a matter of reality.

There was, before the war, a very famous ambassador by the name of U. Alexis Johnson, quite legendary ambassador to Japan.  After the war, when the Atlantic Council was founded, he was one of the founders.  He and Dean Acheson, another one of the founders, were very clear that the world was round and that the Atlantic Council had to recognize that much earlier than most transatlantic organizations.  So that’s the history.

Number two, there’s the mission.  The mission of the Atlantic council is renewing the Atlantic community for 21st-century global challenges.  It’s why we’ve long had a successful Asia program for many years, directed by Banning Garrett, recently opened up a South Asia center, directed by Shuja Nawaz, and are launching a center for Atlantic-African partnership.  This evening is under the international security program and the director, Damon Wilson.

So, and there’s the reality.  Take a look at the situation now:  NATO reaching out to develop it’s global partnerships with Japan, Australia, South Korea; Asian powers playing a key role in stabilizing Afghanistan; the U.S. and E.U. working together to engage China and India on global climate change; the G-20 bringing together key Asian and European partners to address the global financial crisis; North Korea – I don’t have to say much about that; Security developments in the Pacific, such as the development of long-range ballistic missiles impact the debate on missiles in Europe.

I think this link has been apparent since the U.S. entered World War II in Europe after the attack in the Pacific.  So, Admiral, the Atlantic Council will continue to float its boat, as well, in the Pacific.  I now want to turn the podium over to the Honorable Walt Slocombe, the secretary of board and a vice chair of the Atlantic Council, and former undersecretary of defense for policy.

He’s going to introduce our speaker and will later moderate the Q&A session.  Walt, who’s now with Caplin & Drysdale, is – and this is not an overuse of the word – a pillar of the Atlantic Council.  He provides me and the rest of our leadership strategic advice, as well as sound legal advice.  I am still free, walking around, and have not yet been incarcerated; that’s all because of Walt Slocombe.  Walt, I’m grateful for you service, and we’re delighted to have such a distinguished former Pentagon official moderate this evening’s discussion.

(Applause.)

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE:  Thanks, Fred.  It’s a great honor to be asked to introduce Admiral Keating.  He has that kind of résumé that mere mortals only dream of.  He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1971, shortly thereafter began a distinguished career as a naval aviator.  The most impressive thing is not the stripes on his sleeve, or the stars if he were wearing a slightly different uniform; it’s that he has carried out 1200 arrested landings on aircraft carriers.

He was the deputy commander of an air wing during the First Gulf War and he was the commander of NAVCENT during the Second Gulf War.  In between, like all senior military officers, he’s had to do the occasional penance, working in Washington in a variety of jobs.  I had the honor and pleasure of working with him when he was the deputy J-3 during the ’90s.  He then became – after his service in connection with Operation Iraqi Freedom – he became the director of the joint staff, which is the critical position, as I’m sure most of you know, in making that remarkable organization work as well as it does thanks to his efforts and the efforts of a lot of other people and to the Goldwater-Nichols law.

He was then commander – he’s had two – I still call them CINCs – two CINCs jobs – two combat commanders – one at NORAD and the Northern Command, and as you all know, because you wouldn’t be here otherwise, he’s the commander of the Pacific Command.  It’s a real pleasure to have the opportunity to hear his insights into the military and indeed the larger American and strategic role in that critical part of the world.  Admiral Keating, welcome to the Atlantic Council, and thank you for doing this.

(Applause.)

ADMIRAL TIMOTHY KEATING:  Thank you very much, thanks.  Thank you all for this really great opportunity.  A couple of words by preamble: I had the distinction of working for then-undersecretary of defense for policy Walt Slocombe for a while, as he mentioned.  Few officials, in my experience, have had more consequential impact on what the Department of Defense does, did, and is doing than Walt Slocombe.  He was USDP for a long time and in my humble opinion did a magnificent job.  And it’s my honor and privilege to be standing here in front of you having been introduced by – who’d have thunk that back then we would be standing here today?

To Fred, thank you – oh, in fairness, I have to point out – that was a great introduction, and I’m grateful.  But it’s not the best introduction I’ve ever had.  (Laughter.)  It was good, it was very good – (laughter) – and it was accurate.  The best introduction I’ve ever had was of a much smaller group at I think a rotary club in Opa-locka, Florida, where the master of ceremonies was late and they asked me if I would mind introducing myself.  (Laughter.)  That’s the best.  (Laughter.)

We’ve got some – we’ve got, while it’s the Atlantic Council, we have the appropriate visual aid here and I’d like to start with that if I can, and I’m cutting some of you guys out – to describe the Pacific Command AOR – area of responsibility.  I’ll work hard to keep acronyms down to a minimum, but it’s in our vernacular, as you know.

So we have the North Pole; we have the South Pole; we have Alaska to California; we have the east coast of Africa.  That is the Pacific Command area of responsibility.  It’s a pretty large – it’s 50 percent of the surface of the earth, for what it’s worth – about 51 percent of the world’s population.  We’ve got a number of pretty large armies – China, we have some responsibility for the eastern part of Russia.  So China’s army, Russia’s army, North Korea’s army, India’s army, our Army, our armed forces – pretty consequential.

There’s significant economic initiative underway out here.  About $1 trillion – a trillion bucks – of our trade comes from countries in our area of responsibility.  Twenty of the largest ports in the world – of those 20, 15 are in the AOR, nine of them – nine of the largest ports in the world are now in the People’s Republic of China and the world’s biggest port now, Shanghai, by volume, is in our area of responsibility.

So it is a vibrant, dynamic, living, breathing place in which we have the privilege of working and conducting our business.  About a year ago, we decided to rewrite our strategy.  We’d been in the Pacific Command for decades.  The guns have largely been silent in our area of responsibility; for that we are immensely grateful, and it is no accident.  It is due to the efforts of the several in the room, and that is, again, including Walt Slocombe and General Brent Scowcroft.

But we wanted to take what got us where we are and try and catapult it five, 10, 20 years into the future.  It’s a dynamic AOR; the economic engine is churning and there are opportunities and challenges aplenty out there.  If you think about the countries in our area of responsibility – and we’ll walk around here in just a minute – but if you think about them and realize how much room there is for growth, how much opportunity there is for, in some cases, adventurism – or Korea, in some cases bad behavior – but in many more cases than not, cooperating and collaborating to ensure more peace and more stability in the region, that’s why we chose to undertake the process of writing a new strategy for the United States Pacific Command based a lot on what we saw in the rear-view mirror, but trying, as I say, to look five, 10, 20 years down the road – an ambitious undertaking to be sure.

We ended up coming down to three basic tenets of our new strategy – partnership – I’ll talk about each one of them in a minute – partnership, readiness, and presence.  Pretty simple to explain; not so easy to execute.  Partnership – we’re convinced that building upon the very strong bilateral relationships and alliances we have in our AOR.  We have five treaties – Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.  A majority of our country’s treaties involve countries in our AOR, so we build on those longstanding – some of them decades old – bilateral relationships to weave a fabric that has included as its threads multilateral engagement and not just mil-to-mil.

Increasingly, we see opportunities for including elements across the DIME, if you will – diplomatic, intelligence, military and energy and environment.  So we’re looking to cobble all this together in an increasingly tightly woven fabric that emphasizes multilateralism – and I’ll try to site some examples for it in just a minute – and the ability we have as the predominate military power in the region to provide some rudder, some guidance – in some cases leadership – to all of these countries in our area of responsibility.

Some examples that you might be interested in: India.  Once upon a time, prior to my work with Walt, I was the flag lieutenant to then – here’s a term again: CINCPAC – Admiral William J. Crowe, in the mid-’80s.  And for about a year-and-a-half, if you will, I carried my bags – so there’s hope for all of us who are a little younger – but I was carrying Admiral Crowe’s bags around and we made a visit to India.  The CINC went with pretty high expectations and they were largely unfulfilled.  The reception we got was a little chilly, the engagements on a policy level were not very forthcoming, the hospitality was cordial but not overflowing, and the old man left less happy than we liked him to be, generally.

We just went to India for the second time a couple weeks ago.  Much different visit; much different country.  We got there on the last day of their elections.  It is an amazing process – some of you may have had the good fortune of watching India’s national elections.  It is – some call it the greatest show on earth.  Folks were flocking to the televisions in manner and in numbers that were somewhat unusual to us – glued to the big-screen TVs.

Their government today is more willing to talk about engagement and partnership with the United States than they were in the mid-’80s.  They are exercising with us on a much more robust basis – we just concluded a trilateral exercise; unthinkable in the ’80s – Japan, United States and India in the Sea of Japan.  And it was a fairly spirited, high-end technical exercise if you will, where we weren’t just doing division tactics; we were exercising weapons and techniques and procedures that are pretty high-end.

Two years ago, India participated in a five-way exercise including U.S., Japan, Singapore and Australia – unthinkable in the mid-’80s and it’s now a matter of course with India.  So we think that this is a great example of partnership and the benefits we can all derive from increased dialogue, increased cooperation, and increased understanding of what we are all about in the AOR.

Readiness – doesn’t do us any good to have all manner of forces that can’t get out there and exercise, that cannot get out there and respond to military operational directives from the secretary of defense or the president of the United States to provide assistance to countries who don’t quite have all these resident capabilities and to get out there and exercise with them as an example.

Cobra Gold – some of you may have participated in Cobra Gold in younger lives.  This is an exercise in Thailand held every year – this year, five countries involved, 10 countries sent observers.  Think about that.  Ten countries – India and PRC included – sent observers to watch ships, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen operating in a real, live field exercise in a very dynamic and vibrant way and it concluded with shifting from war-fighting, if you will, or exercising the capability – we hope we don’t have to do it, but exercising capability – shifting over to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and United Nations peacekeeping operations.

So it started out fairly aggressive and ended up not just peace-making, but peacekeeping, all under the umbrella of exercise Cobra Gold.  We are in our 35th year; never has participation been more vigorous and more spirited.  So that’s the readiness piece – it is essential for us to be able to field forces that can move out and exercise across the full spectrum of military operational capabilities that you would expect of us at the United States Pacific Command.

The third element of our strategy is presence.  The JOs, as is their wont – junior officers; it’s an acronym – in our headquarters say it this way:  “Virtual presence equals actual absence.”  We’re all used to the wonders of video teleconferences and multiple secure telephone calls and all that.  You’ve got to get out there.  You’ve got to get real boot dirt, you’ve got to get honest-to-goodness grime underneath you fingernails and work with the folks in this very large area of responsibility so that they can develop an intense understanding of what we, the United States of America, offer.

Thirty-six countries in our area of responsibility.  We’ve been to 28 or 29 of them.  Some of them, like Japan, we’ve been 10 times.  Others – well, interestingly, we’ve talked to Burma, Myanmar – didn’t ever think we’d get there, but we got there in an attempt to offer humanitarian assistance about a year ago and they essentially turned us down, which was a tragedy.

At any rate, 27 countries we visited, an unmistakable, unrelenting theme in discussions not just mil-to-mil but with senior defense officials, senior government officials, and commercial partners and commercial interests everywhere we go – unmistakable theme – you, the United States of America, are the indispensable partner.  We don’t necessarily want you with us every minute of every day in our country, on our soil, in our water or in the air overhead, but we’d like you nearby.

We want you to be able to come when we need you; we want you to exercise, operate; we want our young men and women to go to school with you, preferably in the United States.  And we like our young men and women to go to school there.  Admiral Walt Doran attended the Indian military academy years ago and he still cites that as one of the great reasons for the success he enjoyed in our particular area of responsibility.

So, partnership, absolutely essential.  Readiness – we’ve got to be out there.  Presence – you can’t do it virtually, you’ve got to be able to deploy, fly, steam, sail, get there however you can, and operate with these folks so that they develop the understand of what we, the United States of America offer them.  And through all of this, the new strategy, we hope, builds an easy – I’m sorry, a simple, but not easy way to ensure peace and stability in the region.

We remain the indispensable partner, the reliable partner, the country upon which all of these folks can depend to respond in times good and bad without a whole lot of commotion to ensure economic stability throughout the region.  Thanks for your attention this evening and I’d be delighted through Walt’s good graces to try and answer any questions that you might have.

MR. SLOCOMBE:  Admiral, I think that’s a terrific overview of what you’re trying to do, and I’m sure it’s stimulated lots of questions and lots of interest.  So let’s start, Admiral.

Q:  Eric McVadon, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.  Would you comment on China and PSI and then maybe the other end of the spectrum, humanitarian assistance operations with China?

ADM. KEATING:  A couple of examples – thanks for the question – a couple of examples to maybe take it in reverse order.  China had a cold snap in, what, January of 2008.  Guangzhou – you may remember the pictures in the paper when there were 400,000 people stranded at the Guangzhou rail yard – a staggering number of people.  We got on the phone, called our Chinese counterparts, if you will, and said, we’d be happy to help.  And they said we are grateful for the offer.

We were loading up two C-17s – and now, this isn’t a ton of – well, it is several tons of stuff actually – (laughter) – out of Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii.  Now this is a response to cold-weather disaster, cold-weather challenge.  A C-17 out of Hickam and a C-17 out of Elmendorf – they launched, inside of 48 hours were unloading their gear with a Chinese two-star to say thank you very much for the assistance.  Now, at the same time, China mobilized their army in a manner that is a little unusual for them I think, but very helpful to the people of Guangzhou.

The second example was the earthquake several months thereafter.  Same phone call; same guy on China’s end.  He’d say, well, we’re grateful for the offer, we’re thankful for the help.  Two more C-17s go in and unless you’ve dealt with earthquakes, you don’t necessarily think of what do you need in the case of an earthquake.  Chain saws, water, food, and plastic sheeting.  Plastic sheeting was in short supply and the – plastic sheeting – I need to be careful – plastic sheeting shortage – (laughter) – get in trouble there.

But again, the Chinese were grateful for the assistance.  We landed; we offloaded; we took off.  So in those two cases, offers of humanitarian assistance were readily and warmly received.  The same time we – this is right now – Michèle Flournoy, a successor to Walt, has just returned from a visit to the People’s Republic of China, where we have every indication she has been able to get military-to-military talks back on track.

They were suspended by China in the wake of our Taiwan arms sales announcement in October 2008.  We think they’re back on track.  There’s a schedule for mil-to-mil dialogue that she has arranged with her Chinese colleague and we hope that it will lead to an increase in the dialogue and an improvement in the relationship between Pacific Command and our counterparts in the People’s Liberation Army, navy and air force, writ somewhat narrowly, and increased understanding and cooperation on a much larger scale.  So that’s all I’m going to answer for your short question, and I hope I got to it.  We’ve provided humanitarian assistance as disaster relief, and we’re hoping for more fruitful relations with Chinese military in the near future.

Proliferation Security Initiative.  We are prepared, when directed, to respond to guidance from the secretary and the president in enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions, and this is a subset of PSI, if I’m understanding your question.  So as you are aware, PSI is a policy signed to by 90-plus some countries in the world.  We don’t have direct dialogue with the People’s Liberation Army on this topic.  There are some conversations ongoing at the State Department level, including China with respect to North Korea, and beyond that, I’m better off not going into operational detail.  Thanks for the question.  Yes ma’am.  I’m sorry –

MR. SLOCOMBE:  You can handle, this, I think, honestly.

(Laughter.)

Q:  Admiral, Nadia Tsao with the Liberty Time Taiwan.  During you tenure I think you have been trying to help Taiwan and China to dialogue or build confidence – military, you know, confidence-building measure. I don’t know, have you been able to accomplish anything?  Do you see the recent reduction of tension being permanent or, you know, there’s still factors that both sides have to consider about things?

ADM. KEATING:  We certainly hope that the reduction intention is permanent.  It is our profound hope, as I suspect so, too, for PRC and for Taiwan.  We have contributed some instructors for Taiwan’s annual exercise.  As you may know, we send some well-qualified military instructors.  The fact that tension has been defused, if not eliminated across the straight, is very encouraging.

The steps taken by PRC and Taiwan, while some of them are a little kind of pedestrian in a way – sending exotic animals, pandas, to zoos; increased commercial traffic, making it easier to send mail back and forth across the straight – each of these taken in and of itself not a watershed decision, but all contributing to a sense of cooperation and collaboration that we find very encouraging across the straight.  Yes, ma’am?

Q:  Admiral, Betty Lin of the World Journal.

ADM. KEATING:  Hi, Betty.

Q:  Hi.  Not too long ago, a U.S.S. McCain’s towed array was hit by a Chinese sub and can you tell us about what kind of sub it was, and also, can you comment on the PACOM’s ASW capabilities against conventional subs especially with AIB capabilities?  Thank you.

ADM. KEATING:  Is that all you want to know?  (Laughter.)  Um, let me take the McCain piece first.  John McCain, operating in international water the way we operate, our Navy operates around the world all the time – it had a towed array out, and it was damaged.  The investigation’s ongoing; I don’t know precisely why the towed array was damaged.  So we’ll find out perhaps in time.

As for the United States Pacific Command’s ASW policy, we would – I’ve got to keep remembering that the tapes are rolling – (laughter) – we would like to have more than less submarines in the Pacific Command area of responsibility.  Now the United States Navy and Department of Defense, they’ve got to make decisions as to how they apportion those assets.

We’ve got – I think it’s a 60/40 split, Pacific Command and everybody else right now – the Admiral is shaking his head; an intel Admiral shaking his head is encouraging.  (Laughter.)  We regard freedom of access to the maritime domain is absolutely essential to everything we want to get done, all of us want to get done in the Pacific Command AOR.

So guaranteeing right of free passage to anybody that wants to – in accordance with international law – put containers on ships and move them, we would support.  Those who would develop submarine technologies and capabilities that might be used against, to deny maritime access, we would view with disfavor.

So we want to be sure that we can provide adequate defense if we need to in the terms of our nuclear submarine force, the exercises we do with out friends and allies in the AOR.  There are 250-some submarines in our area of responsibility.  That’s a pretty good number of subs – of course not all of them ours, not very many of them ours, but a good number.

So we continued to pursue ASW technology, we want to make sure that countries understand what, the United States of America in the form of the United States Pacific Command can offer them in terms of defense and right of access to the maritime domain.  And countries who develop technologies that would run counter to that policy, we’re going to work to overcome those developments.  Thanks.  Yes, ma’am?

Q:  My name is Sunjin Choi, Institute for Defense Analyses.  Admiral, thank you so much for your succinct remark.  My questions regard your remark on partnership and readiness.  You mentioned PACOM conduct bilateral, multilateral exercise per year with the regional partners.  You have 36 AOR member state that covers 3.9 billion populations.  My question is A, do you have effective measures or the metrics to measure effectively bilateral, multilateral programs, and B, do we have any joint lessons learned process to measure those programs in past?  Thank you.

ADM. KEATING:  That’s a great question.  Two great questions.  The first one, very tough.  Metrics – in a way you end up trying to argue the negative.  If we’re not there, if we don’t exercise on bilateral basis, or more importantly a multilateral basis – if we don’t, how do you know what might happen and might not happen?

I don’t mean to be cute with semantics here, but we work hard to make sure that we are an invited guest everywhere we go in the area of responsibility.  It is not just my luxury, pleasure, but we haven’t been turned down yet – except in Myanmar, Burma.  We flew there to offer humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  We had 36-some helicopters in Thailand and four ships – a part of a coalition effort in the Bay of Bengal.  We were able to fly 180 C-130 hops into and out of Rangoon, but we could have done so much more.  So that’s the one example I can think of where we were told no thanks.

In every other – I’ll think – in every other situation, countries – go back to where I was a little while ago – we remain the indispensable partner.  Now, we don’t want to say this with a lot of chutzpah, we want to be humble about this; we want to be invited.  To the best of my knowledge, we recall we have always – an invitation tendered is an invitation received – and that works both ways.  The second part of your question was –

Q:  (Off microphone.)

ADM. KEATING:  Oh, yeah.  Thank you.  Joint lessons learned, you bet.

Well, here’s an interesting – again, semantics.  Lessons observed – (laughter) – aren’t necessarily lessons learned.  So when we do have these exercises and we have cultural and language opportunities, shall we say, we want to try to skinny down to a couple of real big hitting items that countries and young men and young women and old men and old women can understand, can embrace, and can fix if necessary or pursuer if desirable.

So lessons learned is a great big-ticket item in the Pacific Command.  Lessons observed: volumes and volumes – all of us have seen them on the shelves.  Well, we’re interested – we’re not persuaded by those.  We’re interested and persuaded by lessons learned.  And we’re working very hard with all the nations with whom we engage to make them concrete, to make them simple, and make them fixable in the out-years. Yes, sir?

Q:  Thank you sir, I am John from the Radio Free Asia.  I would like to ask a question on North Korea.  Now, U.S. government is keeping watch on several North Korean vessels right now, which are possibly carrying the weapon.  So are you keeping watch on the North Korean vessel continuously until when, and then do you have any sense of it?  And then secondly, North Korea’s ICBM, so do we have any expectation of when the North Korea launch the ICBM and to      what you’re ready for about it?  Thank you.

ADM. KEATING:  Sure.  (Laughter.)  Aren’t we supposed to finish at six?  (Laughter.)  Please – this is a very serious situation.  North Korea’s activities are very disturbing and unsettling to all of us.  Witness the United Nations Security Council resolution.  As far as a shipment of proscribed cargo, I can’t comment on operational matters like that or intelligence matters.  Our president has said he is satisfied that the Pacific Command, the military of the United States is well prepared to execute whatever direction he gives us, and you can read whatever or not you choose into that, but that’s where I have to leave it.

As far as Taepodongs launched from North Korea, the recent launch following, by a couple of years, the July of 2006 launch – the secretary of defense just said a couple of weeks ago – I think he said it very well – we’re prepared to protect Americans and American property and American citizens and American territories.  We don’t want to tip our hand too much and indicate specific areas of readiness, or operational patterns, but we’re prepared to execute in whatever direction the president or secretary give us with regard to Taepodong-2s as well.  Yes, sir.  Thomas, how are you?  Good.

THOM SHANKER:  Thom Shanker from the New York Times.  Thank you for your time today and for sharing your wisdom with us.  I wanted to get your assessment of the Joint Special Operations Taskforce operating in the Philippines.  What have been the positive takeaways, and, given the stress on soft forces by the surge that dare not call its name in Afghanistan, do you think those forces should be sustained in the Philippines – even grow – or is it time for them to go home and let the Filipinos take over?  Thank you.

ADM. KEATING:  Yeah.  Thanks, Thom, for the question.  JSOTF-P – great military acronym – Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines.  We were directed – we, Pacific Command – to provide forces in conjunction with the United States Special Operations Command to help the armed forces in the Philippines in their struggle against violent extremism, principally in the southern reaches of the Philippine country – Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiya in particular.

We’ve been there for about six years now, in some number.  We’ve got, I’ll just say, several hundred operators there right now, Thom, as you probably know.  They’ve been there for a while.  A critical mission; helping significantly the armed forces of the Philippines, in our view, go back to the metrics question – incidents of violence.  While there are still kidnappings, we’re not entirely sure that there are terrorists.  A little bit of a blurry line in some areas of the Philippines between criminal activity and terrorist activity.

I was able to go with Ambassador Kristie Kenney, who is a real dynamo and a great, great ambassador for our country, on a trip to visit our JSOTF-P personnel about a year ago. We flew down, helicoptered down, drove over.  It wasn’t Interstate 95 – for better or for worse, it wasn’t any Interstate 95.  A little bit bumpy in about a four or five-car convoy – escorted and followed by armed forces of the Philippine marines and soldiers.

So we take this trip into true Joseph Conrad, “Heart of Darkness” Philippine jungle.  And as we leave visible elements of civilization – electrical power wires, TV antennas – and get into a little bit less opulent villages and isolated developments.  Young kids – two, three, four, five years old are running out, waving and applauding and jumping up and down and hollering in their in their native tongue what I’m told is, it’s good to see you.  This kind of support – with their mommas and dads back nodding approvingly – I saw this with my own eyes.  And I thought, this is wonderful; this is terrific.

Ambassador Kenney said, two years ago, mom and dad would have pulled the kids back, and they would have stayed well away from the street.  And if there had been any demonstration, it would have been unfavorable.  So I saw, with my own eyes, enthusiastic support from the citizens who had been previously terrorized by violent extremists.  I believe we have made significant progress.  It’s a tough metric – back to her question.  We’ve got the guys that we have there now, Thom.  We’re going to keep them there for the foreseeable future.

It’s a situation we analyze constantly with the Department of Defense, Department of State and the National Security Council.  We’re there for the foreseeable future and I think that the benefits we gain in spite of significant tension on Special Operations forces, are important enough that we maintain our posture and presence in the Southern Philippines.  Sir?

MIKE HARWOOD:  Air Vice-Marshal Mike Harwood from the U.K.  Glenn Talpey (sp) sends you his love, by the way, just so you know.  I want to know, sir, how you personally learn?  Do you read a lot?  If so, what do you read?  Do you have smart guys who brief you all the time?  Or do you just go and do presence yourself, and see if with your own eyes?  How do you learn?

ADM. KEATING:  I have the great luxury and privilege of being surrounded by smart, brilliant guys and girls, Mike.  I mean, I’ve got – this is going to be syrupy – I’ve got the best job in the world.  Think about it.  I get to live in Hawaii with my wife, fabulous house, I got a – I got.  Whew, Mrs. Jazwinski would be very disappointed in me; third-grade English.  I enjoy – (laughter) – a nice airplane out here that rarely takes off without me being on it – (laughter) – and generally goes where we’d like it to go.  So we have astounding support – personnel, administrative, logistics, equipment – and pretty good funding; we could use a little more, but we’ve got pretty good funding.  (Laughter.)

I learn by listening.  Go back to him, go back to him, Oliver, Magnus, Olman, many in the room.  Some names I don’t recognize, but faces I do.  I try and keep my mouth closed and my ears open.  My wife would not necessarily agree that that’s what I do all the time.  (Laughter.)  It’s the best job in the world.  The staff is brilliant.  We do such important work, and I think, consequential work, with our embassies.  I don’t spend a whole lot of time hanging around with guys in uniform when we visit these 28, 29 – I talk to Angus Houston, I talk to John.  I talk to your guys and our guys.

But we spend more time in our embassies.  We’re spending more time as we can with commercial partners – commercial interests.  We spent a full day in India not in the ministry of defense or ministry of foreign affairs, but at lunches and gatherings arranged by folks in the commercial sector.  So there’s a pretty good exchange of ideas on those terms, on those issues.  So I try and listen more, talk less.  And with the staff, generally, what the staff recommends is almost always spot-on.  And on those rare occasions when I just need to give it little tiny rudder orders because of the experience I got studying at the feet of masters, it’s been my great privilege.  Thanks for the question.  Yes sir.

CHRIS CASTELLI:  Chris Castelli with Inside the Pentagon.  As the Defense Department does its Quadrennial Defense Review, what priorities are you advocating for?

ADM. KEATING:  Our Quadrennial Defense Review – we were just in town two weeks ago talking about this.  It is a singularly important effort, as many of you know.  I’m pleased to report that combatant commanders have a larger say-so than my experience in the past in the formulation of this Quadrennial Defense Review.  It’s a huge challenge for the department, as you would anticipate, with a space review, a nuclear posture review ongoing and several others – not to mention annual budget challenges – opportunities, if you want.

So we’re more active in the formulation of the review.  We submit an integrated priority list – I mean this will be mind-numbing for a lot of you, but an IPL – and we have ten items on our integrated priority list.  These are issues where we would prefer a little more funding, a little more emphasis, a little more output from the Department of Defense on those priority issues of ours.  And we submit them.  Of our 10 – I can’t go into them; they’re classified – all of them – 10 for 10 – are being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.  We think that is beneficial for us.

Now you might say, well, what are those 10 issues?  Again, I can’t go into them.  But if you were to think of areas where we might like – because of the size of the AOR, because of the various countries with whom we’re exercising – that we might like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for example – everybody wants more of those – it’s being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

So we’re very happy with the role the combatant commanders have, we have an active voice in the formulation of the QDR.  It is a singularly important document for us and we’re cautiously optimistic that it will be not just a heavy tome that goes across the street to Congress, but it’ll actually have an impact with Congress and that the American people will be persuaded by the analysis that goes into the QDR.  I’m optimistic.  Robert?

Q:  Admiral, great pleasure to see you again.  Question – I’ll just use the framework of our strategic relationship with Japan and Japan looking into the future – two parts of this.  First off, an initiative – the defense policy realignment initiative – and another acronym – TAR DPRI – a series of 19 different plans that basically restructured and somewhat dispersed our forces further in the Pacific, although it did move some Army command to the big islands.

Number one, how do you see that change in our lay-down posture and how that affects our relationship with Japan?  There’s A.  And the B is, as a subset of that, Guam.  Guam is a little bit further east and a lot further south, and it’s going to be a challenging place not only to train Marines, but also to move them around.  So could you talk about both of those?

ADM. KEATING:  Sure.  It’s a great question, and one in which we’re spending a not-insignificant amount of time and effort.  The Defense Policy Review Initiative, and a subset of that, the AIP – Agreed Implementation Plan.  As you very accurately state, Bob, the DPRI isn’t just Guam.  There are a number – 18 other subsets of DPRI – all of which are in some process of execution now.  We’re going to take a Navy Air Wing out of Atsugi, move them down to Iwakuni – the Japanese have built an entirely new runway down there at Iwakuni; you may have seen it before.

We’re shuffling around some Army flags and some billets – and again, I don’t mean to sound trivial, it’s very important to us and to the Japanese.  We’re combining with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force and our Air Force in Japan to have a combined operation center, which will be very important for us, and so on and so on all through those 18 other parts of the DPRI.  On track, generally well-funded and very beneficial to us across the board – us at Pacific Command, and, we believe, to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

The area, it’s moth-like to the flame.  They go, yeah, well what about Guam?  The previous administration, President Bush, the current administration, President Obama, the secretaries of state and secretary of defense from both administrations have reaffirmed our national commitment to get AIP done.  Got it; loud and clear.  It’s going to take some money.  It’s going to take some time.

There is an understanding that just working inside the fence line at Guam won’t get a defense line inside.  The Department of Defense properties won’t just get it done; there have to be improvements in the infrastructure of Guam.  Those of us who’ve had the pleasure of going to Guam understand.  It’s a country of, I think, 175,000 people.  Well we’re going to move another 15,000 to 18,000 Marines and independents down there.  That’s a 10 percent growth almost overnight.

You can’t do that anywhere in America without some infrastructure considerations and improvement.  That means money and that takes time and there are labor costs.  You have to go back to the Marine Corps who will move 8,000 of their guys and girls down there.  There are training issues attendant to the transfer.  The Marines in Okinawa – I’m preaching to the choir – don’t get all the training they need to get done right now.  We have to move some of them around.  So AIP is not without challenges.

The previous and current administration have expressed their clear commitment to get it done.  There is a new group working inside the Pentagon that is at a little more senior-level to those who were working very hard to get this done in the years past.  We at Pacific Command are doing all that we can to support the Department of Defense and, increasingly, an interagency look at the opportunities intended to moving Marines out of Okinawa to Guam.

Now, you raise a point where Guam’s a little bit off the beaten path.  Yes and no.  It’s kind of wide open spaces down there.  And once we get through some of the environmental impact assessments, I think we’ll find that – I’ve deployed a bunch, as Walt said, have been on a carrier once or twice; I’ve even flown a whole lot in that part of the southern Pacific.  Perhaps you’ve been down there as well.  Great training opportunities.

It’s going to take a little while to get there.  We have the flag of the United States of America flying over Guam.  We can come in and out of Anderson Air Force base, out of Agana, and as we develop it, when we have more forces down there, it’ll be a training center for us.  And we can move folks.  Granted, they’re going to have to get on a ship or an airplane to get where they’re going.  We’ve got a few of those – ships and airplanes – and we can do it without having to ask the host-country permission because it’s our country.

I think it’s a strategic imperative for us to execute AIP, and I believe, in time, we will find the money and get the infrastructure upgraded, improved, to the point where we’ll be happy once we’re down there.  And our Marine Corps has said, we’re going to want every Marine who goes there to say, when I’m done with my tour, I don’t want to leave.  And guys who are outside Guam go, I want to go to Guam because the quality of life, the housing, the infrastructure is the best in the world.  We’re hopeful.  Yes, sir.

MILES POMPER:  Hi, Miles Pomper from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  Thanks for coming, Admiral.  I have a question – you mentioned the nuclear posture review a little bit earlier.  And I was curious about how you see that playing out in your area of responsibility, particularly given the president’s call for a world free of nuclear weapons.  And, particularly the question of dealing with Japan and the question of seat-launch cruise missiles and how you see that playing out over the coming years and carrying out this vision.

ADM. KEATING:  This is my personal opinion – and you might say, well, what’s the difference between your personal and professional?  There really isn’t any.  (Laughter.)  This is a great big deal for us, the United States, to review our nuclear posture.  As I move around the AOR – I mentioned we’ve been to 27 or 28 countries out there – sooner or later, many of the folks with whom we have discussions will get around to asking, is your nuclear deterrent umbrella going to continue to extend over fill-in-the-blank country?

So our capabilities in this area are not taken for granted all throughout our air responsibility.  Everywhere I go, sooner or later, not just in mil-to-mil, the conversation comes up and I say, it’s not mine to determine policy, but it is my hope that our nuclear deterrent umbrella will continue to be effective.  And that probably means it will continue to extend wherever in the world I happen to be.

The nuclear posture review will be aggressive.  Our president has made clear certain aspects that he hopes to be addressed in the nuclear posture review, and I’m sure the guys doing it understand the president’s guidance.  As far as the second part about Japan, what was the second part?

Q:  (Off microphone.)

ADM. KEATING:  I’m not aware of specific Japanese interest in that particular system that you describe.  I am aware, as I say of Japanese interest in the nuclear umbrella continuing to extend over to Japan.  Yes, ma’am.

REBEKAH GORDON:  Hi, sir.  Rebekah Gordon with Inside the Navy.  Just as a follow-on to the question earlier about submarine as being critical to maintaining freedom of the seas, what about surface vessels?  And would you like to see more of them –

ADM. KEATING:  Yes.

MS. GORDON:  (Chuckles) – in PACOM?  Okay.  But, also, as part of that, not just more, but I’m curious to know what types or what capabilities in particular would you be looking for?

ADM. KEATING:  It wasn’t going to be a simple yes or no answer was it?  Well let me go back to one of the elements of our strategy – presence.  Actually, all of them.  I can make a case – we have made the case with CNO Gary Roughead, a good and great friend.

Quantity has a quality all its own.  And for us, in the broad reaches of the Pacific, it is very helpful to have a larger number of service assets that we can deploy.  And remember what our partners say, we like you to hang around for a while but it doesn’t bother us if you leave.  Sometimes they don’t know if we’re two miles, twenty miles or two hundred miles over the horizon.  They just trust that we’re not within eyesight nearby.  There are advantages to that with several countries in particular.

So it is to the Pacific Command’s benefit to have more than less ships.  The more capable they are, the better, because we will ask much of the crews on those ships as we hope to engage, demonstrate readiness and enhance partnership.  the higher end technical capabilities those ships have, the easier it is for us to assure the secretary of defense we’re able to execute whatever operations he tells us to execute – whether it’s United Nations Security Council resolution, whether it’s exercises like Malabar, or whether it’s a no-kidding, high-end – God forbid – but like an Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom type of kinetic military operation.

Lots of ships are better than less ships.  Higher end capabilities are better than lower end capabilities.  There is, of course, the issue of affordability. The DDG-51 is a wonderful platform, and if that’s how the Navy chooses to go, we would be happy with that.  Their decision to make, we just want our fair share of them when the decision’s done.  A little more than our fair share.  (Laughter.)  Thanks, Rebekah.

MR. SLOCOMBE:  Before you take this question, Admiral Keating has been very generous with his time.  I think we should take just this question and just one more to finish up one time.  One of the things one learns in the Pentagon is meetings are supposed to start and stop on time.

Q:  Sir, I hope this question doesn’t disappoint you.  Guy Haywood from the British Embassy also.

ADM. KEATING:  Hello, Guy.

Q:  Sir, thank you.  We traditionally think of warm places when we think of your AOR.  You’ve outlined at the beginning of your strategy and the last lady just made it on presence – as you’re looking out 20 years, to the north of your AOR is the Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea.  I’m thinking presence, and I’m not talking submarines.  As you’ve looked out 20 years and the prospect of ice-free summers, defending U.S. endeavors off the coastline and you provide forces to the U.S. Arctic coastline, how much does the Arctic feature into your thinking in your formulation strategy?

ADM. KEATING:  You know, Guy, it’s a terrific question.  The shortest answer is the Arctic didn’t figure much, but we didn’t ignore it.  There are all manner of interesting aspects to the global warming if that’s what’s really happening – oh man – as there is unmistakable evidence of increased access to the Northwest Passage and the North Passage.

So if you come up here what military command is responsible?  Is it Northern Command?  I could have made a pretty compelling case two-and-a-half, three years ago.  Is it Pacific Command?  You bet.  Is it European Command?  Or is it – and what about Canada?  Is it their water?  How do we work through the policy challenges attendant to military operations up here as is certain will be more than less involved in the out years in operations or at least guaranteeing freedom of access in the maritime domain.

So it is an issue that we are studying more closely – you know the classic staff response, well, we’ll take that for action.  Well, we have it for action.  We’re working on it with Northern Command, with European Command, through the joint staff and the office of the secretary of defense for policy.  It’s complicated, it’s challenging, it’s important.  We talked about the trade – the $1 trillion of trade that our countries do with the United States.  The decrease in transit time is startling between the far Eastern countries and the U.K. and our NATO allies in Europe.

Well, everybody in Europe can cut four or five steaming days off if the Northwest Passage is open.  So an issue of significant strategic and economic importance, we’re working it in concert with, not in contrast to Northern Command, European Command, our friends and allies in the Department of State.

MR. SLOCOMBE:  And on that note, complicated, challenging and important, it is 18:30; you are dismissed.

ADM. KEATING:  Thank you, sir.  Thanks, Walt.

Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.

Back to Admiral Timothy Keating Event Page

Shuja Nawaz, director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, published an op-ed entitled “Pakistan’s Summer of Chaos” in Foreign Policy.  As Pakistan’s leaders prepare for a major campaign in the FATA, Nawaz warns that a failure to take into account the lessons from Swat could be disastrous.

The full text of his essay is available at the New Atlanticist.

As the summer solstice draws near, it seems as if all the evil spirits are coming out to haunt the body politic of Pakistan. The country faces an escalation in hostilities on many fronts. And unlike in the past, when sweet deals and concessions could woo militants and protesters into silence, this time no amount of amulets will drive them away.

 

On the battlefield, the portents exist for a major new clash between the Army and the country’s homegrown militants. There are reports of forthcoming military action against fighters in South Waziristan, on top of the Army’s ongoing assault against the Taliban in Swat and Malakand. The fighting in Swat has displaced nearly 3 million people in just over a month — a number likely to swell as the Army moves into Waziristan. One might expect protests against the government and even perhaps the military to erupt if these internally displaced persons (IDPs) cannot swiftly and safely return home.

Pakistan indeed finds itself in quite a mess, and cleaning it up requires some review of how exactly the country became so disheveled. Before the assault on Swat began last month, the Army had been confined to its bases, apparently having rousted (but not routed) the Taliban. With the local and federal governments absent from the region in name and in services, the militants crept back and established a bloody regime. Violence escalated, and the Army was reticent to step in absent a long-term plan for controlling the area. So, the government agreed to a peace deal with Taliban-sympathizers. The truce was intended to subdue the militants, but instead, it gave them more time to organize.

Rather than melting away, the Taliban began snatching up territory closer and closer to the Pakistani heartland, and outrage among locals and the larger Pakistani population pushed the administration and the Army to react. Their tactic of choice was a full-fledged assault. The Army now has close to 150,000 troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Swat, and Malakand. In Swat alone, there are at least two full divisions from the eastern frontier and an additional four brigades cobbled together from divisions usually stationed near the Indian border. In addition, there is a full brigade of commandos in the Peochar Valley, and nine wings of the Frontier Corps. The total troop commitment in Swat is about 52,000. The military is taking losses daily. The militants, meanwhile, have taken the battle to the center of Pakistan, attacking offices of the Inter-Services Intelligence in Lahore in May and other softer targets, such as the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar last week.

Pakistan needs to regain territory and reestablish the writ of the provincial and federal governments in Swat and Malakand. The bad news is that taking territory, as the military is doing now, is not enough. There is no effective civil or judicial system in place to speedily see to the needs of the population, nor is there an effective local police force to protect civilians from Taliban reprisals. We are still waiting to see any semblance of a government plan for dealing with the IDPs’ return home. The Army is neither trained nor equipped for that task and cannot be expected to hold the areas that it clears. Locals told U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, special envoy to Pakistan, that the civilian leadership was still missing in action when he arrived to assess the situation in IDP camps. Little has really changed.

Now, the Army may be preparing for action in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan areas into South Waziristan, with the goal of flushing out or even eliminating Baitullah Mehsud and his fellow leaders of the Pakistani Taliban. In its effort, the Army may well resort to its old tactic of leveraging tribal rivalries. The target of their affections this time might be Mullah Nazir of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe — traditional enemies of the Mehsuds. If so, it’s a dangerous strategy. If the situation devolves into tribal war, Pakistan risks losing the support of those Mehsuds that may not yet be fully aligned with Baitullah. And the Taliban leadership might simply melt into the countryside as the Army battles in populated areas.

Which brings us back to Pakistan’s 3 million displaced, only 200,000 of whom have been accommodated in official camps. The rest are fending for themselves and are anxious to return to their homes and orchards. Before they can do so, however, those areas must be safe and secure — and there remains only a narrow window for the government to prepare for rehabilitation and reconstruction before winter. With the exception of the United States, very few countries have come forward to assist in this effort. The Muslim world has been notably silent, as have the Europeans. A number of potential donors had already pledged more than $5 billion to help Pakistan’s economy at the Tokyo meeting this spring, but donor fatigue might be setting in now.

Aside from foreshadowing future turmoil, the Swat operation and the flood of IDPs indicate a lack of strategic planning on the part of Pakistan. A coherent strategy was nowhere to be found in both cases, nor was there any meeting of the minds between civilian and military thinkers and between federal and local officials on how to tackle the militants.

Another seemingly obvious but important lesson is that military attacks address only the symptoms of discontent, while doing little to tackle the root causes of militancy. No steps have been taken by the government as yet to integrate FATA into Pakistan’s economy and polity, to regularize the region’s legal system, or to allow Pakistan’s political parties to operate inside FATA’s boundaries. Nor have any plans been made to employ FATA’s bulging youth population, an estimated 300,000 potential Taliban recruits. The government could rapidly create employment by launching heavy infrastructure projects such as east-west roads linking FATA to Pakistan, construction of embankments, small dams, and tube wells.

Washington is doing its best to provide Pakistan the wherewithal to tackle these issues. Now it’s time for Pakistan to step up and formulate its implementation plans, before it loses the trust of its people and the summer boils over into political chaos.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council. This essay was previously published at ForeignPolicy.com.

As President Barack Obama prepares to address the Muslim World from Cairo on Thursday this week, he would do well not to dwell on the past but to look to the future. His speech should be the first salvo in a battle to meet the expectations of a world dominated by youth. He should not revive memories of past conflicts.

He needs to keep certain facts in mind, many of them intuitively clear to him no doubt from his own exposure to parts of the Muslim World and to his early personal friendships with young Muslims.

First, Muslims, who comprise between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world’s population, are a diverse lot. Speaking politically or socially of the “Muslim World” as a bloc would be a mistake, as much as speaking of left-handed persons in the world as a bloc. Second, their population is rising rapidly, close to 2 per cent a year worldwide. In the last century the world’s Muslim population rose from 150 million to over 1.2 billion.

Most important, President Obama will be addressing a population with a huge “youth bulge”: In the Middle East, for example, 60 per cent of the population is below 25 years. Research indicates that some 60 of the 67 countries with a youth bulge are embroiled in internal conflicts today. In 62 countries of the world, two-thirds of the population is below 30. Countries like Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are included in this group. Over half of the population of Iran is below 30 years.

Muslim youth were excited by Obama’s election and it is this group that he should address when he speaks from Cairo on June 4, for they, not the aging autocrats or obscurantist clerics, will control the future of the Muslim World. And they are increasingly connected with the world at large through the internet, radio, and television.

What is the message they wish to hear?

• The US will match its deeds to its words. It will no longer talk of democracy while supporting and propping up autocrats in the Muslim World;
• It will help open up societies, using moral suasion, new technologies, and by aligning itself with the forces of moderation and progress;
• It will help create jobs by investing in the infrastructure of the Muslim World, while laying the foundation for the future with aid for education rather than military hardware; and
• It understands the angst and the anger of the youth of the Muslim World and supports them in their quest to stay true to their Muslim roots while reaching for the fruits of democracy and progress that youth around the globe seek.

If President Obama connects with Muslim youth this week he will be investing in the future by drawing them away from the blandishments of the radical Mullahs. If he bends his message to maintaining ties with the antiquated feudal and dynastic leaders of the Muslim World, the opportunity will be lost to build a better world for all of us.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.  This essay originally appeared in the Huffington Post as “Obama Needs to Look to the Future.” 

Shuja Nawaz, director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, commented on North Korea’s recent nuclear tests as part of a discussion for PRI‘s The World.

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