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A Dialogue with Pervez Musharraf: 11/10/10 – Transcript

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THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

REMARKS BY FORMER PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN
PERVEZ MUSHARRAF

WELCOME:
FREDERICK KEMPE,
PRESIDENT AND CEO,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ,
DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA CENTER,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
PERVEZ MUSHARRAF,
FORMER PRESIDENT,
PAKISTAN

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2010
10:02 A.M.
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

    FREDERICK KEMPE:  Thank you all and welcome to the Atlantic Council. I’m Fred Kempe, President and CEO. President Musharraf, it is a particular honor to see you again and in this setting. My last interview with you before I left the Wall Street Journal – where I was editor looking after Europe and the Middle East, and your region – to lead the Atlantic Council, was in January 2006 in Davos. I’ll give a couple of lines from this interview, just to illustrate how much can change and how little can change in a period of time.  We talked about something that hadn’t made the news much until that time, and that was the notion of a gas pipeline that would run from Iran to Pakistan and potentially on to India, a trilateral track that could be game-changing.  One of the things we’re working on at the Atlantic Council in the South Asia Center is, how does one drive this kind of regional cooperation?  How does one wage peace in the region? 

    We talked about drones.  There had just been an attack on a village where al-Qaida leaders were expected to have had dinner, that killed Pakistani women and children and set off street protests in Pakistan cities.  You talked in the interview of how you hadn’t been informed in advance and that Pakistan had told the U.S., quote, “We don’t want anyone to operate in Pakistan,” unquote, even if that meant a slower response to intelligence.

    Mr. President, we established the South Asia Center two years ago because we recognized the centrality not only of these sorts of questions but because of the centrality of the bilateral relationship with Pakistan in its regional context.  You are an unusual man, talent, that understands both the region and Washington.  And, interestingly, we have picked a leader for our center who is probably the most unique person, Shuja Nawaz, in understanding – he’s an insider in both societies and an outsider in both societies, which is really a frightening bit of schizophrenia to bring to the leadership of any organization.  But he knows how Washington works, and he knows how Pakistan works.  And it gives us a leadership that has a position where the South Asia Center is not an American center; it really is a global center talking about a region and bringing us real, real expertise that has put us at the center of this debate after just two years – less than two years in operation.

    Only by understanding the relationship with Pakistan with this kind of sophistication can we move forward.  There may be no more important bilateral relationship in 2011, for the U.S., than this one, President Obama’s trip to India notwithstanding.

    So we want to talk about the global – the geographic subcontinent in the center – Gulf states, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran.  We understand it’s all interlinked.  And we think the solution to the problems we’re looking at will, in the end, only come from this.

    John Kerry has called our work on U.S.-Pakistan relations “seminal.”  Since the center’s launch, we have published an updated report.  The first report we did was in 2009.  We then did an updated report on the tenuous relationship.  And we commit – we remain committed to our mission of waging peace.

    Let me just quote the first sentence from that report.  Quote:  “Perhaps no bilateral relationship in the world matches that of the U.S and Pakistan when it comes to its combustible combination of strategic importance and perilous instability.”  So that context is as important, as is our speaker today, a man who understands the context and the challenges as well as anyone on Earth. 

    Few people in the world have an understanding of the inner workings of Pakistan, its current place in the region and its future direction better than President Musharraf.  He worked his way up through the military and political ranks to become general and army chief of staff in 1998.  He took over president after a bloodless coup in 1999, and led his country until his resignation in 2009.  His life story tracks the dramatic history of the country and the region.  He is not only a person of history in the region, but as we’ll hear today, he’s very much a person also of the present.

    President Musharraf, the floor is yours.  And then Shuja Nawaz will moderate you after your opening comments.  (Applause.)

    PERVEZ MUSHARRAF:  Mr. Frederick Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council, members of the council, it is indeed my unique privilege to be talking to all of you on a very important subject, the subject of our region, what is happening there.  It is the happening place today.  And the strategic focus of the whole world is to our region.  Therefore, I would like to really say that we must understand the reason – region. 

    And there is no doubt that the world and indeed the United States coalition forces and Pakistan must cooperate fully to emerge successful in whatever they are battling.  But within this, therefore, I am going to talk to you on regional developments, on the current situation there in the region, and also the ups and downs of Pakistan and United States relationships. 

    As you said, it’s a strategic relationship of great importance – but may I very frankly say that yes, indeed, in words.  But in actions, one would expect much more to show or to demonstrate the strategic importance that Pakistan enjoys in that region, which I’m going to now enunciate through whatever I’m going to say.

    I would like to take a historical perspective of this – whatever has been happening in – around in this region, and I will start (by ?), because from that I’m going to – sorry – (phone rings) – (laughter) – I think – yeah, (go shut it off ?) – (laughter) – I’ll take the historical perspective, dividing it into certain periods, and within that I will extract the relationship of Pakistan and the United States and why there have been ups and downs.

    First period that I’m going to take is 1979 to ‘89.  And may I say, right since 1948, Pakistan has been a strategic partner of the United States.  And we have been with you all these years, for 42 years right up to 1989 very clearly. 

    From 1979 to ‘89, we launched – with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we launched a jihad against the Soviet forces.  We called it a jihad – when I say “we,” United States and Pakistan – we called it a jihad because we wanted to draw mujahadeen from the whole world, which we did.  We drew about 25,000 to 30,000 mujahadeen from Morocco to Indonesia, from almost all Muslim countries.  We also trained, armed Taliban from the frontier province of Pakistan and pumped them into Afghanistan.

    So this continued – the strategic relationship with the United States, on its up, continued since ‘48, especially in these 10 years where we fought a war together in Afghanistan.  We fought a jihad.  For 10 long years, this jihad was waged.  And in this jihad, the elites of Afghanistan abandoned Afghanistan for United States and the comforts of Europe.  The jihad was spearheaded by religious militant groups.

    And also, the negative aspect, which I must highlight, that what – the glue that held Afghanistan together, the ethnic groups together – which they call Misaq-e-Milli, which translates into “a national covenant” – this glue, after the king was deposed by the Soviets, was no more.  Therefore, when we talk of political resolution, we are talking of a new national covenant, home-grown national covenant giving the Pashtuns of Afghanistan the dominant position in governance.

    Well, these are the two points that I wanted to highlight.  So this period of ‘79-’89 ended in the Soviet defeat in 1989.  But what happened after 1989? 

    I’ll take the next period of ‘89 to 2001, 12 years.  I call this the 12 years of disaster.  Firstly, Pakistan and Afghanistan, this region was totally abandoned by the United States.  Not only abandoned, there was a strategic shift in the United States towards Pakistan – against Pakistan towards India.  There were the sanctions imposed on Pakistan through the Pressler amendment, and cozying up of relations with India starting 1989, in spite of the fact that we were the strategic ally for 42 years and we fought a war together for 10 years.

    This led to a sense of betrayal within the people of Pakistan, which exists even now.  So 1989, the abandonment of the region was one – the first great blunder committed by United States, not only vis-a-vis Pakistan, but also that the 25,000 mujahadeen who were holed up in Afghanistan coalesced into al-Qaida.

    And then in 2005, Taliban emerged.  All this happened because there was a total void and vacuum in Afghanistan, each ethnic group fighting the other, from ‘89 to ‘95 for six years, battling each other.  Even the Pashtuns were divided into about eight different groups, and they ravaged and destroyed the country.

    In ‘95, when Taliban emerged, the fighting then on went between two groups:  the Taliban on one side, Northern Alliance, which was Uzbek, Tajic, Hazara minorities, on the other side.  They then destroyed Afghanistan for another – up to 2001 – for another five, six years.  So in these 12 years, Afghanistan became a ghost country.

    I went to Kabul immediately after 9/11, soon after, when I visited Afghanistan.  It – Kabul was worse than Somalia, if anyone has seen Somalia in the bad days.  So this was Kabul, a ghost city.  This is what happened in these 12 years.  After having won a victory against Soviet Union, the fruits of that victory went to Europe, because the strategic focus then was Eurocentric because of Cold War, East-West, Warsaw Pact, NATO, Berlin Wall, reunification of Germany.  All that happened.  All the gains went to Europe. 

    What did Afghanistan get or Pakistan get?  Nothing.  For 12 years we were abandoned, and Pakistan got 4 million refugees in the process, into Pakistan.  We had to fend for 4 million refugees, warfare, warlordism in Afghanistan, Pakistan alone, to protect its own interests in these 12 years.  That (was the downs of/would redound of ?) Pakistan-United States relations, where Pakistan, the people of Pakistan, thought that United States has used Pakistan and abandoned us.

    Then comes 9/11 and the terrible terrorist attack here in United States.  Pakistan again becomes important.  Pakistan is needed again.  And therefore we again become strategic partners.  But when we became strategic partners, the question that I was asked everywhere that I went in Pakistan:  “What makes you think United States will not again use us and abandon us?”  It’s important, ladies and gentlemen, today, when we are trying to take a decision whether to stay or quit:  Are we again to be abandoned?  Question mark in the minds of every Pakistani.

    So now the next blunder that I would (sort of ?) talk of, which is very, very significant.  After 9/11 – after 9/11, the Taliban were defeated with the help of Northern Alliance, which were the minorities:  Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras.  Taliban dispersed, ran al-Qaida, totally decimated.  They ran into the mountains and cities of Pakistan.  There was no command structure.  There was total disarray in Taliban, al-Qaida – nothing of the sort. 

    Afghanistan now was available for the political instrument to be used.  The military instrument delivered in Afghanistan in 2000s – soon after 9/11.  By giving – (inaudible) – Afghanistan, where force was dominant position – military dominant position in Afghanistan; and now political solution available to be executed in Afghanistan. 

    But unfortunately, that political solution didn’t come about.  What is that political solution?  You cannot govern Afghanistan with a minority of Panjshiris dominating the government.  Panjshiris are only 8 percent.  They are half of Tajiks.  Afghanistan has always been governed by Pashtuns historically, they being 50, 55 percent of Afghanistan.  Now here was a situation early in 2002 where we could have changed policy and strategy, taken Pashtuns on board and put a legitimate Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul.  Unfortunately, we did not do that.  The environment was available.  We failed to do that.

    And therefore, we continued governance with the Panjshiri minority, the biggest blunder with which we are persisting even now.  Now we are trying to talk to moderate Taliban or Talibans.  What we should have done in 2002 and ‘3 from a position of strength now we are trying to do from a position of weakness.  That was the next blunder. 

    And now we are in the process of taking a decision whether to stay or quit.  Well, ladies and gentlemen, this fourth decision has to be taken very carefully.  We cannot commit a fourth blunder.

    What I would like to say is, in Afghanistan, a lot of people ask whether we can win.  I would like to – my reply is, we must not lose, even if we don’t – even if the answer to the winning may be 50-50.  But we must not lose.  And let me say with 100 percent conviction, if we stay there and show resolve, we will not lose.  And we are not losing. 

    So therefore, my food for thought here is, ladies and gentlemen, that we must not lose first and then work out the winning strategy.  And I have said that Pakistan is supposedly a strategic partner.  Well, I don’t know.  Pakistanis and people of Pakistan are not too sure whether we are the strategic partner in words and deeds and actions.

    Pakistan has certain sensitivities, ladies and gentlemen.  What are the sensitivities of Pakistan?

    Firstly, our integrity, our well-being, of course, and the world showing concern and giving us importance which is due to us.

    The other is the Kashmir dispute.  The Kashmir dispute is important not only that it’s a dispute in the United Nations since ‘48, but today it is causing a lot of terrorism and extremism within our society.  In 1989, when Kashmir erupted, freedom suddenly erupted in the Indian part of Kashmir, dozens of mujahadeen groups sprung up within Pakistan.  And thousands of people were prepared, volunteering to join to go to India to held Kashmir – Indian-held Kashmir to fight against the Indian army.  And all these much-maligned names of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Hizbul Mujahadeen, et cetera, et cetera – I don’t want you to remember names – are products of ‘90s.

    Now, when there’s another intifada kind of a movement by people of India-held Kashmir, and that is suppressed by the Indian army with hundreds of people, dozens killed, these very mujahadeen groups again start rising and people give them a lot of support.  This sensitivity and its impact to terrorism and extremism must be understood by the world.  And therefore the significance of resolution of the Kashmir dispute – not because Pakistan wants it.  It’s necessary for the region, for the world to fight terrorism and extremism.

    The other sensitivities are nuclear capability.  Ladies and gentlemen, Pakistan is much the rogue element, rogue nuclear state, rogue army, “Islamic bomb.”  I don’t know why Indian is not a “Hindu bomb” or an Israeli bomb is not a “Jewish bomb.”  Why is Pakistani bomb only an “Islamic bomb”?  I don’t understand this logic.  But anyway, Pakistan is nuclear for as a defensive existential threat exists on it.  Our strategy was of military – defensive military deterrence right from 1948.  And we quantified this into army, navy, air force on the conventional side.  We held that always.

    In 1974, India went nuclear, so therefore the defensive deterrence strategy became untenable.  Therefore, Pakistan had to go nuclear.  And when India started firing missiles in the early ‘90s, Pakistan had to make missiles to restore that balance and restore the strategy of defensive deterrence, which we did.  So therefore while Pakistan’s nuclear or strategic capability is an existential compulsion, which is not the case with India.  And I don’t understand the logic, and no Pakistani will ever understand the logic, of why Pakistan’s nuclear assets are disturbing the world.  So this is our sensitivity.

    Our nuclear, our strategic assets is the pride of every man walking the streets of Pakistan.  So any indication of negativism coming from abroad, a threat coming on the strategic capability of Pakistan, is viewed extremely seriously by every individual Pakistani.  So this is the compulsion.

    Now, President Obama’s visit to India.  I don’t want to talk much, (if you wish ?).  And I don’t believe in Pakistan being Indo-centric. 

    And I do believe that relationships – in bilateral importance of relationships.  United States president wants to go to India, absolutely he has all the rights to do everything.  But if Pakistan is a strategic partner, Pakistan has strategic significance – Pakistan is suffering because of so many bomb blasts, hundreds, if not thousands, of people dead; Pakistan army has suffered 2,500 dead; Pakistan’s ISI has suffered about 300 dead; and then we’ve had this flood, massive flood, unprecedented, so many casualties – I thought President Obama should have shown some concern for this small strategic partner and visit to Pakistan.

    No mention of Kashmir.  I’ve explained the issue.  It is sensitive, from fighting terrorism and extremism point of view.  So while the concern of India may be that no third parties ought to be involved, yes, indeed, it should not be involved and we should resolve Kashmir dispute bilaterally, which we were doing in my time, and we were near a solution. 

    But certainly from the sole superpower, one expects concern for Pakistan, being a strategic ally of importance, and also sensitivity to terrorism and extremism, because Kashmir does contribute negatively towards terrorism and extremism. 

    While there is concern in United States or interest in United States because India wants to purchase $45 billion of arms purchases, yes, it is our commercial and economic interest, but I remember in my time, Pakistan, I was requesting European Union and United States for an FTA, free trade agreement, or a PTA, preferential trade agreement, on an additional market access, because I believed in trade, not aid, because trade means opening of factories, job creation, poverty alleviation, unemployment reduction.  Unfortunately, it was not given. 
   
    Lastly, ladies and gentlemen, I talk of the political scene in Pakistan.  Here in United States, as we’ve all said, you know, Pakistan’s strategic significance, therefore you ought to be concerned what is happening in Pakistan and what the future holds for Pakistan.  We must ensure that Pakistan’s integrity, its solidarity, its stability is maintained, because we have to fight terrorism and extremism and defeat it. 

    And if we want to do that, we look at the political realities in Pakistan.  Today Pakistan is on a downward turn:  its economy, its governance, political turmoil and, of course, terrorism and extremism.  In this situation, let’s look at the future.  One has to look at the future; otherwise, we always tend to react, react when it is too late. 

    We need to see is there light in this darkness that Pakistan is facing today.  And that light will come through the political alternatives.  I do understand that democracy has to be maintained, but through democratic – through the process of elections, is light visible?  We will have elections in 2013, hopefully, when the government completes its tenure, or some people are saying midterm elections or whatever. 

    But what will be the result of that elections?  Will we have a government which will deliver to Pakistan and take Pakistan forward in its darkness toward light, fight terrorism, ensure the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan?  I don’t see that light, unfortunately.

    Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I personally thought that I need to get involved.  Maybe, maybe there is a chance that I produce an alternative which may be viable for Pakistan.  And therefore I have joined politics.  Where one has to analyze the future of Pakistan, we must ensure the stability and solidarity of Pakistan for the sake of controlling of turmoil in that region and containing further turmoil in the region.

    This is all that I had to say, ladies and gentlemen.  I know I had less time.  I’m open to any questions that you may want to ask.  (Applause.)

    SHUJA NAWAZ:  Thank you, Mr. President.  As usual, that was a sweeping, strategic view, a vision that you’ve often reflected in your talks. 

    I’m going to pick up on some of the points that you raised, and particularly on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.  And reminded by a quote from Gen. Zial ul Haq to Ambassador Jamsheed Marker when he said that being friends with America is like living on the banks of a great river; every four years, it changes course and leaves you either flooded or high and dry.  (Laughter.)  And one could get that flavor from your commentary on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

    But when you took the fateful step of joining what some call the coalition of the coerced, after 9/11, you agreed to provide access to the United States to Pakistani territory to launch the attack on Afghanistan.  And there is enough evidence that some of the earlier drone attacks, which led to a lot of public outcry against Pakistan’s involvement in the war, were also launched from Pakistani airfields originally and then moved to Afghanistan.

    There was no Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan at that time, and it resulted largely because of the infusion of the Pakistan army into the border region.

    So when looking back on this period, do you think there was too much haste in acceding to the U.S. request?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Well, this is the argument that many people have given, and I have faced this question many, many times.  First of all, Pakistan’s decision to join the coalition and the United States.  The first question that I asked myself before joining:  What is in Pakistan’s interest?  Does Pakistan want Talibanization, a Talibanized government in Pakistan?  Do we believe in obscurantist views of Islam that Taliban hold?  Do we want that in Pakistan?  The answer was no, we don’t.  And I know that 99 percent of Pakistanis will say no, we don’t want that.

    With all that confidence, it was not in our interest to be supportive towards Taliban.  So it was Pakistan’s interest, not U.S. interest. 

    Then I also went further.  If we did not join, what could happen?  And my answer, which I don’t want to elaborate, was certainly very dangerous for Pakistan because India was ever prepared to join, and certainly United States would have attacked Afghanistan.  How do they attack Afghanistan from Iran – from India?  Obviously, violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and airspace or whatever or land.

    So therefore, from all points of view, bravado is good at a personal level.  I’m prepared to show bravado.  But where nation and states are involved, bravado is not the solution for a leader.  And therefore, I take – took the decision.  And whether that decision was correct or wrong, I think with hindsight, most of the Pakistanis believe that it was a correct decision now.

    Now, regarding TTP, was it not there?  Yes indeed TTP was not there.  There were – there was TNSM, which was more serious, TNSM led by Sufi Muhammad, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi.  He was the main leader, and he is a man who’s stronger in this region, in the division – Malakand division, it is TNSM.  TTP is a later induction, yes.

    But then there was (no ?) Baitullah Mehsud.  He – these are all products – because of what has been happening – these are products because we defeated, as I said.  And after 9/11, Taliban and al-Qaida were defeated. 

    When did Taliban reemerge?  2003 or even 2004, I think, and 2003.  We had a two-year period to execute a political solution in Afghanistan acceptable to the people, with Pashtun in the dominant position.  I coined the term:  “All Taliban are Pashtun, but all Pashtun are not Taliban.”  I said this in 2002.  So therefore let’s get – let us win away Pashtun from the Taliban and get them on our side, the Pashtun. 

    Now, that was not done, so therefore Taliban emerged.  When Taliban emerged in 2004, things started now going towards Taliban.  While we battled al-Qaida and decimated them, which is the position now, they are few in numbers.  But Taliban have emerged.  So these can’t be – you can’t put that on my – (chuckles) – that I did something which created TTP.  (It has been all ?).

    And then Kashmir?  Yes, indeed.  As I said, Kashmir, a freedom struggle erupted.  The – this had all its dynamics.  So religious militancy in Afghanistan, religious militancy in Kashmir.  And after 9/11, yes, indeed, the – all these also turned their guns towards us, towards me.  So therefore our national – (inaudible) – (caught on ?) actually.  Religious extremism went on the rise.  And because of that, TTP also came about et cetera, et cetera.  Yes, I agree. 

    So I think we need to – we need to feel the history, but also feel future – the realities of today and battling it in future and winning.  I think we should concentrate on that and not go wrong there.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Just to go back to the drones, you mentioned yourself that every single person in Pakistan –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.

    MR. NAWAZ:  – on the street is opposed to the drones.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.

    MR. NAWAZ:  If FATA is an integral part of Pakistan – and it is –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.

    MR. NAWAZ:  – then why allow the drone attacks to cross your sovereign boundary.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.  Yes, you did ask (me that ?). 

    MR. NAWAZ:  Yes.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Now, drones, this is a – this is a – this is a dilemma, here.  Let me share with you:  The dilemma is that these drones do certainly target militants.  I know that.  But at the same time, indiscriminate use of drones cause a lot of collateral damage.  That is what is negative.  And the other negative is violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan.

    Now, you have said about my time – in my time, I never allowed anything to violate sovereignty of Pakistan.  We needed drones for giving us information and intelligence about targets.  Where is the target?  That is the main thing.  Where are the militants?  And aerial surveillance is important to spot the militants. 

    But then, after spotting them, is the issue of what action to be taken now.  There are many methods of dealing with a target.  You can use the Air Force with precision-guided munitions, you can send your helicopter gunships, or you can use – we have created a force called SOTF, Special Operations Task Force of SSG, the Special Services Group, Helibond (ph) force.  We can send the Helibond (ph) force, surround it and attack it.  So there are various methods.

    Now, I was for use of Pakistan armed forces – (inaudible) – a target was ?) indicated.  So that was (end figures ?) itself.  I think there were only a few drone attacks in those times.  I always objected to them.  Now there is just indiscriminate use of drones, and that is causing a negative, while they do attack militants, but the people of Pakistan do not accept violation of their sovereignty.  So that is the dilemma.

    I’ve always been saying, why not give drones to Pakistan, the Pakistan armed forces?  Now that is where the United States laws come into play of transfer of high technology and all.  Well, then you – well, this is – this is unusual circumstances, unusual measures required. 

    MR. NAWAZ:  This is the element of mistrust that still prevails between the two strategic partners.  But let me take you back across the border.  You were saying something quite important about Afghanistan and the U.S. strategy there. 

    You said, “can we win,” and you said the response is, “We must not lose, and then come up with a strategy.”  Now, it’s been almost 10 years since there has been kinetic operations in Afghanistan.  What in your mind is that missing strategy?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.  I mean, that is the key question, yes.

    First, I said the important part:  Do not lose.  And when we talk of quitting, it is – has terrible impact, negative on both sides, negative on partners more to, because every partner in the coalition, I think, including Pakistan, would like to evaluate the situation after you quit.  And certainly I am reminded of 1989 – all ethnic groups fighting each other, millions of refugees in Pakistan, and we are, again, alone.  So Pakistan will have to think – must think.  Negative.

    The enemy strategy is very, very clear.  If I was a Taliban commander, God forbid, the easiest thing is to while away time.  “One year, I mean, what is the problem?  I mean, time is on my side.  Let’s wait out until these people go.”  What a negative thing.

    So first of all let us show regard, ladies and gentlemen.  We must know in tribal culture force chivalry is expected.  And this little bit of veering and cowardice is never respected.  So therefore please show resolve and stay there.

    Now we have to certainly win.  What is the winning strategy?  And how can we do it?  We have to first be in a military-dominant position.  Speak from position of strength; never speak from position of weakness.

    So how do you do that?  Our forces today, U.S. forces, coalition forces – if you just take this – are diluted in space.  Militarily, we called it “dilution of space.”  Too much space, less force.  So any thinking of going across the Pakistan border, by the way, is increasing space with the same force, more dilution of space.  You will be defeated.  You will suffer more casualties.  Never make that mistake.

    So therefore, now how do you do away with this dilution of space?  Afghan National Army?  Yes, indeed.  Raise more.  But do we know that the Afghan National Army today is all Tajik?  What a blunder.  Fifty percent, 55 percent is ethnic Pashtun.  How can you do this?  There has to be a great balance in the army.  In the Afghan National Army, there have to be more Pashtuns.

    Secondly, is there any other element?  I think there is even now, although we are eight years late.  We should have done it in 2002.  If you see Pashtun culture, tribal culture, in this tribal culture, in the tribal tribes, two things that I want to highlight.

    The clerics had no position in the – in the hierarchy.  They were confined to their mosques.  Who wielded authority?  Tribal malik.  Over the centuries, over the centuries, tribal malik.  Where are they?  They have been suppressed, but they are there.  They are there.

    Secondly, this tribal culture, everyone carries a weapon, and they have armories.  Each side has its armory.  Whenever there was a tribal feud, weapons used to be issued from this armory and withdrawn.  So there’s a weapon culture, and pride in weapons and good weapons.

    Now, let us locate tribes who have no ideological affinity with Taliban and tribal maliks who have some – I don’t want to use the four-letter words – who have something in there.  (Scattered laughter.)  And they then are raised, armed.  Give them their pride.  Let them come with you and fight the Taliban.  By the way, a tribal – lashkar – they are called “lashkars.”  Tribal lashkars have always fought with the Pakistan army against India in all wars.  So therefore let’s create those lashkars.  So this is to gain military dominance.

    And then the political instrument.  Military will never give you a solution.  It can only create an environment for you.  So political instrument.  We have to get the Pashtuns on board.  There is no moderate Taliban.  I don’t agree with this term of “moderate Taliban.”  There is Taliban.  There is Pashtun.  So we – but what – however, whatever the name, get the Pashtuns on board.  We have to get them.

    And, good thing in that, the Taliban is not a monolith, ladies and gentlemen.  It’s not Mullah Omar over all the Taliban, you’ve got good command structure like the army.  It’s not at all that.  There are a number of Taliban groups operating.  In fact, let me tell you that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is in Kunar, and Haqqani, their people have clashed with each other.  Gulbuddin Hekmatyar people suffered about 150 dead killed by Haqqani group chaps.  And he then ambushed them.  So what I’m trying to say is that there is – it’s very good that there are a number of Taliban.  So there is scope for managing political affairs, but from a position of strength.

    MR. KEMPE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  One last question from me before I share you with the audience.  And I know that they have many questions.  This is picking up on your points regarding the 2013 elections in Pakistan.  You said you decided to join politics.  Some would say that you joined politics in 1999 when you took over the government.

    However, what has changed in Pakistan from the time that you left Pakistan voluntarily that you think would allow you to go back?  And then the obstacle which you obviously face apart from potential legal challenges is the question that – the indirect election of the presidency, with the provincial assembly members, the national assembly, the senate voting for the office of the president.  Your party, the All Pakistan Muslim League, has only just been launched.  Do you think there is any realistic chance that you will have enough support, particularly if the elections are called early?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes, well, a journey of a thousand miles starts with the first step.  And it’s always the first step which overawes people, that it is too big.  Well, if it’s too big, then you think of it as too big, don’t enter because you don’t have that leadership in you.

    I presume it is not too big because, number one, I left not because I was – my popularity was rock-bottom.  I was the most popular man in Pakistan until 2007.  There’s no doubt in my mind.  I know that.  I had a standing in Pakistan in the masses, in the people of Pakistan.  It is in 2007 that political turmoil took place because of certain legal actions that I took, for which there was a reason; I don’t want to get involved in that.

    It is not that Pakistan was going down.  It was not that the socioeconomic development of Pakistan was going down.  It was not that Pakistan’s people, the condition of the people, the welfare, well-being of the people was going down.  The poverty in Pakistan, according to the World Bank figures, 2008 figures, are from 34 percent, it reduced to 17 percent.  Which government has done this?  And the people of Pakistan know it.  It went down – it was hard, poverty, in the seven years that I was there.  Now, so this is one, that my popularity did go down.  There is no doubt.  But it didn’t touch rock-bottom, that I was – I was popular in a lot of segments in Pakistan.  One is this.

    The other point is what Pakistan is suffering today is the reason for, again, people thinking of me, that I could deliver from the darkness.  I said that in this darkness, the people of Pakistan are not seeing any light.  What is the choice if not people’s party?  People’s party is performing today in government.  And I don’t have to elaborate; everyone knows what is happening in Pakistan as far as governance is concerned.

    The alternative is Nawaz Sharif, PMLN:  tried twice and failed miserably.  In ‘99, Pakistan was a failed and defaulted and bankrupt state.  We had $300 million only in the foreign exchange reserves.  And all our indicators – debt-to-GDP ratio was 103 percent – maybe a little better than the United States today.  (Laughter.)  But however, it was 103 percent.  And it was in a – the (economy ?) was in a terrible state.  People were poor, they were crying, they were yearning for some change. 

    I was a chief then.  I know how many women and men came to me and told me, “When are you going to take over?  What are you waiting for – when Pakistan is gone?”  I’m talking about ‘99.  If I gave the names of some of them, you even – this gathering will know them, who came to me and told me to take over before Pakistan is gone – in ‘99. 

    This condition now is almost the same.  Despondency, hopelessness, people wanting to run away, inflation touching the sky, people committing suicide, people in the street.  Now they are remembering what they’ve missed:  the important, essential items in Pakistan.  Sugar is one of the essential items.  I was reading just two days back, in 2006 the sugar price went from 21 to 23 rupees per kilo.  And I called the sugar mill growers to explain to me what is the cost of sugar cane they are getting and what is the profits they make, why is this to be increased.  Today it is 115 rupees a kilo.  This is what has happened in two years. 

    This is just one thing.  I don’t have to quote all other figures and all other economic indicators.  Therefore, the Pakistan – people of Pakistan are yearning for deliverance.  And that is why the first step has a lot of relevance.  And I think there’s a lot of – a chance of success.  I cannot be sure.  But I believe that it is better to try and fail than to go down not trying at all.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I’m going to open it up.  And I’m going to start in the front over here.  If you could please wait for the microphone and identify yourself when you’re called upon.  Ambassador – (inaudible) –

    Q:  Mr. President, good morning.  Welcome back to Washington.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  How are you, sir?

    Q:  Yes, very well, thank you.  Very fond memories of the many different times –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes, indeed.

    Q:  – that we met and visited Pakistan, and also the first meeting you had with President Bush when I was ambassador to the United Nations at our official residence in New York after 9/11.

    My question builds on what you were just talking about, Mr. President, which is the economic situation.  I do remember that the economy was growing, I think, at its peak during your tenure, at something like 7 percent a year.  You were –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Eight point 4 percent, sir, in 2006.  (Laughter.) 

    Q:  Okay.  I stand corrected.  And I recall that we were talking about different ways of economic cooperation, including trying to create reconstruction opportunity zones so that we could give preferential treatment to Pakistani products that would come into the United States.  So could you perhaps just elaborate a little bit on what your economic platform would be to get Pakistan back on its feet economically again if you were – had the opportunity?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes, indeed.  Yes – sir, thank you very much.  I cherish the memory of my association with you, sir.  Because you were very frank in our approach.  I appreciated your frankness.  And you also appreciated my frankness in exchange.

    You’ve reminded me of the ROZs, sir.  ROZ was reconstruction opportunity zones for the development of economic – socioeconomic development of the – of the tribal regions, tribal agencies.  And we were also promised $(150 ?) million a year, if you remember.  Nothing came about.  That was the negative side.

    So therefore, in the – in this tribal agency, what I want to say is, we have to be fast.  We have to be trusting.  We have to move fast in delivering and doing something for the people, for the tribal agency, for the frontier – for people of Pakistan, even; for Pakistan, even.

    Now, economy.  Today, the economy of Pakistan is nose-diving downward.  I have been analyzing why.  Why is it going down, sir?  First (feel ?) was, immediately after 2008, when the elected government came into being, one thing that happened:  massive flight of capital from Pakistan, going out; Pakistanis taking their – running away with their money.  This led to the exchange rate – the dollar, which was held at 60 rupees for eight years between ‘60 and ‘61, shot up to 85.  Today, it is 87 rupees.  Sixty to 87 rupees, sir.

    FDI has almost – has gone down considerably; I won’t say it has dried up.  So these – the reduction in FDI.  Exports have – half the factories have closed; so therefore, revenue collection has gone down.  The impact is your fiscal deficit gone down – or increased – your balance-of-payment deficit increased, and your – again, your debt-to-GDP ratio on the rise.  I don’t know the latest figure.  So these are the negative trends.

    Why?  Because of lack of trust and confidence in the government.  I personally think if the people – if there is trust and confidence in the government, merely – without doing anything – there will be a reverse flow of money.  After all, Pakistanis want to invest in their own country.  They can be motivated.  They love their country.  Why should they take their money out?  They’ll bring the money back.  And why would the Gulf, these Gulf sheikdoms and anyone else – why would FDI not come back to Pakistan?  I mean, I believe diplomacy and trade relations – mostly, interstate relations have a lot to do with interpersonal relations.  And I’m very sure that Gulf and everyone will be – could be persuaded to invest in Pakistan.  So if we can reverse both these, the economy will start doing well.  I have no doubt in that.

    And our condition today is not what was there in 1999.  The foreign exchange reserves are there.  We left them, from $300 million, to $18-1/2 billion.  This is what we left for Pakistan.  Now it is less.  It is, I think, $8 billion or something, but it is there; it is not $300 million.  And also, our trade is there, our revenue collection is there.  We raised the revenue collection from 308 billion rupees to 1 trillion (rupees).  Now it will certainly go down, but not that much.

    So all this is – the stock exchange; which we went up from – the 1,000 stock exchange indicate – index – had gone to 14-1/2 thousand.  In 2007, it was 14-1/2 thousand.  It has gone down, but it is at 8,000 or 9,000, I think.  So the situation is not as bad.  It is recoverable.  But what is required is confidence of the people in the government, and the government to perform for the state and the people of Pakistan.

    I have a simple definition as food for thought, it is my own definition of – for a leader or for any government:  Ensure the security, progress and development of the state; welfare, well-being of its people.  This is the definition I have.  And if this is being ensured, and it can be ensured, all other things are secondary.  And why I’ve – why I’ve said this – because I know I’m talking to a U.S. audience – democracy, ladies and gentlemen, is – democracy is a tool to deliver for the state progress of the state and welfare, well-being of its people.  It is not an end in itself.  It must deliver to the state and the people.

    So if you have elected government, democratically elected government, but running the state and the people down to the ground, I don’t think that kind of democracy is a democracy that any state wants.  So therefore, end product is the state, welfare of the state, well-being of the people, and that must be ensured.  So we hope that democracy in Pakistan delivers to the people and the state.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.  We have a question there.  And as you can see, there’s a great demand for questions, Mr. President.  We will try –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes, well, I am the culprit.  Sorry, my apologies.  I am giving long answers.

    MR. NAWAZ:  We will try and get to as many as we can.

    Q:  I’m Harlan Ullman.  Mr. President, it’s always good seeing you again.  Thank you for your comments.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Nice meeting you.

    Q:  I agree entirely with your analysis, but where I respectfully disagree is I don’t think we can wait till 2013.

    I’m recently returned from another trip to Pakistan, where – I agree with you – the situation is far more dire than people in this country appreciate.  It seems to me that the most recent strategic dialogue only procrastinated the inevitable, which is going to be some kind of a collision between the United States and Pakistan because of profound misunderstandings.

    My question to you is, what, if anything, can the United States or Pakistan do in the short term to turn around what I believe is going to be this collision?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Well, thank you, sir.

    I am surprised, as well as glad, to hear what you’ve said.  Well, we – what the United States can do is to help Pakistan, and helping Pakistan is – I have been – very bluntly indicated whatever is happening is not really helping Pakistan.  We have to help Pakistan economically, yes, indeed, but concerns of corruption certainly is there.  There’s no doubt.

    So you asked a difficult question, frankly.  What the United States – I think if I was there, I would have asked for market access, give market access, so that I can create jobs, I can open factories, and I can do reducing unemployment, I can reduce poverty.  Now that is certainly a thing that the United States can certainly do immediately.  It can be done immediately. 

    Remaining, I think what Pakistan – on the law and order side, we are being harmed from many directions.  We are fighting terrorism and extremism.  I think United States need to develop a better understanding of the ISI and the army, instead of blaming the army and the ISI for collaborating with Taliban.  I don’t understand why this is done.  On one side, the army has suffered 2,500 dead at the hands of the same Taliban or TTP or TNSM or everyone. 

    So they are killing the army men for – and you are blaming the army.  So I don’t – (honestly, there’s ?) a mismatch.  They are killing the ISI personnel, about 300 dead, out of – I think about eight or 10 bomb attacks on ISI offices all over Pakistan.  But yet you are saying we – they are collaborating with Taliban.  So there’s a mismatch.  Please understand, try to understand.

    And I would say leave micromanagement to Pakistan.  Be concerned with their intentions, that they do not want Taliban and al-Qaida, and be concerned with their strategic delivery.  Don’t micromanage for them.  They understand who to talk to, how to talk, which enemy to take on board and defeat the other, and then go for the other.  Leave this micromanagement to the people of Pakistan.

    So this is the second, I think – a better understanding. 

    I don’t think you can – we need internal stability in Pakistan, political stability.  I don’t know whether the United States can contribute on bringing political stability into Pakistan, but that is the ultimate requirement because it is political stability which will then bring about economic stability, and fighting terrorism and extremism, and good governance.  And that – I don’t know whether the United States can assist.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

    We have Sebastian Gorka at the back. 

    Q:  Thank you, Mr. President, for your very candid presentation.  Sebastian Gorka, National Defense University. 

    If I may draw you out on what seems to be a tension in your presentation, you spoke, with regards to the president’s visit to the region, of your resentment with regards to Indo-centric depictions of Pakistan, that you’re obsessed with India.

    At the same time, earlier on, you spoke of the fact that the nuclear capacity of your nation is a compulsion, is an existential compulsion.  Is that existential compulsion to do with India or something else?  If not, then how do you reconcile these two comments, please?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  It has to do with India, yes, certainly, because if you know, sir, I know of Indian forces – if I were to tell you very briefly, Indian forces today are based on 33 infantry divisions.  Twenty-five of them are oriented towards Pakistan’s border.  They have got about six armor and mechanized divisions, which are the offensive punch, all six organized against Pakistan’s border.  Their forward air bases, with – which are the air bases that are used for an offensive, all oriented towards Pakistan’s border.  Their navy, mainly oriented towards Pakistan’s shores.  So what do you expect?

    And when there are incidents like the attack on the Parliament, in my time, the whole army came on to the borders on Pakistan.  And therefore, we had to move our army and it was a (world ?) situation developed.  What do you expect Pakistan to do?  It’s an existential threat, where a force which is three, four times bigger than Pakistan is oriented against Pakistan’s borders.  And when incidents take place, then the politicians in India are crying for punishment on Pakistan, attacking Pakistan, et cetera, et cetera.

    So what does Pakistan – what does the leadership in Pakistan do?  It has an existential threat.  Therefore I said our military strategy is of minimum defensive deterrence in the conventional and unconventional.  Now, previously it was conventional only.  With India going nuclear, it is also unconventional now.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Mr. Moody.

    Q:  Jim Moody.  Mr. President, very nice to see you again.  Thank you for your frank comments.

    Stepping back from the immediate issues you’ve been discussing that are very important, for those like myself who have lived in Pakistan and love Pakistan, we’re very concerned about the educational system there.  I’ve been to many schools where – I’ve been to many villages where it says on the education map there’s a school there, but you go there, there’s no school.  They call them ghost schools.  Thank goodness that you helped initiate NCHD – that was a good program – but international measures say that only 4 percent of – 40 percent of Pakistani children of school age are in school.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.

    Q:  This is a huge burden for the future.  Stepping away from the immediate issues, political and military, how do we get Pakistan to head towards those Millennium Goals that are so crucial for the long-term benefit of Pakistan?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yes.  I couldn’t agree with you more, sir.  Indeed, the long-term strategy – human resource development, education, health, poverty alleviation, employment generation – education is the key.  This is a knowledge-based economy of the world, and we are missing out.

    But that is a long-term strategy.  Now, how to do it?  I do understand we have to do something.  What did we do and what needs to be done is certainly more allocation of funds to – for education, but when we talk of more allocation of funds, I increased the budget to education from 2.9 percent to 4 percent.  It was miserable.  Four (percent) is also miserable.  But sir, 1 percent increase is 170 billion rupees.  This is the kind of money required, 1 percent increase, from a GDP of $170 billion.

    Now our total PSDP of Pakistan, which was in – between ‘88 and ‘99 used to be about 90 billion rupees, total GD – PS – the Public Sector Development Project commitment.  It was – in 2006, it went to 520 billion rupees.  So 520 billion was the (kitty ?).  Out of this 1 percent increase to education is 170 billion.  So therefore, the difficulty and money requirement.

    However, I totally agree with you that government has not been performing.  You are hundred percent right of ghost schools.  I would like to add, there are ghost teachers.  Twenty percent teachers in Pakistan are ghost teachers.  We carried out a survey in 1996 or ‘7, I think, under the orders of the government.  I was then a lieutenant general and a corps commander.  In my region we carried out a total survey by the army, by us.  Twenty percent schools, 20 percent roughly teachers are ghost, only on paper, money going in pockets.

    So therefore, we have to do something more than the government.  And therefore we created this NCHD.

    This gentlemen sitting right there, Nasim Ashraf.  He came.  He was a doctor here having a very good practice.  He came and gave me this idea of education and health at the grassroot level.  And in education, he came with the idea that we’ll have literacy centers (that are ?) literacy and feeder schools.

    No brick and mortar, no spending or money.  We will take schools from the villages, open school – these feeder schools, get teachers from that village – girls and boys.  And I bought the idea.  I told him to come to Pakistan, and he did that.  And since 2001, (till the ?) – that NCHD spread to 110 districts of Pakistan.  They opened thousands of feeder schools and thousands of adult literacy centers.

    Then there are a lot of philanthropics in Pakistan, lot of philanthropic activity where they are involved in collecting money, donations and opening schools.  And they are the best because they do it with a passion.  And there are dozens of them.  I personally think the government should reinforce the philanthropists because they do things with passion, and make them expand.

    So I think it has to be a multi-pronged strategy to educate the people of Pakistan, which is so important not only from economic development, but also fighting off terrorism and extremism.  It is the root of terrorism.  So I wouldn’t agree with you more, sir.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Mr. President.

    Mr. (Kung, now ?) over there.

    Q:  When you were in power, you came across as a Pakistani leader who genuinely wanted a Kashmir solution, and you made many, many efforts to reopen the debate, to think outside the box.  And it was reported that you were very close to doing an agreement with India.

    Is it true?  And if it is, can it be revived today?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  You get me elected, then I’ll revive it.  (Laughter.)

    Q:  So be it.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  The issue, yes, I think you’re right.  We were – I used to be called a man of war, which I was.  I was in uniform.  But I call myself a man for peace.  And I said that with conviction because I said I have seen the ravages of war.  I fought all the wars, and all the confrontations with India, or in the region elsewhere, internally against Baluch tribal uprisings, et cetera.

    So I have seen ravages of war.  My own best friend has been killed in war.  My son is named after my best friend.  So therefore nobody understands the ravages of war as much as I have – I do.  So therefore I am a man for peace.  A lot of people in India asked me how – “You are a military man.  What are you doing?”

    I said, “I understand the ravages of which none of you understands.  So therefore I am for peace.”  And with that idea, I initiated the process with (inaudible), and I initiated the process with Manmohan, I proudly say that initiated with Manmohan Singh – (inaudible) – yes, indeed.  We were proceeding well.

    There are three qualities required in a leader – I think I said this everywhere – for a deal, for some agreement on disputes to succeed.  One is sincerity – sincerity to resolve the dispute, from the heart, from the heart and soul and mind.

    The other is flexibility, flexibility to accept others’ point of view.

    Third one is the problem area.  And that is boldness and courage.  Why it is required is whenever you reach a deal like on an issue like Kashmir, there will be a give and take.  I mean, none of the two sides will be naive enough to give everything.  So there has to be a give and take, and you will have to give – India has to give, and Pakistan will have to give also.  That give part becomes problematic because there’ll be agitation in your own backyard.

    And if there is a leader who buckles under pressure, then he’ll be thinking that my political clout will go down, my popularity will go down, and the people – well, then that interferes in the fast movement towards peace.  So I think boldness is required.  We were proceeding reasonably fast, in fact.

    We had worked out the parameters, and we were drafting an agreement.  So I think it’s a pity that we couldn’t reach conclusions.  Fleeting moments come in the lives of leaders and countries, and the key to success is to grasp the fleeting moment and don’t let it fly past.  Unfortunately, they flew past – (really flew past ?).

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Mr. President.

    We’ve got about 15 minutes left, but we have a number of questions.  I’m going to try and go through them quickly.  We have Christina Lamb over there.  The microphone’s coming to you, Christina.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  (Inaudible.)

    Q:  Thank you.  Good to see you again, Mr. President.  I wanted to ask you – you talked about the blunders made in Afghanistan –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Sorry?

    Q:  You talked about the blunders made in Afghanistan by the U.S.  I wanted to ask you why –

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  The blunders?

    Q:  Yes – why you allowed the Taliban leadership safe haven in Quetta and enabled them to recruit and train.  Were you really in – fully in control of ISI? – there’s a lot of evidence that ISI had been helping the Taliban – or do you share their view that some of these people, including the Haqqani network, are actually strategic assets for Pakistan?  Thank you.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  I have to be very careful in answering to you, lest you write something which I – which disagrees with us – (laughter) – which you did before.  (Laughter.)  Yeah.

    I’ve forgotten your question.  (Laughter.) 

    MR. NAWAZ:  It was the safe havens for the Taliban in Quetta and North Waziristan.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Yeah.  Yes.  Safe havens.  Now, if you think that I provided safe havens to Taliban in Quetta – I mean, what answer can I give you?  People who attack me, who are trying to kill me, I am providing safe havens to them? 

    I mean, it’s – I can’t answer anything other than this:  Quetta, we talk of Quetta shura.  I mean, a lot of people talk of Quetta shura.  There is a (CIA ?) office and ISI office in Quetta.  Have they identified where this Quetta shura office is?  Quetta shura is a vague statement. 

    There is a – there are refugee camps around Quetta.  The biggest camp is 100,000 – about 90,000, which you must be knowing.  Have you gone inside this camp?  I have flown in a helicopter around the camp, because I thought maybe, if one day we have to put in a military action there, let me see what kind of a place this is.  There are lanes inside this where two men cannot cross each other, so close and so congested.  Ninety thousand people living like this.  It’s a nightmare if there is any military operation in this area.

    Now, all these refugee – and there are dozens of such refugee camps in Pakistan – all these refugee camps are used for all purposes.  Terrorists must be coming and staying there inside.  There must be people who are harboring them.  But to think that I as the president of Pakistan is allowing this to happen is not the case.  It’s a porous border.  We introduced checks at Chaman.  Chaman is the main border, where thousands of vehicles come and go every day – including, the ISAF vehicles who go to Kandahar go through Chaman border from this – our side.

    We introduced biometric system there, and passes system, so that we can control the movement across the border.  On the Afghan side, they tore all our passes.  And in spite of my best effort to introduce a similar biometric system on the other side, nobody has done that.  So we have been trying our best to control movements.  But on the other side, there is no response. 

    So therefore I would say that while these refugee camps may be a safe haven for any kind of activity, it is not government sponsored.

    So that is what I would like to say.  So there is no safe haven created or no – everything with the Taliban to come and stay there.  After all, all the al-Qaida and Taliban leaders of significance, tell me one who has been caught in Afghanistan.  All have been caught in Pakistan.  And by whom?  By Pakistan law enforcement agencies and intelligence, the ISI, in cooperation with CIA, yes, indeed. 

    So I think these are sensitivities which really are – disturbs everyone in Pakistan when we put all the blame on Pakistan.  All blame for movement across the border in Afghanistan is on Pakistan.  I don’t understand why, why is it not on the coalition forces and Afghan forces.  If Afghan Taliban come into Pakistan, why is Pakistan only responsible?  Why are the Afghan forces and coalition forces not responsible?  Why do they allow them to come into Pakistan?  So at least share the blame 50-50.

    So I don’t understand this.  This is what really develops the mistrust and lack of confidence in each other.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

    Ambassador Inderfurth.

    Q:  President Musharraf, let me join others welcoming you here.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Thank you.

    Q:  It’s good to see you again.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Thank you.  It was lovely meeting you, seeing you again.

    Q:  I’d like to ask you about Afghanistan, about the role of Pakistan and India in Afghanistan.  Many people say that the two countries are engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan.  And since you were just talking about peace, is it possible for India and Pakistan to wage proxy peace in Afghanistan?  Both countries have interests there.  Pakistan has strong security interests.  India also has interests.  What would you do to move away from proxy war to proxy peace?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Thank you, sir.  But who is initiating the proxy war, is the first question. 

    Now, what is happening in Afghanistan – I mean, I am from Pakistan, obviously, so please don’t think that I am saying all this just to protect Pakistan.  But I know there are many Indians who may be sitting here, but unless we face facts and we fight this terrorism with unity of thought and action, we will fail. 

    Now, what is happening there, and what is happening to Pakistan?  I would like to just enunciate.  There’s an Indian consulate in Kandahar and Jalalabad, which you all know, everyone knows.  Why is it there?  Why are these two there on the Pakistan border?  Is there an Indian community there?  Is India doing some trade there? 

    What is the interest of India in these two continents?  Nothing other than carrying out aiding, abetting terrorism in Pakistan, stabbing Pakistan in the back.  I have documentary evidence of this.

    I know Indian intelligence, RAW agents, coming into these consulates.  I know the construction activity of roads that they are doing.  And I’ve been telling President Karzai, don’t give construction activity to Indians on our border.  They could go anywhere in the interior on the west or anywhere; why do they want to build roads?  We will build the roads for you.

    But no, they must build there, where their agents come, because they want to pump in terrorists into Pakistan.  Our terrorist, Bramdagh Bugti, who is the grandson of Bugti, who was killed in Afghanistan – in Pakistan, and who is against the integrity of Pakistan – and he said this on television and in the media, that he doesn’t – they don’t believe in Pakistan – he is sitting in Kabul, sir.  He goes to Delhi.  He’s received by RAW agents.  I have seen the photographs. 

    So let me say this to this august gathering.  All training of Afghan diplomats, police, military, intelligence, takes place in India.  I have been offering everything to Karzai.  Nothing in Pakistan, all in India. 

    What is happening, sir?  We are being stabbed in the back.

    So what does Pakistan do?  What should ISI do?  ISI’s supposed to protect Pakistan’s interest, and that is what they do.  So therefore the United States must understand what is happening.  And let me say – I have said this very openly to everyone – help Pakistan in stopping all of this.  There must not be a proxy war there, I totally agree.  But please understand who’s doing it and why it is happening.

    MR. NAWAZ (?):  Thank you.  Good question.

    Q:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. President.  You made some remarks earlier on regarding the conduct – by the way, my name is Paul Aulibra (ph) from Shirat (ph) – some remarks about the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan, and you made some suggestions regarding empowering local tribes and leaders, et cetera.  Now, that seems to run contrary to what is the at least the official strategy of ISAF and NATO and Gen. Petraeus of building up the Afghan army and the national police.

    Now, do you see a possibility of your ideas or similar ones of empowering tribes and local leaders to take place?  Is there anybody who can listen to this?  Or are we doomed to fail because of this idea that we need to build national institutions and, first and foremost, the army and the police?  Thank you.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Well, I – it’s not in conflict, whatever – if we are developing Afghan National Army and police, and we can raise them to a level where we can have – avoid dilution in space, as I said, that is a good course of action.  But I had said an added possibility – if we cannot have that possibility of lashkars, then we must raise more Afghan National Army.  Well, I’m not against it at all.  Police and Afghan National Army is the answer.  Ultimately, they are to take over.  But my (grudge ?) against that is I hope ethnic balance is being maintained.

    Now, if they are to be again Tajiks, I’m afraid you are pushing more Pashtuns to the Taliban.  And the moment you leave, with this kind of a force, there will be war there, total war, with all Pashtuns fighting these people, ‘89, revival of ‘89.  So therefore we must have ethnic balance, and we must have Pashtuns in governance in the dominant position, not in governance alone, not in having one or two ministers having been given useless portfolios, and saying that we have Pashtun ministers there.

    Karzai himself is a Pashtun.  But under his rules, the Afghan National Army is all Tajik.  So how is this happening?  And this is what alienates the Pashtuns.  We must have the Pashtun on board.  So therefore if the police and Afghan National Army is being raised in large numbers enough to police the border and the cities and towns of Afghanistan, that’s very good.  I think that’s the right strategy.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.  Mr. President, we are getting near the end of our time.  So I’m going to request the last two questions.  And this is in the order that I recognize.  And so Pam Constable over here, and then Mr. Segalin (ph) at the back.

    Q:  Good morning.  General, it’s very nice to see you again.

    I’d ask – I’d like to ask you about a different militancy problem, not one coming from Afghanistan, but one coming from within the country, particularly Punjab, particularly LeT.

    You mentioned the dilemma of drones.  Pakistan also faces a dilemma of how to deal with groups that have been very helpful to it in the past with India, and I believe has even offered again to join with the army against India if necessary, but that are in fact causing havoc.  I have heard from U.N. officials as recently as yesterday saying that LeT saw the Mumbai attack as a fantastic success because of the fact that it destroyed so many promising chances for peace between the two countries.

    And given the fact that you’ve banned so many of these groups, and they came back and they came back, I’d also like to ask you one of many things I’d like to ask you about your own time in office; I will ask you only one.  Given everything that has happened since July of 2007, did you make a mistake at Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa?  Thank you.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Did you make a mistake after –

    MR. NAWAZ:  At Lal Masjid.

    Q:  Attacking Lal Masjid and the brothers.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  LeT and – I have hinted at the history that in 1989, Kashmir’s freedom struggle started.  And with Kashmir’s freedom struggle, the first group that erupted was Hizbul Mujahadeen in Indian-held Kashmir.  Because of the suppression of the Indian army, they ran into Pakistan.  So Hizbul Mujahadeen came about.  And then Lashkar-e-Taiba erupted in early ‘90s.  And later, toward the end, it was Jaish-e-Muhammad.  Now – and many other names which I don’t even remember, frankly – dozens of mujahadeen groups came about in Pakistan.

    There was such public sympathy, that no government really did anything about it.  And also, may I say, since they were going to Kashmir and fighting the Indian army, it went along with the psyche of the people of Pakistan, with everyone.  After all, Kashmir cause has to be solved, and India was refusing to even table it in any form.  It was not allowing Pakistan any room towards resolution in the United Nations or anywhere.  Therefore, it went along – this mujahadeen activity went along with the psyche, with the thinking of the entire population of Pakistan.

    Then comes 9/11, and now we join the coalition, and there is Taliban and al-Qaida and everything.  These very mujahadeen groups whose orientation was Kashmir, they turned their guns inwards and they developed nexus with Taliban and al-Qaida.  Now, this is the bigger problem area, that they are involved in terrorism in Pakistan.  Therefore we need to – I – as you said, I had banned almost all of them.  You bring me back, I’ll ban them again maybe, but it’s easier said than done.

    Allow Pakistan government and the intelligence organizations – allow them, with patience, some time.  You can’t rock the boat so much that the boat capsizes.  So therefore, while these things have to be done, allow piecemeal, gradual action through a well thought-out strategy which does not disturb the entire law-and-order situation in Pakistan.

    So this is what I would like to say.  Yes indeed, there is a requirement of reining in these groups.  By the way, the Jamaat – this Lashkar-e-Taiba’s other wing, the Jamaat ud-Dawa, they did the best work in earthquake.  They did an excellent job in the relief operations just now in flood.  So you’re dealing with a situation which has popularity in the people.  When they weren’t fighting Kashmir, it’s very popular with the people of Pakistan.  They are mujahadeen, they are fighting Indian army.  Why?  Kashmiris are being killed, so therefore we must help and we must fight.

    So it’s a difficult situation for any government in Pakistan.  So the root is resolve the Kashmir dispute, frankly.  That is the root, and that is my concern that President Obama goes and doesn’t even talk of – for heaven’s sake, if you are – in this unipolar world, you are a sole superpower, you have responsibilities towards everyone.

    So therefore, I thought maybe at least he should have mentioned that you need to – (two of ?) you need to resolve this Kashmir dispute.

    So this was – the other point, the Lal Masjid, certainly I didn’t do anything wrong.  In the heart of Islamabad, people take over the Red Mosque, 2,500 people there, and mostly they are Jamia Hafsa, the women.  About another 2,500 with weapons, with ammunition, with explosives, with suicide jackets inside the mosque in there.

    We were being humiliated.  The government was being insulted.  Pakistan’s writ, the government – writ of the government was challenged by these.  And only one kilometer from the diplomatic enclave, I remember the alarm that was caused in the diplomats.  They’re sending their families out, and these people getting Chinese and beating them up inside that mosque, so we had to take action.

    But before taking action, I did everything to bring them to – towards an understanding.  And I used all religious lobbies – the Council of Islamic Ideology, the (Waqf of Modares ?).  I called the Imam Kaaba from Saudi Arabia and every – everyone.  When everything failed, but we succeeded in getting the thousands out and only 150 terrorists were left, there was an attack.  And that is what we – Pakistan cannot be declared a “banana state” – “banana republic,” where it can’t act when the writ of the government is challenged – at least, not under me.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Mr. Sigaland (sp), at the back.

    Q:  I’d like to ask, if you become the next leader of Pakistan, will you stop all drone attacks and prevent drones from being used to actually fire missiles, only – will you just use – allow them to exist for gathering intelligence?

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  We’ll cross the bridge when I – when we reach there.  (Laughter.)  First, you get me there, then I’ll decide what to do about – (laughter).

    These are – I said it’s – there’s a – there’s a dilemma.  We have to resolve this dilemma.  While we must target militants, we must not do something which disturbs public opinion massively in Pakistan.  So we must get to some solutions.  The dilemma has to be resolved.  I don’t know how to resolve it but, yes, it has to be resolved.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Mr. President, on behalf of Fred Kempe and my colleagues at the Atlantic Council, I want to thank you for your very frank and candid interview.  (Applause.)

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Thank you.

    MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

    MR. MUSHARRAF:  Thank you.  Thank you.

(END)

Iran Issue Brief Launch: 11/08/10 – Transcript

Return to Iran Issue Brief Launch event page

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

IRAN TASK FORCE ISSUE BRIEF LAUNCH:
“THE IRAN STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR
STRATEGIC PATIENCE”

WELCOME:
FREDERICK KEMPE,
PRESIDENT AND CEO,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ,
DIRECTOR,
SOUTH ASIA CENTER,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
CHUCK HAGEL,
CHAIRMAN,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

STUART EIZENSTAT,
CO-CHAIR,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL IRAN TASK FORCE,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

BARBARA SLAVIN,
AUTHOR,
“THE IRAN STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR
STRATEGIC PATIENCE”

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2010
3:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

FREDERICK KEMPE:  Thank you and welcome to the Atlantic Council.  I’m Fred Kempe.  I’m president and CEO.  And I’d like to particularly acknowledge and thank our esteemed colleagues and co-chairs of this task force: Sen. Chuck Hagel – also chairman of the Atlantic Council – and Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat. 

    The South Asia Center was launched last year at the council under director Shuja Nawaz – actually now almost going on two years, two years now.  And we launched it because we saw that a focus of U.S.-European relations would be dealing not just with Afghanistan and Pakistan, which people usually connect with South Asia in this town, but also Iran. 

    And this has become a central forum and point of contact for policy members, members of Congress, as well as European and regional leaders.  We’ve had a long string of European officials dealing with these issues, coming through and meeting with us as well. 

And we do focus on the wider South Asia, which does mean the geographical subcontinent as well as Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran.      And we see this as a whole.  You can’t just look at the Iran issue without looking at Pakistan.  You can’t look at Pakistan without looking at Central Asia, and you certainly can’t look at it all without looking at Iran.  So Iran is of special importance to the center and the council because of the U.S. role with its government – the difficulties that we all know about.

    But we are also very interested not just looking at how the U.S. is looking at Iran but also how Iran is looking at the U.S. and how Iran is looking at itself, and looking at its role in the region.  Very often, we get so caught up in our own conversation here that we’re not putting ourself enough in the shoes of others. 

    So we’ve been asking through the taskforce, are the U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iran working?  Are there any other negotiating options left for the United States?  If a reformist regime were in power in Iran, would it actually make any difference to the U.S.-Iran relationship?  And more importantly, I suppose, is how does Iran see itself in this world?  And then, who is Iran?  Is it Ahmadinejad?  Is it Khamenei – Ayatollah Khamenei?  Is it the Revolutionary Guards? 

    So Mark Brzezinski and Shuja Nawaz have done an excellent job in pulling together experts and bringing them together to have frank discussions in this room on the current situation and the way forward.  And so the issue brief that’s released today to you all and prepared by our friend Barbara Slavin, one of the great experts on Iran in this town, is a culmination of all those meetings.  I hope you’ll think it’s a good read.  And it will be the first of several briefs that we’ll write on these subjects, you know, looking into different pieces of this brief in more detail, and other parts. 

We want to thank the Ploughshares Fund for making this project possible through their support.  And before I pass the event to Shuja, who will introduce Barbara and moderate the session, I just want to invite Sen. Hagel and Ambassador Eizenstat to say a few words as well.  Sen. Hagel.

    CHUCK HAGEL:  Fred, thank you and thank you each for giving us some time today.  I, on behalf of the Atlantic Council and our board and our members, want to thank Fred, of course, as well as our leaders of this effort – in particular, my much-esteemed co-chairman, the all-knowing public servant Ambassador Eizenstat, a man who’s had almost every job in government.  Stu, thank you very, very much for your personal involvement and commitment of time as you have given this effort.

    As you will hear today from, in particular, Shuja and Barbara, the essence of this first report, which will culminate in a larger taskforce product.  But we think these kinds of briefs are important for many reasons.  But it takes people through, we hope, an informed and educated analysis as to not only the complications of this issue – which there are many, as you all understand – but there are very serious consequences for whatever is the outcome on this particular issue, and this issue being the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

    As Fred had noted – and I think this is in particularly important, and I think is one of the most valuable results of this first report and, I anticipate, of our taskforce final report, is the emphasis on wise and comprehensive focus by the United States and its allies on this issue of Iran.  When I say comprehensive, I refer to not only addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, but all the other dimensions of this relationship. 

    That would include, of course, what Fred just talked about:  Who is Iran?  Who is in charge of Iran?  We know those who occasionally will take some time to study a little history and culture, that – (audio break) – is a part of a great product of the – (audio break) – that is, the Persian heritage and the history that, that heritage has brought forth.  That is not to be minimized, diminished or dismissed, as any of these historical factors are, when we are trying to analyze policy and how we approach countries and people. 

    And I say “people” in particular because governments don’t always represent the people.  There are policies of government, and then there are the citizens of that country.  And we reflect on that point when I use the term “wise.”  We need to be wise and judicious, and particularly judicious in how we use all our instruments of power.

    Military is but one instrument of power, and sometimes it is not the most effective.  It’s important. And using all of a nation’s instruments of power in coordination and combination of a purpose that’s worthy of that nation’s efforts is what we try to get at in this study. 

I also want to note a great work that Mark Brzezinski has done, as Fred has mentioned.  Mark – I think he’s in Europe or –

    BARBARA SLAVIN:  China.

    MR. HAGEL:  China.  He went a little further than Europe.  And that – that’s important to note Mark’s contributions because he will continue to play a significant role.  So thank you again, and to thank once again Shuja and Barbara and all the participants that helped form and write this brief.  We had many very, very informed and experienced experts in this area who took their time to come before this group and give us the benefit of their background and experience and expertise.  So we thank them as well.

    Now, let me introduce my co-chairman, Ambassador Eizenstat.

    STUART EIZENSTAT:  Thank you, Senator.  The senator and I developed a very close relationship during the Clinton administration and I really found him to be one of the most knowledgeable and wise people in the country on foreign and defense policy.  And it’s been a privilege to work with him on this project. 

    This project is another example of how Fred Kempe has infused a sense of energy and direction to the Atlantic Council since he’s taken over.  And Fred, I congratulate you on setting this taskforce up and on Mark Brzezinski’s and Shuja’s work on it.  And of course – (audio break).

Let me try to – in just literally a sentence or two because I want to leave time for the actual presentation, of why we decided to get into this area.  I mean, hadn’t everything about Iran already been explored?  Wasn’t everybody in town and elsewhere focusing on Iran?  We think that this taskforce has done something that’s unique and will continue to be unique.

    We start from the proposition that we believe this will be the defining foreign policy challenge of the Obama administration and for the United States in the years ahead.  But we also started from the proposition that while many had looked at Iran from different perspectives, no one had actually looked at their domestic reality: what was happening internally; how that affects their view of what the United States and others are doing; how it affects their policy and therefore what we can learn in terms of addressing our own policy to that reality, trying to mold it in ways that are acceptable to the United States but ultimately take into account that domestic reality.  And I think that’s what’s new, and that’s what’s novel. 

And Barbara has done a superb job in her study of doing the first initial rollout for the taskforce.  We appreciate it.  And I think without any further ado, I’d like to turn it over to her.  And again, thank Shuja and Barbara for their work, and Fred for initiating this and the senator for leading it.

    SHUJA NAWAZ:  Thank you, Ambassador Eizenstat.  Let me just give you a quick background on what the taskforce has done in the first nine months since we started.  Our first meeting took place in May, and we had a presentation by Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund.  We looked at the interests and the views of concerned powers, which included the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Israel, Turkey, India and Pakistan.  And he tried to crystallize how each of these countries envisages Iran’s role and their own real interest in Iran. 

And then Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations provided a briefing on what kind of regional role the present Iranian leadership is seeking for itself and for their country and talked about the strategic and geopolitical aspirations of Iran’s current leadership.  Ted Koppel, the producer of Discovery Channel’s special, “Iran, The most Dangerous Nation?” served as the discussant and provided observations and led the question-and-answer session.

Then in July, we had another session of the taskforce which focused on foreign policy, looking on the opposition movement in Iran, its similarities and contrasts with the current regime, on nuclear issues, its views on – the views of allies and enemies, and on Iranian foreign policy.  And this was a presentation by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University.

And then we had a presentation on prospects for nuclear diplomacy by Andrew Parasiliti, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  And that exchange was moderated by Barbara Slavin. 

Then last month, we looked at nuclear capabilities and strategic goals.  And we were very lucky to get Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman who was at the time when he met them – at the end of 2009, when he met the Iranian government – the senior-most U.S. official to have met them face to face. 

And we also were lucky to have Olli Heinonen, the former head of the safeguards department of the IAEA.  And indeed, in today’s issue brief we have a very useful summation of where we stand on the nuclear issue by Olli Heinonen, who’s a friend and who’s a former colleague at the IAEA.

As the senator said, we will continue our work on Iran, making it as unique as possible and as comprehensive as possible.  And we’ll be periodically issuing these briefs, and then we’ll come up with a final policy – a set of policy recommendations in due course. 

The first brief is being released today, and its author, Barbara Slavin, is a well-known journalist and an editor.  She’s also the author of a great book on Iran called, “Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation.” 

Before I give the floor to Barbara to talk about the brief, I just wanted to remind everyone that after she finishes – and if you wish to speak or have a question, if you wouldn’t mind turning your name-tent on its side so that I can recognize you.  Then please wait for the microphone to be brought to you so that you can announce who you are, and it can be captured for our audiences.

So thank you for coming, and over to Barbara.

MS. SLAVIN:  Okay.  Thanks, Shuja.  Thank you all for coming.  This is my maiden effort for the Atlantic Council, and I want to thank Sen. Hagel and Ambassador Eizenstat, Fred Kempe, Shuja Nawaz, Mark Brzezinski in China and also Shikha and Alex on the staff here at the Atlantic Council. 

We did this rather quickly.  I think you can all, perhaps, understand why Iran has been much in the news of late.  And a lot of people have been giving their opinions about what U.S. policy toward Iran should be.  So we thought that it was important to begin to express our ideas and also give some context for the discussion. 

I’ve tried to do four basic things in the report: first, look at Iranian domestic politics and the divisions that have deepened in the elites since the 2009 presidential elections.  Second, I’ve looked at the impact of those divisions on the nuclear issue and U.S.-Iran relations.  Third, I’ve looked at sanctions and the impact that they’re having on the Iranian economy – (audio break) – Iran’s foreign policy.  And lastly, I make a few very modest suggestions.  These are just very preliminary.  As Shuja mentioned, there will be much more fleshed out and detailed recommendations at the end of this process.

The bulk of the report is about the Iranian domestic scene.  And here, the word is factionalization and factionalism.  As any student of Iran knows, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never been unified – not before, during or after the revolution of 1979 – when it comes to politics, economics, views on society. 

And those who call it a totalitarian state really don’t know the country at all.  This is not a country where the elite are all forced to belong to one political party as in China or the old Soviet Union.  And whenever one faction appears to have completely vanquished its opponents, as seemed to occur last summer after the elections, then that faction immediately splinters.

And we have seen, certainly in the last few months, that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has had a lot of problems, a lot of clashes with the parliament of the country, with other branches of government and even, on occasion, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

He has alienated traditional conservatives, members of the old Islamic coalition, Heyate Mo’talefeh.  This is a very significant group that – (audio break) – the bazaars and has a hold over a lot of very important Islamic charities, members who are very prominent in the Islamic Revolution and were very important members of the government afterwards.

Ahmadinejad is on poor terms with Ali Larijani, who is the former nuclear negotiator and is the speaker – (audio break) – parliament.  He’s a member of an old clerical family and his brother, Sadegh, is head of the judiciary; was appointed by the supreme leader. 

Ahmadinejad has also irritated Khamenei and ultraconservative clerics by promoting a kind of folk Shiite Islam – it’s full of superstition – and by giving wide powers to a member of his family, an in-law named Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who has made a number of controversial comments about Israelis, about Iranian nationalism and about so-called Iranian Islam.

And there have even been indications now of some friction with members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is, of course, the institution upon which the survival of the regime rests.  There was an article in an IRGC publication that criticized Ahmadinejad for contending that the Majlis, the parliament, was not the most important institution in government.  And it said that this contradicted the views of the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, who passed away in 1989.

Now, I’m not suggesting that Khamenei, the successor of Khomeini, is about to jettison Ahmadinejad.  I don’t think that’s possible.  He called his reelection “a divine assessment” and he has really stuck with him, I think, for the time being.  But there is a lot of friction.  There’s a lot of tension. 

And I think the outlook is for more of this factionalism, especially as Iran now is phasing out consumer subsidies in the economy.  And it’s also approaching yet more elections.  It will have parliamentary elections in 2012 and new presidential elections in 2013. 

Now, the factionalism is intensifying, in part, because of the economic situation, which is quite poor.  This is partly due to sanctions, which have tightened considerably this year.  But they’re also partly due to Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy.  He squandered oil revenues when the price of oil was high.  He handed money out to the poor, to numerous people, but without any kind of real plan.  As a result, no jobs – or very few jobs have resulted from this, and inflation was quite high for a number of years.

Now revenues are much reduced and the IMF estimates that the Iranian economy grew by only a little over 2 percent last year and that growth in the current Iranian fiscal year, which ends March 31st, will be between 1.5 and 2 percent.  And that’s simply not enough to provide the sorts of jobs that Iran’s youthful population needs.  The unemployment rate among Iranians under 30 is estimated to be about 30 percent.  And 70 percent of the population is under 30. 

Sanctions are having an impact.  They are making it more difficult for Iran to both sell and buy petroleum products.  And they’re also frightening away investment in the oil and gas sector. 

And I contrast this – actually, Ambassador Eizenstat remembers well – when in the mid-’90s, when the Clinton administration approved of so-called secondary sanctions, which were meant to penalize oil companies that invested, I believe $20 million in the energy sector of Iran – (audio break) – sanctions. 

All of these sanctions were waived because at that time, or shortly thereafter, Iran got a reformist president, Mohammad Khatami.  And the Europeans were very interested in engagement with Iran at that time.  They didn’t want to confront the country. 

Now the situation is very different and this is because of what happened in 2009.  It’s because of the elections.  It’s because of the crackdown.  The Europeans are even more exercised about human rights, it seems, sometimes, than the United States is.  And so the Europeans have gotten on board and so have the Japanese. 

Nomura International, which is a unit of the Japanese brokerage firm, estimates that because of Japanese withdrawal from the Iranian oil sector, Iran’s oil production will drop 15 percent by 2015 and exports will decline from about 2 million barrels a day currently to 1.5 million barrels, which is really a significant drop.

Now, how does all of this factor into the nuclear negotiations?  We are likely to have some talks in the next few weeks.  The Iranians announced over the weekend that they’d like to meet in Turkey.  But they’re dancing around each other.  I think eventually we will have some kinds of discussions. 

I think the problem is that the political divisions within Iran are such that it’s going to make it difficult for the government to reach a deal that will stick.  We all saw what happened a year ago.  There was a proposal for Iran to – two-thirds of its low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a research – (audio break) – which the United States actually provided in the 1960s.  This is a reactor that produces medical isotopes. 

Ahmadinejad brought this deal – (audio break) – and he was immediately attacked by every faction, from reformists to ultraconservative.  Ali Larijani, who had suffered a great deal when he was the nuclear negotiator of Iran was the one to cast the first stone.  And then others followed and the supreme leader did not, in the end, back it up.  The deal fell apart.

Now, since then, as I mentioned, we’ve had more sanctions.  The U.S. proceeded to sanctions.  And the Obama administration pivoted, from the engagement track to the pressure track.  There’s a sense that I get from talking to U.S. officials that for the first time since 2003, when the U.S. military was feeling most successful in the Middle East – for the first since 2003, the Obama administration, the United States feels that it has some leverage over Iran because of sanctions, because of the economic situation.

Another factor is that the nuclear clock, so called, while it’s still ticking, is ticking a little bit more slowly than a lot of people had feared.  And here, I direct you to Olli Heinonen’s excellent summary of the status of the Iranian nuclear program.  He writes that although Iran has managed to produce about 3 tons of low-enriched uranium, theoretically enough for a bomb or maybe two bombs, the IAEA would be able to detect any diversion of this material very quickly. 

And also, Iran is having a lot of difficulty producing more advanced centrifuges.  The centrifuges that it uses are an antiquated model that Pakistan provided it with in the late 1980s.  And Olli Heinonen writes that Iran is having design problems and also, it’s having difficulty because of sanctions in procuring the maraging steel and carbon fiber that it needs to make these more advanced centrifuges.  So this suggests that there is time for diplomacy to work – time for sanctions and engagement to work – without having to resort to other sorts of measures. 

Now, it’s hard to be optimistic about engagement, about diplomacy, given the history of U.S.-Iran relations, which John Limbert and many others here know painfully well.  The pattern has been that when one side was ready for engagement, the other was not and vice versa.  The 2009 elections have complicated diplomacy for both sides. 

For Europe and also for the United States, the vicious crackdown on peaceful protestors that followed the elections last year have made human rights a priority.  I know that President Bush talked about the freedom agenda and so on, but for the first time, there is a freedom movement to support in Iran.  This is no longer a fiction.  And for Iran – (audio break) – once again looms large as a scapegoat for internal unrest.  They can accuse the United States of promoting a velvet overthrow, soft revolution, soft war, whatever you want to call it.  So we have a stalemate.

And I think, still, it’s important that the United States continue to try to engage, if only to put the Iranians on the defensive and to show that it actually is interested in diplomacy.  And here, I have a few very modest suggestions.  These are very preliminary and, as I mentioned, they’ll be fleshed out when the taskforce – some of them, frankly, I think are no-brainers.  Some of them are things that the Obama administration is already doing but perhaps could do a better job at.

One of the things that the administration is doing – my understanding from conversations with U.S. officials.  The U.S. and its allies are updating the offer that was made last year concerning the Tehran research reactor to take into account the fact that Iran has increased its stockpile of LEU over the past year. 

We don’t have all the details.  There have been some accounts in the press.  I think it’s still a bit preliminary and we won’t know, obviously, until there is a time and place fixed for another meeting of either the Vienna group and Iran or the P-5-plus-1. 

At the same time that the U.S. – (audio break) – offer, I think it would be wise to update a very comprehensive – (audio break) – that was made in 2008.  This was presented to the Iranians in Geneva in the summer of 2008 and it looked at possible areas of economic cooperation, easing of sanctions and so on. 

This offer needs to be looked at again.  I think it needs to be refreshed, particularly in light of what’s happened to Iran’s oil sector over the last couple of years.  I’m not saying the U.S. should necessarily publicize it or present it.  That might be negotiating with ourselves, but if the Iranians do show up and if they look like they’re actually serious, then this is something the U.S. and its allies should have ready.

At the same time, the U.S. needs to intensify its outreach to the Iranian people.  Sen. Hagel mentioned this.  This is very important.  Just because we have a fight with the Iranian government doesn’t mean we should not be promoting educational exchanges, trying to get as many Iranian students as possible to study in the United States and offering help to Iran in areas such as earthquake prediction and treatment of drug addiction and HIV/AIDS, where the United States and its NGOs have something to offer.  Now, I don’t know if the Iranians will accept it.  In the past, they have.  And this is certainly still a possible area for discussion. 

Another area which I highlight in the report and I think is very important is Afghanistan.  This is, perhaps, the one area where the U.S. and Iran are largely on the same page.  And certainly, they should be talking to each other. 

I don’t know if the Iranians will help the U.S.  They certainly haven’t always been of assistance, although they were after 9/11 in getting rid of the Taliban at that time.  They have a common interest with the United States in stability in Afghanistan, drug interdiction and preventing the total return to power of the Taliban. 

There was a recent meeting in Rome where an Iranian official participated and he got a briefing from Gen. Petraeus and he was very impressed, I understand – from my Iranian sources.  I think this sort of meeting certainly should be repeated and the Iranians should be made to feel that we understand that they have a huge stake in what happens in Afghanistan.  After all, they’ve had the largest number of Afghan refugees in their country for many years and they suffer from the drug problem.

Finally, the area of human rights.  This is something that the Obama administration got a bit of a slow start on, but I think they’re moving on a bit more.  U.S. advocacy here is very important.  Senior officials from President Obama on down should continue to condemn Iranian human rights abuses. 

And they should urge Iran to release some 500 political prisoners – (audio break) – are being held in that country, be it students, journalists, women’s rights advocates and lawyers who were jailed for defending these people.  Iran is not living up to its international commitments, let alone its own laws on human rights.  This should be pointed out.  And there’s been a suggestion, also, that the – (audio break) – the U.N. could name a special representative – (audio break) – human rights.  I think that would be a very good idea. 

There needs to be pressure put on Iran.  We’ve noticed that Iran does respond to pressure.  The incident of the woman who was sentenced to stoning for adultery – there was a huge cry and she has not been stoned.  She’s not been executed.  So Iran does react when pressure is put on this issue.

And finally, the U.S. should continue its efforts to help Iranians access the Internet and satellite television so they can get unbiased news and they can communicate more easily with each other. 

Ultimately, I believe that history, demography and the educational level of Iranians means that this country will have a more democratic and less onerous form of government in the future.  But this is up to Iranians to lead this movement.  We can’t do it for them. 

Iran has been struggling to achieve a representative government for more than a century.  And it’s frankly, I think, better equipped – even now with all the repression that has occurred since last year’s elections, it’s better equipped to have this sort of government than countries that the United States has promoted regime-change in. 

I think that in the interim, while this process goes forward in Iran, Washington needs to exercise strategic patience.  This is in the title of my – (audio break).  We need to do nothing that is going to get in the way of this political evolution.  Ultimately, Iran is going to reassume its rightful place as a major regional power that contributes to the peace and prosperity of its citizens and the wider world.  And I’ll leave it there.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  I’m going to let you take a little breather and ask the first question, if I may, but I’m going to pose it to our co-chairs.

MS. SLAVIN:  Okay.

MR. NAWAZ:  Senator and Ambassador Eizenstat, as opposed to strategic patience, there appears to have been, within the last week or so, some signs of strategic impatience within the corridors of power in Washington.  A column in The Washington Post by David Broder appeared to suggest that ramping up for war, if not actually going to war might be a good – (audio break) – President Obama to undertake in order to help the economy. 

And then Sen. Graham has been talking also about the need to perhaps punish Iran in a military maneuver.  What do you think are the – (audio break) – of something like this becoming viable?  And it is even advisable at this stage to be throwing out these ideas?

MR. KEMPE:  And let me put a question on top of that because I think it’s related and that is, those who argue against strategic patience would argue that what you’re saying is, give Iran the time and space it needs to fully develop its nuclear-weapons capability.  So is that a potential outcome from strategic patience and is it an outcome we can live with?  Ambassador?

MR. EIZENSTAT:  Let me answer in a couple of ways.  The first is, I think that so long as we can demonstrate that the sanctions are really biting – and here, the EU’s efforts to really engage in significant sanctions beyond that which most thought they would on the financial sector are having a really significant impact.  It’s much more costly to ship goods, to import oil.  And this is an area where we need to do a lot of work with China and see that China doesn’t fill that gap. 

But I think that Iran is not North Korea.  It recognizes that – (audio break) – integrated into the world economy.  And to the extent that – (audio break) – a real show and demonstration of global solidarity on sanctions, I think it will bring them back to the table – number one. 

Number two, this is a time when if there ever was a need for it, Sen. Vandenberg’s admonition of politics ending at the water is really crucial because this is a time when we’ve got to make sure that we have a bipartisan effort.  There’s a lot of polarization that’s going to occur and I think that this is a time when we need to have and show a united front. 

Number three, I don’t think that Barbara is suggesting – and I certainly wouldn’t – that by strategic impatience, we mean indefinite patience.  Because we recognize that each day, even with the centrifuges not operating as efficiently as they can, that more and more enriched uranium is occurring.  It’s being enriched up to a 20-degree level.  There is work going on, on weaponizations, of miniaturization, of increased missile capacity.  And so patience is important but it’s not something that is infinite and the Iranians have to see that. 

I think we’ll be in a much better position to know what path to take when we see how these negotiations, which are certain to occur, and probably this month, really – (audio break) – are the Iranians serious?  Are they willing to go back to a sort of Geneva-plus, Vienna-plus proposal, taking into account the additional amounts of enriched uranium, or is this going to be a long and indefinite stall? 

And I guess the last point is in terms of military options.  That has to be on the table.  The administration has kept it on the table.  The Israelis have kept it on the table.  But it is on the table at this point because it is recognized that there are profound fallouts from that and that the military option can’t be done with a single isolated strike as could occur with the Syrian reactor or the Iraqi reactor 20 years ago; that they’ve diffused their system, they’ve put it underground and that it would take considerable effort over a prolonged period of time to do great detriment to it. 

So that is not to take it off the table.  Quite the contrary.  But it is to suggest that before one leaps to that, one has to look at all the other ramifications.  And I would say to give sanctions a chance to work.  They are working.  They will continue to bite.  And we have to hope that at some point, the leadership, as diffused as it is in Barbara’s excellent analysis, will come together to recognize that the costs of pursuing militarization and a military capacity are greater than what the effort is worth at this point.

And I think this – (audio break) – that the administration and others haven’t quite come to.  And that is, what is our goal?  Is the goal to stop all enrichment?  Is the goal to simply stop a military capability?  Or is the goal to stop total weaponization?  Those are very different checkpoints.  And I think it’s very clear that we try to achieve a bipartisan agreement on what the actual realistic goal is.

MR. HAGEL:  Well, as usual, Ambassador Eizenstat has framed it up exactly right, at least, I subscribe to everything Stu has just noted and as he has presented it. 

I would add only this:  As to the use of military force, whether it’s for a political motive or not, I don’t think I have to remind the public that the United States of America is currently in two wars – two of the longest we’ve ever been in.  And before we finally wind our way out of each, they will be the longest wars we’ve ever engaged in. 

That has come at a very significant cost to this country.  I think it’s undermined our interest in the world.  You don’t need to go much beyond asking any general who’s in charge of men and women in the Pentagon, their families, or any metric that you want to apply – record suicides, record divorces, record homeless and all the rest – as to but one consequence of taking the nation to war. 

So I think talking about going to war with Iran in fairly specific terms should be carefully reviewed.  And that’s pretty dangerous talk.  It’s easy to get a nation into war; not so easy to get a nation out of war, as we are finding out.  I’m not sure that the American people are ready to go into a third war. 

Second, if you subscribe to what Barbara has laid out – at least, what our taskforce has found – in particular, the internal dynamics that are occurring in Iran, then why in the world would you, as Barbara has noted, want to get in the way of that? 

We do have some rather significant evidence that sanctions are working.  And they’re working because we – our government, our policies; imperfect, flawed problems; every policy has those.  But nonetheless, it has accomplished something even bigger than sanctions.  And that is they have brought a consensus together of most countries – the European Union, the Chinese are involved, Russians are involved.  We have a rather significant consensus on this issue up to a point.  And I think all you need to do is reflect on the United Nations’ vote on this as a pretty good indicator. 

Now, that alone won’t change the dynamics.  But as Barbara – (audio break) – if you subscribe to what our taskforce has come up with, then aren’t we wiser to let this play out?  Aren’t we – (audio break) – wiser, rather to get ourselves into another very difficult predicament because – (audio break) – we do also know that wars have – (audio break) – most of the time and especially – (audio break) – where we live in a day they have unintended consequences.  They have uncontrollable consequences.  We live in an interconnected global – (audio break) – and I think, again, we should factor that in. 

Last point I would make: as to the question of, well, but aren’t we just allowing the Iranians to buy time?  Maybe.  We have to recognize that the real world is about risks.  You calibrate your decisions and your policymaking based on that risk analysis. 

Is it riskier to go to war right now or is it riskier to pursue the policies that we are pursuing?  Policymakers have to decide that.  They have to sort their way through that and then they come to a decision.  It’s my analysis – and answering your question, Shuja – that it is far riskier to talk of war and to go to war. 

As the ambassador has noted, we are the mightiest military force on Earth.  The world has never seen such military power.  But that military power must always be tempered with a purpose.  And the military option is always on the table – of course it is – for any sovereign nation.  But at the same time we recognize that, that option is there. 

The leaders of our country, the leaders of the world are not living in an “Alice in Wonderland” type of a world.  They are living in a real world and they have to make real decisions based on what they calculate to be the dynamics and the facts as they are today.  But probably more importantly, what they think they will be.  That’s leadership

So that’s how I would add to the ambassador’s comments.  Thank you. 

MR. KEMPE:  Let me add two sentences, just for the record, about the Atlantic Council.  Sen. Hagel, a Republican; Ambassador Eizenstat, a Democrat.  It’s not the reason they were picked and not the reason they decided to do it but it just reflects that we’re after a centrist, consistent policy not only on Iran but really on all American foreign policy with our allies. 

And when we don’t do that – when we do get into the partisan bickering over matters of national interest where it’s hard to debate what the national – it’s hard to debate what outcome one would want in the national interest – our enemies take solace from our partisan bickering over matters of national interest and our friends get frustrated.  And we don’t have inconsistent – so this is one area where we’re working on this.  But the Atlantic Council works on achieving this across the board.  We call it “radical centrism”.  (Laughter.) 

MS. SLAVIN:  I like that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Fred, for clarifying that.  And Senator, you mentioned “Alice in Wonderland” and on picking up on Ambassador Eizenstat’s very useful suggestions, particularly the one about defining ones goals, that there is one of my favorite quotes from “Alice in Wonderland” – that when you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.  (Laughter.)  So I think we do need to decide which road to take. 

And so my first question to Barbara before the audience joins us in the questions, is:  Is Afghanistan going to offer that first opening, perhaps?  Because in the end you have to deal directly with the government.  You can’t negotiate with the people of Iran.  You have to deal with the government that’s in power.  So do you see Afghanistan as offering that opening?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, as I was preparing this, I had some conversations with administration officials and one said that, you know, they don’t see Afghanistan, somehow, as the silver bullet that solves our problems with Iran.  But I think they do see it as an area where Iran and the United States not only have common interests but really do need to cooperate. 

If Afghanistan is going to be stabilized it’s going to need all of its neighbors to sign onto whatever, say, coalition government may emerge or whatever peace talks may emerge.  So I think it is one area where the U.S. and Iran can talk to each other without a lot of baggage, without a lot of difficult history. 

Although it’s a different government, a different president that’s in power now in Iran than in 2001; if you look back at that period not only was Iran supporting the Northern Alliance, which was so pivotal in getting rid of the Taliban in 200, but the U.S. and Iran actually had, fairly, senior diplomatic talks from the fall of 2001 through May of 2003 in Europe.  They were led by deputy assistant secretaries of state and so on. 

And this was a period that now a number of people, like Ryan Crocker, look back on as, sort of, the golden age – Jim Dobbins.  You know, when these were very productive talks.  Members of al-Qaida were turned over, were extradited, understandings were reached and it’s sort of a pity that, that ended with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 

I don’t know if you can get back to that but certainly you can include Iran in all the various multilateral discussions that are going to be held and we should do that. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  And now we open the floor to questions.  So who would like to start?  Please wait for the microphone and please identify yourself for the record.  Thank you. 

Q:  Richard Sawaya with the National Foreign Trade Council.  You mentioned Afghanistan.  That’s one of the two wars that we are embroiled in.  What about extending – I’d be interested in your views relative to the crisis, the political crisis in Iraq where we have more blood, treasure and unintended consequences, arguably, than in Afghanistan. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Barbara, if I may just repeat the question for our television viewers.  What about the war in Iraq?

MS. SLAVIN:  Sure.  I went – (audio break) – Iraq in this brief.  That might be a topic for a second one.  Iraq is – it’s interesting and everyone has always said well, of course, the Iranians got a lot of influence when we got rid of Saddam and that’s true.  But I think the Iranians are tearing their hair out about Iraq, too, right now. 

I remember getting an e-mail from an acquaintance of mine in Tehran predicting that Maliki would be reconfirmed as prime minister right after Ramadan.  Now, that was when?  Back in the end of August, September?  (Chuckles.)  And we still, of course, don’t have a new Iraqi government. 

This is more ticklish because, although, there have been reports that Iran is giving some support to the Taliban now, the reports of Iranian involvement in Iraq are much more serious.  And we know that American servicemen and women have died because of IED technology and special groups and others that have been supported by Iran since 2010. 

So the U.S. and Iran have not really been able to cooperate in anyway on Iraq – (audio break).  Will that change?  I don’t know.  That’s why I suggest Afghanistan because we have the history of cooperation there. 

You know, it’s ironic in – I mentioned these talks that were going on from 2001 to 2003.  They’re actually – they were Iranians offering to help the United States and Iraq as well, when it became clear that the U.S. was going to be invading that country as well.  And the Bush administration said, no thank you, we can manage this on our own. 

So one has to think what – how history might have been different if we had decided to cooperate with the Iranians in 2003 and Iraq. 

MR. NAWAZ:  If you could just wait for the microphone, please. 

Q:  Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service.  I’d like to get the comments of all three if possible.  But how exactly does saying that all options are on the table help the U.S. case in human rights or anything else or even with respect to the nuclear program?  (Audio break.) 

Assuming what Sen. Hagel was saying is correct, that attacking Iran will have unforeseeable consequences – (audio break) – any observer would conclude might involve – or very much could involve the necessity for ground troops.  How, at this point, can – (audio break) – threat on the part – (audio break) – states and give – (audio break) – two wars? 

So, again, my question is – (audio break) – repeatedly saying all options are on the table – (audio break) – help any of the causes that have been laid out or that are of concern to the taskforce?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, my personal view is that, you know, the United States has to say it but it’s an option that should not be exercised at this point.  I take my cue from, actually, Iranians, particularly members of the Green movement, who say that the one thing that could destroy the chances for democracy in that country for another generation would be a U.S. attack on Iran. 

I think perhaps Ambassador Eizenstat and Sen. Hagel will be able to respond better as to why you have to say that, that option remains on the table. 

MR.    :  And Ambassador and Senator, if either of you want to comment on the Iraq question as well. 

MR. EIZENSTAT:  I guess, I would say that if you really don’t mean it and they know you don’t mean it, it’s not significant.  But from my standpoint, while I agree with everything that’s been said with and emphasized, that we need to give sanctions a chance to work.  We need to give the increasing isolation that Iran is facing a chance to change their policies.  We need to avoid, in effect, driving the opposition into the hands of the more radical elements. 

We also have to send a very clear message, in my opinion, that what is most unacceptable is Iran having a nuclear bomb.  And if they don’t understand that we think that, that is, indeed, unacceptable, then they have, perhaps, no incentive to change.  (Audio break.)  There’s always an escalating sense and you know there things short of bombing. 

We’ve seen already news reports of worms in – you know, in some of the machines, the seamless machines that drive the centrifuges.  I mean, there are a whole range of actions that can be taken to slow down and even cripple the process short of this imagery of having 100,000 troops invading and waves and waves of bombers.  We have a lot of options.

But, to me, it really is critical to make it clear to Iran that we’re giving them this extra time.  We’re going to keep the sanctions pressure on.  We have the strategic patience but that, at the end of the day, it is not acceptable for Iran, as it is currently led, to have a nuclear bomb and, in my opinion, a nuclear capability.  And if we don’t send that signal then I think we’re in serious trouble. 

MR. HAGEL:  Well, I would add this:  I’m not so sure it is necessary to continue to say all options are on the table.  I believe that the leadership in Iran, regardless of the five power centers that you’re referring to – whether it’s the ayatollah or the president or the Republican Guard, the commissions – have some pretty clear understanding of the reality of this issue and where we are. 

I think the point that your question really brings out – which is a very good one.  If you were going to threaten on any kind of consistent basis, whether it’s from leadership or the Congress or the administration or anyone who generally speaks for this country in anyway, than you better be prepared to follow through with that. 

Now, Stuart noted putting 100,000 troops in Iran – I mean, just as a number as far as if to play this thing out.  The fact is, I would guess that we would all – I would be the one to start the questioning – would ask where you’re going to get 100,000 troops.  (Laughter.)  So your point is a very good one, I think. 

I don’t think there’s anybody in Iran that does not question the seriousness of America, our allies or Israel on this for all the reasons we made very clear.  And I do think there does become a time when you start to minimize the legitimacy of a threat.  When you threaten people or you threaten sovereign nations, you better be very careful and you better understand, again, consequences because you may be required to employ that threat and activate that threat in some way. 

So I don’t mind people always, as we have laid out, and I think every president and every administration, anybody of any consequence who’s talked about this can say – does say.  But I think it’s implied that the military threat is always there.  Stu made an important point about, there are a lot of ways to come at this. 

But once you begin a military operation – I mean, you ask any sergeant – and it’s the sergeants and the guys at the bottom, not the policymakers that have to fight the war – (audio break) – there the ones who have to do all the dying and all the fighting – (audio break) – sacrifices, not the policymakers. 

But my point is, once you start that, you’d better be prepared to find 100,000 troops because it may take that or, eventually, where you’re going – my earlier point:  You don’t know.  And you can’t just – (audio break) – concept of, well, we’re going to do this but it’ll be marginalized, it’ll be a limited warfare.  I don’t think any nation can ever go into that way.  So that would be what I would just add to the rest of the other conversations. 

MR. EIZENSTAT:  Yeah, I would just again emphasize, number one, that we need to give, as Barbara is suggesting, sanctions and a potential outreach on a more positive and broader initiative a chance to work.  But if it’s rejected, we have to consider ramping up sanctions more.  But we also, again, have to make it clear, in my opinion, that it’s not acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. 

There are a lot of things that go along with that, that are short.  And that’s my point.  Not that we put 100,000 troops in but there are a lot of things short of that that can be taken against Iran that can be very disruptive.  I hope we don’t have to get to that.  But I don’t think the option is sending 100,000 troops in or doing nothing.  That’s not the option.

We have a whole range of options and we have a little bit of time more, as the report indicates, than we thought we did six months or so ago. 

MR.    :  I’m sorry, I forgot to –

MR. KEMPE:  We’re excusing Ambassador Eizenstat who had a previous appointment.  Thanks very much.  We really appreciate it. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Ambassador. 

Q:  Hi, my name is – (inaudible) – from the Brazilian Embassy.  Just a quick question.  Iran has been under U.S. sanction for the past 30 years.  So why do you think it’s going to work now?  Why is it easier to negotiate?  Why do you think it’s easier to negotiate with Iran on the sanctions? 

MS. SLAVIN:  Yeah.  I mean, Iran has been under one form of sanction or another from the U.S.  What’s different, of course, is that these are now multilateral sanctions.  As I pointed out, in the mid-’90s when the U.S. had a policy of dual containment; Europeans, Asians were all blindly going on their way signing agreements with Iran.  There was a lot of business.  That has changed. 

And actually, the report – you know, we have seen a shift.  European trade is coming down.  China, for a time, seemed like it was going to fill the gap, but even Chinese imports of Iranian oil are going down now.  And also, Chinese investment in the Iranian oil sector is going down now, according to a report that I cite in the issues brief. 

I think the world is getting the message that this is a government that is not behaving well.  And the U.S. has never had this kind of consensus behind this policy.  So I think it has a much greater chance of working; unilateral – (audio break) – also work but multilateral sanctions – (audio break) – do. 

And you see where – (audio break) – the Iranian officials.  The former president, Rafsanjani, said recently that these sanctions are no joke and that Ahmadinejad should pay attention to them.  There’s lots of commentary even in the very controlled Iranian press about the impact that sanctions are having.  So I think that it is a different situation now. 

And the other aspect is the human rights aspect; the revulsion that so many people feel over the human rights abuses that have been committed by the government.  And this is really –

MS. SLAVIN:  – you know, we all knew before, that this regime could, on occasion, be very brutal and that people were executed and assassinated and so on.  But we never saw it before the way we have seen it now on YouTube and Facebook and so on. 

And it’s – we also have a new crop of Iranian émigrés, people who were part of the reform movement who’ve been forced to leave the country since last year.  And they are very outspoken.  And you know, they have fresh information and knowledge about the society that perhaps we didn’t have before.

MR. HAGEL:  If I may, I’d like to add just one thing – one point of perspective because it rarely gets brought up for obvious reasons.  The whole nuclear issue did not begin with this administration, this being in the Iranian administration or previous administrations after the revolution in 1979.

The nuclear program started under the shah, who was our puppet, essentially.  We financed him.  We liked him.  We set him up – well, “like,” maybe too strong a word, but it was clearly in America’s interest to have a strongman dictator.  When you talk about revulsions of human rights, history is instructive here.

And so I think – and not to defend anything or anyone, or certainly not this current government in Iran, but when we’re looking at this – and this is why taskforces are important and taking time to hear from experts.  Let’s open up the aperture here and get the entire vision and understanding of history.

That wasn’t that long ago – 1979.  The people of Iran remember that, not all of them.  As Barbara said, they have one of the youngest demographies in the world, which is hopeful and good for freedom.  But we’ve got to also factor in the frame of reference and the framework of thinking of a lot of the Iranians and the brutality that came as a result of the shah’s actions that we supported, that we propped up.  And it goes back a few years before 1979.

So again, that doesn’t change the dimension or the dynamics or the risks or the threats.  But it is instructive to go back a little bit and understand why certain countries think the way they do, certain people think the way they do.  It was noted here earlier and I really do believe this and in fact, I was with some people last week who are currently leaders in that part of the world and there were two Iranians in the group.

And they said one of the things that would fasten that society back together – quicker than anything else – would be in a military attack and that would bring the Iranians back together for cultural reasons, for historic reasons.  Now, maybe a military option eventually will be the only thing that’s left.  I don’t know that.  But again, like we have said, we better be careful and we’d better think through that and employ every other option before we have to make that decision, if we have to make it.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Senator.  We have a question here.

Q:  Hi.  I just wanted to make a comment on –

MR. NAWAZ:  Identify yourself, please.

Q:  Benjamin Raff (ph) from the Heritage Foundation.  The ambassador said unacceptable and I had a question – what that exactly means when there’s five countries or six countries that keep on saying this, that it’s unacceptable and Iran keeps on enriching uranium.  And we have the example of North Korea.  And at that time, those same countries said it was unacceptable and it actually happened.  So what does that actually mean?

And the other question is with the word “democracy.”  When you say you want a democratic Iran, we’ve already said that Iran is not a totalitarian regime.  There’s many different centers of power.  So I guess what you mean is you want a country with more human rights.  And how does that exactly serve American interests?  It serves the interests of the Iranian people, but is that something that we should take risks for as American policymakers?

MR. NAWAZ:  Barbara?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, it was Ambassador Eizenstat who said it was unacceptable.  I didn’t say that.  (Chuckles.)  You know, my personal view – and this is just my personal view is that the United States could probably contain, deter, live with a nuclear – (audio break) – a nuclear Pakistan, a nuclear India, a nuclear Israel, a nuclear North Korea.

There are a lot of – (audio break) – I’m not sure they would ever actually go all the way to a weapon.  I think it frankly doesn’t serve their strategic interest to actually have the weapon.  I think it serves their interest to have the world think that they might have the weapon and they would go beyond that.

But that’s something that we can address, certainly, as we work our way through this – (audio break).  I think the United States should – (audio break) – their definition of what it means by nuclear capability, nuclear-weapons capability, should decide whether it can put up with some limited uranium enrichment or it’s opposed to all enrichment.  These things all have to still be clarified.

On the question of democracy, vis-à-vis human rights, I think what Iran – what Iranians want is a more representative and less brutal government that will be focused on their national interests.  And frankly, if Iran had a different sort of government, I don’t think the world would have such a problem with Iran having nuclear weapons.

It’s the nature of the regime that makes it, quote, unquote, “unacceptable” because Iran, as we know, doesn’t act as a very constructive player in a number of areas in the Middle East.  And it treats its own people very poorly.  So whether you call it democracy or you call it human rights, I’ve spent a fair amount of time in the country over the last 14 years and I think I have a sense of what Iranians would like, ideally, if they could get it.

I’m not sure that they would a complete transformation, but they certainly open to a freer system where people will not be thrown in prison for demonstrating peacefully on the streets, certainly won’t be shot to death for demonstrating peacefully on the streets.

MR. NAWAZ:  And that’s what you appear to be suggesting with your various other measures such as greater access to the Internet, greater freedom of communication inside the country, that the U.S. and other countries can help.  We have a question from Ambassador Limbert.

Q:  Thank you.  John Limbert, university professor.  Barbara, first of all, I want to thank you for a very memorable phrase you’ve used about Iranians, which I have stolen on numerous occasions, which is the Iranians consider themselves the Rodney Dangerfield of the Middle East.  (Laughter.)  They just don’t get no respect.

And in so many areas, including the – (audio break) – this issue of respect, of being dictated to, it comes up over and over again.  And we hear it – we hear it from President Ahmadinejad.  We hear it from many others.  We hear it in the context of the nuclear program.  We heard it in the context of the Tehran research reactor deal. 

What is your view – and Sen. Hagel, yours, is what is behind this statement?  How does one deal with something like this?  Is this a smokescreen for other things?  Or is there some way of dealing with it and how you view this constant refrain in the Iranian position?

MS. SLAVIN:  (Chuckles.)  Well, John, you’re much more than a university professor as everybody knows.  John was most recently deputy assistant secretary of state for Iran.  And your – one of your contributions was to help change the language that the U.S. government uses toward Iran so that it is more respectful.

I think “respect” is a very important word and President Obama, when he refers to Iran, always talks about mutual interest, mutual respect and I think this is key to have an understanding of where they’re coming from when we approach any kind of talks with them, any kind of negotiations.

You know, we’ve gotten beyond the, you know, Condi Rice formulation of you know what you need to do.  We don’t wag our finger at them quite so much as we used to, although every now and then, it slips into the State Department briefings, a little bit of that.

Respect is important but so is power and so – particularly the power to inflict economic pain on Iran and I think that the Iranians have shown that when their national interests really are at stake, they can make decisions, whether you’re respectful toward them or not.  So I would hope our diplomats would use appropriate language.

Iran has very skillful diplomats.  Even now, after the purge that Ahmadinejad has inflicted on the foreign ministry, there are still some pretty savvy people.  And one would hope that they will approach talks in a respectful manner toward the United States.  Iran doesn’t help its case when Ahmadinejad comes to the U.N. General Assembly and alleges that the U.S. might have been 9/11.  (Chuckles.)  So you know, respect is a two-way street and I think they understand that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Senator, you want to add something?

MR. HAGEL:  Only this.  I think Barbara said it very well.  I could connect Benjamin’s question into your question because I think they do present an integration here of interests and ultimate outcomes.  When you connect what Benjamin, what he asked, regarding what does this mean, when you say these things like “unacceptable,” “weapons,” what is acceptable? 

Enrichment, uranium, what rights do countries have to possess nuclear power and nuclear capability?  Which we have stated that all nations have that right.  Where is that line and it blurs over, it seems to me, into what you’re talking about.  And you are as knowledgeable about this, John, as anybody, certainly anybody in this room. 

It blurs into your point because if we have any hope of making any progress through the diplomatic channels and all the other influences that we are using and coordinating to influence an outcome, that is all going to be framed and partially part of whatever acceptance there is to what will we accept?  What will Iran accept? 

And I go back to this real example.  The Turkish-Brazilian so-called compromise, which essentially, basically, we laid that on the table a year ago.  And then we walked away from it.  It wasn’t only our fault.  The Iranians blew it up too.  That’s not a new assessment.  So my point in bringing that up, the Brazilian-Turkish point is because it goes back into Benjamin’s point because it starts to get to the issue which we’re all going to have to get at and get to at some point.  What are you willing to accept?  How much and how do you do that? 

The Russians, if you remember, put that deal on the table a couple years ago, that we’ll enrich it, return it and so on and so on and so on.  So this also gets into the technicalities and the depth of this, that I don’t think you can pull apart.  It is all woven in that same fabric and this is part of the – the real complexity, as you know, especially, John, and many in this room, is trying to find some resolution here. 

And I think what we can – what we need to do, as much as anything else, and it goes back to what Stu was talking about, what we all have referred to, Barbara, purpose, so on, is just try to continue to put this issue, not unlike the Middle East peace process, on a continuation of high ground.  I don’t think you’re going to solve the Iranian piece. 

And I don’t think it’ll be solved in six months.  Maybe it will be, but all these questions.  It’s like the Middle East issue.  If we continue to keep moving it up on higher ground, higher ground and get it to some point where there is a confluence that will dictate a settlement, that will be in the interest of all countries. 

The last point I’d make, we should not underestimate, again, and Barbara’s brought this – Fred talked about it initially, the regional aspect of this.  This is critical and it’s something that I have always thought we made huge mistakes when we went into Iraq and Afghanistan the way we did it, that we didn’t regionalize the strategic concepts, the geopolitical strategic dynamic of all those – of all those movements and decisions and actions that we took.  We’re now trying to do that.  We’re going to have to do that, but it seems to me that Iran is a clear case of that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Fred?

MR. KEMPE:  Yeah, just two sentences.  Let me underscore what Sen. Hagel just said.  If you just take a look at the way Turkey looks at missile defense versus the way Poland looks at missile defense, geography makes a difference.  And we will have an agreement in Lisbon in the NATO summit in a couple of weeks, but it will be a very careful agreement that takes into account Turkey’s sensitivities, which I think is very important to say.

The other thing is just for clarity, for the Atlantic Council, you’ve heard one task member say it’s unacceptable to have nuclear weapons in Iran, another one say that one could contain, deter, live with.  The Atlantic Council itself doesn’t take positions, taskforce does, do.  As you can see, this taskforce hasn’t really decided that point.  But I don’t think it really has to.

I think the – I think the questions that we need to get at is what should we be willing to accept?  What levers do we have to actually determine that?  And then how do we determine what we should be willing to accept?  For example, it’s not just could we contain Iran?  It’s what do we do about proliferation in the wider region? 

It’s not just, you know, are they going to carry through on threats to you know, push Israel into the sea.  It’s also what’s the impact on Hamas, Hezbollah, et cetera, et cetera.  So I think what Barbara said about the nature of the regime would have been Ambassador Eizenstat’s answer, almost certainly.

MR. NAWAZ:  And also that strategic patience doesn’t equal infinite patience.  I think that’s the message.  We have a question from Benjamin and then Sean (ph).

Q:  Thanks.  Benjamin Loehrke from Ploughshares Fund.  Thank you for convening this great group of radical centrists.  (Laughter.)  My question, I’ll offer to Barbara.  Now that we’re hearing reports that sanctions are beginning to bite, from a domestic political standpoint, how do Iranians view the enrichment program?  And how will this affect Iranians as they go to the negotiating tables over the next couple weeks?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, you know, it’s hard, of course, to do proper polls in Iran.  There have been some and there, you know, this is just really from anecdotal – my own sense of it from having traveled a long time and I don’t think Iranians really – they care about the notion that Iran should have advanced technology.  They don’t want to be deprived of that.  They think it is their right.  But if they were able to trade that for a better economy, I think they’d do it in a minute.

This is, you know, it’s – there’s so many slogans that are tossed around in that country and people repeat them, pro forma because they have to.  They’re drummed into them ad nauseam.  In the book that I wrote about the U.S. in Iran, I titled the first chapter, “Death to America and Can I Have Your Autograph?”

Going to one of their celebrations of the – I think it was the 29th anniversary of the revolution and you know, everybody’s chanting, death to America, death to America.  And there were a group of kids.  They all placards on them saying, nuclear is our natural right and you know, all of this stuff.

And there were a bunch of young kids who spotted me in the crowd and saw that I was a foreigner and asked where I was from.  And I said I was an American.  And Ahmadinejad is up on the platform, you know, blah, blah, blah about Israel and the Holocaust and so on.  And I swear, 50 kids, young girls, all came up and asked for my autograph.  You know – (chuckles) – just because I was from the States.  So you figure it. 

I mean, I think that it’s just – it’s an issue that the government uses for nationalism.  It’s something that they try to build up to unite the people because there isn’t much, frankly, to unite Iranians anymore.  It’s – the Islamic Republic lost its religious fervor a long time ago.  So they portray this as Iran’s right, but it’s – it’s certainly not the first priority for most Iranians in my view.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.  We have a question here.

Q:  Right, so my question is for Ms. Slavin, also.

MR. NAWAZ:  If you wouldn’t mind identifying yourself, Sean.

Q:  Yeah, yeah.  Sorry.  My name is Sean Ruda (ph).  I guess that – well, first, thank you for your report and thank you to the Atlantic Council for having me.  But my question’s really related to the last two, namely, you know, you cite the current political instability as potentially a good thing because the follow-on regime could be more open, maybe more democratic is a good way to put it and more respectful of human rights.

And then you go on to say, and more likely to cooperate or at least not be so violently confrontational with Israel and/or the West.  So my question is why?  I mean I feel like we often conflate this idea that you know, a more democratic regime would be more like us in a lot of ways.  And I feel, you know, I think you would acknowledge, democratic peace theory has about as many caveats as evidentiary points.

MS. SLAVIN:  Sure, sure.

Q:  And Ahmadinejad was elected.  I mean maybe the most recent election was called a little early, but ultimately, it’s not clear that he would not have won given big support in rural areas.  And you, yourself, cite that a lot of his internal opposition is from hardline reactionary elements, right?

MS. SLAVIN:  That’s true.

Q:  So even if we assume that you’re right and a follow-on regime, if we’re patient, comes in with more respect for these human rights and whatnot, why would we – why would we assume that they would not pursue as aggressive a Shiite-crescent extending foreign policy?  I mean I don’t know how you’d characterize the influence of Lebanon as anything but destabilizing?  What evidence do you have from your study?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, I think the evidence really comes from the policies that were in effect when Mohammad Khatami was president.  Iran was a lot less confrontational.  It sought better relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf.  Khatami went to Lebanon, but he gave a speech in Beirut.  He didn’t go to the border, you know, with Israel and make a lot of threats about wiping Israel off the map.  It was a different tone.

The nuclear program, the enrichment program was suspended for two years when Khatami was president while the Europeans negotiated with the United States.  So we already have an example of what a more constructive Iranian administration can look like. 

I take – I make this statement because of the comments that have been made by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the leaders of the Green movement have repeatedly talked about the fact that they would have a different – (audio break).  I take it from my experiences visiting Iran over the last 14 years that they would have a different approach. 

The economy is very important and if you will recall, one of the slogans in one of the demonstrations that took place after the elections last year was, let’s see, no to Lebanon, no to Gaza, my life only for Iran.  Iranians resent the fact that so much of their money is wasted, in their view, on supporting Hezbollah, Hamas and so on.  And I think they would take a very different view.  I don’t think they would devote those kinds of resources to these kinds of radical movements.

Khatami also used to say that if the Palestinians reached an agreement with the Israelis, that Iran would not stand in the way of that.  It was a different perspective.  So we have to hope, I think, that a future Iranian government would be more nationalistic in the sense of dealing with Iranian interests.

Would it give up its claims to influence in the region?  No.  I mean the shah was the one who started in meddling in Lebanon.  The shah was the one who had the nuclear program.  It was under his government that three small islands were seized from the United Arab Emirates.  So I don’t think you would see an end to Persian nationalism by any means.  But the tactics, I think, would be different.  And certainly, there would be less of a confrontation, hopefully, with the United States and the West.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  I’m going to ask Sen. Hagel and Fred if they’d like to say anything before I wrap up this discussion with my thanks?

MR. HAGEL:  Only to thank you, again, Shuja, for your good work and of course, you, Barbara, and all who have participated over those last nine months and will continue.  Thank you all for joining us and to Fred and his leadership.  The job of chairman is to stay out of the way and not screw anything up.  (Laughter.)  So ladies and gentleman, the president.  (Laughter.)

MR. KEMPE:  I actually have nothing to add. 

MR. HAGEL:  It’s too easy.

(Cross talk, laughter.)

MR. KEMPE:  Uncharacteristically.  (Laughter.)

MR. NAWAZ:  In that case – in that case, it’s up to me to thank the audience for coming and to thank the members of our taskforce, many of whom will be watching this on television or listening to it on our website or reading the transcript for their invaluable work in supporting what we are doing.  I also want to thank, again, the Ploughshares Fund for having given us the initial grant to get this going and we hope to carry it forward. 

Picking up on some of the themes that have been raised today, some regional issues that need to be discussed on a broader level because this is the South Asia Center.  We want to look at what India’s view is, what Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf States are thinking about Iran and how they can help this relationship and the engagement the West and Iran.

I also want to thank, again, the project director for the Iran Task Force, Mark Brzezinski, who had to be in China, unfortunately, and missed this first launch.  So we want to thank you and my colleagues, Shikha Bhatnagar, Alexandra Bellay and Roy Baran.  So thank you all for coming.  We’ll see you again.

MR. KEMPE:  Thank you.  Good.  (Applause.)

(END)

The U.S. and Pakistan: Uneasy Ties

Pakistani woman and US Marine

"Pakistan today is like a ship in heavy seas, having lost its propulsion’’ described a recent visitor to Islamabad. The imagery is dramatic but apt as the country reels under the effects of a massive flood and political squabbling that appear to have reduced government to firefighting rather than coming up with a credible long-term plan. It is critical that Pakistan’s Ship of State be navigated out of rough seas in the face of a perfect storm of national and regional challenges.

News of the floods is fast receding from the headlines, and the fear is that donors will halt their aid and move on to issues elsewhere. Meanwhile the US-Pakistan relationship seems to be fraught, in the wake of increased drone attacks and incursions by NATO helicopters into Pakistani territory. As the two allies meet today in Washington, both the floods as well as their relations need to be addressed, and both countries need to avoid missteps that could add to instability in the region.

As for flood relief, the United States appears to be the most generous donor, with nearly $400 million in promised aid, accounting for a quarter of all official aid pledged to date. The United Nations has asked the international community for $2 billion in humanitarian aid. Pakistan estimates its losses at about $43 billion, although the World Bank and Asian Development Bank estimates came in at $9.7 billion. Still, how will the gap be filled?

The mood in Washington is not very positive, as Congress reacts to the growing war bill for Afghanistan on the one hand and Pakistan’s apparent inability to control the Afghan Taliban from using its territory as a safe haven. Pakistan also possesses the ability to stop NATO supplies from reaching Afghanistan via its land route at any time. This rankles the Americans. The deep mutual mistrust between the United States and Pakistan will likely be reflected in today’s meetings.

Internally, Pakistan is facing severe economic hardships as a result of the floods that will last well into the next few years. Economic growth is already creeping downward from previous estimates of below-par 4 percent annually to near zero and, according to some analysts, perhaps into negative territory.

Population figures are on an upward trajectory and the largely youthful population of 180 million, with a median age of 18, faces lack of education and employment. Meanwhile the gap between the rich and the poor will be exacerbated, as the rural poor live largely in the devastated flood plains.

The recently improved economic team in the civilian administration may not have the political backing to make their reform agenda stick nor be able to change behavior to improve tax revenues. In a country where the prime minister and other political leaders reportedly have either not paid income taxes in recent years or only nominal amounts, and foreign assets and incomes are routinely hidden from the tax man’s eyes, the prospects of fiscal stability are dim. A culture of entitlement grips all institutions. All hands are not on the tiller but in the till.

Against this dark scenario, friends of Pakistan will need to inject support for civil society that is once more trying against all odds to help the millions affected by the floods. But the needs are too great to be met from inside Pakistan.

In a major agricultural economy, where buffalo milk contributes the largest amount to national income (close to $10 billion year) and often means the difference between life and death to the farmers, lost livestock needs to be replaced urgently. The wheat, cotton, and rice crops also need to be re-launched. If food shortages persist and flood-related diseases spread, social upheaval may well be on the cards.

Meanwhile, most US aid has not yet landed in Pakistan. Two months have gone by since the flood and yet there is no visible plan to shift these funds to flood relief and reconstruction. USAID appeared to be waiting for the World Bank and Asian Development Bank assessment of flood damage. The funds could also be held hostage by certification requirements. If Pakistan fails any of the tests written into the aid law, Congress is bound to cut off assistance, especially to the military. That would unleash a huge problem inside Pakistan’s fragile polity as well as a reaction from the Pakistan military that may affect the coalition efforts in Afghanistan. The recent contretemps over the helicopter attacks and the subsequent stoppage of NATO supplies may foreshadow a wider breach.

These are some of the issues that the United States and Pakistan will have to deal with in their meetings. There needs to be better and clearer communication between Islamabad and Washington of how each side defines its strategic aims and red lines. Given the Byzantine politics of Pakistan and inept handling of crisis after crisis by a rudderless government, and a Washington establishment transfixed by the looming headlights of mid-term elections and mired in a difficult exit strategy out of war in Afghanistan, the auguries are not inspiring. A perfect storm may be brewing in Pakistan.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This article originally appeared in the Boston Globe. Photo credit: Getty Images.

Pakistan’s Internal and External Challenges: Political Myths and Realities

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center held a discussion with Ashraf Qazi, Chairman of the Council on Pakistan Relations; C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University; Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council; and Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.

Concurrent with the Strategic Dialogue in Washington, this panel of experts examined the crucial questions facing the US and Pakistan.

As the United States and Pakistan gear up for their third ministerial-level Strategic Dialogue meeting to be held in Washington next week, critical questions about Pakistan’s domestic politics and relations with the US remain unresolved. Where does the Pakistani government stand in the aftermath of the floods? How has the sharp rise in diplomatic and military skirmishes between the US and Pakistan affected an already precarious relationship? As steps are taken to move toward a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, where do American and Pakistani interests converge and conflict?

Speaker Bios:

Ashraf Qazi is the founder and Chairman of the Council on Pakistan Relations, a Washington DC based not-for-profit advocacy organization interested in strengthening ties and enhancing mutual understanding between the US and Pakistan. He is also the CEO of Ciena Healthcare Management, a Michigan-based health care company. Mr. Qazi is a graduate of Daemen College in Amherst, New York.
 
C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously, she has served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is also a senior fellow with the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point.
 
Harlan Ullman
is a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and a member of its Strategic Advisors Group. He is also a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. In business he is Chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders in business and government. A former naval person with 150 combat operations and missions in Vietnam in patrol boats and later commands, he is on the advisory boards for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and serves as an advisor for the Pentagon’s Business Transformation Agency. Dr. Ullman is also a columnist with UPI.

Pakistan’s Energy Sector: Arresting the Decline

On October 21st, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted Ziad Alahdad, former Director of Operations at the World Bank Institute, for a discussion of Pakistan’s energy sector.

Mr. Alahdad, who has over 38 years of experience in this field, offered insights about how Pakistan can resolve its energy issues.

The shortage of energy in Pakistan is a primary constraint to the country’s economic development. Policymakers have articulated their goals for developing the energy sector but have struggled to implement their policies, responding to crises as they arise rather than averting them through the optimal and sustainable use of resources. One solution to this problem is the concept of Integrated Energy Planning and Policy Formulation (IEP), a method that has been tried and tested in developing and developed countries alike. Though political and security concerns continue to dominate the dialogue on Pakistan, the time to act on the energy situation is now.

Featuring:

Ziad Alahdad, Consultant Advisor and former Director of Operations at the World Bank

Moderated by:

Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council

Shuja Nawaz Interviewed on Changing U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Highlight - Nawaz

In light of recent events in Pakistan, Shuja Nawaz, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, appeared on PBS NewsHour and National Public Radio’s Morning Edition.

PBS NewsHour Segment: U.S.-Pakistani Ties: a History of Needing Each Other, Patching Things Up

Summary: With tension rising again between the U.S. and Pakistan, described as “two countries that need each other badly,” Margaret Warner looks at the state of relations with Shuja Nawaz of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.

To view the segment, click here or play the video below.

 

 

NPR Morning Edition: Helicopter Strike Strains Tense U.S.-Pakistan Ties

Summary: The increased difficulty now stems from U.S. pressure on Pakistan to root out militants on its soil.

To listen to the segment, click here or play the radio below.

Shuja Nawaz on PBS NewsHour: 10/06/10 – Transcript

Click here to return to news posting

MARGARET WARNER: And for a closer look at the tensions in this crucial alliance, we’re joined by Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and author of its recent report, "Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S./Pakistan Relationship," and David Ignatius, a columnist for The Washington Post. He recently returned from a reporting trip to Pakistan.

And welcome back to you both. Shuja Nawaz, beginning with you, how serious is this rift over the helicopter raids and the blocked border crossing?

SHUJA NAWAZ, director of South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council: I think it reflects the general mistrust, which is pretty deep.

And it was extremely badly handled, I believe, by NATO and by the coalition. The apology that was tendered today could have easily been done at the very outset, which would have stopped the — the Pakistanis using the — the blockage of the convoys in Torkham. And it would have been resolved quite directly and immediately.

They missed an opportunity. They got caught in legalese. I believe, based on one report that I have received, that helicopters were actually returning back towards Afghanistan when they came upon this post on which they fired. If that is correct, then NATO should have been aware of that.

MARGARET WARNER: How do you read this David?

DAVID IGNATIUS, columnist, The Washington Post: Well, as your report showed, this is a week in which all the tensions that are in this relationship were evident.

Whenever I — I look at Pakistan and at the relationship, I — I try to caution myself that public pronouncements, public anger doesn’t tell you the whole story. The reality right now is that these are two countries that need each other badly, and they have a history of patching things together and muddling through.

And you would have to guess that, in this case, that will happen again. But I last week was in Pakistan. I had the experience two days before this helicopter attack in which members of the Pakistani Frontier Corps were killed by American fire visiting a training camp northwest of Peshawar in which U.S. special forces, sort of in secret, are training members of that same Frontier Corps to go out and fight in the tribal areas. So that shows the degree of complexity in this relationship.

MARGARET WARNER: Yes. Pakistan and the U.S. really are engaged in a covert war inside Pakistan, much more than either side acknowledges, right?

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. And, for quite a long time, the civilian government has been speaking out of both sides of its mouth, and it has actually inflamed public opinion, particularly regarding the drones. The — in September, we have had…

MARGARET WARNER: Which are the drone attacks, unmanned Predator drone attacks that have seen a huge increase in September.

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. In September, it was the largest ever number of attacks in any one month since the drone attacks began in the region.

But now, in recent months, the government had stopped using this as a stick to beat the U.S. with. And public opinion was gradually accepting them. But, clearly, now, with the timetable looming, the U.S. and the coalition is going to be forced into all these measures to regain momentum.

MARGARET WARNER: You’re talking about the timetable that President Obama has set to begin to dial back in Afghanistan, which is middle of next year.

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. Yes. And that’s going to create tensions within Pakistan, and particularly, as you reported, in North Waziristan, where they have a huge force presence, something like 35,000 men. But they haven’t moved against Haqqani.

MARGARET WARNER: The Haqqani Network, the al-Qaida-allied network.

So, David, is there essentially a fundamental difference between Pakistan and the U.S. over how to fight or to what degree to fight al-Qaida and its affiliates, or is it because the Pakistani military is stretched too thin?

DAVID IGNATIUS: Well, the Pakistani military says that’s why it can’t conduct the offensive in North Waziristan that the U.S. would like. And I think most U.S. officials recognize that, certainly after the flood, they are stretched too thin, that they probably couldn’t do it.

When I talked to Pakistani commanders in this zone, in Peshawar and outside, they basically said, don’t expect us to clear North Waziristan this year or probably even next year.

And I think the frustration for the U.S. is, basically, we’re looking at this porous border. The Haqqani Network, really one of the most bloodthirsty, in our view, factions of the Taliban, streaming in, I think General Petraeus is saying that…

MARGARET WARNER: Into Afghanistan.

DAVID IGNATIUS: Into Afghanistan. And General Petraeus is saying to the Pakistanis, either you do this, or we will do this.

We don’t really have the forces to back that up. And so, in the end, it’s not being done. There’s tremendous frustration. I think U.S. commanders see the time ticking out on their mission in Afghanistan, knowing that, unless they close the safe havens, they have got trouble.

MARGARET WARNER: So, that brings up Afghanistan front and center. Do the two governments actually have different — a key difference in their aims there? What’s the end state they would like to see?

SHUJA NAWAZ: I think Pakistan, like most countries in the region, heard the president’s speech at West Point last year, and saw July 2011 as the date by which the American military would begin withdrawing.

And the speed is not clear. But that’s what they heard, and that’s what they are hedging their bets on. Clearly, they don’t see a military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Success will be defined by how quickly the Afghans take over the fight and how much reconciliation can bring back people like Haqqani or other elements of the Taliban.

MARGARET WARNER: But, I mean, Petraeus and Karzai are saying the same thing, essentially, that it has to be a political solution. So, what’s — what’s the friction point between Washington and Islamabad on the Afghan conflict?

DAVID IGNATIUS: The friction point is that — is that the Pakistani government would like to be the key broker of any deal that’s done with the Taliban.

And they feel now that they’re being excluded. They hear reports about the U.S., the Karzai government, the British, various people talking with elements of the Taliban.

I actually think there’s a little less going on than the news of the last week might suggest in terms of real progress. It’s in the U.S. interest, of course, for the Taliban to think that there are elements of the Taliban that are doing a secret deal, and that will sow division.

But the Pakistanis are very frustrated. They think they’re being cut out of something. And they’re saying, you have got to bring us in, because it won’t work otherwise.

MARGARET WARNER: You know, underlying, both in this report, this NSC document, and also in the Woodward book is of course the fundamental nervousness in Washington about the stability of the civilian government, given that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state.

Do you think that’s well-founded?

SHUJA NAWAZ: I think there’s adequate evidence of the weakness of the civilian government. It’s been evident in the recent floods in Pakistan and the very poor and tardy response to that, and the fact that the military had to step in and even withdraw 70,000 troops from the borders in order to cope with that.

So, that has really upset the — the very delicate balance inside the country.

MARGARET WARNER: Between the military and the civilian government?

SHUJA NAWAZ: Exactly. And that’s something that the U.S. and Pakistan should be aware of, because Pakistan’s needs are now going to be enormous for a number of years to come. And rather than have this kind of Mexican standoff on attacks across the border and closing the — the supply route, they need to focus on where that aid is going to come from.

Pakistan will need the aid. The U.S. needs Pakistan to ensure stability in Afghanistan leading up to July 2011 and beyond.

MARGARET WARNER: But the real nightmare scenario is that neither military, nor civilian government in Pakistan can hold it together, and that these nuclear weapons can fall into other hands.

DAVID IGNATIUS: Yes.

MARGARET WARNER: Is — how nervous are the people you talk to about that?

DAVID IGNATIUS: I think the nervousness about the nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban is more something in the press than — I think that’s viewed…

MARGARET WARNER: So, that’s not driving this?

DAVID IGNATIUS: … as an unlikely scenario. This report that the White House just sent to Congress is stunningly frank about how badly things are going in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Reading the discussion, this issue of the civilian government, a weak civilian government vs. the military, you almost have the feeling that’s what’s happened — and the U.S. is — is really recognizing this — is a kind of soft military intervention.

The military is now the decisive force in just about everything. And this report basically says, that’s so. It doesn’t endorse it, but it accepts that it’s reality.

MARGARET WARNER: Yes, this very frank tone in this, as you said. David Ignatius, Shuja Nawaz, thank you.

Developments in Pakistan Won’t Help Relationship with the U.S.

Pakistan Protest

Even as the recently released tell-all Obama’s Wars by Bob Woodward raises fresh doubts about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and will likely stoke mistrust in the United States about Pakistan as a partner against the Afghan Taliban, a series of stories that paint the Pakistani army in a negative light will undoubtedly contribute to the tensions. These events occur against the backdrop of heightened U.S. drone activity inside Pakistan’s border region and at least two reported NATO helicopter attacks on Pakistani soil. How the Pakistani army sees these events and addresses the ensuing challenges will have enormous impacts on the future trajectory of South Asia, as well as the direction of Pakistan’s fragile democracy.

First, there was the reported kidnapping of The News journalist Umar Cheema and the standard operating procedures of Pakistani intelligence agencies used to humiliate and torture him, according to his detailed account of the incident. Other than denials, there does not appear to be a clear or detailed explanation from the government or the Inter Services Intelligence directorate, Pakistan’s top spy agency, of who did this, nor any indication from the government that a rapid and credible public inquiry is underway. In the absence of such actions, rumors will fly and allegations will be made that will undermine the state and its agencies.

Second, there has been a new viral video released on the Internet purporting to be a record of extrajudicial killing of blindfolded Pashtun captives in civilian clothes by Urdu-speaking (that is, non-Pashtun) soldiers in army uniforms and carrying standard army weapons. The presence of a senior person identified in the soundtrack as "Tanveer Sahib" may implicate an officer in this incident. According to the New York Times, the Pakistani military initially dismissed the video as a forgery. The Times later reported that the army had investigated the incident, found it to be genuine, and promised to act against the perpetrators.

Fairly or not, this video and other negative stories about the army’s operations and its behind-the-scenes role in Pakistani politics will likely be seen within Pakistan as coordinated and hostile actions from outside Pakistan to put pressure on the Pakistan army to bend to U.S. demands on a number of fronts. The army’s readiness to move against the elements involved in these killings speaks to its new and informed leadership. Similar reports of extrajudicial killings in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in 1971 were brushed aside by the army at that time. They lost the hearts and minds of the local population, fuelled an insurgency, and created a refugee stream into India that drew that country into invading East Pakistan to help create Bangladesh. By contrast, in June 1992, an incident in Sindh province earlier described by the army in Sindh as an "encounter" with local robbers was openly investigated by the army high command, following a BBC report of killings by an army major as a favor to a local landlord. The major was court-martialed and sentenced to death. Senior officers who failed to investigate the incident adequately and participated in covering it up were removed or dismissed to much public acclaim. The army’s stock went up in the public eye.

The current army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will need to confront this latest allegation head-on and quickly rather than let it simmer and adversely affect public support for the military as well as morale inside the institution. If a "rogue officer" was at work giving his troops an unlawful command to murder civilian prisoners, then the army needs to clear it up in a manner that will identify and bring to court the culprits and help educate the rest of its officers and troops against similar actions. At a time when the civilian government is under stress and economic and political problems have besieged it, it is important that the army is seen as a stable entity working with the government for the common good.

General Kayani also faces a challenge on the border from the U.S. and NATO. A first incursion into Pakistan seemed to have been handled quickly by him and Adm. Mike Mullen to reduce unhappiness on the Pakistan side. They spoke and decided not to add to the public rhetoric. But now an additional incident in Kurram involving a NATO helicopter attack that reportedly killed three soldiers of the Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that patrols the tribal areas, has led to the closing of the border to NATO supplies for Afghanistan and a public rebuke from the government of Pakistan.

This situation could easily careen out of control. The Obama administration, which is unhappy with what it perceives as Pakistan’s lack of action against anti-American militants, is seriously miscalculating if it is using such tactics to pressure Pakistan to launch operations against its will. Better to argue your case behind closed doors, as allies should — or risk a public split. Similarly, Pakistan risks overestimating its leverage over the United States and NATO by shutting down the coalition’s supply routes across the Durand Line. If anything, this embargo will accelerate the U.S. drive to diversify its logistics chain — while taking money out of Pakistanis’ pockets.

There is some positive news. On Thursday, Kayani announced a fresh list of newly promoted three-star generals, completing his team of senior officers who will outlast his own new three-year term at the helm of the army. By all accounts, he has chosen tried and tested professionals and superseded some Musharraf loyalists. As with the lieutenant generals promoted in April, he has by and large selected apolitical and professional soldiers with a broad, mature view of the world and of Pakistan’s place in it. Many of them have topped their classes at the military academy, winning the Sword of Honour, or have attended advanced military courses abroad, as has Kayani. Here’s hoping they get their chance to prove that Pakistani’s military can be a force for stability in South Asia, and a voice for the rule of law at home.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This essay first appeared at ForeignPolicy.com’s AfPak Channel. Photo credit: Getty Images.

General Musharraf’s Return

Musharraf Returns

  "Today, God has given me the opportunity to set the tone for my political legacy. Come join me in changing Pakistan’s destiny. It is not an easy task but one we must work for, as Pakistan is ours. ‘All Pakistan Muslim League’ is our platform from where I will work tirelessly to serve Pakistan and bring back national unity-Pakistan First."  With those words on one of his Facebook pages, as promised, former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf appears to have launched his new political party out of London. Clearly, he is attuned to the technology of today. But is he attuned to Pakistan?

Musharraf claims to have more than 300,000 youth followers. He has also attracted some serious Pakistani Diaspora supporters, including successful entrepreneurs. But his key support comes from his inner team whom he promoted while in power in Pakistan. Few major politicians inside the country appear to have spoken publicly about their support for him. Some who have met him and then are reported by his media staff to have considered joining his campaign to return to Pakistan in political triumph privately deny that they wish to join him. If his advance guard is telling him that the ground is ready for him in Pakistan, Musharraf needs to do some independent checking. The deck is stacked against him.

First, he faces personal danger from the moment he lands. The militants whom he challenged and attacked have long memories. Second, the leading political parties are more than likely to coalesce against him at the provincial and federal level. He knows well from his own time in power that the rules of the game favor those in power. Imposition of restrictions on public gatherings, closure of meeting places, and other ways of disrupting a political campaign, including ostensibly for Musharraf’s own personal safety (as he did by imposing restrictions on Benazir Bhutto immediately after her return in 2007) will likely hobble his campaign. His own Pakistan Muslim League (Q), also known as the King’s Party during his presidency, has split and is largely out of the central political game for now. If Musharraf can manage to bring all the bits and pieces of the Muslim League together under his new All Pakistan Muslim League, he may have a core to launch his campaign. But current indications are not very bright on that score. The Muslim League over time has become known as a party of hangers-on and relies on official largesse for life support. Out of power generals and politicians cannot give the Muslim League what it needs to survive.

And then there is the Pakistani Army. It has turned the corner on its former chief, as it always does. A previous Army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, found little support inside army headquarters when he launched his party. He has had no traction since. Indeed, few Pakistanis would be able to tell you its name (the Awami Qiyadat Party). Recent conversations with officers at different ranks and including many senior generals about Musharraf’s standing indicate clearly that they resent what they call Musharraf’s move away from professionalism of the army and infusion of the army into civilian jobs. They are trying to restore that inner core of the army’s professionalism now and would resist being drawn into the political fray by Musharraf’s return. Most of Musharraf’s favorite generals are no longer in key positions inside the army. Some of them have been superseded in the recent promotions as General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chosen by Musharraf to succeed himself, puts his own stamp on the upper echelons of the army and on the institution as a whole. Finally, the chances of Musharraf being charged with "high treason" and other crimes for upending a democratically elected government in October 1999 and thus drawing the Pakistan army into the defendant’s box in court worry the military high command enormously.

While the weakness of the current civilian government may appear to be a tempting target, the negatives surrounding Musharraf’s return militate against the successful rebirth of Musharraf the politician. For his own sake and to save Pakistan from further political turmoil, he may wish to re-examine his plans to return. He could do a lot for Pakistan from his current perch abroad by drawing together bright young Pakistanis who could share their knowledge and experience and help foster the rebirth of civil society, using the technological instruments of our times to foster change for the better. He could also perform the role of a philanthropist and an apolitical spokesman for Pakistanis at home and abroad rather than someone who is missing the trappings of power.  As he would put it, he needs to place "Pakistan first!"

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This essay first appeared at ForeignPolicy.com’s AfPak Channel.

Transcript: NATO Beyond Afghanistan Conference – Second Panel

Transcript of the second panel from the NATO Beyond Afghanistan conference held September 27, 2010.

NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN:
A CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
IN A POST-ISAF WORLD

PANEL 2: NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN – SHARPENING OR BREAKING

MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ,
DIRECTOR,
SOUTH ASIA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH,
ASSOCIATE FELLOW,
CHATHAM HOUSE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL STRATEGIC ADVISORY GROUP

GIAN GENTILE,
VISITING FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

VAGO MURADIAN,
EDITOR,
DEFENSE NEWS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
10:45-12:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

SHUJA NAWAZ:  Good morning, everyone.  I’m Shuja Nawaz.  I’m the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and I am delighted to welcome you all back to this second session.  Since this is a military-related gathering, we are starting on time and ending on time.  That’s the advantage.  Otherwise, Washington clocks tend to run a bit slow, particularly for conferences after coffee breaks. 

This is the panel that is looking at the topic of “Sharpening or Breaking?  NATO Military Power Beyond Afghanistan,” and there are a number of questions that have been posed to us and I’m sure that there are many others, particularly in light of the fact that the morning session has already covered some of the crosscutting issues, recognizing that NATO is a political military alliance.  So you can’t separate the political from the military and it’s sometimes a question of sequencing and sometimes a question of how you mesh the two together. 

Let me first introduce my panelists.  I’m delighted to have with us Julian Lindley-French.  Julian is a member of our Strategic Advisors Group at the Atlantic Council.  He is a professor of military art and science at the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands, and he has held various important academic and consultancies and research appointments around the globe, also acted as a consultant to NATO in Brussels at the headquarters. 

Then to his left is Col. Gian Gentile.  He’s a U.S. Army officer who’s on sabbatical from West Point, where he teaches, and he is a graduate of U.C. Berkeley and did his Ph.D. in history at Stanford.  Quite importantly for the topic at hand, he has served two tours in Iraq, first as the executive officer of a combat brigade in the Tikrit area in 2003 and then as a commander of a battalion in a restive area of northwest Baghdad in 2006. 

He is currently during his sabbatical a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.  For those that are interested in an earlier kind of warfare that we won’t be talking about today, I guess, he published a book in 2001 called “How Effective is Strategic Bombing.”

COL. GIAN GENTILE:  From strategic bombing to COIN.

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes, so we cover the spectrum.  And then to my right is Vago Muradian.  Vago is the editor of Defense News, which is one of the leading defense news weeklies with correspondents in 16 countries. 

Before that he had other, similar assignments.  He was managing editor of Defense Daily International and also worked on the Air Force Times.  He has covered global operations including in Europe, Haiti, Somalia and Zaire.  Before covering the Air Force, he served as the Defense News’s land warfare reporter and he started his career inside the Army. 

So going back to the topic – and I’m glad that we had the morning session precede us because I think it sort of set the ground for what we are going to be talking about today.  I just want to remind the conference that a couple of years ago at the Atlantic Council – I’m glad Harlan is sitting here because he was part of that group when Gen. Jones put together a paper on Afghanistan that famously began, make no mistake, we are losing in Afghanistan.  So the question now is, are we winning?  And if so, has the purpose, the shared purpose of the NATO alliance been defined properly?

There’s been a lot of commentary that the operations in Afghanistan, despite the fact that we’ve been at it for eight or nine years now, were really not combined operations, that they were divided and that it was not unified command and it took us quite a while to unify that command and to centralize the military leadership. 

So the question then comes up is NATO the tip of the spear, or is it the backpack for the U.S. and a handful of other allies.  And if so, how is NATO’s role going to be defined or redefined, particularly in light of the question that was raised in the first panel, which is when you have already a calendar and a date by which a transition or an exit will begin?  Despite all the caveats about what is meant by July 2011, the message, particularly in the region where I come from, is that the U.S. and the allies are going to be exiting. 

So is this really a time for NATO to try and reorganize itself for the job in Afghanistan?  And then more importantly, in light of the economic issues at home, how on Earth will NATO be able to reformulate its approach to the use of military power as an adjunct of political policy around the globe?  It was mentioned that a big issue is the question of out of area of operations.  That raises a question, is it out of area or is it out of NATO’s depth, and is NATO ready for these kinds of operations?

So what will happen in Afghanistan in particular once the U.S. and some of the other leading countries take off?  What will NATO do?  Will they merely redefine the role of their troops, as is apparently the case?  The U.S. is trying to persuade them, or will they actually find a way to exit even more speedily than planned originally. 

These are some of the questions.  I’m sure you will have many and we hope to have a conversation with you.  I propose to ask Julian to launch this discussion, if you would please, and then, as the program shows, we’ll follow with Col. Gentile and then Vago in this order.  So Julian?

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Thank you, sir.  I’m a strange beast.  I’m a Yorkshire optimist.  There aren’t many of us around in this business.  But you know, I’m attending a lot of these events, as many of my colleagues are at the moment, and too often it feels like we’re attending a wake, a wake for Afghanistan and a wake for NATO.  I don’t buy either, frankly.  It’s not over in the region.  I think we are beginning to get a proper regional perspective about the future, an economic perspective about the future of the region.  Therefore, we have gripped with certain realities we didn’t a few years ago. 

But nor do I accept for a minute, which I hear often in Europe, that effectively NATO is over.  There’s no real alternative.  ESDP or CSDP is bubbling along, but not doing very much.  But I think the problem is – and I think you in Washington in particular have to grip this – I genuinely think there is what I call the great European defense depression going on right now. 

We had the Great Depression of the ’30s.  There’s a defense depression in Europe, where a case for armed forces and the use of force has been damaged so profoundly by a mixture of indolent European action – very few Europeans went into Afghanistan believing that we were going to win; we did the least possible to keep you guys engaged in our security and defense and paying for much of it – and frankly, by a lot of poor American leadership. 

You haven’t led very well since 2001, and you can hardly expect allies to kind of follow you unconditionally when your leadership isn’t very good.  I see that there are again signs of improvement, but that is the essential contract that is at the heart of alliance and that is where we are right now.

In the next three weeks – Edgar alluded to it – we’re about to see what I’ve called the British strategic pretense and impecunity review, which could be a very, very important moment indeed.  I’m hoping that it’s a bit like 1934, that it’s a chance for the Brits to retrench, to look at security in the round, to consider defense as part of their broad security effort and the British leadership role in Europe, along with France, which is critical, frankly, along with Germany, to move us forward.  I fear that it’s merely a kind of function of exhaustion and financial damage, financial disarmament, even. 

If that’s the case, if indeed Britain just becomes another European power, then you Americans have a problem.  And you have a big problem, I would suggest.  In the next three or four weeks, we need your influence.  Now, I use the word influence critically here because whether it’s in Afghanistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan or indeed beyond that, we are in the influence game.  It’s all about influence. 

And I’m old-fashioned.  I happen to believe the world is a safer place when the West is strong, and I happen to believe that the West is strong when it is militarily balanced, credible in all the key roles that we need it to be credible in, and that includes being the dominant military grouping.  And the only organization that can possibly deliver that is NATO.  We’re not going to reinvent it.  There’s no other organization. 

I think beyond Afghanistan, as the question suggests, we might be seeing the need for a radical reorganization of the European pillar.  I think there’s going to have to be a reemergence of a European pillar – that means a pillar where Europeans organize themselves, in effect, to support both NATO and the European Union across a range of missions. 

But as I said in my question this morning, I also believe, Chairman, that NATO must be allowed to grip a fundamental question, which is what is the likely nature of future war and how are we going to fight it?  Because ultimately that is what NATO is for.  If we talk Article V, you can talk architectures, you can talk solidarity, you can talk strategic reassurance – but it’s about the ability of the alliance to be credible and be seen to be credible in a world of uncertain change in considering the nature of future war. 

Now, here is a dilemma.  We will have to make some hard choices.  There’s no question about that, whether they be financial or military.  And here I have some sympathy with our leaders.  We simply don’t want to make the wrong choices.  But in our effort not to make the wrong choices, I fear we will make no choices at all.  What I brought out of this morning’s session and what I’ve heard many times now is that Lisbon will not be that moment when, in fact, the bureaucracy, with partners, the member nations working together, will start to consider the environment, will start to consider creative solutions. 

I’m doing a lot of work at the moment with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps on operationalizing the comprehensive approach.  There are many things we can do to use our existing resources far better.  And one thing I’m absolutely convinced about is that if we don’t have a major better-spending project as the first day-after-Lisbon project, then Lisbon will have failed because it’s very clear that whatever we have to do more in the military realm, it will at the very least not have to cost any more money. 

That means there needs to be a very clear mandate from Lisbon that we start to look at how we make ourselves more effective and more efficient and the two are not the same.  Now, let me say a few words, if I may, on the situation, just to conclude on Afghanistan right now, as the two questions that were posed, Chairman, to us.  What effect has Afghanistan had on allied military effectiveness and has the experience allowed us to refine doctrines, training, equipment, tactics, et cetera, et cetera? 

My answer to that would be, not enough.  Would you like to turn that off, somebody?

(Off-side conversation.)

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  It’s Boyko?  Really?  (Laughter.)  He always has to be present.

MR. NAWAZ:  Introspection.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Introspection, there you go.  I think the problem with Afghanistan is the way we’ve structured it.  When I go around the world and I talk, particularly in Asia, the dangerous impression that we’ve given to allies, partners and adversaries is that we’re far weaker than we are.  By the way, we’ve given that impression to ourselves as well. 

I think the way we’ve organized PRTs has been far too stovepiped, back to national capitals rather than an international, multinational effort.  I think the way – and part of that is due to the comprehensive approach, the civil-military side of it, which has been so complicated that by definition, it’s tended to disaggregate the multinational level and reinforce the idea of national stovepipes because that’s where the spending decisions are made. 

Look at the NRF.  There’s been much criticizing of the NRF, but NRF 13 had a 27-percent CJSOR – combined joint statement of requirement.  In fact, the future for most Europeans will be a much better use of multinational formations.  And I never understand why we spend so many years working these damned things up and the moment we go on operations, we scrap them and we go back to some very inefficient national stovepipe. 

So I suppose my challenge, given the experience of the last years in Afghanistan and indeed the wider region, given the rules-of-engagement issue, given the caveats issue, is twofold.  Will we have the courage to be radical post-Lisbon, to reconstruct a genuinely European pillar where some of the smaller Europeans who spend an average $4 billion a year very badly – 19 NATO Europe members, very badly – are encouraged to move even towards some limited forms of defense integration and whether the U.S. will wait for us? 

Because what worries me about what I’m seeing in Afghanistan is, in fact, this is no longer a NATO operation.  This is a CENTCOM operation with NATO being used as a fig leaf.  The European allies will tolerate that for a time because we understand that this is the critical crunch period.  The U.S. is pouring in troops, with the Brits doing our best as well, and the next two years are genuinely critical. 

But what concerns me is that if CENTCOM, in a sense, becomes a precedent for the subjugation of NATO Europe to U.S. command structures, then that will accelerate the demise of the alliance.  No one will want that, but it could happen by the sheer preponderance-of-force issue, that the United States is so powerful compared with the European forces that we end up with this reality.  In a sense, it could become an excuse for Europeans to do even less.  If that happens over the next two years, that will be far more damaging that any particular reverse on the ground. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Julian.  If I could move to Col. Gentile, one of the pointed questions that emerges is, what kind of future war are we going to be fighting?

COL. GENTILE:  Right.  I heard Julian say that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes, and if so, first of all, how do you evaluate NATO’s operations within the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and what will be the nature of the future war and what lessons have we learned or are learning?

COL. GENTILE:  Hopefully, I can address those excellent questions.  It’s also a privilege to be on this panel with Shuja as the chair, with Vago on it as well.  Anybody who pays attention to defense issues reads Defense News, so I’m operating with a fair amount of trepidation here – and also Julian as well because he’s the editor of an article that I just wrote on the history of counterinsurgency.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  And I’m tough.

COL. GENTILE:  (Chuckles.)  That’s right.  He just sent me this list of – it’s a really good piece, you may want to look at – but no.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Five pages later.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah.  So I took the train down from New York City this morning and I got in about – I don’t know, probably 30, 45 minutes into the first panel.  As I was just setting my book bag down outside, I heard a question.  I heard a person stand up and the person said, I’m Joe Collins, and I said, I wonder if that’s my old friend and mentor Joe Collins, and it was. 

And Joe Collins brought up this question, or this term, utility of force, which I found to be a very important and absolutely critical question in how we think about what we’re doing in Afghanistan, how we think it’s going there or how we assess progress and effectiveness and also it tied to Julian’s point about how we conceive of the future of warfare, and what role does force play in that. 

So for the next five or six minutes, I have a few points I want to make.  I’m going to try to come at that question of utility of force and future conflict.  But I’m going to come at it from a more narrow angle – I think that it might be useful for this panel, from what came before and what’s going to come after this afternoon – and that’s from the angle of the American Army. 

Because let’s face it, the American Army is the key player in what we’ve been doing in Afghanistan for the last nine years and in Iraq for a few years shorter.  So that is the angle that I’m going to come at this question of utility of force and the future of conflict. 

I found also this question I really liked for this panel.  It says “Sharpening or Breaking?  NATO Military Power Beyond Afghanistan.”  So I’m going to address that question from a view of the American Army.  To be sure, the American Army has sharpened over the last nine years in terms of its ability to do nation-building, counterinsurgency. 

Of course both of those two words are synonymous.  They mean the same thing, at least how the American Army and other major armies do counterinsurgency now.  It is the same thing as nation-building, nation-building at the barrel of a gun.  Certainly, the American Army has been sharpened over the last nine years in its ability to do counterinsurgency. 

However, this has come at a cost, which gets at this whole question – and also, Julian, you raised this – how much money are we going to spend, how we’re going to organize, all these kinds of things.  It comes at a cost, and the cost of becoming sharpened at counterinsurgency is, at least for the American Army, its ability to do combined arms, combined-arms operations, the American Army’s ability to fight, to fight an enemy that fights or operates beyond the laying of IEDs on the road and then running away, but fights in a sophisticated way.

I think you can make the argument – although many would not want to hear this – that the American Army, in terms of its ability to do combined-arms operations at battalion, brigade, division and even higher is not just breaking but it’s broken.  I’m going to come up to that point in a few minutes.  And I’m going to make a few supporting points that are going to lead to this, I think, this essential problem within the American Army of its ability to do combined-arms operations. 

The first point I want to make, after nine years of doing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it’s a problem that we have in the United States, especially with the American Army, but I also think within policymaking circles, of strategy.  You often hear the term, our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.  Counterinsurgency is not strategy.  Strategy, simply defined, is the level of war that should, after assessment, asking questions, of weighing costs and benefits, should link tactical, operational methods in a military sense, other elements of national power to achieve policy objectives.  That is a simple definition of strategy. 

Counterinsurgency is not strategy, but we often hear this term counterinsurgency strategy.  To be sure, strategy could employ the tactics and operational methods of counterinsurgency.  But the problem with the term counterinsurgency strategy, as it’s used today – it implies that strategic rationale and thought have gone in to the employment of the tactics and operations of counterinsurgency, especially with Afghanistan. 

One could make the argument, and I have before, although this is not, I think, necessarily a well-liked or appreciated argument, that our strategy in Afghanistan is out of balance.  If the president’s political objectives are defeat, disrupt, disable al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that it can no longer use those places as a base to attack the United States, then as a question of strategy, I ask, why is it that the American Army, as the primary player in this, seems to be able to only offer up the maximalist approach of counterinsurgency – aka nation-building – in Afghanistan?

So in that sense, one could make the argument that our strategy in Afghanistan is broken.  But the problem with the term counterinsurgency strategy is that it implies that strategic thinking has gone into it.  Within the American Army, I think one of the reasons why we don’t have the ability, in terms of strategy, to be able to offer alternatives in Afghanistan is – and this is a second point I want to make – is that the American Army has been, over the last number of years – has become trapped in what I call a counterinsurgency straitjacket. 

By that I mean it’s sort of an intellectual framework that is so confining that it prevents the American Army from thinking about alternatives in Afghanistan and even how it thinks about future conflict in the world.  The counterinsurgency straitjacket consists of two immutable rules that are always in place. 

The first immutable rule of the counterinsurgency straitjacket is that at least the American Army, but other armies too, have to start off doing counterinsurgency badly.  In fact, they must start off failing at it miserably.  But then, once a new doctrine is put into place, some better generals are assigned, maybe a few more brigades are put into the mix, then an army can learn and adapt and get better at counterinsurgency. 

And the second immutable rule that’s a part of this counterinsurgency straitjacket is that counterinsurgency American-style, à la FM 3-24, worked in Iraq, namely during the surge in Iraq, and it was the American Army doing something different, practicing a new kind of counterinsurgency that was the fundamental cause for the lowering of violence in Iraq.  So those are the two immutable rules that make up this counterinsurgency straitjacket. 

But here’s the problem with this thing – it’s that an army – and this relates to Afghanistan – if we do want to seriously consider alternatives, within the counterinsurgency straitjacket, an army cannot learn and adapt its way out of doing counterinsurgency.  It can only get better at it because it starts at a level of not getting it and being poor at it.  It learns and adapts and it gets better at counterinsurgency.  But it can’t learn and adapt its way out of counterinsurgency. 

Hence, this straitjacket that prevents us from seeing alternatives, for example, in a place like Afghanistan, which leads to my final point, which is the one I started with and this problem – this serious problem I think – of combined-arms atrophy, which is also linked to this counterinsurgency straitjacket.  Because we’ve become so consumed within the American Army with counterinsurgency that it has taken our eye off the ball, so to speak, of the serious problems we have within the American Army being able to do combined arms.

Combined arms, what do I mean by combined arms?  At the battalion, the brigade, the division, the corps level within an army, those organizational levels and their ability to combine arms – like artillery, armor, infantry – against an enemy who fights in a sophisticated way.  Think of the Israeli army in Lebanon in 2006 and the experience they had when they faced Hezbollah, who fought them differently from the way the Palestinian terrorists had fought them in the six years prior.

There’s been a number of good analyses that have shown the effects of doing really nothing but counterinsurgency on the Israeli army and what happened to them in 2006.  We can see the same thing happening today within the American Army.  Our artillery battalions don’t shoot like they used to.  When artillery battalions, for example, go to Afghanistan or Iraq, they do other things than firing their guns.  One hears reports coming out of the national training centers of, certainly, a refining of the ability to do counterinsurgency operations, but not necessarily combined-arms operations. 

History shows what happens to armies when they become overly focused on counterinsurgency:  the British army in the Second Boer War; a number of years previously, the French army in the Franco-Prussian War, from the colonial experience; more recently, the army of the Republic of Vietnam, who by 1973 and ’74, when they were left on their own, had become essentially a counterinsurgency army and was defeated soundly by a North Vietnamese army in 1975 who knew how to fight using combined arms.

So history shows what happens when armies spend a lot of time focusing on counterinsurgency.  Now, my argument here is not that the Army has the luxury to stop preparing its units, if they’re going to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq, on counterinsurgency.  My argument is that we need to be able to break out of this counterinsurgency straitjacket, look at strategy in a more creative, sort of alternative way and also appreciate what has happened to the American Army in terms of its ability to do combined-arms warfare.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Gian.  Clearly, this is a major issue, how much are we learning and how will we learn?  So let me move to Vago and perhaps you can address this issue.  One is the strategic shift, and the other is at the tactical level, how much of the lessons have been learned?  Gian was mentioning the Boer War.  The British produced a wonderful little manual called “The Defense of Duffer’s Drift”.

VAGO MURADIAN:  Right.  There’s a new take of that.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah, “The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa”.

MR. MURADIAN:  Yeah, it was a fantastic little book.

MR. NAWAZ:  Maybe that will give you the opening.

MR. MURADIAN:  Well, I’m going to be neither studied nor optimistic, to counter Harlan’s studied optimism, and I don’t want to apply any kind of strategic thinking in this, and that’s kind of my joke. 

I think that the big problem we have is that nobody really is thinking strategically, where sometimes tactical and doctrinal things are really construed as sort of strategic approaches, which I kind of have a problem with.  There’s a friend of mine in the Pentagon who says, U.S. military people ought to stand more in front of maps and near maps to understand geography and what are sort of, again, strategic drivers.

I think the alliance is really at an inflection point.  You can argue that there haven’t been as many Europeans who are as well-versed in combat operations since World War II, and in many respects that’s a very positive thing, I think, in terms of thinking your way through problems and also improving basic military expertise, being able to identify defects and certain select capability areas that have to be reconciled. 

I also want to give credit where credit is due.  I think that NATO has done a tremendous job.  These contributions that nations have made, despite their caveats, asterisks and 21 layers of impenetrable structure, is still yielding – is still very, very expensive.  It still constitutes massive national investment and, I think, is making a difference on the ground. 

The problem is that we were in strategic drift for a long, long time and now all of a sudden are sort of realizing that, okay, no, no seriously this time we’re really going to get it right and do it right.  So the question is whether you run out of will, steam and, more important, money. 

The treasuries run this.  It really doesn’t matter if what you will save is minimal.  That’s the one thing that I’ve – you could cut U.S. defense spending dramatically and you’re really doing nothing or not that much to address $13 trillion in debt, and yet, as Liam Fox always says, that’s exactly what’s going to happen. 

Defense has to pay its fair share and is paying that fair share.  Whether it’s in Germany, in France, in Britain, with the SDSR, as ill-thought-out as it may be and as scattershot as it may be, it is going to yield cuts.  The British army is likely to leave Germany after seven decades of occupation.  You’re going to find the RAF being much smaller. 

And I think a bigger question I think that everybody has and needs to grapple with is, at what point do you get smaller – so small on national levels that your centers of gravity really start to erode and you’ve really got to think of, again, a much, much more intimate integration, whether it’s under an EU or a NATO banner or what have you where you have a couple of countries that are global still – Britain, France – still maintain sort of broad – broadish national capabilities, and then you have other nations that, literally, you tick off a box and you go into a European army and there are pools of equipment spread around the continent that would be at the disposal.

Well, look, EU has already created a diplomatic corps.  So you can join the EU diplomatic corps.  You’re no longer a French diplomat or a British diplomat.  You’re an EU diplomat and I think it’s only a matter of time before you see that at a national European level.  I think from a capability standpoint, one would assume that the alliance is going to look at this and look at this in a positive way.  I mean, I think that there have been huge gains in Afghanistan.  I think that now you can call somewhat more complicated than going through your national chains of command. 

But you’ve got French aircraft that are supporting American troops.  You’ve got American aircraft that are supporting Dutch troops, and what have you.  National caveats are a way of life.  It will be in any alliance and multinational operation.  To assume otherwise is, I think, just naïve.  We’ve got to realize that at a certain point you can try to dilute it as much as you can but that will still exist.  There will be some still hard lines for folks. 

But the question is – my focus is a little bit more on the future.  What is your driving strategic threat?  What is shaping your mindset?  The Pentagon’s interest in China is growing, has grown.  It is based on the intelligence and this is now – it conveniently has an administration that says, hey, wait a minute, this is a problem, as opposed to having an administration that said, whatever you do, don’t rock the boat.  We have a whole series of other issues and can’t afford to tangle this. 

So the lip service was better.  I think there was more lip service paid, whereas now, folks are looking at this seriously from a U.S. standpoint as to what its equities are in Asia, how does that change vis-à-vis rise of China, and also what are some of the capabilities that the United States is going to need?  And hence there are people who are interested in strategic bombers anew, realizing that the future is not just going to be all COIN all the time that will fit. 

There are some people who make that argument within the Pentagon, by the way.  That which we’ve done – Defense Secretary Gates has sort of hinted at that, that what we’re doing is what we’re going to be doing.  Unlikely:  That’s kind of been a historic and classic recipe for disaster each time we’ve done that.  Well, if you look at it from a European perspective, which I try to do because I visit Europe often enough, it is, what are my driving strategic threats?

I don’t have a Russia now over on the other side of the border.  I have economic integration, which means that the chances of Germany coming crashing across the Rhine is somewhat limited now than maybe it might have been 100 years ago.  So you really start looking at it and saying what are my national militaries there for. 

If you’re a former colonial empire, then you have a little bit more of an interest and have a global role, view.  But otherwise, you’re looking – (audio break) – so it’s cyber, counterterrorism and then as Edgar said, I think the “big idea” idea is great because nobody – (audio break) – European militaries to at least raise their game.  The question is can you get the average – (audio break) – the national leaders just do a really, really poor job. 

I was going to use an expletive but I’m in a sophisticated academic environment now.  I’m not going to do that.  But they do sort of a poor job – (audio break) – all about and what does it mean.  So they really take their cue, anticipatory cue, from what the people will do.  And as anybody knows, it’s a line from “Men in Black”, people are smart – (audio break) – people are stupid sometimes.  So they don’t really realize that what they’re doing is actually not in their strategic interest. 

So my fear is that here we’ve built this capability, admittedly with some major capability gaps, by the way, as nations have at various levels embraced better – (audio break) – surveillance reconnaissance capabilities, UAVs, improved their special operations game.  You’ve got a whole lot of guys who haven’t done that. 

So you’ve got that capability gap that’s built in Afghanistan and one that is likely to widen even more rapidly as the United States, despite its – (inaudible) – drive, is still spending more than everybody else in the world combined.  So even when it’s trying to save, it’s going to be spending huge amounts of money, whereas in Europe, centers of gravity are really being reduced. 

So whether or not the alliance finally decides that I’m no longer an out-of-area operation, then the lesson I take from Afghanistan is, oh my God, this is too hard.  It makes my brain hurt and I really want to go – (audio break) – was, which is a defensive alliance exclusively – (audio break) – defending against what?  Well, I’ll dabble in cyber.  I’ll do missile defense because the Americans will come in with their Aegis cruisers and their ground-based missiles – (audio break) – sit behind that because I can sell that to my people. 

So I think it’s – I want to hope there’s strategic thinking.  I would like to think that folks are going to say, hey, wait a minute; there are really enormous gains that we’ve made.  We are making a contribution on the ground.  Stan McChrystal was right.  If it wasn’t for NATO troops in Afghanistan, the United States would have to cough them up and that would be a very, very – (inaudible) – given where the U.S. Army and the U.S. military is in terms of being tired. 

But you really do need to, again, ditch the agenda, get people to say, okay, what’s at stake here, what are the issues and where do we need to take this.  It can’t just be about efficiency and affordability.  You’ve got to obviously make it better, but you’ve got to start thinking a hell of a lot bigger than anybody’s thinking.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Vago.  That’s a nicely nuanced approach.  So perhaps it will counter some of the earlier wake-like atmosphere that was being created.  I’m actually going to give up my prerogative as the chair, not take up time with my question because I think it’s important to get the conversation going with you, the audience.  You’re the critical part of this conference.  So let’s see if we can begin at the back this time.  So Arnaud, you had a question and then we’ll move to the front.

Q:  Yes, Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS.  I wonder if you could apply yourself to the future of warfare, in terms of robotic warfare coming on much sooner than anyone had anticipated.

MR. NAWAZ:  You want to try that?

COL. GENTILE:  Vago’s probably –

MR. MURADIAN:  I’ll take a stab at it.  I was going to say that if you look at robotic warfare, I think it’s growing.  It’s going to get better.  The U.S. Air Force probably tells you that they’ve kind of been in robotic warfare since 1918, and they’re right, with the Kettering Bug and virtually unmanned systems in every war that we’ve fought, including Vietnam. 

So you could argue that that’s been kind of a march of history.  Wherever you can replace people to do operations – the Israelis certainly have made enormous strides both in unmanned ground systems as well.  And obviously the big question that everybody’s asking is intellectually – Peter Singer at CSIS is working on these – excuse me, at Brookings, my apologies.  Sorry about that.

Ten lashes, self-imposed.  What are some of the moral and intellectual questions that come as weapons and systems become ever more automated?  I still think that we will have humans that are actually doing the shooting.  I don’t think we’ll ever get to the point where they are going to start autonomously taking out targets. 

But the thing is that given that we’re looking at what are euphemistically called HVTs – high value targets – you’re following them for a long time and once you figure out that, hey, this the guy I’m looking for, you need to shoot pretty quickly.  Otherwise you’re going to lose him.  So that’s an entirely I think different kettle of fish. 

And man-machine interfaces are starting to become a bigger and bigger issue.  If you consider in the U.S. Air Force’s case, the first generation of Predator required 80 man-hours of analysis per each hour of information collected.  The new one collects 10 times as much information and requires 10 times as much analysis.  So you do the math.  You’ve got 65 orbits.  Each orbit is four aircraft, up at any given time.  I mean, you really have to start automating stuff.  Otherwise you’re never going to be able to dig through the analysis load.

COL. GENTILE:  Just a quick comment on technology and war and, again, back to my focus area on this panel and the American Army.  The American Army had a bad experience with technology, so to speak, in the 1980s, but especially in the 1990s, when it came up with this idea called network-centric warfare, which also then cascaded over – as I understand these analyses of these, especially the Israeli army, which was one of the problems that they had in 2006 – this belief that information, knowledge produced through better technology would give a fighting force perfect understanding of the enemy.

This is what the American Army had come to in the 1990s.  And recent experience in war of the counterinsurgency type, but still war, shows that just to be an incredibly bad fundamental premise for an army to operate on.  I mean, it still involves, whether you’re doing counterinsurgency or high-end conflict, making contact either with local populations, or if you’re fighting an enemy somewhat like you, making contact with that enemy, developing the situation, producing information through fighting. 

I mean, I come from the H.R. McMaster school on this, that it is those essentials that are needed in an army.  Technology certainly supports and helps, but it should not replace this fundamental aspect of the nature of warfare.  I also think that if the American Army had this problem in the 1990s with network-centric warfare, counterinsurgency warfare is the same problem. 

It’s the same wine but it’s just in different skins.  And with counterinsurgency warfare, we’ve placed our faith that the theory of counterinsurgency actually works in practice through procedures.  I mean, how many times have you heard – I’m stretching it from the technology and robotics, but there’s a link here. 

How many times have you heard people say as a matter of fact that in Afghanistan this brigade is going to clear, then hold, then build?  The president himself, when he spoke at West Point in November, when he was talking about the additional brigades flowing into Afghanistan, said that these brigades will move in and protect the population.  These are all theoretical ideas contained in the theory of counterinsurgency. 

But we’ve turned them into established facts, so to speak, just like the belief we put in technology in the 1990s, that it would do these things for us.  So there is a link there within the American Army and it’s not a progressive one.  It’s the same problem, although in a different form.

MR. NAWAZ:  Julian?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, I’d like to come at this from the angle of a technological shared level of ambition across the alliance.  I suspect that for many Europeans that robotic warfare is actually a way of marching better. 

We often talk about future combat systems, but really, at the national level, it tends more to be driven by defense industries.  And I think defense industries will be crucial in driving the technologies question forward for many European countries, not least because we’ll have to have more synergy across the European defense-industrial base, which will tend to drive that process forward. 

But I thought by way of an answer, because it’s so critical to future combat systems and interoperability, this question – the technological level of ambition – that I’ll give you some figures.  NATO Europe has a combined GDP of 124 percent that of the U.S, yet NATO Europe spends 37 percent of the U.S. in 2009 on defense. 

Now, that’s still quite a lot of money.  That is some U.S. $257.4 billion.  But then you break that figure down.  Of that $257.4 billion, France and the U.K. together represent 43 percent and France, Germany and the U.K. represent 61 percent.  Now, here’s the critical figure.  Those three represent 88 percent of all R&T development across NATO Europe. 

Now, when you’ve got U.S. forces thinking on robotic futures in a whole range of synergistic platforms and systems and then you’ve got the bulk of NATO Europe spending such fractions on this, and even moving towards basic professionalization, I think one could talk strategy until the cows come home.  And it’s a great discussion to have amongst those with a bit of money, but for many European countries, it’s a completely irrelevant question. 

Therefore, I would turn the question around.  What technologies would you Americans see as critical to ensure interoperability with the bulk of your NATO allies who are never going to be dreaming of this stuff?

MR. MURADIAN:  Give it away.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Give what away?

MR. MURADIAN:  I mean, give some of the technologies away, or at least even give some of the systems away, which we’ve done in Afghanistan in particular, to make sure that you resolve interoperability problems so when we go –

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Radios, radios.

MR. MURADIAN:  Hang on a second, here you go.  Just use these because really it’s just going to make life a lot easier.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  You’re absolutely right, Vego.  That’s right.

MR. MURADIAN:  I want to just slightly push back on the colonel, though, for a second, in terms of – and I understand the whole argument on the whole [47:02] and all the mistakes that were made.  There was a whole multiplicity of other factors that were driving it.

COL. GENTILE:  There were, with the Israelis.

MR. MURADIAN:  It wasn’t purely that they’d become an occupation force.  Their enemy really outthought them a lot of times.  There was a very, very clever use of technology. 

For the first time, you had commercial night-vision systems, a question which I’ve asked for a long time, that were set up on rooftops, wired to command centers, did not have any open radio communications because they know the Israelis would read them.  And the thing is, they for the first time knew that there were manned shapes coming up hills at them in the night and I can open fire on them.  I know those are not my guys. 

So all of a sudden, the dynamic – you know, we owning the night was a different dynamic.  They were now starting to own the night and we were starting to taste what that feels like.  Something which is obviously going to happen as technology proliferates, if you go to Price Club and you can buy an NVG for $99, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that some Hezbollah guy or some Taliban guy is going to figure out the same thing.

I also think that there is an almost Neo-Luddism that I’m afraid is developing, in saying every single thing we’re doing is technologically driven.  The man is, of course – the woman, person, human is the most important in the loop.  You can’t do counterinsurgency; you can’t do even – you can’t do any form of military endeavor without people being involved in them. 

The thing is, the technology, the nets and the enabling – and enable I think is a much better phrase – is critical because those COIN units are now drawing real-time full-motion video. 
They have communications to – higher-echelon communications across your squad to a degree that is unprecedented.  And the guys who have tasted a system like Land Warrior absolutely love it because it gets the information into the hands of the guy who needs it.  Okay, wait a minute, now I’ve got that overhead and I know that it’s the second gully, not the first one.  Okay, got it, I’m now oriented more properly. 

So I don’t think anybody – being a very good – you know, having covered Adm. Cebrowski very closely, I don’t think he was ever arguing that it’s a replacement for the people.  I think that folks consistently kind of took that message and twisted it and turned it into whatever they wanted to hear.

MR. NAWAZ:  While we’re moving to the next question, if I can just add that I think it takes a certain amount of thought process to transform information into knowledge and I’d go back to Vago’s point about getting close and looking at maps.  I think you need to understand the enemy and that investment is problem much less than the technological.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Absolutely right.

MR. MURADIAN:  Or who might not be your friend.

MR. NAWAZ:  Exactly, and so I’m struck particularly last night watching “60 Minutes” and the Lara Logan report of this firefight and the U.S. commander of this forward operating base saying that the Taliban have a ridgeline approach, going back to 1894 and 1901, the books that the British produced on Indian frontier warfare.  That was the first thing that was taught, was that you take the ridgeline approach.  You don’t give the ridge away to the enemy.  So you’ve got to know how they fight.  And it struck me that here was this base in a valley surrounded by ridges and the ridges had been left to the enemy.

COL. GENTILE:  Why is it in the valley?  It’s in the valley because that’s where the population is at.  The theory of counterinsurgency says that the way you succeed is through securing the population, which means you give up the ridgeline, even though tactually that might not make sense in that given situation.

MR. NAWAZ:  So the question really then comes to, how well do you know your enemy and how does he fight?  So Harlan, let’s take the conversation forward.

Q:  Harlan Ullman, the Atlantic Council.  A question, and Shuja, I’d like to get your response to this question as well and then a comment.  The white papers for Germany, Britain and France two years ago were remarkable in that they were coincident over the change of danger from national sovereignty and threats against the state to the security of individuals, writ large.  Rupert Smith made this point, arguing that war was about the people. 

To what degree do you agree or disagree with that sentiment, and more importantly, we talk about winning hearts and minds.  Nobody is ever, ever, ever in my judgment had a good comment about what exactly whose hearts it is we are going to try and win, how we’re going to do that, whose minds we are trying to affect and how we do that. 

I wonder if the panel had a couple of ideas about both that in terms of defining, with some specificity, hearts and minds.  And for Gian, you talk about the U.S. Army.  With due deference, I think you’d be talking about land forces or ground forces because there’s another component that has some degree of intellectual input and I think you’re ignoring that.

MR. NAWAZ:  You want to be more specific?

Q:  U.S. Marine Corps.

MR. MURADIAN:  Thank you for holding up the Navy and Marine Corps team, Harlan.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, thank you, Harlan, one of your zinger questions.  How can I put it?  Those white papers – I think that they were at the end of – how can I put this – a process of strategic political correctness in Europe, where everything was disaggregated down to the individual and human rights and all this, which of course is fundamentally important and ultimately is the object of security. 

But I think they all failed to basically group the reality, which is, the system is built on states and the primary relationship for the security of the individual is with the state and through the state.  Now, I think Europeans by and large misunderstood that we’re actually involved in a struggle at present between the state and the anti-state, and the states never become nimble enough to deal with the anti-state. 

Now, it may be in the future that we go back to the state versus the state.  There’s enough friction in the system, enough competition over resources that I, for one, am pessimistic about this century.  I have no reason to believe there will not be moments of deep tension and stress.  Now, whose hearts and minds, therefore, do we need to win? 

Well, of course it depends on the circumstance.  But my first, classic response would be to say, what I want the world’s leaders to understand, first and foremost, is that the West does exist; the West is tolerant; it will guard the open trading system that it has constructed and to which others are buying into.  The Chinese are not challenging it.  They’re part of it.  They want to beat us at it.  But that there are also limits, that defense matters and that state sponsorship of terrorism, for example, will lead to responses. 

As far as fighting terrorism, which is the implicit question that you had worldwide and worldwide terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, I think it’s more a lesson to us than to our adversaries, and that is to our peoples:  One, that it by definition is a very long struggle.  There is no evidence in history that such struggles are short.  Therefore, the first hearts and minds that we have to win are our own people. 

We were too soft on our own people for many years.  I think Kagan may say more on this at lunchtime, that history has indeed returned post-Fukuyama.  Well, history ended because we all thought they’d buy into our dream.  Well, people haven’t.  We have to return our people from the strategic vacation which is basically undermining the whole effort to restructure our security and defense effort in a complex environment. 

But thereafter, I think it’s important as well that we recognize that we are also in an ideological struggle.  That sounds a bit evangelical, and again, being a Yorskshireman, I tend to avoid such things.  But we are.  And we are involved in a war of ideas and a war of knowledge and we’ve ceded that to the enemy.  We try to present our engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan effectively as an extension of good governance, of management, rather than the fact that we are trying to defeat an aggressive anti-Western idea with a better idea.

I think it’s a tragedy over the last few years, particularly Europeans, we’ve become so incompetent at selling what is a very good message from Europe about how to recover post-conflict and build new societies.  Unless we have that envisioned implicitly in our security and defense strategies, then however technical one is, however managerial one is, one will not actually convey the fundamental reason to our publics and other peoples as to why we need to do this stuff.

MR. NAWAZ:  Go ahead.

COL. GENTILE:  Well, first with the Marines – I know the Army; that’s what I’ve been paying attention to.  Also I think with the Marine Corps, so much of what the Marine Corps does, most of the time, is in response to where the Army is heading.  I mean, you find some really – in the last five or six years in Iraq – I remember, in 2003, reading articles by Marine officers of how the American Army in the Sunni Triangle, the 4th Infantry Division was applying too hard of a hand and that they needed to apply a more adept sort of velvet glove. 

So it was a counter, a response to show difference with the Army.  Interestingly, a few months ago, Gen. Conway was talking about how it was time for the Marines to leave Iraq so that they could go to Afghanistan and get into the business of hard fighting in Afghanistan because that’s what the Marines do.  So I focus on the Army because that’s the institution that I’ve spent my life in.  That’s the institution that I fought as a part of in Iraq two times and what I’ve really been paying attention to over the last three years. 

Clearly, the other services have a role in the greater defense establishment, and especially within the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and all those other things Marines have played a role as well.  I like this question about hearts and minds.  It comes up all the time.  Dave Kilcullen in his newest book just forthrightly talks about the importance of winning hearts and minds.  I question through the study of history and operational experience of trying to win hearts and minds, whether they can be won. 

But hearts and minds is a term – because of the theory of counterinsurgency – that has come to be thrown out sometimes as matter of fact – that hearts and minds can be won.  Then, even if they can be won, the next question I would ask would be from the lane of strategy and say, should we try to win them in Afghanistan?  As an example, should we apply an operational method that tries to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan? 

Is that in our interest to do so as a matter of strategy?  And the last point is – you mentioned Rupert Smith and his widely influential, but, I must say, I believe deeply flawed book, “The Utility of Force,” has also come to be seen almost as a matter of fact for defining future conflict.  Future conflict will be more wars amongst the people. 

This has had a very pervasive effect, especially on the American Army and its stability doctrine that it’s just come out with, this whole idea that future wars will be wars amongst the people.  They might be, but they might be other types of wars. 

My argument has been all along that whatever kinds of wars or conflicts or operations the American Army is told to go off to do – and it’s the same with the Marines and the Air Force and the Navy – but with regard to the American Army, what it should be able to do first and foremost is to fight, using combined arms at all levels.  If it can do that, it can do any other kind of operation. 

Now, that is heresy for the counterinsurgency narrative, which states that no, armies that are trained to do that are predisposed to fail and fail badly at these other kinds of operations.  But that should be what the American Army can do first and foremost.

MR. MURADIAN:  But I think that’s actually, to make Gian’s point here, in a lot of these counterinsurgency and urban operations, they have been full-spectrum operations that have involved air.  They’ve involved artillery.  They’ve involved extremely nuanced combined-arms operations, just in a very, very focused way.  So you’re not looking at mass tanks but selective use of tanks, for example, for exit routes and for entry and stuff like that. 

But to shift to try to answer your question, Harlan, I’m going to take from the other two panelists briefly.  Unless you maintain your hearts and minds, ultimately you’re not going to be able to have any policy objective at the end of the day.  So you’ve got to make sure your population is being brought along and that means consistently selling a message that makes sense to people and how they go, okay, so this makes – this is why we’re spending the blood and treasure there. 

In the case of hearts and minds on the ground over there, it’s not that you want them to love you.  I think virtually every poll that you’ve seen, the vast majority of Afghans don’t want the Taliban to come back.  That’s the end of the story.  For them, it’s a basic security thing and as long as I know that a handful of these guys can come back and kill me somehow or terrorize my village, I can’t really be fully with you because I’m not sure you’re going to be here long enough to make sure that happens. 

So now there are other sorts of issues on how do you empower those guys to take a bigger interest in there.  Iraq succeeded in large part because we got Sunnis to be like, hey, look, you have a vested interest in this.  This isn’t about you just starting trouble.  You can be part of the solution here.  I think that hearts and minds is applied as though people are going to just love us and have a portrait of Petraeus in their house or anything.  I don’t think that’s ever going to happen, but you never know.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  I just want to make a quick statement, if I may.

(Cross talk.)

MR. MURADIAN:  Rent with option to buy.

MR. NAWAZ:  Julian has a quick word and then I think Harlan wanted me to say a couple of words and I will.  Then we have two questions.  I’ll take two questions – one from Sebastian and then one up front here – because we are going to be running out of time and I don’t want to keep you from your lunch.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Just the inability to answer your question, Harlan, for me demonstrates the vacuum created by a lack of leadership.  It’s almost a tyranny of public opinion and we seem to be swinging from a kind of strategic political correctness, which was meaningless in the early part of the last decade, to a kind of fundamentalist accountancy approach now.  There’s simply no balance.  And we have to go back to balance, to explaining to publics why we have to do this stuff.

MR. NAWAZ:  I think, Harlan, you were posing the question to me also about winning hearts and minds.  I agree.  You can’t win hearts and minds, particularly over the kind of short timeframe that politics dictates for what will be deemed to be success or failure in Afghanistan. 

But I think it’s very critical to widen the aperture and to go beyond Afghanistan, to Pakistan, to India, to Iran and see if the U.S.’s rhetoric can be matched over a long time by its actions, and particularly on the economic side.  Picking up on Vago’s point, the Pakistanis overwhelmingly have voted against the Taliban inside their own borders.  So it would make no sense for them to support the Taliban in Kabul because of the contagion effect across the border. 

But tactically, of course, they will play whatever cards they have and take advantage of links or past links with some of the afghan Taliban and they will do that in their national interest.  But both Europe and North America really have an opportunity to open up economic ties with the region and with Pakistan – between India and Pakistan and Afghanistan and that’s probably the best way of strengthening against insurgencies and militancies, rather than simply the use of military power.  So that would be my response.  You want to add something?

MR. MURADIAN:  Well, I was going to say a great opportunity I think was lost when the NATO C-17 capability was not deployed in the assistance of the Pakistan floods and that was, I’m told, a financial concern.  What better would have been to have those aircraft landing with NATO written on the side of it, disgorging supplies, and trying to show I can outdo everybody else in the C-17 relay race?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  But isn’t the real issue, if I may, Chairman, that we are in fact competing for the large pool of unemployed, under 25-year-olds, with the Taliban and al-Qaida?  And what frightens me is we have no creative thinking here, because we look at history, what were the Brits doing in the 19th century?  They built railways, partly to ensure that they sucked up that pool of unemployed dangerous young men.  Those are the kind of game-changing ideas we need now.

MR. MURADIAN:  Popes launched the Crusades to get rid of them.

 MR. NAWAZ:  Yes.  Sebastian, sorry to keep you waiting.

Q:  I’m Sebastian Gorka, the Atlantic Council.  If I, with your permission –

MR. NAWAZ:  Is the microphone on?  Okay.

Q:  If I can take you back to the wonkish strategy question, the “so what?” of strategy, it’s pretty obvious why broke governments in Europe don’t do strategy in a time of peace, or perceived peace.  You don’t need to be a brain surgeon to understand that.  But could I get Col. Gentile’s and the other panelists’ comments on, why is a hyperpower that has said for eight years it’s at war incapable of doing strategy? 

We have a QDR that says – that goes against the basic fundamental rules of strategy, which is prioritization, the QDR says we will do IW, COIN and everything else just in case China gets meddlesome.  So we’re going to do the whole panoply.  We’re not going to choose or prioritize.  Whose responsibility is that?  How did we get where we are today, please?

COL. GENTILE:  Right.  Again I’ll tackle this from an American military, specifically an American Army perspective – (audio break) – comment on the inner workings of American policymakers.  But one of the problems, again, that I see within the American Army, as I argued before, is we’re doing the same mistakes.  We’re actually making the same mistakes that we did in Vietnam. 

The United States lost the Vietnam War not because it didn’t develop an effective counterinsurgency approach.  That is just a wrongheaded interpretation of the war in Vietnam.  The United States lost the war in Vietnam because it failed at strategy and policy.  And in the 1980s, in trying to recover from Vietnam, the American Army did, in a sense, at least tactically and operationally, but it continued to move away from a broader understanding of war and how strategy uses national power to achieve aims in war. 

The same thing – it’s the same progression in the 1990s and again it’s the same thing today with this hyper-focus and emphasis on the tactics and operations of counterinsurgency.  So there are no alternatives presented to how to achieve policy aims in Afghanistan and potentially other threats and security problems in the world. 

At least within the American Army and, I think, within the greater parts of the defense establishment, we talk a lot about the doing of operations.  We talk a little bit about strategy, but we don’t talk about war in a holistic sense, and the doing of war, and what it takes to achieve policy aims in war.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Was it the British scientist Ernest Rutherford who said famously that, gentlemen, we have no money.  Now is the time to think.  It’s actually not – I actually challenge your basic thesis, Seb, because a hyperpower, by definition, does not have to do strategy because it is a hyperpower. 

In fact, strategy is the preserve of secondary powers that have to use all means to achieve ends.  When I think of how the U.S. was perceived on September 10, 2001, and how the U.S. is perceived on September 27, 2010, I think it’s only now that you realize that in realistic strategic terms you are not the hyperpower you thought you were and therefore you are beginning to do strategy. 

Having said that, the ability of the United States to actually adapt in any given circumstance is unrivaled.  I’m not just flattering you.  As I say, I don’t flatter Americans.  I’m a Brit.  We don’t do that.  But you do have this ability – and what I see now, it’s actually – it’s a bad moment, but you are beginning to grip the reality as it is. 

And I’m pretty confident that over the next decade, the way you will deal with that reality, now that you’ve accepted that you haven’t got this unipolar moment anymore, or never did indeed have it, will be much more creative and much more impressive.  I just hope the people across the road here on the Hill get that as well.

MR. MURADIAN:  I also think, in response to your QDR question, the timing of the QDR was bad in that the administration came into office, regarding China in particular, to try to take a much more – engagement and we can work with them and everything and then that was rapidly seen, especially with Secretary Clinton’s comments in August, being like, that’s just a bunch of bunk.  These guys are up to something.  We’ve got to man up. 

So that’s basically the change that’s happened in the intellectual process.  And China’s belligerence, which from its own strategic standpoint is kind of amazing that they keep making that mistake, and thank God for us they keep making that mistake:  It gives us all sorts of opportunities to get in there with Vietnam, for example, and with a bunch of other countries in the region, Japan in particular, although it did climb down on the fisherman – coast guard captain or whoever they had in their possession. 

I think that, as Julian said, we have a way of going along, not really thinking about anything and not really prioritizing anything because ultimately, you know, what are your vital national interests?  And we tend not to think like that, unfortunately.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thanks.  Please, it’s on.

Q:  Thank you very much.  You are so generous.  Ioan Pascu, European Parliament.  I’m wondering – you know, you said correctly that you have to define the kind of future war and then rally the allies around it and then, you know, give the momentum for the alliance to overcome the current situation. 

I’m wondering what war means for the Europeans because, you know, more or less, if they have an operation like Afghanistan, they will join the United States.  And they will do what they are doing now and leave the United States to take care of that problem essentially because they are more capable and throw more resources at it. 

Secondly, when they are alone, they are sufficiently powerful not to be challenged in a warlike manner by anybody.  So there is no encouragement and I think that, in general, we have to look at how we define war under the current circumstances because I think that we are moving away from – we are moving in the direction that technology is pushing us or attracting us.  But we are still working with the concepts of the Second World War, First World War and these sorts of types, which are not relevant for today.

MR. NAWAZ:  If I could just add that since we are up against the clock, if in each of your interventions, you could take this question and move us to the future, how do you see NATO evolving out of the Afghan experience?  So, Julian?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, thank you.  That was great.  Ioan, you’re a European political leader.  You’re involved in this process.  You know how hard it is to get a debate inside the European Parliament on these very issues.  We have the worst of all worlds in Europe right now.  Quite a few of NATO’s Europe militaries are little more than armed pensions, frankly.  The balance between equipment budgets – it’s true – the balance between personnel budgets and equipment budgets is so bad. 

And why do they exist?  They exist because these countries think it’s a down payment to keep the Americans engaged in their security and defense.  Frankly, it would be better if we had a debate in Europe that said, in fact, certain countries will not do war.  But they’ll do other things and they’ll invest in that effort and then we can organize this far better than we do. 

Therefore, what is very clear to me is that Europeans cannot stay in the space we are.  Because we might be strong enough now to be reasonably credible in our own neighborhood – and look at our neighborhood – look at North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia.  It ain’t easy.  But 10, 15, 20 years from now, if we are still in the same space, we’re in deep trouble. 

And until we Europeans have that proper debate and people like yourself, with respect – as you know, you’re a friend and a colleague who I respect deeply – lead that process and say, we are going to have this debate in Europe, then whether it’s NATO or the EU, there simply will never be the political will because the public doesn’t get it and the public – this is not a debate among the publics. 

Look at even in Britain.  Defense is so far down the political agenda that unless political leaders say, look, public opinion, we understand.  You voted m in to lead.  This is why we’re going to be doing this and this is why our relationship with the United States is so important and this is why we must make that investment. 

I hope one day before I retire, which I hope won’t be too soon, I will hear European political leaders get up and make the case for why Europe alongside the United States is the strategic cornerstone of stability in the world.  Because if we Europeans don’t do that and we leave it to the Americans, then we and the Americans will suffer, which brings me to my point about NATO’s future on the military side. 

I want to see, by 2020, 2025, a European effort, primarily organized through the alliance, alongside the United States, focused on the following areas:  a modernized Article V architecture, which may well include missile defense, cyber defense and will work with Russia and partners to that end because it will reconceptualize what territorial defense means in the 21st century. 

I want to see a genuine effort to build deployable forces because whether it’s Article V defense or security, you need deployable forces.  Main defense forces are out the window.  I want to see much more synergy, intense cooperation, even integration in areas of logistics and other areas of the table because that will prove value for money which will be critical. 

But I also want to see that force be able to operate under a NATO or an EU flag.  Why?  Because as I said, if you look at Europe’s neighborhood and the basic contract between Europe and the United States will be a couple of Europeans will go with America in a small way around the world.  But the basic deal, guys, is this.  We all get strong enough to deal with our neighborhood credibly to take the pressure off you, so you can do things elsewhere, because we are not world powers. 

But if we cannot do that – and by the way, we will need time to send a force under an EU flag because sending a force under a NATO flag or an American flag would simply complicate the political objective implied in the mission – if we can’t do that by 2020, then I don’t believe that this town in particular, for all the niceties, will really believe in the relationship anymore. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah, just quickly, I’ll pick up on two terms or phrases that Julian used, looking ahead into the future, 10, 15, 20 years, the years 2020-25.  Julian said deployable forces, absolutely; being able to operate synergistically with other NATO forces, within the American military being able to combine all arms from all the different services.  Absolutely, I agree.  That would be a good aim point. 

But again, for the American military and especially the American Army and how the American Marines relate to that, those deployable forces should be built on the premises of, or the pillars of firepower, protection and mobility. 

And again, the reason why I focused my talk today on the American Army, the direction that the American Army seems to be going is of a conception of future conflict that is grounded in the Rupert Smith vision of future war, which is wars amongst the people, influencing behavior, winning hearts and minds, which in an organizational way, in terms of capability, seems to be pushing the American Army, at least, towards a force that is optimized toward light infantry.  And ne can see that slowly developing, at least within the American Army.  So I agree with Julian. 

Unfortunately, the direction, I think, that the American Army and potentially other parts of the American military are taking are not to that kind of deployable force that can deploy to parts of the world to do lots of different things.  But of all the things that the American military has to be able to do – especially the American Army, as I’ve said before – is to be able to fight using combined arms.  And if we’re not careful, we’re going to move away from that primary function.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Can I add one more sentence?

MR. NAWAZ:  Please.

    MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  According to the World Bank, by 2030, 80 percent of the world’s population, 10 billion strong, will live less than 100 kilometers from the sea.  That should be our defining strategic reality.

MR. NAWAZ:  Vago, you have the last word.

MR. MURADIAN:  Oh, my.  Throughout the 2000s, America forgot about Asia.  It has now rediscovered Asia and it’s forgetting Europe, and I think that that can’t happen.  The United States is the only country since the foundation of the alliance that’s been able to lead it, often, in some of these big questions in these moments of crisis. 

It has got to – whether sitting around with a drink in everybody’s hand and figuring out, okay, what do we want to be when we grow up, or in the next stage of our lives – let’s put it that way – and then trying to drive it in that direction.  I mean, I think the whole notion of that – it is an organization better than anything else to try to organize Europe around a pole. 

NATO’s collapse and failure and transition back into a defensive force is also going to bring down and delay any EU effort to advance European military capabilities.  The big problem is that we’ve been here before.  We’ve seen this act before.  Even though some of the subordinate features are different in terms of a different nature of the threat – the anti-government versus the government – I think the problem is that the United States has called on greater defense and called on greater burden sharing and it’s fallen on deaf ears and the problem now is the financial crunch is here. 

So there are folks who are wrestling with fundamental trade-offs in their social and welfare programs and that is driving people to look at anyplace else that they can cut.  We as Americans can look at this and say, okay, four years of unemployment insurance is a little bit too long in Denmark.  Two years ought to be fine.  But for a lot of Danes, it’s a passionate issue.  Thank you very much.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you to the audience for your thought provoking questions and thank the panel.

(Applause.)

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Thank you.

COL. GENTILE:  Thank you.

MR. MURADIAN:  Thank you.

(END)