Iran Issue Brief Launch: 11/08/10 – Transcript

Return to Iran Issue Brief Launch event page

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

IRAN TASK FORCE ISSUE BRIEF LAUNCH:
“THE IRAN STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR
STRATEGIC PATIENCE”

WELCOME:
FREDERICK KEMPE,
PRESIDENT AND CEO,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ,
DIRECTOR,
SOUTH ASIA CENTER,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
CHUCK HAGEL,
CHAIRMAN,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

STUART EIZENSTAT,
CO-CHAIR,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL IRAN TASK FORCE,
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

BARBARA SLAVIN,
AUTHOR,
“THE IRAN STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR
STRATEGIC PATIENCE”

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2010
3:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

FREDERICK KEMPE:  Thank you and welcome to the Atlantic Council.  I’m Fred Kempe.  I’m president and CEO.  And I’d like to particularly acknowledge and thank our esteemed colleagues and co-chairs of this task force: Sen. Chuck Hagel – also chairman of the Atlantic Council – and Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat. 

    The South Asia Center was launched last year at the council under director Shuja Nawaz – actually now almost going on two years, two years now.  And we launched it because we saw that a focus of U.S.-European relations would be dealing not just with Afghanistan and Pakistan, which people usually connect with South Asia in this town, but also Iran. 

    And this has become a central forum and point of contact for policy members, members of Congress, as well as European and regional leaders.  We’ve had a long string of European officials dealing with these issues, coming through and meeting with us as well. 

And we do focus on the wider South Asia, which does mean the geographical subcontinent as well as Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran.      And we see this as a whole.  You can’t just look at the Iran issue without looking at Pakistan.  You can’t look at Pakistan without looking at Central Asia, and you certainly can’t look at it all without looking at Iran.  So Iran is of special importance to the center and the council because of the U.S. role with its government – the difficulties that we all know about.

    But we are also very interested not just looking at how the U.S. is looking at Iran but also how Iran is looking at the U.S. and how Iran is looking at itself, and looking at its role in the region.  Very often, we get so caught up in our own conversation here that we’re not putting ourself enough in the shoes of others. 

    So we’ve been asking through the taskforce, are the U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iran working?  Are there any other negotiating options left for the United States?  If a reformist regime were in power in Iran, would it actually make any difference to the U.S.-Iran relationship?  And more importantly, I suppose, is how does Iran see itself in this world?  And then, who is Iran?  Is it Ahmadinejad?  Is it Khamenei – Ayatollah Khamenei?  Is it the Revolutionary Guards? 

    So Mark Brzezinski and Shuja Nawaz have done an excellent job in pulling together experts and bringing them together to have frank discussions in this room on the current situation and the way forward.  And so the issue brief that’s released today to you all and prepared by our friend Barbara Slavin, one of the great experts on Iran in this town, is a culmination of all those meetings.  I hope you’ll think it’s a good read.  And it will be the first of several briefs that we’ll write on these subjects, you know, looking into different pieces of this brief in more detail, and other parts. 

We want to thank the Ploughshares Fund for making this project possible through their support.  And before I pass the event to Shuja, who will introduce Barbara and moderate the session, I just want to invite Sen. Hagel and Ambassador Eizenstat to say a few words as well.  Sen. Hagel.

    CHUCK HAGEL:  Fred, thank you and thank you each for giving us some time today.  I, on behalf of the Atlantic Council and our board and our members, want to thank Fred, of course, as well as our leaders of this effort – in particular, my much-esteemed co-chairman, the all-knowing public servant Ambassador Eizenstat, a man who’s had almost every job in government.  Stu, thank you very, very much for your personal involvement and commitment of time as you have given this effort.

    As you will hear today from, in particular, Shuja and Barbara, the essence of this first report, which will culminate in a larger taskforce product.  But we think these kinds of briefs are important for many reasons.  But it takes people through, we hope, an informed and educated analysis as to not only the complications of this issue – which there are many, as you all understand – but there are very serious consequences for whatever is the outcome on this particular issue, and this issue being the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

    As Fred had noted – and I think this is in particularly important, and I think is one of the most valuable results of this first report and, I anticipate, of our taskforce final report, is the emphasis on wise and comprehensive focus by the United States and its allies on this issue of Iran.  When I say comprehensive, I refer to not only addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, but all the other dimensions of this relationship. 

    That would include, of course, what Fred just talked about:  Who is Iran?  Who is in charge of Iran?  We know those who occasionally will take some time to study a little history and culture, that – (audio break) – is a part of a great product of the – (audio break) – that is, the Persian heritage and the history that, that heritage has brought forth.  That is not to be minimized, diminished or dismissed, as any of these historical factors are, when we are trying to analyze policy and how we approach countries and people. 

    And I say “people” in particular because governments don’t always represent the people.  There are policies of government, and then there are the citizens of that country.  And we reflect on that point when I use the term “wise.”  We need to be wise and judicious, and particularly judicious in how we use all our instruments of power.

    Military is but one instrument of power, and sometimes it is not the most effective.  It’s important. And using all of a nation’s instruments of power in coordination and combination of a purpose that’s worthy of that nation’s efforts is what we try to get at in this study. 

I also want to note a great work that Mark Brzezinski has done, as Fred has mentioned.  Mark – I think he’s in Europe or –

    BARBARA SLAVIN:  China.

    MR. HAGEL:  China.  He went a little further than Europe.  And that – that’s important to note Mark’s contributions because he will continue to play a significant role.  So thank you again, and to thank once again Shuja and Barbara and all the participants that helped form and write this brief.  We had many very, very informed and experienced experts in this area who took their time to come before this group and give us the benefit of their background and experience and expertise.  So we thank them as well.

    Now, let me introduce my co-chairman, Ambassador Eizenstat.

    STUART EIZENSTAT:  Thank you, Senator.  The senator and I developed a very close relationship during the Clinton administration and I really found him to be one of the most knowledgeable and wise people in the country on foreign and defense policy.  And it’s been a privilege to work with him on this project. 

    This project is another example of how Fred Kempe has infused a sense of energy and direction to the Atlantic Council since he’s taken over.  And Fred, I congratulate you on setting this taskforce up and on Mark Brzezinski’s and Shuja’s work on it.  And of course – (audio break).

Let me try to – in just literally a sentence or two because I want to leave time for the actual presentation, of why we decided to get into this area.  I mean, hadn’t everything about Iran already been explored?  Wasn’t everybody in town and elsewhere focusing on Iran?  We think that this taskforce has done something that’s unique and will continue to be unique.

    We start from the proposition that we believe this will be the defining foreign policy challenge of the Obama administration and for the United States in the years ahead.  But we also started from the proposition that while many had looked at Iran from different perspectives, no one had actually looked at their domestic reality: what was happening internally; how that affects their view of what the United States and others are doing; how it affects their policy and therefore what we can learn in terms of addressing our own policy to that reality, trying to mold it in ways that are acceptable to the United States but ultimately take into account that domestic reality.  And I think that’s what’s new, and that’s what’s novel. 

And Barbara has done a superb job in her study of doing the first initial rollout for the taskforce.  We appreciate it.  And I think without any further ado, I’d like to turn it over to her.  And again, thank Shuja and Barbara for their work, and Fred for initiating this and the senator for leading it.

    SHUJA NAWAZ:  Thank you, Ambassador Eizenstat.  Let me just give you a quick background on what the taskforce has done in the first nine months since we started.  Our first meeting took place in May, and we had a presentation by Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund.  We looked at the interests and the views of concerned powers, which included the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Israel, Turkey, India and Pakistan.  And he tried to crystallize how each of these countries envisages Iran’s role and their own real interest in Iran. 

And then Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations provided a briefing on what kind of regional role the present Iranian leadership is seeking for itself and for their country and talked about the strategic and geopolitical aspirations of Iran’s current leadership.  Ted Koppel, the producer of Discovery Channel’s special, “Iran, The most Dangerous Nation?” served as the discussant and provided observations and led the question-and-answer session.

Then in July, we had another session of the taskforce which focused on foreign policy, looking on the opposition movement in Iran, its similarities and contrasts with the current regime, on nuclear issues, its views on – the views of allies and enemies, and on Iranian foreign policy.  And this was a presentation by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University.

And then we had a presentation on prospects for nuclear diplomacy by Andrew Parasiliti, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  And that exchange was moderated by Barbara Slavin. 

Then last month, we looked at nuclear capabilities and strategic goals.  And we were very lucky to get Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman who was at the time when he met them – at the end of 2009, when he met the Iranian government – the senior-most U.S. official to have met them face to face. 

And we also were lucky to have Olli Heinonen, the former head of the safeguards department of the IAEA.  And indeed, in today’s issue brief we have a very useful summation of where we stand on the nuclear issue by Olli Heinonen, who’s a friend and who’s a former colleague at the IAEA.

As the senator said, we will continue our work on Iran, making it as unique as possible and as comprehensive as possible.  And we’ll be periodically issuing these briefs, and then we’ll come up with a final policy – a set of policy recommendations in due course. 

The first brief is being released today, and its author, Barbara Slavin, is a well-known journalist and an editor.  She’s also the author of a great book on Iran called, “Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation.” 

Before I give the floor to Barbara to talk about the brief, I just wanted to remind everyone that after she finishes – and if you wish to speak or have a question, if you wouldn’t mind turning your name-tent on its side so that I can recognize you.  Then please wait for the microphone to be brought to you so that you can announce who you are, and it can be captured for our audiences.

So thank you for coming, and over to Barbara.

MS. SLAVIN:  Okay.  Thanks, Shuja.  Thank you all for coming.  This is my maiden effort for the Atlantic Council, and I want to thank Sen. Hagel and Ambassador Eizenstat, Fred Kempe, Shuja Nawaz, Mark Brzezinski in China and also Shikha and Alex on the staff here at the Atlantic Council. 

We did this rather quickly.  I think you can all, perhaps, understand why Iran has been much in the news of late.  And a lot of people have been giving their opinions about what U.S. policy toward Iran should be.  So we thought that it was important to begin to express our ideas and also give some context for the discussion. 

I’ve tried to do four basic things in the report: first, look at Iranian domestic politics and the divisions that have deepened in the elites since the 2009 presidential elections.  Second, I’ve looked at the impact of those divisions on the nuclear issue and U.S.-Iran relations.  Third, I’ve looked at sanctions and the impact that they’re having on the Iranian economy – (audio break) – Iran’s foreign policy.  And lastly, I make a few very modest suggestions.  These are just very preliminary.  As Shuja mentioned, there will be much more fleshed out and detailed recommendations at the end of this process.

The bulk of the report is about the Iranian domestic scene.  And here, the word is factionalization and factionalism.  As any student of Iran knows, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never been unified – not before, during or after the revolution of 1979 – when it comes to politics, economics, views on society. 

And those who call it a totalitarian state really don’t know the country at all.  This is not a country where the elite are all forced to belong to one political party as in China or the old Soviet Union.  And whenever one faction appears to have completely vanquished its opponents, as seemed to occur last summer after the elections, then that faction immediately splinters.

And we have seen, certainly in the last few months, that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has had a lot of problems, a lot of clashes with the parliament of the country, with other branches of government and even, on occasion, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

He has alienated traditional conservatives, members of the old Islamic coalition, Heyate Mo’talefeh.  This is a very significant group that – (audio break) – the bazaars and has a hold over a lot of very important Islamic charities, members who are very prominent in the Islamic Revolution and were very important members of the government afterwards.

Ahmadinejad is on poor terms with Ali Larijani, who is the former nuclear negotiator and is the speaker – (audio break) – parliament.  He’s a member of an old clerical family and his brother, Sadegh, is head of the judiciary; was appointed by the supreme leader. 

Ahmadinejad has also irritated Khamenei and ultraconservative clerics by promoting a kind of folk Shiite Islam – it’s full of superstition – and by giving wide powers to a member of his family, an in-law named Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who has made a number of controversial comments about Israelis, about Iranian nationalism and about so-called Iranian Islam.

And there have even been indications now of some friction with members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is, of course, the institution upon which the survival of the regime rests.  There was an article in an IRGC publication that criticized Ahmadinejad for contending that the Majlis, the parliament, was not the most important institution in government.  And it said that this contradicted the views of the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, who passed away in 1989.

Now, I’m not suggesting that Khamenei, the successor of Khomeini, is about to jettison Ahmadinejad.  I don’t think that’s possible.  He called his reelection “a divine assessment” and he has really stuck with him, I think, for the time being.  But there is a lot of friction.  There’s a lot of tension. 

And I think the outlook is for more of this factionalism, especially as Iran now is phasing out consumer subsidies in the economy.  And it’s also approaching yet more elections.  It will have parliamentary elections in 2012 and new presidential elections in 2013. 

Now, the factionalism is intensifying, in part, because of the economic situation, which is quite poor.  This is partly due to sanctions, which have tightened considerably this year.  But they’re also partly due to Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy.  He squandered oil revenues when the price of oil was high.  He handed money out to the poor, to numerous people, but without any kind of real plan.  As a result, no jobs – or very few jobs have resulted from this, and inflation was quite high for a number of years.

Now revenues are much reduced and the IMF estimates that the Iranian economy grew by only a little over 2 percent last year and that growth in the current Iranian fiscal year, which ends March 31st, will be between 1.5 and 2 percent.  And that’s simply not enough to provide the sorts of jobs that Iran’s youthful population needs.  The unemployment rate among Iranians under 30 is estimated to be about 30 percent.  And 70 percent of the population is under 30. 

Sanctions are having an impact.  They are making it more difficult for Iran to both sell and buy petroleum products.  And they’re also frightening away investment in the oil and gas sector. 

And I contrast this – actually, Ambassador Eizenstat remembers well – when in the mid-’90s, when the Clinton administration approved of so-called secondary sanctions, which were meant to penalize oil companies that invested, I believe $20 million in the energy sector of Iran – (audio break) – sanctions. 

All of these sanctions were waived because at that time, or shortly thereafter, Iran got a reformist president, Mohammad Khatami.  And the Europeans were very interested in engagement with Iran at that time.  They didn’t want to confront the country. 

Now the situation is very different and this is because of what happened in 2009.  It’s because of the elections.  It’s because of the crackdown.  The Europeans are even more exercised about human rights, it seems, sometimes, than the United States is.  And so the Europeans have gotten on board and so have the Japanese. 

Nomura International, which is a unit of the Japanese brokerage firm, estimates that because of Japanese withdrawal from the Iranian oil sector, Iran’s oil production will drop 15 percent by 2015 and exports will decline from about 2 million barrels a day currently to 1.5 million barrels, which is really a significant drop.

Now, how does all of this factor into the nuclear negotiations?  We are likely to have some talks in the next few weeks.  The Iranians announced over the weekend that they’d like to meet in Turkey.  But they’re dancing around each other.  I think eventually we will have some kinds of discussions. 

I think the problem is that the political divisions within Iran are such that it’s going to make it difficult for the government to reach a deal that will stick.  We all saw what happened a year ago.  There was a proposal for Iran to – two-thirds of its low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a research – (audio break) – which the United States actually provided in the 1960s.  This is a reactor that produces medical isotopes. 

Ahmadinejad brought this deal – (audio break) – and he was immediately attacked by every faction, from reformists to ultraconservative.  Ali Larijani, who had suffered a great deal when he was the nuclear negotiator of Iran was the one to cast the first stone.  And then others followed and the supreme leader did not, in the end, back it up.  The deal fell apart.

Now, since then, as I mentioned, we’ve had more sanctions.  The U.S. proceeded to sanctions.  And the Obama administration pivoted, from the engagement track to the pressure track.  There’s a sense that I get from talking to U.S. officials that for the first time since 2003, when the U.S. military was feeling most successful in the Middle East – for the first since 2003, the Obama administration, the United States feels that it has some leverage over Iran because of sanctions, because of the economic situation.

Another factor is that the nuclear clock, so called, while it’s still ticking, is ticking a little bit more slowly than a lot of people had feared.  And here, I direct you to Olli Heinonen’s excellent summary of the status of the Iranian nuclear program.  He writes that although Iran has managed to produce about 3 tons of low-enriched uranium, theoretically enough for a bomb or maybe two bombs, the IAEA would be able to detect any diversion of this material very quickly. 

And also, Iran is having a lot of difficulty producing more advanced centrifuges.  The centrifuges that it uses are an antiquated model that Pakistan provided it with in the late 1980s.  And Olli Heinonen writes that Iran is having design problems and also, it’s having difficulty because of sanctions in procuring the maraging steel and carbon fiber that it needs to make these more advanced centrifuges.  So this suggests that there is time for diplomacy to work – time for sanctions and engagement to work – without having to resort to other sorts of measures. 

Now, it’s hard to be optimistic about engagement, about diplomacy, given the history of U.S.-Iran relations, which John Limbert and many others here know painfully well.  The pattern has been that when one side was ready for engagement, the other was not and vice versa.  The 2009 elections have complicated diplomacy for both sides. 

For Europe and also for the United States, the vicious crackdown on peaceful protestors that followed the elections last year have made human rights a priority.  I know that President Bush talked about the freedom agenda and so on, but for the first time, there is a freedom movement to support in Iran.  This is no longer a fiction.  And for Iran – (audio break) – once again looms large as a scapegoat for internal unrest.  They can accuse the United States of promoting a velvet overthrow, soft revolution, soft war, whatever you want to call it.  So we have a stalemate.

And I think, still, it’s important that the United States continue to try to engage, if only to put the Iranians on the defensive and to show that it actually is interested in diplomacy.  And here, I have a few very modest suggestions.  These are very preliminary and, as I mentioned, they’ll be fleshed out when the taskforce – some of them, frankly, I think are no-brainers.  Some of them are things that the Obama administration is already doing but perhaps could do a better job at.

One of the things that the administration is doing – my understanding from conversations with U.S. officials.  The U.S. and its allies are updating the offer that was made last year concerning the Tehran research reactor to take into account the fact that Iran has increased its stockpile of LEU over the past year. 

We don’t have all the details.  There have been some accounts in the press.  I think it’s still a bit preliminary and we won’t know, obviously, until there is a time and place fixed for another meeting of either the Vienna group and Iran or the P-5-plus-1. 

At the same time that the U.S. – (audio break) – offer, I think it would be wise to update a very comprehensive – (audio break) – that was made in 2008.  This was presented to the Iranians in Geneva in the summer of 2008 and it looked at possible areas of economic cooperation, easing of sanctions and so on. 

This offer needs to be looked at again.  I think it needs to be refreshed, particularly in light of what’s happened to Iran’s oil sector over the last couple of years.  I’m not saying the U.S. should necessarily publicize it or present it.  That might be negotiating with ourselves, but if the Iranians do show up and if they look like they’re actually serious, then this is something the U.S. and its allies should have ready.

At the same time, the U.S. needs to intensify its outreach to the Iranian people.  Sen. Hagel mentioned this.  This is very important.  Just because we have a fight with the Iranian government doesn’t mean we should not be promoting educational exchanges, trying to get as many Iranian students as possible to study in the United States and offering help to Iran in areas such as earthquake prediction and treatment of drug addiction and HIV/AIDS, where the United States and its NGOs have something to offer.  Now, I don’t know if the Iranians will accept it.  In the past, they have.  And this is certainly still a possible area for discussion. 

Another area which I highlight in the report and I think is very important is Afghanistan.  This is, perhaps, the one area where the U.S. and Iran are largely on the same page.  And certainly, they should be talking to each other. 

I don’t know if the Iranians will help the U.S.  They certainly haven’t always been of assistance, although they were after 9/11 in getting rid of the Taliban at that time.  They have a common interest with the United States in stability in Afghanistan, drug interdiction and preventing the total return to power of the Taliban. 

There was a recent meeting in Rome where an Iranian official participated and he got a briefing from Gen. Petraeus and he was very impressed, I understand – from my Iranian sources.  I think this sort of meeting certainly should be repeated and the Iranians should be made to feel that we understand that they have a huge stake in what happens in Afghanistan.  After all, they’ve had the largest number of Afghan refugees in their country for many years and they suffer from the drug problem.

Finally, the area of human rights.  This is something that the Obama administration got a bit of a slow start on, but I think they’re moving on a bit more.  U.S. advocacy here is very important.  Senior officials from President Obama on down should continue to condemn Iranian human rights abuses. 

And they should urge Iran to release some 500 political prisoners – (audio break) – are being held in that country, be it students, journalists, women’s rights advocates and lawyers who were jailed for defending these people.  Iran is not living up to its international commitments, let alone its own laws on human rights.  This should be pointed out.  And there’s been a suggestion, also, that the – (audio break) – the U.N. could name a special representative – (audio break) – human rights.  I think that would be a very good idea. 

There needs to be pressure put on Iran.  We’ve noticed that Iran does respond to pressure.  The incident of the woman who was sentenced to stoning for adultery – there was a huge cry and she has not been stoned.  She’s not been executed.  So Iran does react when pressure is put on this issue.

And finally, the U.S. should continue its efforts to help Iranians access the Internet and satellite television so they can get unbiased news and they can communicate more easily with each other. 

Ultimately, I believe that history, demography and the educational level of Iranians means that this country will have a more democratic and less onerous form of government in the future.  But this is up to Iranians to lead this movement.  We can’t do it for them. 

Iran has been struggling to achieve a representative government for more than a century.  And it’s frankly, I think, better equipped – even now with all the repression that has occurred since last year’s elections, it’s better equipped to have this sort of government than countries that the United States has promoted regime-change in. 

I think that in the interim, while this process goes forward in Iran, Washington needs to exercise strategic patience.  This is in the title of my – (audio break).  We need to do nothing that is going to get in the way of this political evolution.  Ultimately, Iran is going to reassume its rightful place as a major regional power that contributes to the peace and prosperity of its citizens and the wider world.  And I’ll leave it there.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  I’m going to let you take a little breather and ask the first question, if I may, but I’m going to pose it to our co-chairs.

MS. SLAVIN:  Okay.

MR. NAWAZ:  Senator and Ambassador Eizenstat, as opposed to strategic patience, there appears to have been, within the last week or so, some signs of strategic impatience within the corridors of power in Washington.  A column in The Washington Post by David Broder appeared to suggest that ramping up for war, if not actually going to war might be a good – (audio break) – President Obama to undertake in order to help the economy. 

And then Sen. Graham has been talking also about the need to perhaps punish Iran in a military maneuver.  What do you think are the – (audio break) – of something like this becoming viable?  And it is even advisable at this stage to be throwing out these ideas?

MR. KEMPE:  And let me put a question on top of that because I think it’s related and that is, those who argue against strategic patience would argue that what you’re saying is, give Iran the time and space it needs to fully develop its nuclear-weapons capability.  So is that a potential outcome from strategic patience and is it an outcome we can live with?  Ambassador?

MR. EIZENSTAT:  Let me answer in a couple of ways.  The first is, I think that so long as we can demonstrate that the sanctions are really biting – and here, the EU’s efforts to really engage in significant sanctions beyond that which most thought they would on the financial sector are having a really significant impact.  It’s much more costly to ship goods, to import oil.  And this is an area where we need to do a lot of work with China and see that China doesn’t fill that gap. 

But I think that Iran is not North Korea.  It recognizes that – (audio break) – integrated into the world economy.  And to the extent that – (audio break) – a real show and demonstration of global solidarity on sanctions, I think it will bring them back to the table – number one. 

Number two, this is a time when if there ever was a need for it, Sen. Vandenberg’s admonition of politics ending at the water is really crucial because this is a time when we’ve got to make sure that we have a bipartisan effort.  There’s a lot of polarization that’s going to occur and I think that this is a time when we need to have and show a united front. 

Number three, I don’t think that Barbara is suggesting – and I certainly wouldn’t – that by strategic impatience, we mean indefinite patience.  Because we recognize that each day, even with the centrifuges not operating as efficiently as they can, that more and more enriched uranium is occurring.  It’s being enriched up to a 20-degree level.  There is work going on, on weaponizations, of miniaturization, of increased missile capacity.  And so patience is important but it’s not something that is infinite and the Iranians have to see that. 

I think we’ll be in a much better position to know what path to take when we see how these negotiations, which are certain to occur, and probably this month, really – (audio break) – are the Iranians serious?  Are they willing to go back to a sort of Geneva-plus, Vienna-plus proposal, taking into account the additional amounts of enriched uranium, or is this going to be a long and indefinite stall? 

And I guess the last point is in terms of military options.  That has to be on the table.  The administration has kept it on the table.  The Israelis have kept it on the table.  But it is on the table at this point because it is recognized that there are profound fallouts from that and that the military option can’t be done with a single isolated strike as could occur with the Syrian reactor or the Iraqi reactor 20 years ago; that they’ve diffused their system, they’ve put it underground and that it would take considerable effort over a prolonged period of time to do great detriment to it. 

So that is not to take it off the table.  Quite the contrary.  But it is to suggest that before one leaps to that, one has to look at all the other ramifications.  And I would say to give sanctions a chance to work.  They are working.  They will continue to bite.  And we have to hope that at some point, the leadership, as diffused as it is in Barbara’s excellent analysis, will come together to recognize that the costs of pursuing militarization and a military capacity are greater than what the effort is worth at this point.

And I think this – (audio break) – that the administration and others haven’t quite come to.  And that is, what is our goal?  Is the goal to stop all enrichment?  Is the goal to simply stop a military capability?  Or is the goal to stop total weaponization?  Those are very different checkpoints.  And I think it’s very clear that we try to achieve a bipartisan agreement on what the actual realistic goal is.

MR. HAGEL:  Well, as usual, Ambassador Eizenstat has framed it up exactly right, at least, I subscribe to everything Stu has just noted and as he has presented it. 

I would add only this:  As to the use of military force, whether it’s for a political motive or not, I don’t think I have to remind the public that the United States of America is currently in two wars – two of the longest we’ve ever been in.  And before we finally wind our way out of each, they will be the longest wars we’ve ever engaged in. 

That has come at a very significant cost to this country.  I think it’s undermined our interest in the world.  You don’t need to go much beyond asking any general who’s in charge of men and women in the Pentagon, their families, or any metric that you want to apply – record suicides, record divorces, record homeless and all the rest – as to but one consequence of taking the nation to war. 

So I think talking about going to war with Iran in fairly specific terms should be carefully reviewed.  And that’s pretty dangerous talk.  It’s easy to get a nation into war; not so easy to get a nation out of war, as we are finding out.  I’m not sure that the American people are ready to go into a third war. 

Second, if you subscribe to what Barbara has laid out – at least, what our taskforce has found – in particular, the internal dynamics that are occurring in Iran, then why in the world would you, as Barbara has noted, want to get in the way of that? 

We do have some rather significant evidence that sanctions are working.  And they’re working because we – our government, our policies; imperfect, flawed problems; every policy has those.  But nonetheless, it has accomplished something even bigger than sanctions.  And that is they have brought a consensus together of most countries – the European Union, the Chinese are involved, Russians are involved.  We have a rather significant consensus on this issue up to a point.  And I think all you need to do is reflect on the United Nations’ vote on this as a pretty good indicator. 

Now, that alone won’t change the dynamics.  But as Barbara – (audio break) – if you subscribe to what our taskforce has come up with, then aren’t we wiser to let this play out?  Aren’t we – (audio break) – wiser, rather to get ourselves into another very difficult predicament because – (audio break) – we do also know that wars have – (audio break) – most of the time and especially – (audio break) – where we live in a day they have unintended consequences.  They have uncontrollable consequences.  We live in an interconnected global – (audio break) – and I think, again, we should factor that in. 

Last point I would make: as to the question of, well, but aren’t we just allowing the Iranians to buy time?  Maybe.  We have to recognize that the real world is about risks.  You calibrate your decisions and your policymaking based on that risk analysis. 

Is it riskier to go to war right now or is it riskier to pursue the policies that we are pursuing?  Policymakers have to decide that.  They have to sort their way through that and then they come to a decision.  It’s my analysis – and answering your question, Shuja – that it is far riskier to talk of war and to go to war. 

As the ambassador has noted, we are the mightiest military force on Earth.  The world has never seen such military power.  But that military power must always be tempered with a purpose.  And the military option is always on the table – of course it is – for any sovereign nation.  But at the same time we recognize that, that option is there. 

The leaders of our country, the leaders of the world are not living in an “Alice in Wonderland” type of a world.  They are living in a real world and they have to make real decisions based on what they calculate to be the dynamics and the facts as they are today.  But probably more importantly, what they think they will be.  That’s leadership

So that’s how I would add to the ambassador’s comments.  Thank you. 

MR. KEMPE:  Let me add two sentences, just for the record, about the Atlantic Council.  Sen. Hagel, a Republican; Ambassador Eizenstat, a Democrat.  It’s not the reason they were picked and not the reason they decided to do it but it just reflects that we’re after a centrist, consistent policy not only on Iran but really on all American foreign policy with our allies. 

And when we don’t do that – when we do get into the partisan bickering over matters of national interest where it’s hard to debate what the national – it’s hard to debate what outcome one would want in the national interest – our enemies take solace from our partisan bickering over matters of national interest and our friends get frustrated.  And we don’t have inconsistent – so this is one area where we’re working on this.  But the Atlantic Council works on achieving this across the board.  We call it “radical centrism”.  (Laughter.) 

MS. SLAVIN:  I like that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Fred, for clarifying that.  And Senator, you mentioned “Alice in Wonderland” and on picking up on Ambassador Eizenstat’s very useful suggestions, particularly the one about defining ones goals, that there is one of my favorite quotes from “Alice in Wonderland” – that when you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.  (Laughter.)  So I think we do need to decide which road to take. 

And so my first question to Barbara before the audience joins us in the questions, is:  Is Afghanistan going to offer that first opening, perhaps?  Because in the end you have to deal directly with the government.  You can’t negotiate with the people of Iran.  You have to deal with the government that’s in power.  So do you see Afghanistan as offering that opening?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, as I was preparing this, I had some conversations with administration officials and one said that, you know, they don’t see Afghanistan, somehow, as the silver bullet that solves our problems with Iran.  But I think they do see it as an area where Iran and the United States not only have common interests but really do need to cooperate. 

If Afghanistan is going to be stabilized it’s going to need all of its neighbors to sign onto whatever, say, coalition government may emerge or whatever peace talks may emerge.  So I think it is one area where the U.S. and Iran can talk to each other without a lot of baggage, without a lot of difficult history. 

Although it’s a different government, a different president that’s in power now in Iran than in 2001; if you look back at that period not only was Iran supporting the Northern Alliance, which was so pivotal in getting rid of the Taliban in 200, but the U.S. and Iran actually had, fairly, senior diplomatic talks from the fall of 2001 through May of 2003 in Europe.  They were led by deputy assistant secretaries of state and so on. 

And this was a period that now a number of people, like Ryan Crocker, look back on as, sort of, the golden age – Jim Dobbins.  You know, when these were very productive talks.  Members of al-Qaida were turned over, were extradited, understandings were reached and it’s sort of a pity that, that ended with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 

I don’t know if you can get back to that but certainly you can include Iran in all the various multilateral discussions that are going to be held and we should do that. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  And now we open the floor to questions.  So who would like to start?  Please wait for the microphone and please identify yourself for the record.  Thank you. 

Q:  Richard Sawaya with the National Foreign Trade Council.  You mentioned Afghanistan.  That’s one of the two wars that we are embroiled in.  What about extending – I’d be interested in your views relative to the crisis, the political crisis in Iraq where we have more blood, treasure and unintended consequences, arguably, than in Afghanistan. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Barbara, if I may just repeat the question for our television viewers.  What about the war in Iraq?

MS. SLAVIN:  Sure.  I went – (audio break) – Iraq in this brief.  That might be a topic for a second one.  Iraq is – it’s interesting and everyone has always said well, of course, the Iranians got a lot of influence when we got rid of Saddam and that’s true.  But I think the Iranians are tearing their hair out about Iraq, too, right now. 

I remember getting an e-mail from an acquaintance of mine in Tehran predicting that Maliki would be reconfirmed as prime minister right after Ramadan.  Now, that was when?  Back in the end of August, September?  (Chuckles.)  And we still, of course, don’t have a new Iraqi government. 

This is more ticklish because, although, there have been reports that Iran is giving some support to the Taliban now, the reports of Iranian involvement in Iraq are much more serious.  And we know that American servicemen and women have died because of IED technology and special groups and others that have been supported by Iran since 2010. 

So the U.S. and Iran have not really been able to cooperate in anyway on Iraq – (audio break).  Will that change?  I don’t know.  That’s why I suggest Afghanistan because we have the history of cooperation there. 

You know, it’s ironic in – I mentioned these talks that were going on from 2001 to 2003.  They’re actually – they were Iranians offering to help the United States and Iraq as well, when it became clear that the U.S. was going to be invading that country as well.  And the Bush administration said, no thank you, we can manage this on our own. 

So one has to think what – how history might have been different if we had decided to cooperate with the Iranians in 2003 and Iraq. 

MR. NAWAZ:  If you could just wait for the microphone, please. 

Q:  Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service.  I’d like to get the comments of all three if possible.  But how exactly does saying that all options are on the table help the U.S. case in human rights or anything else or even with respect to the nuclear program?  (Audio break.) 

Assuming what Sen. Hagel was saying is correct, that attacking Iran will have unforeseeable consequences – (audio break) – any observer would conclude might involve – or very much could involve the necessity for ground troops.  How, at this point, can – (audio break) – threat on the part – (audio break) – states and give – (audio break) – two wars? 

So, again, my question is – (audio break) – repeatedly saying all options are on the table – (audio break) – help any of the causes that have been laid out or that are of concern to the taskforce?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, my personal view is that, you know, the United States has to say it but it’s an option that should not be exercised at this point.  I take my cue from, actually, Iranians, particularly members of the Green movement, who say that the one thing that could destroy the chances for democracy in that country for another generation would be a U.S. attack on Iran. 

I think perhaps Ambassador Eizenstat and Sen. Hagel will be able to respond better as to why you have to say that, that option remains on the table. 

MR.    :  And Ambassador and Senator, if either of you want to comment on the Iraq question as well. 

MR. EIZENSTAT:  I guess, I would say that if you really don’t mean it and they know you don’t mean it, it’s not significant.  But from my standpoint, while I agree with everything that’s been said with and emphasized, that we need to give sanctions a chance to work.  We need to give the increasing isolation that Iran is facing a chance to change their policies.  We need to avoid, in effect, driving the opposition into the hands of the more radical elements. 

We also have to send a very clear message, in my opinion, that what is most unacceptable is Iran having a nuclear bomb.  And if they don’t understand that we think that, that is, indeed, unacceptable, then they have, perhaps, no incentive to change.  (Audio break.)  There’s always an escalating sense and you know there things short of bombing. 

We’ve seen already news reports of worms in – you know, in some of the machines, the seamless machines that drive the centrifuges.  I mean, there are a whole range of actions that can be taken to slow down and even cripple the process short of this imagery of having 100,000 troops invading and waves and waves of bombers.  We have a lot of options.

But, to me, it really is critical to make it clear to Iran that we’re giving them this extra time.  We’re going to keep the sanctions pressure on.  We have the strategic patience but that, at the end of the day, it is not acceptable for Iran, as it is currently led, to have a nuclear bomb and, in my opinion, a nuclear capability.  And if we don’t send that signal then I think we’re in serious trouble. 

MR. HAGEL:  Well, I would add this:  I’m not so sure it is necessary to continue to say all options are on the table.  I believe that the leadership in Iran, regardless of the five power centers that you’re referring to – whether it’s the ayatollah or the president or the Republican Guard, the commissions – have some pretty clear understanding of the reality of this issue and where we are. 

I think the point that your question really brings out – which is a very good one.  If you were going to threaten on any kind of consistent basis, whether it’s from leadership or the Congress or the administration or anyone who generally speaks for this country in anyway, than you better be prepared to follow through with that. 

Now, Stuart noted putting 100,000 troops in Iran – I mean, just as a number as far as if to play this thing out.  The fact is, I would guess that we would all – I would be the one to start the questioning – would ask where you’re going to get 100,000 troops.  (Laughter.)  So your point is a very good one, I think. 

I don’t think there’s anybody in Iran that does not question the seriousness of America, our allies or Israel on this for all the reasons we made very clear.  And I do think there does become a time when you start to minimize the legitimacy of a threat.  When you threaten people or you threaten sovereign nations, you better be very careful and you better understand, again, consequences because you may be required to employ that threat and activate that threat in some way. 

So I don’t mind people always, as we have laid out, and I think every president and every administration, anybody of any consequence who’s talked about this can say – does say.  But I think it’s implied that the military threat is always there.  Stu made an important point about, there are a lot of ways to come at this. 

But once you begin a military operation – I mean, you ask any sergeant – and it’s the sergeants and the guys at the bottom, not the policymakers that have to fight the war – (audio break) – there the ones who have to do all the dying and all the fighting – (audio break) – sacrifices, not the policymakers. 

But my point is, once you start that, you’d better be prepared to find 100,000 troops because it may take that or, eventually, where you’re going – my earlier point:  You don’t know.  And you can’t just – (audio break) – concept of, well, we’re going to do this but it’ll be marginalized, it’ll be a limited warfare.  I don’t think any nation can ever go into that way.  So that would be what I would just add to the rest of the other conversations. 

MR. EIZENSTAT:  Yeah, I would just again emphasize, number one, that we need to give, as Barbara is suggesting, sanctions and a potential outreach on a more positive and broader initiative a chance to work.  But if it’s rejected, we have to consider ramping up sanctions more.  But we also, again, have to make it clear, in my opinion, that it’s not acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. 

There are a lot of things that go along with that, that are short.  And that’s my point.  Not that we put 100,000 troops in but there are a lot of things short of that that can be taken against Iran that can be very disruptive.  I hope we don’t have to get to that.  But I don’t think the option is sending 100,000 troops in or doing nothing.  That’s not the option.

We have a whole range of options and we have a little bit of time more, as the report indicates, than we thought we did six months or so ago. 

MR.    :  I’m sorry, I forgot to –

MR. KEMPE:  We’re excusing Ambassador Eizenstat who had a previous appointment.  Thanks very much.  We really appreciate it. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Ambassador. 

Q:  Hi, my name is – (inaudible) – from the Brazilian Embassy.  Just a quick question.  Iran has been under U.S. sanction for the past 30 years.  So why do you think it’s going to work now?  Why is it easier to negotiate?  Why do you think it’s easier to negotiate with Iran on the sanctions? 

MS. SLAVIN:  Yeah.  I mean, Iran has been under one form of sanction or another from the U.S.  What’s different, of course, is that these are now multilateral sanctions.  As I pointed out, in the mid-’90s when the U.S. had a policy of dual containment; Europeans, Asians were all blindly going on their way signing agreements with Iran.  There was a lot of business.  That has changed. 

And actually, the report – you know, we have seen a shift.  European trade is coming down.  China, for a time, seemed like it was going to fill the gap, but even Chinese imports of Iranian oil are going down now.  And also, Chinese investment in the Iranian oil sector is going down now, according to a report that I cite in the issues brief. 

I think the world is getting the message that this is a government that is not behaving well.  And the U.S. has never had this kind of consensus behind this policy.  So I think it has a much greater chance of working; unilateral – (audio break) – also work but multilateral sanctions – (audio break) – do. 

And you see where – (audio break) – the Iranian officials.  The former president, Rafsanjani, said recently that these sanctions are no joke and that Ahmadinejad should pay attention to them.  There’s lots of commentary even in the very controlled Iranian press about the impact that sanctions are having.  So I think that it is a different situation now. 

And the other aspect is the human rights aspect; the revulsion that so many people feel over the human rights abuses that have been committed by the government.  And this is really –

MS. SLAVIN:  – you know, we all knew before, that this regime could, on occasion, be very brutal and that people were executed and assassinated and so on.  But we never saw it before the way we have seen it now on YouTube and Facebook and so on. 

And it’s – we also have a new crop of Iranian émigrés, people who were part of the reform movement who’ve been forced to leave the country since last year.  And they are very outspoken.  And you know, they have fresh information and knowledge about the society that perhaps we didn’t have before.

MR. HAGEL:  If I may, I’d like to add just one thing – one point of perspective because it rarely gets brought up for obvious reasons.  The whole nuclear issue did not begin with this administration, this being in the Iranian administration or previous administrations after the revolution in 1979.

The nuclear program started under the shah, who was our puppet, essentially.  We financed him.  We liked him.  We set him up – well, “like,” maybe too strong a word, but it was clearly in America’s interest to have a strongman dictator.  When you talk about revulsions of human rights, history is instructive here.

And so I think – and not to defend anything or anyone, or certainly not this current government in Iran, but when we’re looking at this – and this is why taskforces are important and taking time to hear from experts.  Let’s open up the aperture here and get the entire vision and understanding of history.

That wasn’t that long ago – 1979.  The people of Iran remember that, not all of them.  As Barbara said, they have one of the youngest demographies in the world, which is hopeful and good for freedom.  But we’ve got to also factor in the frame of reference and the framework of thinking of a lot of the Iranians and the brutality that came as a result of the shah’s actions that we supported, that we propped up.  And it goes back a few years before 1979.

So again, that doesn’t change the dimension or the dynamics or the risks or the threats.  But it is instructive to go back a little bit and understand why certain countries think the way they do, certain people think the way they do.  It was noted here earlier and I really do believe this and in fact, I was with some people last week who are currently leaders in that part of the world and there were two Iranians in the group.

And they said one of the things that would fasten that society back together – quicker than anything else – would be in a military attack and that would bring the Iranians back together for cultural reasons, for historic reasons.  Now, maybe a military option eventually will be the only thing that’s left.  I don’t know that.  But again, like we have said, we better be careful and we’d better think through that and employ every other option before we have to make that decision, if we have to make it.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Senator.  We have a question here.

Q:  Hi.  I just wanted to make a comment on –

MR. NAWAZ:  Identify yourself, please.

Q:  Benjamin Raff (ph) from the Heritage Foundation.  The ambassador said unacceptable and I had a question – what that exactly means when there’s five countries or six countries that keep on saying this, that it’s unacceptable and Iran keeps on enriching uranium.  And we have the example of North Korea.  And at that time, those same countries said it was unacceptable and it actually happened.  So what does that actually mean?

And the other question is with the word “democracy.”  When you say you want a democratic Iran, we’ve already said that Iran is not a totalitarian regime.  There’s many different centers of power.  So I guess what you mean is you want a country with more human rights.  And how does that exactly serve American interests?  It serves the interests of the Iranian people, but is that something that we should take risks for as American policymakers?

MR. NAWAZ:  Barbara?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, it was Ambassador Eizenstat who said it was unacceptable.  I didn’t say that.  (Chuckles.)  You know, my personal view – and this is just my personal view is that the United States could probably contain, deter, live with a nuclear – (audio break) – a nuclear Pakistan, a nuclear India, a nuclear Israel, a nuclear North Korea.

There are a lot of – (audio break) – I’m not sure they would ever actually go all the way to a weapon.  I think it frankly doesn’t serve their strategic interest to actually have the weapon.  I think it serves their interest to have the world think that they might have the weapon and they would go beyond that.

But that’s something that we can address, certainly, as we work our way through this – (audio break).  I think the United States should – (audio break) – their definition of what it means by nuclear capability, nuclear-weapons capability, should decide whether it can put up with some limited uranium enrichment or it’s opposed to all enrichment.  These things all have to still be clarified.

On the question of democracy, vis-à-vis human rights, I think what Iran – what Iranians want is a more representative and less brutal government that will be focused on their national interests.  And frankly, if Iran had a different sort of government, I don’t think the world would have such a problem with Iran having nuclear weapons.

It’s the nature of the regime that makes it, quote, unquote, “unacceptable” because Iran, as we know, doesn’t act as a very constructive player in a number of areas in the Middle East.  And it treats its own people very poorly.  So whether you call it democracy or you call it human rights, I’ve spent a fair amount of time in the country over the last 14 years and I think I have a sense of what Iranians would like, ideally, if they could get it.

I’m not sure that they would a complete transformation, but they certainly open to a freer system where people will not be thrown in prison for demonstrating peacefully on the streets, certainly won’t be shot to death for demonstrating peacefully on the streets.

MR. NAWAZ:  And that’s what you appear to be suggesting with your various other measures such as greater access to the Internet, greater freedom of communication inside the country, that the U.S. and other countries can help.  We have a question from Ambassador Limbert.

Q:  Thank you.  John Limbert, university professor.  Barbara, first of all, I want to thank you for a very memorable phrase you’ve used about Iranians, which I have stolen on numerous occasions, which is the Iranians consider themselves the Rodney Dangerfield of the Middle East.  (Laughter.)  They just don’t get no respect.

And in so many areas, including the – (audio break) – this issue of respect, of being dictated to, it comes up over and over again.  And we hear it – we hear it from President Ahmadinejad.  We hear it from many others.  We hear it in the context of the nuclear program.  We heard it in the context of the Tehran research reactor deal. 

What is your view – and Sen. Hagel, yours, is what is behind this statement?  How does one deal with something like this?  Is this a smokescreen for other things?  Or is there some way of dealing with it and how you view this constant refrain in the Iranian position?

MS. SLAVIN:  (Chuckles.)  Well, John, you’re much more than a university professor as everybody knows.  John was most recently deputy assistant secretary of state for Iran.  And your – one of your contributions was to help change the language that the U.S. government uses toward Iran so that it is more respectful.

I think “respect” is a very important word and President Obama, when he refers to Iran, always talks about mutual interest, mutual respect and I think this is key to have an understanding of where they’re coming from when we approach any kind of talks with them, any kind of negotiations.

You know, we’ve gotten beyond the, you know, Condi Rice formulation of you know what you need to do.  We don’t wag our finger at them quite so much as we used to, although every now and then, it slips into the State Department briefings, a little bit of that.

Respect is important but so is power and so – particularly the power to inflict economic pain on Iran and I think that the Iranians have shown that when their national interests really are at stake, they can make decisions, whether you’re respectful toward them or not.  So I would hope our diplomats would use appropriate language.

Iran has very skillful diplomats.  Even now, after the purge that Ahmadinejad has inflicted on the foreign ministry, there are still some pretty savvy people.  And one would hope that they will approach talks in a respectful manner toward the United States.  Iran doesn’t help its case when Ahmadinejad comes to the U.N. General Assembly and alleges that the U.S. might have been 9/11.  (Chuckles.)  So you know, respect is a two-way street and I think they understand that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Senator, you want to add something?

MR. HAGEL:  Only this.  I think Barbara said it very well.  I could connect Benjamin’s question into your question because I think they do present an integration here of interests and ultimate outcomes.  When you connect what Benjamin, what he asked, regarding what does this mean, when you say these things like “unacceptable,” “weapons,” what is acceptable? 

Enrichment, uranium, what rights do countries have to possess nuclear power and nuclear capability?  Which we have stated that all nations have that right.  Where is that line and it blurs over, it seems to me, into what you’re talking about.  And you are as knowledgeable about this, John, as anybody, certainly anybody in this room. 

It blurs into your point because if we have any hope of making any progress through the diplomatic channels and all the other influences that we are using and coordinating to influence an outcome, that is all going to be framed and partially part of whatever acceptance there is to what will we accept?  What will Iran accept? 

And I go back to this real example.  The Turkish-Brazilian so-called compromise, which essentially, basically, we laid that on the table a year ago.  And then we walked away from it.  It wasn’t only our fault.  The Iranians blew it up too.  That’s not a new assessment.  So my point in bringing that up, the Brazilian-Turkish point is because it goes back into Benjamin’s point because it starts to get to the issue which we’re all going to have to get at and get to at some point.  What are you willing to accept?  How much and how do you do that? 

The Russians, if you remember, put that deal on the table a couple years ago, that we’ll enrich it, return it and so on and so on and so on.  So this also gets into the technicalities and the depth of this, that I don’t think you can pull apart.  It is all woven in that same fabric and this is part of the – the real complexity, as you know, especially, John, and many in this room, is trying to find some resolution here. 

And I think what we can – what we need to do, as much as anything else, and it goes back to what Stu was talking about, what we all have referred to, Barbara, purpose, so on, is just try to continue to put this issue, not unlike the Middle East peace process, on a continuation of high ground.  I don’t think you’re going to solve the Iranian piece. 

And I don’t think it’ll be solved in six months.  Maybe it will be, but all these questions.  It’s like the Middle East issue.  If we continue to keep moving it up on higher ground, higher ground and get it to some point where there is a confluence that will dictate a settlement, that will be in the interest of all countries. 

The last point I’d make, we should not underestimate, again, and Barbara’s brought this – Fred talked about it initially, the regional aspect of this.  This is critical and it’s something that I have always thought we made huge mistakes when we went into Iraq and Afghanistan the way we did it, that we didn’t regionalize the strategic concepts, the geopolitical strategic dynamic of all those – of all those movements and decisions and actions that we took.  We’re now trying to do that.  We’re going to have to do that, but it seems to me that Iran is a clear case of that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Fred?

MR. KEMPE:  Yeah, just two sentences.  Let me underscore what Sen. Hagel just said.  If you just take a look at the way Turkey looks at missile defense versus the way Poland looks at missile defense, geography makes a difference.  And we will have an agreement in Lisbon in the NATO summit in a couple of weeks, but it will be a very careful agreement that takes into account Turkey’s sensitivities, which I think is very important to say.

The other thing is just for clarity, for the Atlantic Council, you’ve heard one task member say it’s unacceptable to have nuclear weapons in Iran, another one say that one could contain, deter, live with.  The Atlantic Council itself doesn’t take positions, taskforce does, do.  As you can see, this taskforce hasn’t really decided that point.  But I don’t think it really has to.

I think the – I think the questions that we need to get at is what should we be willing to accept?  What levers do we have to actually determine that?  And then how do we determine what we should be willing to accept?  For example, it’s not just could we contain Iran?  It’s what do we do about proliferation in the wider region? 

It’s not just, you know, are they going to carry through on threats to you know, push Israel into the sea.  It’s also what’s the impact on Hamas, Hezbollah, et cetera, et cetera.  So I think what Barbara said about the nature of the regime would have been Ambassador Eizenstat’s answer, almost certainly.

MR. NAWAZ:  And also that strategic patience doesn’t equal infinite patience.  I think that’s the message.  We have a question from Benjamin and then Sean (ph).

Q:  Thanks.  Benjamin Loehrke from Ploughshares Fund.  Thank you for convening this great group of radical centrists.  (Laughter.)  My question, I’ll offer to Barbara.  Now that we’re hearing reports that sanctions are beginning to bite, from a domestic political standpoint, how do Iranians view the enrichment program?  And how will this affect Iranians as they go to the negotiating tables over the next couple weeks?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, you know, it’s hard, of course, to do proper polls in Iran.  There have been some and there, you know, this is just really from anecdotal – my own sense of it from having traveled a long time and I don’t think Iranians really – they care about the notion that Iran should have advanced technology.  They don’t want to be deprived of that.  They think it is their right.  But if they were able to trade that for a better economy, I think they’d do it in a minute.

This is, you know, it’s – there’s so many slogans that are tossed around in that country and people repeat them, pro forma because they have to.  They’re drummed into them ad nauseam.  In the book that I wrote about the U.S. in Iran, I titled the first chapter, “Death to America and Can I Have Your Autograph?”

Going to one of their celebrations of the – I think it was the 29th anniversary of the revolution and you know, everybody’s chanting, death to America, death to America.  And there were a group of kids.  They all placards on them saying, nuclear is our natural right and you know, all of this stuff.

And there were a bunch of young kids who spotted me in the crowd and saw that I was a foreigner and asked where I was from.  And I said I was an American.  And Ahmadinejad is up on the platform, you know, blah, blah, blah about Israel and the Holocaust and so on.  And I swear, 50 kids, young girls, all came up and asked for my autograph.  You know – (chuckles) – just because I was from the States.  So you figure it. 

I mean, I think that it’s just – it’s an issue that the government uses for nationalism.  It’s something that they try to build up to unite the people because there isn’t much, frankly, to unite Iranians anymore.  It’s – the Islamic Republic lost its religious fervor a long time ago.  So they portray this as Iran’s right, but it’s – it’s certainly not the first priority for most Iranians in my view.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.  We have a question here.

Q:  Right, so my question is for Ms. Slavin, also.

MR. NAWAZ:  If you wouldn’t mind identifying yourself, Sean.

Q:  Yeah, yeah.  Sorry.  My name is Sean Ruda (ph).  I guess that – well, first, thank you for your report and thank you to the Atlantic Council for having me.  But my question’s really related to the last two, namely, you know, you cite the current political instability as potentially a good thing because the follow-on regime could be more open, maybe more democratic is a good way to put it and more respectful of human rights.

And then you go on to say, and more likely to cooperate or at least not be so violently confrontational with Israel and/or the West.  So my question is why?  I mean I feel like we often conflate this idea that you know, a more democratic regime would be more like us in a lot of ways.  And I feel, you know, I think you would acknowledge, democratic peace theory has about as many caveats as evidentiary points.

MS. SLAVIN:  Sure, sure.

Q:  And Ahmadinejad was elected.  I mean maybe the most recent election was called a little early, but ultimately, it’s not clear that he would not have won given big support in rural areas.  And you, yourself, cite that a lot of his internal opposition is from hardline reactionary elements, right?

MS. SLAVIN:  That’s true.

Q:  So even if we assume that you’re right and a follow-on regime, if we’re patient, comes in with more respect for these human rights and whatnot, why would we – why would we assume that they would not pursue as aggressive a Shiite-crescent extending foreign policy?  I mean I don’t know how you’d characterize the influence of Lebanon as anything but destabilizing?  What evidence do you have from your study?

MS. SLAVIN:  Well, I think the evidence really comes from the policies that were in effect when Mohammad Khatami was president.  Iran was a lot less confrontational.  It sought better relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf.  Khatami went to Lebanon, but he gave a speech in Beirut.  He didn’t go to the border, you know, with Israel and make a lot of threats about wiping Israel off the map.  It was a different tone.

The nuclear program, the enrichment program was suspended for two years when Khatami was president while the Europeans negotiated with the United States.  So we already have an example of what a more constructive Iranian administration can look like. 

I take – I make this statement because of the comments that have been made by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the leaders of the Green movement have repeatedly talked about the fact that they would have a different – (audio break).  I take it from my experiences visiting Iran over the last 14 years that they would have a different approach. 

The economy is very important and if you will recall, one of the slogans in one of the demonstrations that took place after the elections last year was, let’s see, no to Lebanon, no to Gaza, my life only for Iran.  Iranians resent the fact that so much of their money is wasted, in their view, on supporting Hezbollah, Hamas and so on.  And I think they would take a very different view.  I don’t think they would devote those kinds of resources to these kinds of radical movements.

Khatami also used to say that if the Palestinians reached an agreement with the Israelis, that Iran would not stand in the way of that.  It was a different perspective.  So we have to hope, I think, that a future Iranian government would be more nationalistic in the sense of dealing with Iranian interests.

Would it give up its claims to influence in the region?  No.  I mean the shah was the one who started in meddling in Lebanon.  The shah was the one who had the nuclear program.  It was under his government that three small islands were seized from the United Arab Emirates.  So I don’t think you would see an end to Persian nationalism by any means.  But the tactics, I think, would be different.  And certainly, there would be less of a confrontation, hopefully, with the United States and the West.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Barbara.  I’m going to ask Sen. Hagel and Fred if they’d like to say anything before I wrap up this discussion with my thanks?

MR. HAGEL:  Only to thank you, again, Shuja, for your good work and of course, you, Barbara, and all who have participated over those last nine months and will continue.  Thank you all for joining us and to Fred and his leadership.  The job of chairman is to stay out of the way and not screw anything up.  (Laughter.)  So ladies and gentleman, the president.  (Laughter.)

MR. KEMPE:  I actually have nothing to add. 

MR. HAGEL:  It’s too easy.

(Cross talk, laughter.)

MR. KEMPE:  Uncharacteristically.  (Laughter.)

MR. NAWAZ:  In that case – in that case, it’s up to me to thank the audience for coming and to thank the members of our taskforce, many of whom will be watching this on television or listening to it on our website or reading the transcript for their invaluable work in supporting what we are doing.  I also want to thank, again, the Ploughshares Fund for having given us the initial grant to get this going and we hope to carry it forward. 

Picking up on some of the themes that have been raised today, some regional issues that need to be discussed on a broader level because this is the South Asia Center.  We want to look at what India’s view is, what Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf States are thinking about Iran and how they can help this relationship and the engagement the West and Iran.

I also want to thank, again, the project director for the Iran Task Force, Mark Brzezinski, who had to be in China, unfortunately, and missed this first launch.  So we want to thank you and my colleagues, Shikha Bhatnagar, Alexandra Bellay and Roy Baran.  So thank you all for coming.  We’ll see you again.

MR. KEMPE:  Thank you.  Good.  (Applause.)

(END)

The U.S. and Pakistan: Uneasy Ties

Pakistani woman and US Marine

"Pakistan today is like a ship in heavy seas, having lost its propulsion’’ described a recent visitor to Islamabad. The imagery is dramatic but apt as the country reels under the effects of a massive flood and political squabbling that appear to have reduced government to firefighting rather than coming up with a credible long-term plan. It is critical that Pakistan’s Ship of State be navigated out of rough seas in the face of a perfect storm of national and regional challenges.

News of the floods is fast receding from the headlines, and the fear is that donors will halt their aid and move on to issues elsewhere. Meanwhile the US-Pakistan relationship seems to be fraught, in the wake of increased drone attacks and incursions by NATO helicopters into Pakistani territory. As the two allies meet today in Washington, both the floods as well as their relations need to be addressed, and both countries need to avoid missteps that could add to instability in the region.

As for flood relief, the United States appears to be the most generous donor, with nearly $400 million in promised aid, accounting for a quarter of all official aid pledged to date. The United Nations has asked the international community for $2 billion in humanitarian aid. Pakistan estimates its losses at about $43 billion, although the World Bank and Asian Development Bank estimates came in at $9.7 billion. Still, how will the gap be filled?

The mood in Washington is not very positive, as Congress reacts to the growing war bill for Afghanistan on the one hand and Pakistan’s apparent inability to control the Afghan Taliban from using its territory as a safe haven. Pakistan also possesses the ability to stop NATO supplies from reaching Afghanistan via its land route at any time. This rankles the Americans. The deep mutual mistrust between the United States and Pakistan will likely be reflected in today’s meetings.

Internally, Pakistan is facing severe economic hardships as a result of the floods that will last well into the next few years. Economic growth is already creeping downward from previous estimates of below-par 4 percent annually to near zero and, according to some analysts, perhaps into negative territory.

Population figures are on an upward trajectory and the largely youthful population of 180 million, with a median age of 18, faces lack of education and employment. Meanwhile the gap between the rich and the poor will be exacerbated, as the rural poor live largely in the devastated flood plains.

The recently improved economic team in the civilian administration may not have the political backing to make their reform agenda stick nor be able to change behavior to improve tax revenues. In a country where the prime minister and other political leaders reportedly have either not paid income taxes in recent years or only nominal amounts, and foreign assets and incomes are routinely hidden from the tax man’s eyes, the prospects of fiscal stability are dim. A culture of entitlement grips all institutions. All hands are not on the tiller but in the till.

Against this dark scenario, friends of Pakistan will need to inject support for civil society that is once more trying against all odds to help the millions affected by the floods. But the needs are too great to be met from inside Pakistan.

In a major agricultural economy, where buffalo milk contributes the largest amount to national income (close to $10 billion year) and often means the difference between life and death to the farmers, lost livestock needs to be replaced urgently. The wheat, cotton, and rice crops also need to be re-launched. If food shortages persist and flood-related diseases spread, social upheaval may well be on the cards.

Meanwhile, most US aid has not yet landed in Pakistan. Two months have gone by since the flood and yet there is no visible plan to shift these funds to flood relief and reconstruction. USAID appeared to be waiting for the World Bank and Asian Development Bank assessment of flood damage. The funds could also be held hostage by certification requirements. If Pakistan fails any of the tests written into the aid law, Congress is bound to cut off assistance, especially to the military. That would unleash a huge problem inside Pakistan’s fragile polity as well as a reaction from the Pakistan military that may affect the coalition efforts in Afghanistan. The recent contretemps over the helicopter attacks and the subsequent stoppage of NATO supplies may foreshadow a wider breach.

These are some of the issues that the United States and Pakistan will have to deal with in their meetings. There needs to be better and clearer communication between Islamabad and Washington of how each side defines its strategic aims and red lines. Given the Byzantine politics of Pakistan and inept handling of crisis after crisis by a rudderless government, and a Washington establishment transfixed by the looming headlights of mid-term elections and mired in a difficult exit strategy out of war in Afghanistan, the auguries are not inspiring. A perfect storm may be brewing in Pakistan.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This article originally appeared in the Boston Globe. Photo credit: Getty Images.

Pakistan’s Internal and External Challenges: Political Myths and Realities

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center held a discussion with Ashraf Qazi, Chairman of the Council on Pakistan Relations; C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University; Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council; and Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.

Concurrent with the Strategic Dialogue in Washington, this panel of experts examined the crucial questions facing the US and Pakistan.

As the United States and Pakistan gear up for their third ministerial-level Strategic Dialogue meeting to be held in Washington next week, critical questions about Pakistan’s domestic politics and relations with the US remain unresolved. Where does the Pakistani government stand in the aftermath of the floods? How has the sharp rise in diplomatic and military skirmishes between the US and Pakistan affected an already precarious relationship? As steps are taken to move toward a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, where do American and Pakistani interests converge and conflict?

Speaker Bios:

Ashraf Qazi is the founder and Chairman of the Council on Pakistan Relations, a Washington DC based not-for-profit advocacy organization interested in strengthening ties and enhancing mutual understanding between the US and Pakistan. He is also the CEO of Ciena Healthcare Management, a Michigan-based health care company. Mr. Qazi is a graduate of Daemen College in Amherst, New York.
 
C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously, she has served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is also a senior fellow with the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point.
 
Harlan Ullman
is a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and a member of its Strategic Advisors Group. He is also a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. In business he is Chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders in business and government. A former naval person with 150 combat operations and missions in Vietnam in patrol boats and later commands, he is on the advisory boards for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and serves as an advisor for the Pentagon’s Business Transformation Agency. Dr. Ullman is also a columnist with UPI.

Pakistan’s Energy Sector: Arresting the Decline

On October 21st, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted Ziad Alahdad, former Director of Operations at the World Bank Institute, for a discussion of Pakistan’s energy sector.

Mr. Alahdad, who has over 38 years of experience in this field, offered insights about how Pakistan can resolve its energy issues.

The shortage of energy in Pakistan is a primary constraint to the country’s economic development. Policymakers have articulated their goals for developing the energy sector but have struggled to implement their policies, responding to crises as they arise rather than averting them through the optimal and sustainable use of resources. One solution to this problem is the concept of Integrated Energy Planning and Policy Formulation (IEP), a method that has been tried and tested in developing and developed countries alike. Though political and security concerns continue to dominate the dialogue on Pakistan, the time to act on the energy situation is now.

Featuring:

Ziad Alahdad, Consultant Advisor and former Director of Operations at the World Bank

Moderated by:

Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council

Shuja Nawaz Interviewed on Changing U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Highlight - Nawaz

In light of recent events in Pakistan, Shuja Nawaz, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, appeared on PBS NewsHour and National Public Radio’s Morning Edition.

PBS NewsHour Segment: U.S.-Pakistani Ties: a History of Needing Each Other, Patching Things Up

Summary: With tension rising again between the U.S. and Pakistan, described as “two countries that need each other badly,” Margaret Warner looks at the state of relations with Shuja Nawaz of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.

To view the segment, click here or play the video below.

 

 

NPR Morning Edition: Helicopter Strike Strains Tense U.S.-Pakistan Ties

Summary: The increased difficulty now stems from U.S. pressure on Pakistan to root out militants on its soil.

To listen to the segment, click here or play the radio below.

Shuja Nawaz on PBS NewsHour: 10/06/10 – Transcript

Click here to return to news posting

MARGARET WARNER: And for a closer look at the tensions in this crucial alliance, we’re joined by Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and author of its recent report, "Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S./Pakistan Relationship," and David Ignatius, a columnist for The Washington Post. He recently returned from a reporting trip to Pakistan.

And welcome back to you both. Shuja Nawaz, beginning with you, how serious is this rift over the helicopter raids and the blocked border crossing?

SHUJA NAWAZ, director of South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council: I think it reflects the general mistrust, which is pretty deep.

And it was extremely badly handled, I believe, by NATO and by the coalition. The apology that was tendered today could have easily been done at the very outset, which would have stopped the — the Pakistanis using the — the blockage of the convoys in Torkham. And it would have been resolved quite directly and immediately.

They missed an opportunity. They got caught in legalese. I believe, based on one report that I have received, that helicopters were actually returning back towards Afghanistan when they came upon this post on which they fired. If that is correct, then NATO should have been aware of that.

MARGARET WARNER: How do you read this David?

DAVID IGNATIUS, columnist, The Washington Post: Well, as your report showed, this is a week in which all the tensions that are in this relationship were evident.

Whenever I — I look at Pakistan and at the relationship, I — I try to caution myself that public pronouncements, public anger doesn’t tell you the whole story. The reality right now is that these are two countries that need each other badly, and they have a history of patching things together and muddling through.

And you would have to guess that, in this case, that will happen again. But I last week was in Pakistan. I had the experience two days before this helicopter attack in which members of the Pakistani Frontier Corps were killed by American fire visiting a training camp northwest of Peshawar in which U.S. special forces, sort of in secret, are training members of that same Frontier Corps to go out and fight in the tribal areas. So that shows the degree of complexity in this relationship.

MARGARET WARNER: Yes. Pakistan and the U.S. really are engaged in a covert war inside Pakistan, much more than either side acknowledges, right?

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. And, for quite a long time, the civilian government has been speaking out of both sides of its mouth, and it has actually inflamed public opinion, particularly regarding the drones. The — in September, we have had…

MARGARET WARNER: Which are the drone attacks, unmanned Predator drone attacks that have seen a huge increase in September.

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. In September, it was the largest ever number of attacks in any one month since the drone attacks began in the region.

But now, in recent months, the government had stopped using this as a stick to beat the U.S. with. And public opinion was gradually accepting them. But, clearly, now, with the timetable looming, the U.S. and the coalition is going to be forced into all these measures to regain momentum.

MARGARET WARNER: You’re talking about the timetable that President Obama has set to begin to dial back in Afghanistan, which is middle of next year.

SHUJA NAWAZ: Yes. Yes. And that’s going to create tensions within Pakistan, and particularly, as you reported, in North Waziristan, where they have a huge force presence, something like 35,000 men. But they haven’t moved against Haqqani.

MARGARET WARNER: The Haqqani Network, the al-Qaida-allied network.

So, David, is there essentially a fundamental difference between Pakistan and the U.S. over how to fight or to what degree to fight al-Qaida and its affiliates, or is it because the Pakistani military is stretched too thin?

DAVID IGNATIUS: Well, the Pakistani military says that’s why it can’t conduct the offensive in North Waziristan that the U.S. would like. And I think most U.S. officials recognize that, certainly after the flood, they are stretched too thin, that they probably couldn’t do it.

When I talked to Pakistani commanders in this zone, in Peshawar and outside, they basically said, don’t expect us to clear North Waziristan this year or probably even next year.

And I think the frustration for the U.S. is, basically, we’re looking at this porous border. The Haqqani Network, really one of the most bloodthirsty, in our view, factions of the Taliban, streaming in, I think General Petraeus is saying that…

MARGARET WARNER: Into Afghanistan.

DAVID IGNATIUS: Into Afghanistan. And General Petraeus is saying to the Pakistanis, either you do this, or we will do this.

We don’t really have the forces to back that up. And so, in the end, it’s not being done. There’s tremendous frustration. I think U.S. commanders see the time ticking out on their mission in Afghanistan, knowing that, unless they close the safe havens, they have got trouble.

MARGARET WARNER: So, that brings up Afghanistan front and center. Do the two governments actually have different — a key difference in their aims there? What’s the end state they would like to see?

SHUJA NAWAZ: I think Pakistan, like most countries in the region, heard the president’s speech at West Point last year, and saw July 2011 as the date by which the American military would begin withdrawing.

And the speed is not clear. But that’s what they heard, and that’s what they are hedging their bets on. Clearly, they don’t see a military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Success will be defined by how quickly the Afghans take over the fight and how much reconciliation can bring back people like Haqqani or other elements of the Taliban.

MARGARET WARNER: But, I mean, Petraeus and Karzai are saying the same thing, essentially, that it has to be a political solution. So, what’s — what’s the friction point between Washington and Islamabad on the Afghan conflict?

DAVID IGNATIUS: The friction point is that — is that the Pakistani government would like to be the key broker of any deal that’s done with the Taliban.

And they feel now that they’re being excluded. They hear reports about the U.S., the Karzai government, the British, various people talking with elements of the Taliban.

I actually think there’s a little less going on than the news of the last week might suggest in terms of real progress. It’s in the U.S. interest, of course, for the Taliban to think that there are elements of the Taliban that are doing a secret deal, and that will sow division.

But the Pakistanis are very frustrated. They think they’re being cut out of something. And they’re saying, you have got to bring us in, because it won’t work otherwise.

MARGARET WARNER: You know, underlying, both in this report, this NSC document, and also in the Woodward book is of course the fundamental nervousness in Washington about the stability of the civilian government, given that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state.

Do you think that’s well-founded?

SHUJA NAWAZ: I think there’s adequate evidence of the weakness of the civilian government. It’s been evident in the recent floods in Pakistan and the very poor and tardy response to that, and the fact that the military had to step in and even withdraw 70,000 troops from the borders in order to cope with that.

So, that has really upset the — the very delicate balance inside the country.

MARGARET WARNER: Between the military and the civilian government?

SHUJA NAWAZ: Exactly. And that’s something that the U.S. and Pakistan should be aware of, because Pakistan’s needs are now going to be enormous for a number of years to come. And rather than have this kind of Mexican standoff on attacks across the border and closing the — the supply route, they need to focus on where that aid is going to come from.

Pakistan will need the aid. The U.S. needs Pakistan to ensure stability in Afghanistan leading up to July 2011 and beyond.

MARGARET WARNER: But the real nightmare scenario is that neither military, nor civilian government in Pakistan can hold it together, and that these nuclear weapons can fall into other hands.

DAVID IGNATIUS: Yes.

MARGARET WARNER: Is — how nervous are the people you talk to about that?

DAVID IGNATIUS: I think the nervousness about the nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban is more something in the press than — I think that’s viewed…

MARGARET WARNER: So, that’s not driving this?

DAVID IGNATIUS: … as an unlikely scenario. This report that the White House just sent to Congress is stunningly frank about how badly things are going in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Reading the discussion, this issue of the civilian government, a weak civilian government vs. the military, you almost have the feeling that’s what’s happened — and the U.S. is — is really recognizing this — is a kind of soft military intervention.

The military is now the decisive force in just about everything. And this report basically says, that’s so. It doesn’t endorse it, but it accepts that it’s reality.

MARGARET WARNER: Yes, this very frank tone in this, as you said. David Ignatius, Shuja Nawaz, thank you.

Developments in Pakistan Won’t Help Relationship with the U.S.

Pakistan Protest

Even as the recently released tell-all Obama’s Wars by Bob Woodward raises fresh doubts about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and will likely stoke mistrust in the United States about Pakistan as a partner against the Afghan Taliban, a series of stories that paint the Pakistani army in a negative light will undoubtedly contribute to the tensions. These events occur against the backdrop of heightened U.S. drone activity inside Pakistan’s border region and at least two reported NATO helicopter attacks on Pakistani soil. How the Pakistani army sees these events and addresses the ensuing challenges will have enormous impacts on the future trajectory of South Asia, as well as the direction of Pakistan’s fragile democracy.

First, there was the reported kidnapping of The News journalist Umar Cheema and the standard operating procedures of Pakistani intelligence agencies used to humiliate and torture him, according to his detailed account of the incident. Other than denials, there does not appear to be a clear or detailed explanation from the government or the Inter Services Intelligence directorate, Pakistan’s top spy agency, of who did this, nor any indication from the government that a rapid and credible public inquiry is underway. In the absence of such actions, rumors will fly and allegations will be made that will undermine the state and its agencies.

Second, there has been a new viral video released on the Internet purporting to be a record of extrajudicial killing of blindfolded Pashtun captives in civilian clothes by Urdu-speaking (that is, non-Pashtun) soldiers in army uniforms and carrying standard army weapons. The presence of a senior person identified in the soundtrack as "Tanveer Sahib" may implicate an officer in this incident. According to the New York Times, the Pakistani military initially dismissed the video as a forgery. The Times later reported that the army had investigated the incident, found it to be genuine, and promised to act against the perpetrators.

Fairly or not, this video and other negative stories about the army’s operations and its behind-the-scenes role in Pakistani politics will likely be seen within Pakistan as coordinated and hostile actions from outside Pakistan to put pressure on the Pakistan army to bend to U.S. demands on a number of fronts. The army’s readiness to move against the elements involved in these killings speaks to its new and informed leadership. Similar reports of extrajudicial killings in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in 1971 were brushed aside by the army at that time. They lost the hearts and minds of the local population, fuelled an insurgency, and created a refugee stream into India that drew that country into invading East Pakistan to help create Bangladesh. By contrast, in June 1992, an incident in Sindh province earlier described by the army in Sindh as an "encounter" with local robbers was openly investigated by the army high command, following a BBC report of killings by an army major as a favor to a local landlord. The major was court-martialed and sentenced to death. Senior officers who failed to investigate the incident adequately and participated in covering it up were removed or dismissed to much public acclaim. The army’s stock went up in the public eye.

The current army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will need to confront this latest allegation head-on and quickly rather than let it simmer and adversely affect public support for the military as well as morale inside the institution. If a "rogue officer" was at work giving his troops an unlawful command to murder civilian prisoners, then the army needs to clear it up in a manner that will identify and bring to court the culprits and help educate the rest of its officers and troops against similar actions. At a time when the civilian government is under stress and economic and political problems have besieged it, it is important that the army is seen as a stable entity working with the government for the common good.

General Kayani also faces a challenge on the border from the U.S. and NATO. A first incursion into Pakistan seemed to have been handled quickly by him and Adm. Mike Mullen to reduce unhappiness on the Pakistan side. They spoke and decided not to add to the public rhetoric. But now an additional incident in Kurram involving a NATO helicopter attack that reportedly killed three soldiers of the Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that patrols the tribal areas, has led to the closing of the border to NATO supplies for Afghanistan and a public rebuke from the government of Pakistan.

This situation could easily careen out of control. The Obama administration, which is unhappy with what it perceives as Pakistan’s lack of action against anti-American militants, is seriously miscalculating if it is using such tactics to pressure Pakistan to launch operations against its will. Better to argue your case behind closed doors, as allies should — or risk a public split. Similarly, Pakistan risks overestimating its leverage over the United States and NATO by shutting down the coalition’s supply routes across the Durand Line. If anything, this embargo will accelerate the U.S. drive to diversify its logistics chain — while taking money out of Pakistanis’ pockets.

There is some positive news. On Thursday, Kayani announced a fresh list of newly promoted three-star generals, completing his team of senior officers who will outlast his own new three-year term at the helm of the army. By all accounts, he has chosen tried and tested professionals and superseded some Musharraf loyalists. As with the lieutenant generals promoted in April, he has by and large selected apolitical and professional soldiers with a broad, mature view of the world and of Pakistan’s place in it. Many of them have topped their classes at the military academy, winning the Sword of Honour, or have attended advanced military courses abroad, as has Kayani. Here’s hoping they get their chance to prove that Pakistani’s military can be a force for stability in South Asia, and a voice for the rule of law at home.

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This essay first appeared at ForeignPolicy.com’s AfPak Channel. Photo credit: Getty Images.

General Musharraf’s Return

Musharraf Returns

  "Today, God has given me the opportunity to set the tone for my political legacy. Come join me in changing Pakistan’s destiny. It is not an easy task but one we must work for, as Pakistan is ours. ‘All Pakistan Muslim League’ is our platform from where I will work tirelessly to serve Pakistan and bring back national unity-Pakistan First."  With those words on one of his Facebook pages, as promised, former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf appears to have launched his new political party out of London. Clearly, he is attuned to the technology of today. But is he attuned to Pakistan?

Musharraf claims to have more than 300,000 youth followers. He has also attracted some serious Pakistani Diaspora supporters, including successful entrepreneurs. But his key support comes from his inner team whom he promoted while in power in Pakistan. Few major politicians inside the country appear to have spoken publicly about their support for him. Some who have met him and then are reported by his media staff to have considered joining his campaign to return to Pakistan in political triumph privately deny that they wish to join him. If his advance guard is telling him that the ground is ready for him in Pakistan, Musharraf needs to do some independent checking. The deck is stacked against him.

First, he faces personal danger from the moment he lands. The militants whom he challenged and attacked have long memories. Second, the leading political parties are more than likely to coalesce against him at the provincial and federal level. He knows well from his own time in power that the rules of the game favor those in power. Imposition of restrictions on public gatherings, closure of meeting places, and other ways of disrupting a political campaign, including ostensibly for Musharraf’s own personal safety (as he did by imposing restrictions on Benazir Bhutto immediately after her return in 2007) will likely hobble his campaign. His own Pakistan Muslim League (Q), also known as the King’s Party during his presidency, has split and is largely out of the central political game for now. If Musharraf can manage to bring all the bits and pieces of the Muslim League together under his new All Pakistan Muslim League, he may have a core to launch his campaign. But current indications are not very bright on that score. The Muslim League over time has become known as a party of hangers-on and relies on official largesse for life support. Out of power generals and politicians cannot give the Muslim League what it needs to survive.

And then there is the Pakistani Army. It has turned the corner on its former chief, as it always does. A previous Army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, found little support inside army headquarters when he launched his party. He has had no traction since. Indeed, few Pakistanis would be able to tell you its name (the Awami Qiyadat Party). Recent conversations with officers at different ranks and including many senior generals about Musharraf’s standing indicate clearly that they resent what they call Musharraf’s move away from professionalism of the army and infusion of the army into civilian jobs. They are trying to restore that inner core of the army’s professionalism now and would resist being drawn into the political fray by Musharraf’s return. Most of Musharraf’s favorite generals are no longer in key positions inside the army. Some of them have been superseded in the recent promotions as General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chosen by Musharraf to succeed himself, puts his own stamp on the upper echelons of the army and on the institution as a whole. Finally, the chances of Musharraf being charged with "high treason" and other crimes for upending a democratically elected government in October 1999 and thus drawing the Pakistan army into the defendant’s box in court worry the military high command enormously.

While the weakness of the current civilian government may appear to be a tempting target, the negatives surrounding Musharraf’s return militate against the successful rebirth of Musharraf the politician. For his own sake and to save Pakistan from further political turmoil, he may wish to re-examine his plans to return. He could do a lot for Pakistan from his current perch abroad by drawing together bright young Pakistanis who could share their knowledge and experience and help foster the rebirth of civil society, using the technological instruments of our times to foster change for the better. He could also perform the role of a philanthropist and an apolitical spokesman for Pakistanis at home and abroad rather than someone who is missing the trappings of power.  As he would put it, he needs to place "Pakistan first!"

Shuja Nawaz is director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. This essay first appeared at ForeignPolicy.com’s AfPak Channel.

Transcript: NATO Beyond Afghanistan Conference – Second Panel

Transcript of the second panel from the NATO Beyond Afghanistan conference held September 27, 2010.

NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN:
A CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
IN A POST-ISAF WORLD

PANEL 2: NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN – SHARPENING OR BREAKING

MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ,
DIRECTOR,
SOUTH ASIA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH,
ASSOCIATE FELLOW,
CHATHAM HOUSE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL STRATEGIC ADVISORY GROUP

GIAN GENTILE,
VISITING FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

VAGO MURADIAN,
EDITOR,
DEFENSE NEWS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
10:45-12:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

SHUJA NAWAZ:  Good morning, everyone.  I’m Shuja Nawaz.  I’m the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and I am delighted to welcome you all back to this second session.  Since this is a military-related gathering, we are starting on time and ending on time.  That’s the advantage.  Otherwise, Washington clocks tend to run a bit slow, particularly for conferences after coffee breaks. 

This is the panel that is looking at the topic of “Sharpening or Breaking?  NATO Military Power Beyond Afghanistan,” and there are a number of questions that have been posed to us and I’m sure that there are many others, particularly in light of the fact that the morning session has already covered some of the crosscutting issues, recognizing that NATO is a political military alliance.  So you can’t separate the political from the military and it’s sometimes a question of sequencing and sometimes a question of how you mesh the two together. 

Let me first introduce my panelists.  I’m delighted to have with us Julian Lindley-French.  Julian is a member of our Strategic Advisors Group at the Atlantic Council.  He is a professor of military art and science at the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands, and he has held various important academic and consultancies and research appointments around the globe, also acted as a consultant to NATO in Brussels at the headquarters. 

Then to his left is Col. Gian Gentile.  He’s a U.S. Army officer who’s on sabbatical from West Point, where he teaches, and he is a graduate of U.C. Berkeley and did his Ph.D. in history at Stanford.  Quite importantly for the topic at hand, he has served two tours in Iraq, first as the executive officer of a combat brigade in the Tikrit area in 2003 and then as a commander of a battalion in a restive area of northwest Baghdad in 2006. 

He is currently during his sabbatical a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.  For those that are interested in an earlier kind of warfare that we won’t be talking about today, I guess, he published a book in 2001 called “How Effective is Strategic Bombing.”

COL. GIAN GENTILE:  From strategic bombing to COIN.

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes, so we cover the spectrum.  And then to my right is Vago Muradian.  Vago is the editor of Defense News, which is one of the leading defense news weeklies with correspondents in 16 countries. 

Before that he had other, similar assignments.  He was managing editor of Defense Daily International and also worked on the Air Force Times.  He has covered global operations including in Europe, Haiti, Somalia and Zaire.  Before covering the Air Force, he served as the Defense News’s land warfare reporter and he started his career inside the Army. 

So going back to the topic – and I’m glad that we had the morning session precede us because I think it sort of set the ground for what we are going to be talking about today.  I just want to remind the conference that a couple of years ago at the Atlantic Council – I’m glad Harlan is sitting here because he was part of that group when Gen. Jones put together a paper on Afghanistan that famously began, make no mistake, we are losing in Afghanistan.  So the question now is, are we winning?  And if so, has the purpose, the shared purpose of the NATO alliance been defined properly?

There’s been a lot of commentary that the operations in Afghanistan, despite the fact that we’ve been at it for eight or nine years now, were really not combined operations, that they were divided and that it was not unified command and it took us quite a while to unify that command and to centralize the military leadership. 

So the question then comes up is NATO the tip of the spear, or is it the backpack for the U.S. and a handful of other allies.  And if so, how is NATO’s role going to be defined or redefined, particularly in light of the question that was raised in the first panel, which is when you have already a calendar and a date by which a transition or an exit will begin?  Despite all the caveats about what is meant by July 2011, the message, particularly in the region where I come from, is that the U.S. and the allies are going to be exiting. 

So is this really a time for NATO to try and reorganize itself for the job in Afghanistan?  And then more importantly, in light of the economic issues at home, how on Earth will NATO be able to reformulate its approach to the use of military power as an adjunct of political policy around the globe?  It was mentioned that a big issue is the question of out of area of operations.  That raises a question, is it out of area or is it out of NATO’s depth, and is NATO ready for these kinds of operations?

So what will happen in Afghanistan in particular once the U.S. and some of the other leading countries take off?  What will NATO do?  Will they merely redefine the role of their troops, as is apparently the case?  The U.S. is trying to persuade them, or will they actually find a way to exit even more speedily than planned originally. 

These are some of the questions.  I’m sure you will have many and we hope to have a conversation with you.  I propose to ask Julian to launch this discussion, if you would please, and then, as the program shows, we’ll follow with Col. Gentile and then Vago in this order.  So Julian?

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Thank you, sir.  I’m a strange beast.  I’m a Yorkshire optimist.  There aren’t many of us around in this business.  But you know, I’m attending a lot of these events, as many of my colleagues are at the moment, and too often it feels like we’re attending a wake, a wake for Afghanistan and a wake for NATO.  I don’t buy either, frankly.  It’s not over in the region.  I think we are beginning to get a proper regional perspective about the future, an economic perspective about the future of the region.  Therefore, we have gripped with certain realities we didn’t a few years ago. 

But nor do I accept for a minute, which I hear often in Europe, that effectively NATO is over.  There’s no real alternative.  ESDP or CSDP is bubbling along, but not doing very much.  But I think the problem is – and I think you in Washington in particular have to grip this – I genuinely think there is what I call the great European defense depression going on right now. 

We had the Great Depression of the ’30s.  There’s a defense depression in Europe, where a case for armed forces and the use of force has been damaged so profoundly by a mixture of indolent European action – very few Europeans went into Afghanistan believing that we were going to win; we did the least possible to keep you guys engaged in our security and defense and paying for much of it – and frankly, by a lot of poor American leadership. 

You haven’t led very well since 2001, and you can hardly expect allies to kind of follow you unconditionally when your leadership isn’t very good.  I see that there are again signs of improvement, but that is the essential contract that is at the heart of alliance and that is where we are right now.

In the next three weeks – Edgar alluded to it – we’re about to see what I’ve called the British strategic pretense and impecunity review, which could be a very, very important moment indeed.  I’m hoping that it’s a bit like 1934, that it’s a chance for the Brits to retrench, to look at security in the round, to consider defense as part of their broad security effort and the British leadership role in Europe, along with France, which is critical, frankly, along with Germany, to move us forward.  I fear that it’s merely a kind of function of exhaustion and financial damage, financial disarmament, even. 

If that’s the case, if indeed Britain just becomes another European power, then you Americans have a problem.  And you have a big problem, I would suggest.  In the next three or four weeks, we need your influence.  Now, I use the word influence critically here because whether it’s in Afghanistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan or indeed beyond that, we are in the influence game.  It’s all about influence. 

And I’m old-fashioned.  I happen to believe the world is a safer place when the West is strong, and I happen to believe that the West is strong when it is militarily balanced, credible in all the key roles that we need it to be credible in, and that includes being the dominant military grouping.  And the only organization that can possibly deliver that is NATO.  We’re not going to reinvent it.  There’s no other organization. 

I think beyond Afghanistan, as the question suggests, we might be seeing the need for a radical reorganization of the European pillar.  I think there’s going to have to be a reemergence of a European pillar – that means a pillar where Europeans organize themselves, in effect, to support both NATO and the European Union across a range of missions. 

But as I said in my question this morning, I also believe, Chairman, that NATO must be allowed to grip a fundamental question, which is what is the likely nature of future war and how are we going to fight it?  Because ultimately that is what NATO is for.  If we talk Article V, you can talk architectures, you can talk solidarity, you can talk strategic reassurance – but it’s about the ability of the alliance to be credible and be seen to be credible in a world of uncertain change in considering the nature of future war. 

Now, here is a dilemma.  We will have to make some hard choices.  There’s no question about that, whether they be financial or military.  And here I have some sympathy with our leaders.  We simply don’t want to make the wrong choices.  But in our effort not to make the wrong choices, I fear we will make no choices at all.  What I brought out of this morning’s session and what I’ve heard many times now is that Lisbon will not be that moment when, in fact, the bureaucracy, with partners, the member nations working together, will start to consider the environment, will start to consider creative solutions. 

I’m doing a lot of work at the moment with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps on operationalizing the comprehensive approach.  There are many things we can do to use our existing resources far better.  And one thing I’m absolutely convinced about is that if we don’t have a major better-spending project as the first day-after-Lisbon project, then Lisbon will have failed because it’s very clear that whatever we have to do more in the military realm, it will at the very least not have to cost any more money. 

That means there needs to be a very clear mandate from Lisbon that we start to look at how we make ourselves more effective and more efficient and the two are not the same.  Now, let me say a few words, if I may, on the situation, just to conclude on Afghanistan right now, as the two questions that were posed, Chairman, to us.  What effect has Afghanistan had on allied military effectiveness and has the experience allowed us to refine doctrines, training, equipment, tactics, et cetera, et cetera? 

My answer to that would be, not enough.  Would you like to turn that off, somebody?

(Off-side conversation.)

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  It’s Boyko?  Really?  (Laughter.)  He always has to be present.

MR. NAWAZ:  Introspection.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Introspection, there you go.  I think the problem with Afghanistan is the way we’ve structured it.  When I go around the world and I talk, particularly in Asia, the dangerous impression that we’ve given to allies, partners and adversaries is that we’re far weaker than we are.  By the way, we’ve given that impression to ourselves as well. 

I think the way we’ve organized PRTs has been far too stovepiped, back to national capitals rather than an international, multinational effort.  I think the way – and part of that is due to the comprehensive approach, the civil-military side of it, which has been so complicated that by definition, it’s tended to disaggregate the multinational level and reinforce the idea of national stovepipes because that’s where the spending decisions are made. 

Look at the NRF.  There’s been much criticizing of the NRF, but NRF 13 had a 27-percent CJSOR – combined joint statement of requirement.  In fact, the future for most Europeans will be a much better use of multinational formations.  And I never understand why we spend so many years working these damned things up and the moment we go on operations, we scrap them and we go back to some very inefficient national stovepipe. 

So I suppose my challenge, given the experience of the last years in Afghanistan and indeed the wider region, given the rules-of-engagement issue, given the caveats issue, is twofold.  Will we have the courage to be radical post-Lisbon, to reconstruct a genuinely European pillar where some of the smaller Europeans who spend an average $4 billion a year very badly – 19 NATO Europe members, very badly – are encouraged to move even towards some limited forms of defense integration and whether the U.S. will wait for us? 

Because what worries me about what I’m seeing in Afghanistan is, in fact, this is no longer a NATO operation.  This is a CENTCOM operation with NATO being used as a fig leaf.  The European allies will tolerate that for a time because we understand that this is the critical crunch period.  The U.S. is pouring in troops, with the Brits doing our best as well, and the next two years are genuinely critical. 

But what concerns me is that if CENTCOM, in a sense, becomes a precedent for the subjugation of NATO Europe to U.S. command structures, then that will accelerate the demise of the alliance.  No one will want that, but it could happen by the sheer preponderance-of-force issue, that the United States is so powerful compared with the European forces that we end up with this reality.  In a sense, it could become an excuse for Europeans to do even less.  If that happens over the next two years, that will be far more damaging that any particular reverse on the ground. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Julian.  If I could move to Col. Gentile, one of the pointed questions that emerges is, what kind of future war are we going to be fighting?

COL. GENTILE:  Right.  I heard Julian say that.

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes, and if so, first of all, how do you evaluate NATO’s operations within the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and what will be the nature of the future war and what lessons have we learned or are learning?

COL. GENTILE:  Hopefully, I can address those excellent questions.  It’s also a privilege to be on this panel with Shuja as the chair, with Vago on it as well.  Anybody who pays attention to defense issues reads Defense News, so I’m operating with a fair amount of trepidation here – and also Julian as well because he’s the editor of an article that I just wrote on the history of counterinsurgency.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  And I’m tough.

COL. GENTILE:  (Chuckles.)  That’s right.  He just sent me this list of – it’s a really good piece, you may want to look at – but no.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Five pages later.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah.  So I took the train down from New York City this morning and I got in about – I don’t know, probably 30, 45 minutes into the first panel.  As I was just setting my book bag down outside, I heard a question.  I heard a person stand up and the person said, I’m Joe Collins, and I said, I wonder if that’s my old friend and mentor Joe Collins, and it was. 

And Joe Collins brought up this question, or this term, utility of force, which I found to be a very important and absolutely critical question in how we think about what we’re doing in Afghanistan, how we think it’s going there or how we assess progress and effectiveness and also it tied to Julian’s point about how we conceive of the future of warfare, and what role does force play in that. 

So for the next five or six minutes, I have a few points I want to make.  I’m going to try to come at that question of utility of force and future conflict.  But I’m going to come at it from a more narrow angle – I think that it might be useful for this panel, from what came before and what’s going to come after this afternoon – and that’s from the angle of the American Army. 

Because let’s face it, the American Army is the key player in what we’ve been doing in Afghanistan for the last nine years and in Iraq for a few years shorter.  So that is the angle that I’m going to come at this question of utility of force and the future of conflict. 

I found also this question I really liked for this panel.  It says “Sharpening or Breaking?  NATO Military Power Beyond Afghanistan.”  So I’m going to address that question from a view of the American Army.  To be sure, the American Army has sharpened over the last nine years in terms of its ability to do nation-building, counterinsurgency. 

Of course both of those two words are synonymous.  They mean the same thing, at least how the American Army and other major armies do counterinsurgency now.  It is the same thing as nation-building, nation-building at the barrel of a gun.  Certainly, the American Army has been sharpened over the last nine years in its ability to do counterinsurgency. 

However, this has come at a cost, which gets at this whole question – and also, Julian, you raised this – how much money are we going to spend, how we’re going to organize, all these kinds of things.  It comes at a cost, and the cost of becoming sharpened at counterinsurgency is, at least for the American Army, its ability to do combined arms, combined-arms operations, the American Army’s ability to fight, to fight an enemy that fights or operates beyond the laying of IEDs on the road and then running away, but fights in a sophisticated way.

I think you can make the argument – although many would not want to hear this – that the American Army, in terms of its ability to do combined-arms operations at battalion, brigade, division and even higher is not just breaking but it’s broken.  I’m going to come up to that point in a few minutes.  And I’m going to make a few supporting points that are going to lead to this, I think, this essential problem within the American Army of its ability to do combined-arms operations. 

The first point I want to make, after nine years of doing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it’s a problem that we have in the United States, especially with the American Army, but I also think within policymaking circles, of strategy.  You often hear the term, our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.  Counterinsurgency is not strategy.  Strategy, simply defined, is the level of war that should, after assessment, asking questions, of weighing costs and benefits, should link tactical, operational methods in a military sense, other elements of national power to achieve policy objectives.  That is a simple definition of strategy. 

Counterinsurgency is not strategy, but we often hear this term counterinsurgency strategy.  To be sure, strategy could employ the tactics and operational methods of counterinsurgency.  But the problem with the term counterinsurgency strategy, as it’s used today – it implies that strategic rationale and thought have gone in to the employment of the tactics and operations of counterinsurgency, especially with Afghanistan. 

One could make the argument, and I have before, although this is not, I think, necessarily a well-liked or appreciated argument, that our strategy in Afghanistan is out of balance.  If the president’s political objectives are defeat, disrupt, disable al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that it can no longer use those places as a base to attack the United States, then as a question of strategy, I ask, why is it that the American Army, as the primary player in this, seems to be able to only offer up the maximalist approach of counterinsurgency – aka nation-building – in Afghanistan?

So in that sense, one could make the argument that our strategy in Afghanistan is broken.  But the problem with the term counterinsurgency strategy is that it implies that strategic thinking has gone into it.  Within the American Army, I think one of the reasons why we don’t have the ability, in terms of strategy, to be able to offer alternatives in Afghanistan is – and this is a second point I want to make – is that the American Army has been, over the last number of years – has become trapped in what I call a counterinsurgency straitjacket. 

By that I mean it’s sort of an intellectual framework that is so confining that it prevents the American Army from thinking about alternatives in Afghanistan and even how it thinks about future conflict in the world.  The counterinsurgency straitjacket consists of two immutable rules that are always in place. 

The first immutable rule of the counterinsurgency straitjacket is that at least the American Army, but other armies too, have to start off doing counterinsurgency badly.  In fact, they must start off failing at it miserably.  But then, once a new doctrine is put into place, some better generals are assigned, maybe a few more brigades are put into the mix, then an army can learn and adapt and get better at counterinsurgency. 

And the second immutable rule that’s a part of this counterinsurgency straitjacket is that counterinsurgency American-style, à la FM 3-24, worked in Iraq, namely during the surge in Iraq, and it was the American Army doing something different, practicing a new kind of counterinsurgency that was the fundamental cause for the lowering of violence in Iraq.  So those are the two immutable rules that make up this counterinsurgency straitjacket. 

But here’s the problem with this thing – it’s that an army – and this relates to Afghanistan – if we do want to seriously consider alternatives, within the counterinsurgency straitjacket, an army cannot learn and adapt its way out of doing counterinsurgency.  It can only get better at it because it starts at a level of not getting it and being poor at it.  It learns and adapts and it gets better at counterinsurgency.  But it can’t learn and adapt its way out of counterinsurgency. 

Hence, this straitjacket that prevents us from seeing alternatives, for example, in a place like Afghanistan, which leads to my final point, which is the one I started with and this problem – this serious problem I think – of combined-arms atrophy, which is also linked to this counterinsurgency straitjacket.  Because we’ve become so consumed within the American Army with counterinsurgency that it has taken our eye off the ball, so to speak, of the serious problems we have within the American Army being able to do combined arms.

Combined arms, what do I mean by combined arms?  At the battalion, the brigade, the division, the corps level within an army, those organizational levels and their ability to combine arms – like artillery, armor, infantry – against an enemy who fights in a sophisticated way.  Think of the Israeli army in Lebanon in 2006 and the experience they had when they faced Hezbollah, who fought them differently from the way the Palestinian terrorists had fought them in the six years prior.

There’s been a number of good analyses that have shown the effects of doing really nothing but counterinsurgency on the Israeli army and what happened to them in 2006.  We can see the same thing happening today within the American Army.  Our artillery battalions don’t shoot like they used to.  When artillery battalions, for example, go to Afghanistan or Iraq, they do other things than firing their guns.  One hears reports coming out of the national training centers of, certainly, a refining of the ability to do counterinsurgency operations, but not necessarily combined-arms operations. 

History shows what happens to armies when they become overly focused on counterinsurgency:  the British army in the Second Boer War; a number of years previously, the French army in the Franco-Prussian War, from the colonial experience; more recently, the army of the Republic of Vietnam, who by 1973 and ’74, when they were left on their own, had become essentially a counterinsurgency army and was defeated soundly by a North Vietnamese army in 1975 who knew how to fight using combined arms.

So history shows what happens when armies spend a lot of time focusing on counterinsurgency.  Now, my argument here is not that the Army has the luxury to stop preparing its units, if they’re going to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq, on counterinsurgency.  My argument is that we need to be able to break out of this counterinsurgency straitjacket, look at strategy in a more creative, sort of alternative way and also appreciate what has happened to the American Army in terms of its ability to do combined-arms warfare.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Gian.  Clearly, this is a major issue, how much are we learning and how will we learn?  So let me move to Vago and perhaps you can address this issue.  One is the strategic shift, and the other is at the tactical level, how much of the lessons have been learned?  Gian was mentioning the Boer War.  The British produced a wonderful little manual called “The Defense of Duffer’s Drift”.

VAGO MURADIAN:  Right.  There’s a new take of that.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah, “The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa”.

MR. MURADIAN:  Yeah, it was a fantastic little book.

MR. NAWAZ:  Maybe that will give you the opening.

MR. MURADIAN:  Well, I’m going to be neither studied nor optimistic, to counter Harlan’s studied optimism, and I don’t want to apply any kind of strategic thinking in this, and that’s kind of my joke. 

I think that the big problem we have is that nobody really is thinking strategically, where sometimes tactical and doctrinal things are really construed as sort of strategic approaches, which I kind of have a problem with.  There’s a friend of mine in the Pentagon who says, U.S. military people ought to stand more in front of maps and near maps to understand geography and what are sort of, again, strategic drivers.

I think the alliance is really at an inflection point.  You can argue that there haven’t been as many Europeans who are as well-versed in combat operations since World War II, and in many respects that’s a very positive thing, I think, in terms of thinking your way through problems and also improving basic military expertise, being able to identify defects and certain select capability areas that have to be reconciled. 

I also want to give credit where credit is due.  I think that NATO has done a tremendous job.  These contributions that nations have made, despite their caveats, asterisks and 21 layers of impenetrable structure, is still yielding – is still very, very expensive.  It still constitutes massive national investment and, I think, is making a difference on the ground. 

The problem is that we were in strategic drift for a long, long time and now all of a sudden are sort of realizing that, okay, no, no seriously this time we’re really going to get it right and do it right.  So the question is whether you run out of will, steam and, more important, money. 

The treasuries run this.  It really doesn’t matter if what you will save is minimal.  That’s the one thing that I’ve – you could cut U.S. defense spending dramatically and you’re really doing nothing or not that much to address $13 trillion in debt, and yet, as Liam Fox always says, that’s exactly what’s going to happen. 

Defense has to pay its fair share and is paying that fair share.  Whether it’s in Germany, in France, in Britain, with the SDSR, as ill-thought-out as it may be and as scattershot as it may be, it is going to yield cuts.  The British army is likely to leave Germany after seven decades of occupation.  You’re going to find the RAF being much smaller. 

And I think a bigger question I think that everybody has and needs to grapple with is, at what point do you get smaller – so small on national levels that your centers of gravity really start to erode and you’ve really got to think of, again, a much, much more intimate integration, whether it’s under an EU or a NATO banner or what have you where you have a couple of countries that are global still – Britain, France – still maintain sort of broad – broadish national capabilities, and then you have other nations that, literally, you tick off a box and you go into a European army and there are pools of equipment spread around the continent that would be at the disposal.

Well, look, EU has already created a diplomatic corps.  So you can join the EU diplomatic corps.  You’re no longer a French diplomat or a British diplomat.  You’re an EU diplomat and I think it’s only a matter of time before you see that at a national European level.  I think from a capability standpoint, one would assume that the alliance is going to look at this and look at this in a positive way.  I mean, I think that there have been huge gains in Afghanistan.  I think that now you can call somewhat more complicated than going through your national chains of command. 

But you’ve got French aircraft that are supporting American troops.  You’ve got American aircraft that are supporting Dutch troops, and what have you.  National caveats are a way of life.  It will be in any alliance and multinational operation.  To assume otherwise is, I think, just naïve.  We’ve got to realize that at a certain point you can try to dilute it as much as you can but that will still exist.  There will be some still hard lines for folks. 

But the question is – my focus is a little bit more on the future.  What is your driving strategic threat?  What is shaping your mindset?  The Pentagon’s interest in China is growing, has grown.  It is based on the intelligence and this is now – it conveniently has an administration that says, hey, wait a minute, this is a problem, as opposed to having an administration that said, whatever you do, don’t rock the boat.  We have a whole series of other issues and can’t afford to tangle this. 

So the lip service was better.  I think there was more lip service paid, whereas now, folks are looking at this seriously from a U.S. standpoint as to what its equities are in Asia, how does that change vis-à-vis rise of China, and also what are some of the capabilities that the United States is going to need?  And hence there are people who are interested in strategic bombers anew, realizing that the future is not just going to be all COIN all the time that will fit. 

There are some people who make that argument within the Pentagon, by the way.  That which we’ve done – Defense Secretary Gates has sort of hinted at that, that what we’re doing is what we’re going to be doing.  Unlikely:  That’s kind of been a historic and classic recipe for disaster each time we’ve done that.  Well, if you look at it from a European perspective, which I try to do because I visit Europe often enough, it is, what are my driving strategic threats?

I don’t have a Russia now over on the other side of the border.  I have economic integration, which means that the chances of Germany coming crashing across the Rhine is somewhat limited now than maybe it might have been 100 years ago.  So you really start looking at it and saying what are my national militaries there for. 

If you’re a former colonial empire, then you have a little bit more of an interest and have a global role, view.  But otherwise, you’re looking – (audio break) – so it’s cyber, counterterrorism and then as Edgar said, I think the “big idea” idea is great because nobody – (audio break) – European militaries to at least raise their game.  The question is can you get the average – (audio break) – the national leaders just do a really, really poor job. 

I was going to use an expletive but I’m in a sophisticated academic environment now.  I’m not going to do that.  But they do sort of a poor job – (audio break) – all about and what does it mean.  So they really take their cue, anticipatory cue, from what the people will do.  And as anybody knows, it’s a line from “Men in Black”, people are smart – (audio break) – people are stupid sometimes.  So they don’t really realize that what they’re doing is actually not in their strategic interest. 

So my fear is that here we’ve built this capability, admittedly with some major capability gaps, by the way, as nations have at various levels embraced better – (audio break) – surveillance reconnaissance capabilities, UAVs, improved their special operations game.  You’ve got a whole lot of guys who haven’t done that. 

So you’ve got that capability gap that’s built in Afghanistan and one that is likely to widen even more rapidly as the United States, despite its – (inaudible) – drive, is still spending more than everybody else in the world combined.  So even when it’s trying to save, it’s going to be spending huge amounts of money, whereas in Europe, centers of gravity are really being reduced. 

So whether or not the alliance finally decides that I’m no longer an out-of-area operation, then the lesson I take from Afghanistan is, oh my God, this is too hard.  It makes my brain hurt and I really want to go – (audio break) – was, which is a defensive alliance exclusively – (audio break) – defending against what?  Well, I’ll dabble in cyber.  I’ll do missile defense because the Americans will come in with their Aegis cruisers and their ground-based missiles – (audio break) – sit behind that because I can sell that to my people. 

So I think it’s – I want to hope there’s strategic thinking.  I would like to think that folks are going to say, hey, wait a minute; there are really enormous gains that we’ve made.  We are making a contribution on the ground.  Stan McChrystal was right.  If it wasn’t for NATO troops in Afghanistan, the United States would have to cough them up and that would be a very, very – (inaudible) – given where the U.S. Army and the U.S. military is in terms of being tired. 

But you really do need to, again, ditch the agenda, get people to say, okay, what’s at stake here, what are the issues and where do we need to take this.  It can’t just be about efficiency and affordability.  You’ve got to obviously make it better, but you’ve got to start thinking a hell of a lot bigger than anybody’s thinking.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Vago.  That’s a nicely nuanced approach.  So perhaps it will counter some of the earlier wake-like atmosphere that was being created.  I’m actually going to give up my prerogative as the chair, not take up time with my question because I think it’s important to get the conversation going with you, the audience.  You’re the critical part of this conference.  So let’s see if we can begin at the back this time.  So Arnaud, you had a question and then we’ll move to the front.

Q:  Yes, Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS.  I wonder if you could apply yourself to the future of warfare, in terms of robotic warfare coming on much sooner than anyone had anticipated.

MR. NAWAZ:  You want to try that?

COL. GENTILE:  Vago’s probably –

MR. MURADIAN:  I’ll take a stab at it.  I was going to say that if you look at robotic warfare, I think it’s growing.  It’s going to get better.  The U.S. Air Force probably tells you that they’ve kind of been in robotic warfare since 1918, and they’re right, with the Kettering Bug and virtually unmanned systems in every war that we’ve fought, including Vietnam. 

So you could argue that that’s been kind of a march of history.  Wherever you can replace people to do operations – the Israelis certainly have made enormous strides both in unmanned ground systems as well.  And obviously the big question that everybody’s asking is intellectually – Peter Singer at CSIS is working on these – excuse me, at Brookings, my apologies.  Sorry about that.

Ten lashes, self-imposed.  What are some of the moral and intellectual questions that come as weapons and systems become ever more automated?  I still think that we will have humans that are actually doing the shooting.  I don’t think we’ll ever get to the point where they are going to start autonomously taking out targets. 

But the thing is that given that we’re looking at what are euphemistically called HVTs – high value targets – you’re following them for a long time and once you figure out that, hey, this the guy I’m looking for, you need to shoot pretty quickly.  Otherwise you’re going to lose him.  So that’s an entirely I think different kettle of fish. 

And man-machine interfaces are starting to become a bigger and bigger issue.  If you consider in the U.S. Air Force’s case, the first generation of Predator required 80 man-hours of analysis per each hour of information collected.  The new one collects 10 times as much information and requires 10 times as much analysis.  So you do the math.  You’ve got 65 orbits.  Each orbit is four aircraft, up at any given time.  I mean, you really have to start automating stuff.  Otherwise you’re never going to be able to dig through the analysis load.

COL. GENTILE:  Just a quick comment on technology and war and, again, back to my focus area on this panel and the American Army.  The American Army had a bad experience with technology, so to speak, in the 1980s, but especially in the 1990s, when it came up with this idea called network-centric warfare, which also then cascaded over – as I understand these analyses of these, especially the Israeli army, which was one of the problems that they had in 2006 – this belief that information, knowledge produced through better technology would give a fighting force perfect understanding of the enemy.

This is what the American Army had come to in the 1990s.  And recent experience in war of the counterinsurgency type, but still war, shows that just to be an incredibly bad fundamental premise for an army to operate on.  I mean, it still involves, whether you’re doing counterinsurgency or high-end conflict, making contact either with local populations, or if you’re fighting an enemy somewhat like you, making contact with that enemy, developing the situation, producing information through fighting. 

I mean, I come from the H.R. McMaster school on this, that it is those essentials that are needed in an army.  Technology certainly supports and helps, but it should not replace this fundamental aspect of the nature of warfare.  I also think that if the American Army had this problem in the 1990s with network-centric warfare, counterinsurgency warfare is the same problem. 

It’s the same wine but it’s just in different skins.  And with counterinsurgency warfare, we’ve placed our faith that the theory of counterinsurgency actually works in practice through procedures.  I mean, how many times have you heard – I’m stretching it from the technology and robotics, but there’s a link here. 

How many times have you heard people say as a matter of fact that in Afghanistan this brigade is going to clear, then hold, then build?  The president himself, when he spoke at West Point in November, when he was talking about the additional brigades flowing into Afghanistan, said that these brigades will move in and protect the population.  These are all theoretical ideas contained in the theory of counterinsurgency. 

But we’ve turned them into established facts, so to speak, just like the belief we put in technology in the 1990s, that it would do these things for us.  So there is a link there within the American Army and it’s not a progressive one.  It’s the same problem, although in a different form.

MR. NAWAZ:  Julian?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, I’d like to come at this from the angle of a technological shared level of ambition across the alliance.  I suspect that for many Europeans that robotic warfare is actually a way of marching better. 

We often talk about future combat systems, but really, at the national level, it tends more to be driven by defense industries.  And I think defense industries will be crucial in driving the technologies question forward for many European countries, not least because we’ll have to have more synergy across the European defense-industrial base, which will tend to drive that process forward. 

But I thought by way of an answer, because it’s so critical to future combat systems and interoperability, this question – the technological level of ambition – that I’ll give you some figures.  NATO Europe has a combined GDP of 124 percent that of the U.S, yet NATO Europe spends 37 percent of the U.S. in 2009 on defense. 

Now, that’s still quite a lot of money.  That is some U.S. $257.4 billion.  But then you break that figure down.  Of that $257.4 billion, France and the U.K. together represent 43 percent and France, Germany and the U.K. represent 61 percent.  Now, here’s the critical figure.  Those three represent 88 percent of all R&T development across NATO Europe. 

Now, when you’ve got U.S. forces thinking on robotic futures in a whole range of synergistic platforms and systems and then you’ve got the bulk of NATO Europe spending such fractions on this, and even moving towards basic professionalization, I think one could talk strategy until the cows come home.  And it’s a great discussion to have amongst those with a bit of money, but for many European countries, it’s a completely irrelevant question. 

Therefore, I would turn the question around.  What technologies would you Americans see as critical to ensure interoperability with the bulk of your NATO allies who are never going to be dreaming of this stuff?

MR. MURADIAN:  Give it away.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Give what away?

MR. MURADIAN:  I mean, give some of the technologies away, or at least even give some of the systems away, which we’ve done in Afghanistan in particular, to make sure that you resolve interoperability problems so when we go –

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Radios, radios.

MR. MURADIAN:  Hang on a second, here you go.  Just use these because really it’s just going to make life a lot easier.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  You’re absolutely right, Vego.  That’s right.

MR. MURADIAN:  I want to just slightly push back on the colonel, though, for a second, in terms of – and I understand the whole argument on the whole [47:02] and all the mistakes that were made.  There was a whole multiplicity of other factors that were driving it.

COL. GENTILE:  There were, with the Israelis.

MR. MURADIAN:  It wasn’t purely that they’d become an occupation force.  Their enemy really outthought them a lot of times.  There was a very, very clever use of technology. 

For the first time, you had commercial night-vision systems, a question which I’ve asked for a long time, that were set up on rooftops, wired to command centers, did not have any open radio communications because they know the Israelis would read them.  And the thing is, they for the first time knew that there were manned shapes coming up hills at them in the night and I can open fire on them.  I know those are not my guys. 

So all of a sudden, the dynamic – you know, we owning the night was a different dynamic.  They were now starting to own the night and we were starting to taste what that feels like.  Something which is obviously going to happen as technology proliferates, if you go to Price Club and you can buy an NVG for $99, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that some Hezbollah guy or some Taliban guy is going to figure out the same thing.

I also think that there is an almost Neo-Luddism that I’m afraid is developing, in saying every single thing we’re doing is technologically driven.  The man is, of course – the woman, person, human is the most important in the loop.  You can’t do counterinsurgency; you can’t do even – you can’t do any form of military endeavor without people being involved in them. 

The thing is, the technology, the nets and the enabling – and enable I think is a much better phrase – is critical because those COIN units are now drawing real-time full-motion video. 
They have communications to – higher-echelon communications across your squad to a degree that is unprecedented.  And the guys who have tasted a system like Land Warrior absolutely love it because it gets the information into the hands of the guy who needs it.  Okay, wait a minute, now I’ve got that overhead and I know that it’s the second gully, not the first one.  Okay, got it, I’m now oriented more properly. 

So I don’t think anybody – being a very good – you know, having covered Adm. Cebrowski very closely, I don’t think he was ever arguing that it’s a replacement for the people.  I think that folks consistently kind of took that message and twisted it and turned it into whatever they wanted to hear.

MR. NAWAZ:  While we’re moving to the next question, if I can just add that I think it takes a certain amount of thought process to transform information into knowledge and I’d go back to Vago’s point about getting close and looking at maps.  I think you need to understand the enemy and that investment is problem much less than the technological.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Absolutely right.

MR. MURADIAN:  Or who might not be your friend.

MR. NAWAZ:  Exactly, and so I’m struck particularly last night watching “60 Minutes” and the Lara Logan report of this firefight and the U.S. commander of this forward operating base saying that the Taliban have a ridgeline approach, going back to 1894 and 1901, the books that the British produced on Indian frontier warfare.  That was the first thing that was taught, was that you take the ridgeline approach.  You don’t give the ridge away to the enemy.  So you’ve got to know how they fight.  And it struck me that here was this base in a valley surrounded by ridges and the ridges had been left to the enemy.

COL. GENTILE:  Why is it in the valley?  It’s in the valley because that’s where the population is at.  The theory of counterinsurgency says that the way you succeed is through securing the population, which means you give up the ridgeline, even though tactually that might not make sense in that given situation.

MR. NAWAZ:  So the question really then comes to, how well do you know your enemy and how does he fight?  So Harlan, let’s take the conversation forward.

Q:  Harlan Ullman, the Atlantic Council.  A question, and Shuja, I’d like to get your response to this question as well and then a comment.  The white papers for Germany, Britain and France two years ago were remarkable in that they were coincident over the change of danger from national sovereignty and threats against the state to the security of individuals, writ large.  Rupert Smith made this point, arguing that war was about the people. 

To what degree do you agree or disagree with that sentiment, and more importantly, we talk about winning hearts and minds.  Nobody is ever, ever, ever in my judgment had a good comment about what exactly whose hearts it is we are going to try and win, how we’re going to do that, whose minds we are trying to affect and how we do that. 

I wonder if the panel had a couple of ideas about both that in terms of defining, with some specificity, hearts and minds.  And for Gian, you talk about the U.S. Army.  With due deference, I think you’d be talking about land forces or ground forces because there’s another component that has some degree of intellectual input and I think you’re ignoring that.

MR. NAWAZ:  You want to be more specific?

Q:  U.S. Marine Corps.

MR. MURADIAN:  Thank you for holding up the Navy and Marine Corps team, Harlan.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, thank you, Harlan, one of your zinger questions.  How can I put it?  Those white papers – I think that they were at the end of – how can I put this – a process of strategic political correctness in Europe, where everything was disaggregated down to the individual and human rights and all this, which of course is fundamentally important and ultimately is the object of security. 

But I think they all failed to basically group the reality, which is, the system is built on states and the primary relationship for the security of the individual is with the state and through the state.  Now, I think Europeans by and large misunderstood that we’re actually involved in a struggle at present between the state and the anti-state, and the states never become nimble enough to deal with the anti-state. 

Now, it may be in the future that we go back to the state versus the state.  There’s enough friction in the system, enough competition over resources that I, for one, am pessimistic about this century.  I have no reason to believe there will not be moments of deep tension and stress.  Now, whose hearts and minds, therefore, do we need to win? 

Well, of course it depends on the circumstance.  But my first, classic response would be to say, what I want the world’s leaders to understand, first and foremost, is that the West does exist; the West is tolerant; it will guard the open trading system that it has constructed and to which others are buying into.  The Chinese are not challenging it.  They’re part of it.  They want to beat us at it.  But that there are also limits, that defense matters and that state sponsorship of terrorism, for example, will lead to responses. 

As far as fighting terrorism, which is the implicit question that you had worldwide and worldwide terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, I think it’s more a lesson to us than to our adversaries, and that is to our peoples:  One, that it by definition is a very long struggle.  There is no evidence in history that such struggles are short.  Therefore, the first hearts and minds that we have to win are our own people. 

We were too soft on our own people for many years.  I think Kagan may say more on this at lunchtime, that history has indeed returned post-Fukuyama.  Well, history ended because we all thought they’d buy into our dream.  Well, people haven’t.  We have to return our people from the strategic vacation which is basically undermining the whole effort to restructure our security and defense effort in a complex environment. 

But thereafter, I think it’s important as well that we recognize that we are also in an ideological struggle.  That sounds a bit evangelical, and again, being a Yorskshireman, I tend to avoid such things.  But we are.  And we are involved in a war of ideas and a war of knowledge and we’ve ceded that to the enemy.  We try to present our engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan effectively as an extension of good governance, of management, rather than the fact that we are trying to defeat an aggressive anti-Western idea with a better idea.

I think it’s a tragedy over the last few years, particularly Europeans, we’ve become so incompetent at selling what is a very good message from Europe about how to recover post-conflict and build new societies.  Unless we have that envisioned implicitly in our security and defense strategies, then however technical one is, however managerial one is, one will not actually convey the fundamental reason to our publics and other peoples as to why we need to do this stuff.

MR. NAWAZ:  Go ahead.

COL. GENTILE:  Well, first with the Marines – I know the Army; that’s what I’ve been paying attention to.  Also I think with the Marine Corps, so much of what the Marine Corps does, most of the time, is in response to where the Army is heading.  I mean, you find some really – in the last five or six years in Iraq – I remember, in 2003, reading articles by Marine officers of how the American Army in the Sunni Triangle, the 4th Infantry Division was applying too hard of a hand and that they needed to apply a more adept sort of velvet glove. 

So it was a counter, a response to show difference with the Army.  Interestingly, a few months ago, Gen. Conway was talking about how it was time for the Marines to leave Iraq so that they could go to Afghanistan and get into the business of hard fighting in Afghanistan because that’s what the Marines do.  So I focus on the Army because that’s the institution that I’ve spent my life in.  That’s the institution that I fought as a part of in Iraq two times and what I’ve really been paying attention to over the last three years. 

Clearly, the other services have a role in the greater defense establishment, and especially within the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and all those other things Marines have played a role as well.  I like this question about hearts and minds.  It comes up all the time.  Dave Kilcullen in his newest book just forthrightly talks about the importance of winning hearts and minds.  I question through the study of history and operational experience of trying to win hearts and minds, whether they can be won. 

But hearts and minds is a term – because of the theory of counterinsurgency – that has come to be thrown out sometimes as matter of fact – that hearts and minds can be won.  Then, even if they can be won, the next question I would ask would be from the lane of strategy and say, should we try to win them in Afghanistan?  As an example, should we apply an operational method that tries to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan? 

Is that in our interest to do so as a matter of strategy?  And the last point is – you mentioned Rupert Smith and his widely influential, but, I must say, I believe deeply flawed book, “The Utility of Force,” has also come to be seen almost as a matter of fact for defining future conflict.  Future conflict will be more wars amongst the people. 

This has had a very pervasive effect, especially on the American Army and its stability doctrine that it’s just come out with, this whole idea that future wars will be wars amongst the people.  They might be, but they might be other types of wars. 

My argument has been all along that whatever kinds of wars or conflicts or operations the American Army is told to go off to do – and it’s the same with the Marines and the Air Force and the Navy – but with regard to the American Army, what it should be able to do first and foremost is to fight, using combined arms at all levels.  If it can do that, it can do any other kind of operation. 

Now, that is heresy for the counterinsurgency narrative, which states that no, armies that are trained to do that are predisposed to fail and fail badly at these other kinds of operations.  But that should be what the American Army can do first and foremost.

MR. MURADIAN:  But I think that’s actually, to make Gian’s point here, in a lot of these counterinsurgency and urban operations, they have been full-spectrum operations that have involved air.  They’ve involved artillery.  They’ve involved extremely nuanced combined-arms operations, just in a very, very focused way.  So you’re not looking at mass tanks but selective use of tanks, for example, for exit routes and for entry and stuff like that. 

But to shift to try to answer your question, Harlan, I’m going to take from the other two panelists briefly.  Unless you maintain your hearts and minds, ultimately you’re not going to be able to have any policy objective at the end of the day.  So you’ve got to make sure your population is being brought along and that means consistently selling a message that makes sense to people and how they go, okay, so this makes – this is why we’re spending the blood and treasure there. 

In the case of hearts and minds on the ground over there, it’s not that you want them to love you.  I think virtually every poll that you’ve seen, the vast majority of Afghans don’t want the Taliban to come back.  That’s the end of the story.  For them, it’s a basic security thing and as long as I know that a handful of these guys can come back and kill me somehow or terrorize my village, I can’t really be fully with you because I’m not sure you’re going to be here long enough to make sure that happens. 

So now there are other sorts of issues on how do you empower those guys to take a bigger interest in there.  Iraq succeeded in large part because we got Sunnis to be like, hey, look, you have a vested interest in this.  This isn’t about you just starting trouble.  You can be part of the solution here.  I think that hearts and minds is applied as though people are going to just love us and have a portrait of Petraeus in their house or anything.  I don’t think that’s ever going to happen, but you never know.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  I just want to make a quick statement, if I may.

(Cross talk.)

MR. MURADIAN:  Rent with option to buy.

MR. NAWAZ:  Julian has a quick word and then I think Harlan wanted me to say a couple of words and I will.  Then we have two questions.  I’ll take two questions – one from Sebastian and then one up front here – because we are going to be running out of time and I don’t want to keep you from your lunch.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Just the inability to answer your question, Harlan, for me demonstrates the vacuum created by a lack of leadership.  It’s almost a tyranny of public opinion and we seem to be swinging from a kind of strategic political correctness, which was meaningless in the early part of the last decade, to a kind of fundamentalist accountancy approach now.  There’s simply no balance.  And we have to go back to balance, to explaining to publics why we have to do this stuff.

MR. NAWAZ:  I think, Harlan, you were posing the question to me also about winning hearts and minds.  I agree.  You can’t win hearts and minds, particularly over the kind of short timeframe that politics dictates for what will be deemed to be success or failure in Afghanistan. 

But I think it’s very critical to widen the aperture and to go beyond Afghanistan, to Pakistan, to India, to Iran and see if the U.S.’s rhetoric can be matched over a long time by its actions, and particularly on the economic side.  Picking up on Vago’s point, the Pakistanis overwhelmingly have voted against the Taliban inside their own borders.  So it would make no sense for them to support the Taliban in Kabul because of the contagion effect across the border. 

But tactically, of course, they will play whatever cards they have and take advantage of links or past links with some of the afghan Taliban and they will do that in their national interest.  But both Europe and North America really have an opportunity to open up economic ties with the region and with Pakistan – between India and Pakistan and Afghanistan and that’s probably the best way of strengthening against insurgencies and militancies, rather than simply the use of military power.  So that would be my response.  You want to add something?

MR. MURADIAN:  Well, I was going to say a great opportunity I think was lost when the NATO C-17 capability was not deployed in the assistance of the Pakistan floods and that was, I’m told, a financial concern.  What better would have been to have those aircraft landing with NATO written on the side of it, disgorging supplies, and trying to show I can outdo everybody else in the C-17 relay race?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  But isn’t the real issue, if I may, Chairman, that we are in fact competing for the large pool of unemployed, under 25-year-olds, with the Taliban and al-Qaida?  And what frightens me is we have no creative thinking here, because we look at history, what were the Brits doing in the 19th century?  They built railways, partly to ensure that they sucked up that pool of unemployed dangerous young men.  Those are the kind of game-changing ideas we need now.

MR. MURADIAN:  Popes launched the Crusades to get rid of them.

 MR. NAWAZ:  Yes.  Sebastian, sorry to keep you waiting.

Q:  I’m Sebastian Gorka, the Atlantic Council.  If I, with your permission –

MR. NAWAZ:  Is the microphone on?  Okay.

Q:  If I can take you back to the wonkish strategy question, the “so what?” of strategy, it’s pretty obvious why broke governments in Europe don’t do strategy in a time of peace, or perceived peace.  You don’t need to be a brain surgeon to understand that.  But could I get Col. Gentile’s and the other panelists’ comments on, why is a hyperpower that has said for eight years it’s at war incapable of doing strategy? 

We have a QDR that says – that goes against the basic fundamental rules of strategy, which is prioritization, the QDR says we will do IW, COIN and everything else just in case China gets meddlesome.  So we’re going to do the whole panoply.  We’re not going to choose or prioritize.  Whose responsibility is that?  How did we get where we are today, please?

COL. GENTILE:  Right.  Again I’ll tackle this from an American military, specifically an American Army perspective – (audio break) – comment on the inner workings of American policymakers.  But one of the problems, again, that I see within the American Army, as I argued before, is we’re doing the same mistakes.  We’re actually making the same mistakes that we did in Vietnam. 

The United States lost the Vietnam War not because it didn’t develop an effective counterinsurgency approach.  That is just a wrongheaded interpretation of the war in Vietnam.  The United States lost the war in Vietnam because it failed at strategy and policy.  And in the 1980s, in trying to recover from Vietnam, the American Army did, in a sense, at least tactically and operationally, but it continued to move away from a broader understanding of war and how strategy uses national power to achieve aims in war. 

The same thing – it’s the same progression in the 1990s and again it’s the same thing today with this hyper-focus and emphasis on the tactics and operations of counterinsurgency.  So there are no alternatives presented to how to achieve policy aims in Afghanistan and potentially other threats and security problems in the world. 

At least within the American Army and, I think, within the greater parts of the defense establishment, we talk a lot about the doing of operations.  We talk a little bit about strategy, but we don’t talk about war in a holistic sense, and the doing of war, and what it takes to achieve policy aims in war.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Was it the British scientist Ernest Rutherford who said famously that, gentlemen, we have no money.  Now is the time to think.  It’s actually not – I actually challenge your basic thesis, Seb, because a hyperpower, by definition, does not have to do strategy because it is a hyperpower. 

In fact, strategy is the preserve of secondary powers that have to use all means to achieve ends.  When I think of how the U.S. was perceived on September 10, 2001, and how the U.S. is perceived on September 27, 2010, I think it’s only now that you realize that in realistic strategic terms you are not the hyperpower you thought you were and therefore you are beginning to do strategy. 

Having said that, the ability of the United States to actually adapt in any given circumstance is unrivaled.  I’m not just flattering you.  As I say, I don’t flatter Americans.  I’m a Brit.  We don’t do that.  But you do have this ability – and what I see now, it’s actually – it’s a bad moment, but you are beginning to grip the reality as it is. 

And I’m pretty confident that over the next decade, the way you will deal with that reality, now that you’ve accepted that you haven’t got this unipolar moment anymore, or never did indeed have it, will be much more creative and much more impressive.  I just hope the people across the road here on the Hill get that as well.

MR. MURADIAN:  I also think, in response to your QDR question, the timing of the QDR was bad in that the administration came into office, regarding China in particular, to try to take a much more – engagement and we can work with them and everything and then that was rapidly seen, especially with Secretary Clinton’s comments in August, being like, that’s just a bunch of bunk.  These guys are up to something.  We’ve got to man up. 

So that’s basically the change that’s happened in the intellectual process.  And China’s belligerence, which from its own strategic standpoint is kind of amazing that they keep making that mistake, and thank God for us they keep making that mistake:  It gives us all sorts of opportunities to get in there with Vietnam, for example, and with a bunch of other countries in the region, Japan in particular, although it did climb down on the fisherman – coast guard captain or whoever they had in their possession. 

I think that, as Julian said, we have a way of going along, not really thinking about anything and not really prioritizing anything because ultimately, you know, what are your vital national interests?  And we tend not to think like that, unfortunately.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thanks.  Please, it’s on.

Q:  Thank you very much.  You are so generous.  Ioan Pascu, European Parliament.  I’m wondering – you know, you said correctly that you have to define the kind of future war and then rally the allies around it and then, you know, give the momentum for the alliance to overcome the current situation. 

I’m wondering what war means for the Europeans because, you know, more or less, if they have an operation like Afghanistan, they will join the United States.  And they will do what they are doing now and leave the United States to take care of that problem essentially because they are more capable and throw more resources at it. 

Secondly, when they are alone, they are sufficiently powerful not to be challenged in a warlike manner by anybody.  So there is no encouragement and I think that, in general, we have to look at how we define war under the current circumstances because I think that we are moving away from – we are moving in the direction that technology is pushing us or attracting us.  But we are still working with the concepts of the Second World War, First World War and these sorts of types, which are not relevant for today.

MR. NAWAZ:  If I could just add that since we are up against the clock, if in each of your interventions, you could take this question and move us to the future, how do you see NATO evolving out of the Afghan experience?  So, Julian?

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Yeah, thank you.  That was great.  Ioan, you’re a European political leader.  You’re involved in this process.  You know how hard it is to get a debate inside the European Parliament on these very issues.  We have the worst of all worlds in Europe right now.  Quite a few of NATO’s Europe militaries are little more than armed pensions, frankly.  The balance between equipment budgets – it’s true – the balance between personnel budgets and equipment budgets is so bad. 

And why do they exist?  They exist because these countries think it’s a down payment to keep the Americans engaged in their security and defense.  Frankly, it would be better if we had a debate in Europe that said, in fact, certain countries will not do war.  But they’ll do other things and they’ll invest in that effort and then we can organize this far better than we do. 

Therefore, what is very clear to me is that Europeans cannot stay in the space we are.  Because we might be strong enough now to be reasonably credible in our own neighborhood – and look at our neighborhood – look at North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia.  It ain’t easy.  But 10, 15, 20 years from now, if we are still in the same space, we’re in deep trouble. 

And until we Europeans have that proper debate and people like yourself, with respect – as you know, you’re a friend and a colleague who I respect deeply – lead that process and say, we are going to have this debate in Europe, then whether it’s NATO or the EU, there simply will never be the political will because the public doesn’t get it and the public – this is not a debate among the publics. 

Look at even in Britain.  Defense is so far down the political agenda that unless political leaders say, look, public opinion, we understand.  You voted m in to lead.  This is why we’re going to be doing this and this is why our relationship with the United States is so important and this is why we must make that investment. 

I hope one day before I retire, which I hope won’t be too soon, I will hear European political leaders get up and make the case for why Europe alongside the United States is the strategic cornerstone of stability in the world.  Because if we Europeans don’t do that and we leave it to the Americans, then we and the Americans will suffer, which brings me to my point about NATO’s future on the military side. 

I want to see, by 2020, 2025, a European effort, primarily organized through the alliance, alongside the United States, focused on the following areas:  a modernized Article V architecture, which may well include missile defense, cyber defense and will work with Russia and partners to that end because it will reconceptualize what territorial defense means in the 21st century. 

I want to see a genuine effort to build deployable forces because whether it’s Article V defense or security, you need deployable forces.  Main defense forces are out the window.  I want to see much more synergy, intense cooperation, even integration in areas of logistics and other areas of the table because that will prove value for money which will be critical. 

But I also want to see that force be able to operate under a NATO or an EU flag.  Why?  Because as I said, if you look at Europe’s neighborhood and the basic contract between Europe and the United States will be a couple of Europeans will go with America in a small way around the world.  But the basic deal, guys, is this.  We all get strong enough to deal with our neighborhood credibly to take the pressure off you, so you can do things elsewhere, because we are not world powers. 

But if we cannot do that – and by the way, we will need time to send a force under an EU flag because sending a force under a NATO flag or an American flag would simply complicate the political objective implied in the mission – if we can’t do that by 2020, then I don’t believe that this town in particular, for all the niceties, will really believe in the relationship anymore. 

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.

COL. GENTILE:  Yeah, just quickly, I’ll pick up on two terms or phrases that Julian used, looking ahead into the future, 10, 15, 20 years, the years 2020-25.  Julian said deployable forces, absolutely; being able to operate synergistically with other NATO forces, within the American military being able to combine all arms from all the different services.  Absolutely, I agree.  That would be a good aim point. 

But again, for the American military and especially the American Army and how the American Marines relate to that, those deployable forces should be built on the premises of, or the pillars of firepower, protection and mobility. 

And again, the reason why I focused my talk today on the American Army, the direction that the American Army seems to be going is of a conception of future conflict that is grounded in the Rupert Smith vision of future war, which is wars amongst the people, influencing behavior, winning hearts and minds, which in an organizational way, in terms of capability, seems to be pushing the American Army, at least, towards a force that is optimized toward light infantry.  And ne can see that slowly developing, at least within the American Army.  So I agree with Julian. 

Unfortunately, the direction, I think, that the American Army and potentially other parts of the American military are taking are not to that kind of deployable force that can deploy to parts of the world to do lots of different things.  But of all the things that the American military has to be able to do – especially the American Army, as I’ve said before – is to be able to fight using combined arms.  And if we’re not careful, we’re going to move away from that primary function.

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Can I add one more sentence?

MR. NAWAZ:  Please.

    MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  According to the World Bank, by 2030, 80 percent of the world’s population, 10 billion strong, will live less than 100 kilometers from the sea.  That should be our defining strategic reality.

MR. NAWAZ:  Vago, you have the last word.

MR. MURADIAN:  Oh, my.  Throughout the 2000s, America forgot about Asia.  It has now rediscovered Asia and it’s forgetting Europe, and I think that that can’t happen.  The United States is the only country since the foundation of the alliance that’s been able to lead it, often, in some of these big questions in these moments of crisis. 

It has got to – whether sitting around with a drink in everybody’s hand and figuring out, okay, what do we want to be when we grow up, or in the next stage of our lives – let’s put it that way – and then trying to drive it in that direction.  I mean, I think the whole notion of that – it is an organization better than anything else to try to organize Europe around a pole. 

NATO’s collapse and failure and transition back into a defensive force is also going to bring down and delay any EU effort to advance European military capabilities.  The big problem is that we’ve been here before.  We’ve seen this act before.  Even though some of the subordinate features are different in terms of a different nature of the threat – the anti-government versus the government – I think the problem is that the United States has called on greater defense and called on greater burden sharing and it’s fallen on deaf ears and the problem now is the financial crunch is here. 

So there are folks who are wrestling with fundamental trade-offs in their social and welfare programs and that is driving people to look at anyplace else that they can cut.  We as Americans can look at this and say, okay, four years of unemployment insurance is a little bit too long in Denmark.  Two years ought to be fine.  But for a lot of Danes, it’s a passionate issue.  Thank you very much.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you to the audience for your thought provoking questions and thank the panel.

(Applause.)

MR. LINDLEY-FRENCH:  Thank you.

COL. GENTILE:  Thank you.

MR. MURADIAN:  Thank you.

(END)

Pakistan’s Surprising Stability: 09/23/10 – Transcript

Back to Pakistan’s Surprising Stability Event Page

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

PAKISTAN’S SURPRISING STABILITY

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
SHUJA NAWAZ
DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA CENTER,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPEAKERS:
ANATOL LIEVEN,
PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TERRORISM STUDIES, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
 
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
3:30 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

SHUJA NAWAZ:  Good afternoon, everyone.  I’m Shuja Nawaz.  It’s good to see a lot of familiar faces.  Thank you all for coming and thank you, in particular, to our speaker, Anatol Lieven, who has come all the way from London to share his thoughts with us on a rather interesting title:  “Pakistan’s Surprising Stability.”  I did warn him beforehand that in Washington, there would probably be some questions about just the title alone, but I’m sure that he has the answers.

As many of you who’ve followed Pakistan know, he’s been one of the, in my mind, better commentators on the situation on the ground, who has earned the respect of people even within Pakistan, which is often very difficult, because they see him actually spending time on the ground, which a lot of other hit-and-run commentators often don’t.  And he is a chair of the international relations and terrorism studies at King’s College, London.  He’s also a senior fellow at the New America Foundation.

And importantly for us, as we await his new book – he has a new book coming out called “Pakistan:  A Hard Country,” published by Penguin, that should be out this fall.  Of course, he has an interesting background as a journalist working in South Asia and the former Soviet Union, has produced a number of books on the topic, as well as a great knowledge and understanding of the United States and U.S. policy and its role in the world. 

He’s published at least two books that are worth mentioning “Ethical Realism:  A Vision for America’s Role in the World,” which was coauthored with John Hulsman and published in 2006, and “America Right or Wrong:  An Anatomy of American Nationalism.”  So without any further wastage of time, if I could as Anatol to speak for about 20 minutes, and then we’ll have a conversation after that.

ANATOL LIEVEN:  Thank you so much, Shuja.  Thank you for inviting me.  It’s a great pleasure to be back in Washington again.  I can’t resist this because I just saw it now.  I thought I might show you – and this isn’t directed against the Nixon Center, a place I’m much attached to, with which I’ve done much work – and I don’t know who was actually responsible for the title, but there is something very revealing, a bit, about this title.  And I wonder if anyone can tell me what’s wrong with it.  It is entitled “Asia’s role in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.”  What is wrong with this title?

Q:  (Off mike.)

MR. LIEVEN:  They are actually in Asia.  The implication of this is that the Middle East and the Indian Ocean are situated in, shall we say, Central America, perhaps, or Canada, and that Asia is an outside force trying to play a role.  Now, you’ll forgive me for pointing out, but this is a kind of mindset that I encountered rather often, no doubt in every imperial capital.  It was probably exactly the same in London in the 19th century. 

In fact, I know it was because a friend of mine was at a meeting of the British Conservative Party during the initial years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and this British MP trumpeted, the Russians have always been imperialists!  Look at all the trouble they gave us in India – (laughter) – India being, you understand, a county of the United Kingdom, you know. 

Anyway, this leads me to, perhaps, an obvious point, which I feel is often forgotten and shouldn’t be, which is that we are visitors in this region.  We may have good reasons for being there; we may have bad reasons for being there, but we do not live there.  We’re not going to stay there forever. 

Sooner or later, we are going to get out, hopefully, obviously, leaving some measure of stability behind, hopefully having achieved some measure of success in our objectives.  But we are going to get out.  The countries of the region will, by definition, have to remain.  We have to remember that.  What happens in Afghanistan is a vital interest of Pakistan in a way that, even given 9/11 and so forth, it is not for the United States. 

That leads to the second point, which is that it is not the duty of Pakistani officers or officials to serve the interests of the United States.  We may advise them that it would be in the interest of their country to do so, but it is their duty to serve the interests of Pakistan, just as it is the duty of an Indian officer or a British officer to serve the interests of their country.  And leaving side questions of personal advantage, they will make up their mind on policy according to what they think is in the interest of Pakistan, not the United States.  It is their duty to do so.

A third point – well, I should say in passing, by the way, that although I bear the dreadful title of “chair of terrorism studies,” I actually try not to use it whenever I can possibly escape it because I find this way of thinking about the world – it can be extremely dangerous because it tends to reduce one’s view of other countries to one prism alone – that of the threat from terrorism.  That in turn, I’m sorry to say, licenses a whole set of people to think and talk about parts of the world, which they have no actual qualifications for doing. 

They do not know these parts of the world.  They don’t understand them.  They haven’t lived in them.  Clearly, any understanding of that part of the world has to originate not from an outside view centered on terrorism – I mean, not, of course, that the terrorist threat is not real and that we must not structure policy around that – but in the end, the great majority of what happens inside Pakistan or, indeed, in other countries throughout the Muslim world, is not centered on terrorism and the extremist threat.  It’s centered on a whole number of other things, which I shall touch on today.

Finally, by way of an introduction, but in the context of the war on terror, I think it is crucially important to remember that in terms of the terrorist and extremist threat to the region, to the United States and to the world, even if one is to regard this as a battlefield against terrorism, Afghanistan is, in itself, a relatively minor feature of that battlefield.  It has only been elevated to what appears to be a center feature by the horrible, malignant, but one-off touch-word event of 9/11. 

Pakistan, on the other hand, is a central feature of that battlefield.  And the reasons for this have nothing to do with sentiment.  I would to say they have to do with mathematics – population.  Pakistan is six times as big, huge army, nuclear weapons.  And in terms of the direct terrorist threat to the West, of course, most importantly of all – a very large diaspora, particularly in Britain, but also to a considerable extent in this country.

In other words, while very understandable, in terms of the fact that we are fighting a war in Afghanistan and we are under attack from forces partly – though only partly – based on Pakistani territory, the fact remains that to sacrifice Pakistan, essentially – Pakistani stability, or even to risk sacrificing Pakistan’s existence – for the sake of victory in Afghanistan, is to make a fundamentally false strategic calculation.  It is to make a mistake analogous to, I don’t know, Napoleon deciding to throw his force obsessively at the castle of Hougoumont at Waterloo, and forget about Blucher on the other side coming up behind him.

Pakistan is the important issue – the really important issue – in that part of the world.  It is also a permanent issue, which will remain of critical importance because of its size, because of its position, because of its relations with India, among other things, because of the Pakistani diaspora long after, in fact, we have withdrawn from Afghanistan. 

And if Pakistan were to succumb – were either to collapse – well, to collapse as a state, to break up or to suffer an Islamist revolution, that would be a catastrophe for Western policy and for the region and for humanity, I would say, which would dwarf anything that could possibly happen – anything, any outcome that could possibly occur – in Afghanistan. 

Now, fortunately – and as Shuja alluded to, this may be a controversial point – I am much less – I’m worried – but I’m much less pessimistic on the subject of Pakistan’s survival in the short-to-medium term, at least, by which I mean some decades, than a large part of the commentators and opinion and so forth in the West.  That’s why I’ve called this talk “Pakistan’s Surprising Stability.”

And the central thesis of my book, which is, in many ways, of course, a rather depressing on – it even depresses me, to an extent – you know, if you want to sell newspapers or books or whoever, and I’m not going to tell you who I’m speaking about here, the best tactic is to write something which says – or books, newspapers, circus tickets, I don’t know, margaritas, perhaps – the best approach is to say, catastrophe is looming!  We are on the verge of an abyss.  And I have the magic solution, here in the bottle or glass or book, which will not just prevent a catastrophe, but which will lead to tremendous improvement and flowering.

Or to put it another way, Pakistan is on the verge of collapse, but if only one had a limited number of, you know, changes in policy, which I will now set out, Pakistan will become a successful democracy.  The notion that there might be something a little contradictory between these two positions seriously does not occur to some of the people who put this line across, partly because, as I say, it sells books and things.

My own view is that the present overall state, political and economic setup in Pakistan is guaranteed, by immensely deeply embedded, innate – stemming from the depths of society and tradition itself – powerful and interlinked forces of kinship, property owning and political power, which operate, to a very considerable extent, under both civilian and military governments, and which operate whichever of the main political parties are in power, either at the national or the provincial level.

And one should not, in my view, be misled, therefore, by the picture of the apparent volatility of Pakistani politics and changes of government.  If you actually look at the way the country is governed and conducts itself and carries on, the changes at ground level are often surprisingly slight – in fact, usually surprisingly slight.  The problem is that these same forces of embedded kinship, property and patronage, which they extract from the state and then redistribute to themselves, are also, to a very great extent, the forces responsible for impeding progress and development in Pakistan.

In my book, I used the phrase “Janus-faced” so often that my editor tells me that he actually went through it with the “find” button looking for the word “Janus” and cutting it out.  But you see what I mean.  On the one hand, this holds Pakistan together.  It holds the Taliban in check.  It holds Islamist revolution in check.  These forces have a deep stake in preventing the overthrow of the system by Islamist revolution.  But on the other hand, clearly this is not a political setup.  And once again, it’s something that operates under both civilian and military governments, which is going to transform the country economically and develop it.

That leads to the inability to do much, it would seem, about what, in my view – and I wrote this in the book before this summer – is by far the greatest long-term existential threat to the existence of Pakistan, which is not extremism or terrorism.  It’s water.  If people are really interested in Pakistan, they should read the World Bank report of 2004 and the updated version, which came out in 2008 – very prophetic, in many ways, it looks predicting, as the Himalayan glaciers melt, catastrophic floods in the short-to-medium term, followed by even more disastrous droughts in the long run.

And I hasten to add, this is not predicated on the absurd line that the glacier’s going to melt completely by 2035 or whatever; you’re looking at a much longer process, but one which still, unless something very radical can be done to improve the country’s water infrastructure and water conservation and water management, threatens absolute disaster in the long run.  And although I won’t go into that in great detail here, that is, in my view, what Western aid to Pakistan should be concentrated on above all.

So I mean, as far as the threat of Islamist revolution within Pakistan is concerned, this, in my view, has been greatly exaggerated.  It’s very important, from this point of view, to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency, something to which I have to say, you know, as somebody who is often asked by the media to comment, the media often misses.  There is a tendency, every time there is another major terrorist attack in Pakistan, to regard this as, in some way, aversion of what had happened in FATA in the tribal areas, in Swat and so forth, which is that it is a sign of the Taliban taking over.  It isn’t.

To the best of my knowledge, terrorism alone, or even chiefly, has never succeeded in overthrowing a state.  It can even, actually, strengthen a state because of course, it gives the state – it can turn public opinion against the opposition or the terrorists or the revolutionaries, and it can also give the state a moral license to become very much more savage and ruthless in response. 

If you want to overthrow a state, you need some combination of three things – one or two or even three:  either an insurgency which overruns more and more of the countryside and smaller towns, which the Taliban did succeed in doing in much of FATA, and then extending outside, briefly, to Swat, a mass movement on the streets of the cities, as is Iran in the late ’70s, or a mutiny of the army – a revolutionary movement within the army.  This is a point to which I’ll return.  Now so far, the first has only occurred in the tribal areas and some of the other Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

It is worth remembering – and this isn’t – I mean, it sounds radical, but the prime minister of India and the interior minister have acknowledged this themselves – that a far greater portion of India is controlled by the Naxalite-Maoist rebels than the Pakistani Taliban controlled of Pakistan at their height.  We haven’t noticed, of course, because the Naxalites haven’t directly attacked Western targets and also, in pursuit of what seems to be a very formal, classic Maoist strategy, they’re building up their bases in the countryside before actually moving on the cities.

Nonetheless, I mean, nobody thinks that the Indian state is close to collapse about this, but nonetheless, there is a very extensive insurgency there.  In Pakistan, the insurgency has been confined to areas where my British ancestors on my mother’s side fought rebellion after rebellion for 100 years, from the 1840s to the 1940s, without, except on very rare occasions, thinking that this was going to lead to the overthrow of British rule in the plains of Punjab, let alone Delhi or Calcutta.  So this is still fairly restricted.

The terrorism, of course, is now occurring across much of the country, and will doubtless continue to do so.  As far as mass movements on the streets of the cities are concerned – sort of overthrow of the state from within – one must remember, again – I mean, this is becoming a cliché, but it’s nonetheless true – that there is something absolutely astonishing about political Islamism in Pakistan, which is this:  Pakistan has the oldest – I mean, deeply troubled and intermittent, of course – but I think I’m right in saying pretty much the oldest tradition of democratic democracy and elections which have taken place even under military rule in much of the Muslim world, with rare exceptions.

Pakistan has among the oldest and most intellectually powerful tradition of political Islam in the Muslim world – Maududi and the Jamaat – and Pakistan is very, very poor.  Many people are obviously deeply impoverished and permanently discontented with their government.  Indeed, I must – many people have said that, you know, given the quality of government in Pakistan, you would have to be insane not to be permanently discontented with it.  And yet, Pakistan has one of the weakest Islamist political movements, in terms of mass support, in the Muslim world, at least anywhere where there is any opportunity for mass mobilization. 

Weaker than in Turkey, obviously; weaker than in Algeria, where they actually won an election until we backed the army to get rid of them again; almost certainly weaker than in Egypt, if truly free elections were allowed; Iran, of course, well, that’s a somewhat separate issue, being Shia.  But isn’t that remarkable, how weak they are, really?  Rather surprising.  And in my view – and I won’t go into great detail about this – but this is largely, once again, to do with the fact that the Pakistani political system is structured around patronage. 

The political system, but much of the actual wealth of the country, consists of extracting money from the state and recycling it to your political followers or, of course, extracting money from the state and spending it on the military and recycling it within the military.  And I mean, that’s one set of things.

The other set of things, which is critically important, is that the Islamists are, to a considerable extent, culturally alien to much of Pakistan.  Their brand of modernist Islam is not the Islam followed by the mass of the Pakistani population.  That, in turn, reflects a – now, that could change, over time, but it seems to be changing very, very slowly

The rather – how shall I describe it?  How would you – sorry, that’s a very unfair question.  I was going to ask how one would describe Nawaz Sharif’s attitude to Islam – certainly highly respectful, and they do many things in the name of Islam.  But without wishing to be offensive, I think it would be fair to say that their attitude to certain of the precepts of Islam, into which I will not go too deeply, is, shall we say, fairly relaxed and genial. 

Now, why hasn’t this cost them, you know, politically and so?  Well, one is, they are embedded in the patronage structures.  But the second is, hey, this is how the bulk of Punjabi males regard their religion, you know?  They are not rigorous, severe Islamists.  And finally, on the subject of revolution in Pakistan, there’s something that a friend of mine who works for a Norwegian company in Lahore said to me a couple of years ago. 

He said, look, if I could come up with or were given by god the most obviously brilliant program for saving Pakistan that could possibly be imagined – something which nobody could conceivably argue intellectually – obviously brilliant and acceptable – and I jumped up on a box and I started preaching this, what would happen?  Well, first, all the other provinces would say, we’re not going to follow this; he’s a Punjabi.  Then all the other Punjabis would say, we’re not going to follow this because he’s a Jat.

Then most of the Jats would say, first, we’re not going to follow him because he follows this particular shrine and we don’t; we follow another shrine.  And then they’d say, well, we can’t follow him, because he comes from this baradari – this sub-thing of the Jat.  Then in his own baradari, they’d say, we can’t follow him because he comes from this village.  So we get down to village level.  Then most of the village would say we can’t follow him because his grandfather and my uncle had a fight over land 100 years go or 50 years or 10 years ago or whatever.

So he said in the end, this wonderful revolutionary program would be followed by my extended family.  And he said, if you know my extended family, you couldn’t be sure even of that.  So you see what I mean.  The country is actually too divided to accept a united revolutionary program.  If, god forbid, Pakistan were to fall to pieces, the result would not be a successful, united Islamist revolution, as in the Iranian style.  It would, in fact, be the fragmentation of the country amidst appalling ethnic and ethno-religious civil war.  Now, is it going to fragment?  Well, I think the answer there comes down, in the end, first, to all the things that I’ve said. 

And when I say that Pakistan is so divided, these very divisions also cause an element of balance.  Take Karachi and Sindh.  You know, there is a lot of hatred there – ethnic hatred – between the various ethnic groups, and the most important being, of course, between the Muhajirs – the Urdu speakers of Karachi – and the Sindhis.  Equally, you do not have to be a great genius to see, if you’re a Sindhi or a Muhajir, that if either of them goes for broke, the result will be a catastrophe that destroys them both.

Now, if you are an impoverished laborer, you may not care.  But if you’re a big landowner or a businessman or anyone with a stake in that society, you know, as this Muhajir politician said to me one time, I could never, ever, ever say this publicly, but I’m tempted, from time to time, to kiss the rangers – the Pakistani rangers who prevent things in that city from getting out of hand. 

So there is a Hapsburg aspect to this.  You know, you keep the Hungarians and the Slovaks in line because they hate each other more than they hate you, if you see what I mean.  The second thing that this quote about kissing the ranger – something which, by the way, I don’t advise as a strategy; I think that it might bewilder them – brings out is that the army is critical to ultimately maintaining the survival of the country and cracking down.

And I think what the past couple of years have shown is that if the army comes to see a real threat to the country, to the government, to the state, and therefore, to itself, it will, in the end, react and react successfully – perhaps belatedly.  One could well say that they took a hell of a lot of time to react to the Taliban’s increasing takeover of Swat and so forth, but when they did react, they reacted very toughly indeed.  I was up there in Swat last summer.  And they did indeed drive them back, and they’ve driven them out of other areas, as well.  I think that they will continue to do so. 

Will the army split and collapse from within?  Will there be this nightmare scenario that is so often raised about Islamist revolt within the army?  In my view, no, except in one scenario, with which I will end.  Why no?  For three reasons.  The first is that the army is a profoundly shaping cultural force.  I’m sitting next to the man who has written one of the very best books on the Pakistani military.  The notion of loyalty and discipline is very deeply ingrained.  It is held in place by, by Pakistani standards, enormous amounts of money extracted by the state and spent on the military – and on the soldiers; you know, not stolen by the generals.

There is an acute awareness in the military, that if there were a mutiny from within the military, which would split the military, it would destroy all that.  It would destroy the country and the army along with it.  And that brings me to this third point, which is that if that happened, who, in the view of the Pakistani military, would walk in?  Well, it would be the Indians.  The Indians would benefit from that.  And in any case, it would destroy Pakistan.

What are the circumstances in which a large part of the army might mutiny?  In my view, and from what I’ve heard in Pakistan, there is really only one.  And that is if the United States were to move into Pakistan on the ground – were to invade and try to occupy, for some considerable passage of time, FATA, for example, or Northern Baluchistan, or even, god forbid, go further. 

Because what I’ve been told by everybody from privates to a lieutenant general is that there is a very strong likelihood, at that point, of the Frontier Corps, at least, mutinying – or, rather, two things happening:  One is, the army decides to fight – to actually order the army to fight against the Americans.  Well, then we are in rather apocalyptic territory, to put it mildly.  Or, of course, the army high command says don’t fight, and then part of the army mutiny in order to fight. 

And one of the ways in which it was phrased to me was this:  The rank and file don’t like the drone attacks.  The mass of the population in Pakistan don’t like the drone attacks.  ¬The army goes along with them partly because it has no choice, partly because, actually, these drone attacks also quite often get people who we want to get, you know, who are fighting against us. 

But there is also the point that the javan (ph) – the ordinary soldier – can’t do anything about the drone attacks but fire his gun in the air if he sees a drone.  If you want to stop the drone attacks, you have to – you know, that has to be a decision of the high command to loose the air force on them, and that’s not going to happen. 

You have American soldiers on the ground, there is something the ordinary Pakistani soldier can do – fight.  And he is expected to fight by his wife, his mother, his sister back in the village.  If he doesn’t, when he goes back to his village, they will call him a coward and a traitor to Islam.  And he couldn’t bear that.  It would hit him in his deepest feelings. 

So I would end by making this point very strongly – and it’s not a hypothetical point because of course, there is, god forbid, always the enduring possibility of another terrorist attack on America, which can be traced back to Pakistan.  And I’ve heard many disquieting suggestions that, at that point, an American administration might be jockeyed into something like this.  It would be an appalling paradox if, after all this, in my view, very hysterical talk, very often, in the U.S. media and politics about the fragility of Pakistan, Pakistan as a failing state, Pakistan as going to collapse if, in the end, what caused Pakistan to collapse would be an American action. 

Because you know, I’ve talked about the stability of Pakistan, the surprising stability, resilience, endurance and so forth, but believe me, if there were ever a serious, open mutiny in the army, then the country would very, very likely begin to go downhill towards disintegration with extreme speed because then you would get every malcontent in the country, which would tend to rally to the mutineers.  And that, once again, would be a catastrophe for the United States and the world, which would dwarf anything that can happen in Afghanistan.  Thank you.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you, Anatol.  I think there’s – (applause) – there’s a tremendous amount of information and knowledge captured in the very brief introductory comments.  Obviously, we’re going to have to read the book to get all the details. 

MR. LIEVEN:  And unlike my students, you can all afford to buy it.  (Laughter.)

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes. Obviously, I would have a lot of questions myself, but given the audience, I’m only going to ask one question and then open it up to the floor.  So when I do, I would request you please wait for the microphone, identify yourself and then speak, so that we can capture this and maybe have a transcript for those that couldn’t make it, as well as for all our own use.  My one question, Anatol, is, you talked about water, and that’s obviously a very serious threat.  It’s no longer over the horizon; it’s on the horizon. 

A very related issue is demography because Pakistan’s population profile is such, you know, with a median age of 18, a fertility rate that is still among the highest in the developing countries and in the region, in particular, in South Asia, and because of the fact, as you’ve mentioned, that you can’t take Pakistan out of its geography.  So where do you see the demographic shift within Pakistan affecting domestic politics, as well as its external relationships in the region?

MR. LIEVEN:  Yeah, well, I mean, clearly, it’s the combination of these two things.  It is, you know to put it at its harshest, the possibility that by the last years of this century, we’ll have a situation in which 250 million people live in a place much of which is as dry as the Sahara Desert.  And that is not a hypothetical possibility, given what’s happening to the water table in various areas.

What you do on the demographic side, I mean – and you know, in turn, of course, exacerbating every internal tension – ethnic tension between the different provinces and different areas.  You can already see this happening.  The problem is what you do on the demographic front.  I mean, I just don’t know.  I mean, we all know the theoretical answers in principle, in terms of spreading women’s education and so forth.  And the consequences of that, in terms of reducing the birthrate, do seem to be very well-established around the world.

But I mean, that – and everybody knows this – but how, in practice, to do this on the ground in Pakistan – I mean, that’s summed up – I’m sorry, this is terribly cynical of me, but somebody was saying to me the other day that 9,000 schools have been washed away as a result of the floods in Pakistan. 

And I have to say that, to judge by my observations and anecdotal evidence around the country, a good third of those might have been built as schools, or maybe the money had been taken to build them as schools, but they were, in fact, being used by local landowning politicians, you know, to keep their cows in, or something of the sort.  Or they’d been built and the teacher had never been appointed or the teacher was drawing the salary, you know, because he was the cousin of the politician and, you know, et cetera, et cetera. 

I mean, once again, you’re dealing here with the deeply ingrained factors obstructing aspects of development.  But on the water side, of course, I’m slightly more opti – well, no, I mean, put it this way:  I could see how it could be done, all the obstacles notwithstanding.  And what gives me some optimism there if, you know, the funds can be provided and structures can be put in place, is two things from Pakistani history.  The first is the fact that in the years after independence, the Pakistani state had a really remarkable and striking success in extending the water infrastructure that it had inherited from the British. 

Now, of course, Pakistan today is a different state.  The idealism of the initial years has run out.  The civil service, unfortunately, has deteriorated.  But nonetheless, I mean, it does show that there isn’t some, you know, innate obstacle to a state-led program radically to improve the water infrastructure.  When it comes to water use, I mean, this will be very, very difficult.  And my god, I saw, when traveling around the country, enough dreadful examples of the waste of water. 

But on the other hand, a large part of the Pakistani rural population – and not just the big landowners, but middling and even fairly small farmers, as well, did, after all, take very, very well to the Green Revolution.  Now, maybe they took to it too well, you know, in terms of use of water, overuse of fertilizers and so forth. 

But they certainly didn’t just sit there saying, ooh, this is new.  What?  Fertilizer in a bag?  No, no, no, we’re not going to have anything to do with this.  Let’s throw it into the river.  No, you know, they saw an opportunity; they took it.  It does seem, to me, possible, therefore – only possible, in principle – that one might be able to put in place, especially, of course, as the water visibly runs out in front of their eyes, to put in place a set of incentives and so on which will lead to the better use of water and water conservation – something which, after all, does have deep, ancient cultural roots in much of this society, you know, in terms of – you know, it’s not an alien idea.  Very, very difficult, but not, in my view, impossible. 

And as I say, this is what I would dump – both because you know, it’s so critical and because it provides visible benefits for large numbers of people and because it employs large numbers of people – it is very labor-intensive, working on water infrastructure – this is where I would be directing much of Western aid. 

And incidentally, I do have to also say, and here, we are talking about a long-term issue, as far as Pakistan is concerned, but also India and the region, in terms o the long-term consequences of Pakistani collapse, which, once again, dwarfs what happens in Afghanistan.  I would not make aid of this kind to Pakistan dependent on what happens in Afghanistan.  I would give the stuff anyway.  One reason for that is – now, I’m speaking, here, as a historian, but you know, hell, that’s why we distinguish between statesmen and politicians. 

A statesman, in my view, is somebody who can look 100 years into the future and see that Pakistan will be gravely endangered as a society and, unless there is some miracle or Pakistan has collapsed already for other reasons, Pakistan will still have nuclear weapons.  And 100 years from now, therefore, what happens to Pakistan will still have some capacity to pose a really radical threat to the United States – 100 years from now, you know.  I mean, this goes beyond what happens in Kandahar in the next six months.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you.  Okay, we’ll open it up.  So let’s go here and then right behind – Bob?

Q:  Thank you.  I’m Robert Bauds (ph).  I teach at the National Defense University, which is located here.  Thank you for some really provocative comments, but I must confess, I think I’m less optimistic than you are, water notwithstanding.  Without going into too much detail, I’ve seen two trends in Pakistan which I think could be very dangerous. 

One is that, kind of, the center of gravity, if you will, of the political culture is moving slowly, but maybe inexorably, in a more hard-line, more sort of radical, Islamist direction, number one.  And number two, it seems to me that there are certain elements within the political establishment, going from the Jamaat, maybe the PMLN and certain elements within the growing bourgeoisie, who are ideologically sympathetic to and who actually patronize religious militants. 

And what I am worried about is that even though the military seems to have mobilized itself against insurgents in the tribal areas, that before they know it, the insurgent elements or radical elements will have, sort of, metastasized through Pakistan.  Southern people now talk about southern Punjab and so forth. 

And I’m not sure when exactly, but in the not too distant future, you could have a situation like Algeria, that is not a revolution, but it pits the military against well-entrenched militant organizations inside the country, whether they’re in the mountain areas or in the urban areas, and that poor Pakistan would have to go through, kind of, what Algeria did – this horrible bloodletting for years – before they could really stamp it out. 

But I see right now – I mean, you mentioned yourself that the military was very slow in responding to a growing problem when it was on the border, but now I think it’s my perception it’s sort of spreading through the heart of the country, as well.  I mean, how would you react to that?

MR. LIEVEN:  Well, there’s always been – I mean, first, I don’t, I must say, see the center of gravity shifting towards more radical Islamism.  I mean, the PMLN has always presented itself as an Islamist party.  But equally, I mean, by its very internal nature, it is not a revolutionary party.  It is also backed by the industrial classes in Punjab, who are, in turn, extremely well-aware of what would happen to them and their businesses if there were a categorical break with the United States and the West.

In terms of pursuing, shall we say, an extremely ambiguous attitude towards extremist groups, well, here, you can sort of break it down in different ways.  First, as far as groups acting against India is concerned, yes, they have enormous sympathy throughout at least Punjabi society, probably other areas, as well.  Nobody wants to abolish them or crack down on them.  The military wants to keep them on the shelf. 

The military is willing to rein them in.  We can see that, you know – and prevent them from taking action.  But nobody is willing to actually go out and crush or abolish Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jamaat-ud-Dawa (sp), and so forth.  Keep them on the shelf.  Oh, and incidentally, they’re also not at all willing to prevent their activists going to fight in Afghanistan against us. 

However, terrorism against the West – here, I think, it is also worth remember that you know, I’ve said that we won’t be in Afghanistan forever, whereas Pakistan will be around there, as will Russia and China and India and so forth – it’s also worth remembering we won’t be in Afghanistan, but we will be in Washington, London, et cetera, et cetera.  In other words, let’s remember that we didn’t get into Afghanistan for any other reason, initially, than that Afghanistan had been the base for an attack on the United States.

From the point of view of the safety of American citizens, what matters first and foremost is that the Pakistani state continue to cooperate against terrorism against us, against this country.  That, they have done by no means perfectly, but nonetheless, according to British intelligence, at least, very well and pretty sincerely so far.  So that’s the second thing.  The third thing is the history of sectarian terrorism within Pakistan.  This has been a very, very mixed picture. 

The PLMN, as, on occasions, previously, bits of it are now seeking, at the very least, détente and coexistence with Sipah-e-Sahaba, you know, appearing beside them.  Equally, some of the most savage crackdowns on Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the past have been conducted by PLMN governments, while the PPP, on occasions while in power, has sought to buy these people off and live with them, and so forth.

You see, well, two things here.  One of the working titles of my book, but it sounded much too academic for Penguin, was “Pakistan:  The Negotiated State.”  And I’ll give you the sort of classic example of this.  A general who was in charge of anti-bandit, anti-dacoit operations in Sindh told me a little story about when he was down there some considerable time ago, now.  And incidentally, I was actually present, listening to one end of a telephone conversation along very similar lines last year.

And he described to me how one of his major generals had identified the base of a considerable dacoit group on the estate of a major landowner in Sindh, who happened, not coincidentally, to be a member of parliament for the then-ruling party.  The major general wanted to go in guns blazing, get these people and so forth, and so on.  The lieutenant general said, no, no, wouldn’t do it that way. 

I mean, it’s not going to do any good.  The government will force you to let them go anyway.  Let’s do it my way.  Flew in by helicopter, had launch with the sardar in question.  Very convivial, a couple of fairly heavy hints were dropped.  Anyway, left a note for the sardar saying, sardar sabah (sp), you know, I’d be very, very grateful if you could oblige me in this matter. 

A couple of days later, four of the dacoits were handed over by this man with a note in response:  General Sabah, it was so nice to see you the other day.  As to these boys, you can shoot two of them.  The other two, I would be greatly obliged if you would put before the courts.  And the implication is, you can go beat the shit out of them – forgive me – along the way, and then they’ll ultimately be released.  But you can shoot two of them.  And I said, did he say which two?  And he said, yes, yes, he said which two.  You know, they’d obviously offended him in some way or whatever, whatever.  Negotiation, he said. 

This is how it works.  In other words, you know, the idea that you’re going to get a blanket crackdown on Islamist groups in Pakistan is not going to happen.  Equally, just because you don’t have a blanket crackdown doesn’t mean that, you know, action isn’t being taken to restrict them.  Now, as for the possibility of a wider insurgency, the danger is there.  And I should have said, I don’t discount that altogether.

And also, I must say, we do have to see what legacy the floods leave behind.  I’m going back there in the winter.  I don’t want to rush in there because – forgive me while I turn this off – but on that score, I must also point out, you know, there’s been a lot of apocalyptic writing about the impact of the floods, as well. 

How many times has Bangladesh suffered natural catastrophes on an even large scale over the decades and yet, these have had, it would seem, almost no effect on Bangladesh’s society, political order, political parties, system of government at all?  There is an extraordinary level of resilience, I find, often, in these societies.  Now, maybe not; you could be right.  Perhaps this is going to lead to the spread of really revolutionary and insurgent feeling through the countryside, maybe. 

But you know, I don’t actually see, as yet, you know, really clear evidence that this is happening.  But you know, god forbid, you may be right.  We’ll have to see, you know.  But it hasn’t happened yet, remember, and we’re not nine years since 9/11.  And you know, Pakistan’s been around, now, for 60 years, 63.

MR. NAWAZ:  Well, there was a question, as we move to the next question – but there was the issue of the cyclone in 1970 that certainly began the process of the dismemberment of Pakistan.

MR. LIEVEN:  Mm-hmm, but I have to say on that score – please don’t take offense – but looking historically, I cannot see how a country configured like that could have survived in the long run anyway.  You know, Pakistan today is a much greater natural ethnic, historical – you know?

MR. NAWAZ:  Please introduce yourself, sir.  It’s on.

Q:  (Inaudible, off mike) – the Eliot School.  Just a comment.  I mean, I’ve been going back to Pakistan every year, because my family’s still there, for the past 16 years, and there is a sense of victimization of the general population that the West and the army and the politicians.  And it has turned into just, sort of, complaining about it to a seething anger.  And that anger, in an urbanized country, could lead to, sort of, a cascading effect that nobody, I think, can predict. 

And then – that was just a comment and then, you know, the issue of water is very much related to availability of food.  It’s related to the quality of the land, energy.  Transportation is linked to that because of urban-rural migration patterns.  So these things are interlinked.  And I think generally, institutions in the West, as well as in Pakistan, are established to deal with single problems.  And these are a multitude of problems, and you never know which one could, you know – combination of these could cause the state to fail.  So my first question is, do you think that’s a valid argument/discussion, and what could be done about it? 

The second question is, with army controlling most of the resources and basically oriented for a physical fight, do you see that they sense this mid-to-long-term threat to Pakistan, and if they’re willing to do something about that?  Thank you very much.

MR. LIEVEN:  Yeah.  Well, on the first point, you know, to some extent, I’m arguing against apocalyptic lines and perhaps I exaggerate a little for effect.  Yes, there is the possibility along the lines that you describe.  Getting this together to the point where it could actually overthrow the state, you know, as opposed to spontaneous, sporadic local eruptions of anger would, nonetheless, in my view, be very difficult, in terms of organization leadership. 

But the possibility is there.  And certainly, I mean, once again, that’s another reason for America to be careful in its policy because one could easily see how an American action could spark this kind of eruption of mass anger.  On the – sorry?

Q: The issues of water –

MR. LIEVEN:  Oh, yes.  Well, you’re quite right, of course.  It is hideously entangled.  But nonetheless, you know, there are a lot of good ideas out there for where to begin, in terms of cutting down on the wastage, relining the canals, relaying the pipes, you know, so that they leak less, spreading drip feed.  I mean, it’s a slow process, but least technically, the answers are available. 

Getting them through, of course, once again, given the nature of the state, the weakness of the state, will be hard.  As far as the army is concerned, well, you know, that brings one to one of the sort of fundamental paradoxes about Pakistan and the army, which is, many people said to me, within Pakistan, the army is either too weak or it’s too strong. 

It’s too strong because it keeps intervening and overthrowing governments and preventing the politicians developing a real sense of responsibility and so forth and so on, although, you know, for the moment, I mean, you know, they’re concentrating on the fight against the TTP and the others, and they’re not actually threatening to overthrow the government, for the moment. 

And indeed, the other thing is, there has been a certain change of consciousness in the political parties, or at least, in the PLMN, because of course, they don’t want to come to power on the shoulders of the army.  They are actually waiting.  They also don’t want to take responsibility for this existing disaster, of course.  So it’s not the thing of the 1990s, where the party in opposition was, you know, desperately, constantly trying to seize power again, in league with the army.

But on the other hand, you know, you often hear that the army is also too weak.  When it takes power, it doesn’t, even under Zia, introduce a really tough dictatorship.  It doesn’t make plans for really long-term development.  It doesn’t, in fact, function, in other words, as the Turkish army under Ataturk and his successors, and that comes partly down, once again, to the nature of the country.  For that, it’s not a question of just men with guns; it’s also a question of an army backed by a nationalist movement, a nationalist consciousness.  And that can’t exist in a country like Pakistan because after all, it isn’t a nation.  It’s something else, whatever it is.  So you know, no, unfortunately, I don’t see that.

Sorry, this is all very politically incorrect, but what the hell.  A Pakistani businessman  – because I was talking about the Fauji Foundation – you know, the military-industrial thing.  And I asked him, you know, one of the arguments that’s been made about the Fauji Foundation is that it distorts the free market and it’s unfair to business.  And he said, no, we don’t really worry about that.  It’s, you know, them competing with us. 

They’re not big enough, really, to distort the market.  ON the contrary, he said, what would be really good is if, instead of retired soldiers becoming the head of the Fauji Foundation, it should be absolute qualification – a criterion for every person who’s going to become chief of staff – that he should have served as the head of the Fauji Foundation.  Because then, he said, the next time we have a military government, at least we’ll be economically literate.  Sorry.  (Chuckles.)

MR. NAWAZ:  Ambassador Milam.

Q:  Bill Milam from the Wilson Center.  I want to go back, if I may, to your comparison with Bangladesh.  And this, perhaps, follows up a little bit on the questions of the gentleman who sat here a minute ago.  I’ve lived in both countries.  I was in Bangladesh when it had one of its worst natural disasters, when somewhere between 65,000 and 130,000 people died in a tidal surge of some proportion. 

The distinction I would draw to your attention is, these things pull Bangladeshis together, which is unusual, because it’s a very fractious kind of society, though homogenous.  And it’s strange that it is so fractious, in one sense.  But on the other hand, when something really bad happens, they do pull together. 

Now in the floods that have just happened in Pakistan, the stories are not of people pulling together, but of people pulling apart.  And I just wonder if – you know, I’ve seen some reporting about some of the – (inaudible, background noise) – opening dikes the wrong way, flooding other people’s property.  I don’t know how accurate that is.  But I just wonder if these floods don’t increase the odds, not necessarily to really high or even over 50 percent, but are not the odds of some sort of social-political dissolution made more likely by the floods?  It’s my black swan theory coming back to haunt. 

The other question I want to ask while I’ve got the microphone is that if there was some sort of pulling apart of the country by province, we saw what happened in 1971, when east Pakistan tried to pull away.  And by the way, I don’t agree with Shuja.  I think the dissolution of what we call united Pakistan started in 1951, not 1969.  But whatever.  Would the army not react in the same way by trying to crush some sort of separatism in these provinces?  And isn’t that an apocalyptic outcome, too? 

MR. LIEVEN:  On the first point, sir, you’re entirely right, of course, and what I should have said was that if, as is, after all – you know, once again, as the World Bank reports suggests – I mean, they were talking about the medium term, but hell, maybe we’re in the medium term already – if these floods become a regular occurrence, then yes, I think they do have the capacity, you know, before even the terrible droughts set in, to destroy the country, possibly not in terms of a sudden apocalypse, but in terms of what you were referring to – the exacerbation of every kind of local strain and conflict, to the point where, in a way, organized society begins to unravel.

I mean, I’ve just been reading a book about the great Arab conquests, and the striking thing is that before they arrived – and this, indeed, enabled the Arab conquests to take place with such extraordinary speed – local Roman and Byzantine society had, to a considerable extent, unraveled.  You know, the countryside was depopulated; the towns were collapsing, you know, because of the collapse of – well, anyway, you see what I mean.  A longer process, but yes, I think that’s very true.

In terms of the disintegration of the country along provincial lines, well, you see there, I would see this as probably only being possible if the army itself had already broken up.  And then you’re in circumstances, of course, of episodes of savage repression, but also, full-scale civil war.  The possibility of a Bangladeshi-style, savage crackdown, as long as the army remains coherent, well, once again, I mean, before you get to that point, say in Sindh, which appears to be the most likely  candidate, you know, you have de facto civil war between the Sindhis and the Muhajirs. 

At that point, the army appears not as the sort of savage, you know, persecutor of society as a whole, but as the savior, in many ways.  You know, and you have moderate Muhajirs and Sindhis saying for god’s sake, please come in and save us, you know.  And then they don’t need to massacre large numbers of people, you know.  They restore order.  Elsewhere, well, I mean, remember, most of Pakistan is Punjab, and that’s why what you said, sir, about the possibility of an insurgency in Punjab is ultimately the death blow, if it happens. 

And what one has to be worried about elsewhere, it’s mostly the army retains the capacity, in the end, to defeat local insurgency, as its proved in the Pashtun areas.  But also, of course, well, a friend was telling me a story about his uncle, who is an ANP friend, actually.  He was saying, you know, we still talk about, you know, the “Pashtunistan” and so on, but actually, nobody in their senses wants to join Afghanistan for god’s sake.  And he described this uncle of his who, in private, had been describing the Afghans as savages and, you know, we don’t want anything to do with them.

But uncle, how can you say this?  You know, you’re an ANP man all these years; you’ve been saying our Afghan brothers.  Oh, forget that.  That’s just to frighten the Punjabis so that they don’t beat us up, you know.  And it’s a bit the same in Baluchistan, as well.  Describing my book, visiting this guy who talked this tremendous Baluch nationalist line, ferocious Baluch nationalist line, he turned out to have just reaccepted a position as one of the directors of Pakistani Petroleum. 

You know, the Baluch provincial assembly is, of course, dominated by parties calling themselves nationalists.  Sixty-two (62) out of the 65 members are ministers, at least to the last of my count, are ministers without portfolio or advisors without ministerial rank.  Why?  Well, without wishing to impugn any of their motives, I would suggest that it may not be totally unconnected with the fact that each of them gets a 50 million rupee personal development grant for their districts, you know. 

It’s frankly, it’s basically the old British “subsidize the tribes” line, except we handed out bags of gold and Pakistan hands out – but the point is, do these people really want to give up their personal development grants in order to join a full-scale insurgency which would turn Baluchistan into Somalia?

I have to say, as well, that the three who are not, at least the last time I counted, the last time I was there, the three who are not members of the government, it’s not out of principle.  It’s the fact that two of them are dead, which is an obstacle to being in government even in Baluchistan.  And the third has a blood feud with the chief minister who has threatened personally to shoot him if he sees him, which would enliven the cabinet meetings.  So you see, you don’t want to believe everything these –

MR. NAWAZ:  I can see that being a real problem.  Maybe the working title of your book should have been, “A Pragmatic State.” 

MR. LIEVEN:  A pragmatic state – eminently pragmatic.

MR. NAWAZ:  And Bill, on your point, I think if you’re looking for the cause of the dissolution of Pakistan, one probably needs to go back to 1947, rather than ’51.  It’s the proximate cause that we were looking to at the time.  Let me just come on this side of the aisle and then I’ll come back there.  So Dan?

Q:  Great.  Dan Markey at the Council on Foreign Relations.  What I really like about your argument is this plea to understand sort of the sub-structure of Pakistani society as both repressive and stabilizing at the same time.  And I think it points out a reality that I think many people who are working on Pakistan, thinking about Pakistan miss because they’re too busy looking at that thin film of formal structures at the top – institutional structures, and so on, with the exception of the army, which, as you point out, has some deeper roots to it in terms of power and influence.

But I wonder if, maybe, you’ve thought about whether – you’ve just done an outstanding job of describing and explaining the stability of Pakistan’s past, but you may not be describing the Pakistan of the future, not just for some of the reasons that have already been pointed out – demographics, floods, climate – but the youth of Pakistan, who may not be as tied into the same repressive social/political/economic structures as the past, the thing that we generally put under the category of globalization, which includes technology change, communication, opportunities for organizing and mobilizing political dissent that simply weren’t available in Pakistan’s relatively recent past, and which can give rise to social movements that can be either fracturing or uniting, depending. 

I just wonder how you think about what is new under the sun.  I mean, you referred to yourself, at one point, as a historian, and I think you’ve come up with a really very impressive and important way of thinking about Pakistan’s past.  But now if you take off your historian cap and look into the future, what are some of the things you think might unravel that we haven’t talked about yet?

MR. LIEVEN:  Yeah.  Well, I have to say, on that score, please forgive me if I make a little plea.  Does anyone here have a million dollars to spend?  Because what I’ve found, in writing this book – and that’s, you know, an excellent question – but what I’ve found is, we are very, very poorly placed to begin to answer these questions.  And that is because the basic sociological research that would enable us to begin to draw even serious provisional conclusions has not been done.

If you look at, you know, the sociological/anthropological literature on Pakistan, it’s, of course, very extensive for the Pashtuns, although much of it quite outdated by now.  It’s pretty substantial, as far as Karachi is concerned.  As far as the rest of the country is concerned, it is, to a great extent, an enormous void.  To give one example, I mean, critical, of course, it is the question of whether urbanization and the growing youth of the population is changing religious patterns. 

Are these people, as most of the sort of standard models would suggest, some anecdotal evidence suggest, becoming less Barelvi and more Deobandi, and more extreme Deobandi, you know, and so forth and so on, or in fact, are they to a great extent, though they’ve moved to the towns, still preserving the religious patterns of the countryside, in terms of allegiances to shrines and so forth?  Well, there’s also anecdotal evidence for that.  What’s the truth?  We don’t know!  Nobody’s done the research.  I mean, think about it! 

But not just on that; there isn’t a single study – not a single study of a single town in Punjab – not one.  There’s not a single academic study of a Pakistani political party – the mainstream parties, though something’s been done on the MQM, and so forth – not one.  So I’m very, very sensitive to that question.  You’re absolutely right.  And I should leave open, quite right, the possibility that this will change fundamentally.  But I don’t think that anyone is in a position, actually, to say very much.  That’s why I say I need a million pounds so that, you know, I can hire teams of –

MR. NAWAZ:  I thought you said dollars?

MR. LIEVEN:  Oh yeah, well perhaps I could re-write the check after you’ve signed it.  (Laughter.)  No, I need a team of researchers – trained researchers, Pakistanis, you know, organized – to go out and actually start asking these questions and producing these deep studies and not, once again – I mean, you know, all the money is going to research in FATA.  Now, yes, that’s fair enough, but I mean, A, I’m extremely skeptical about some of the results that come out because, you know, doing the research on the ground there – meanwhile, as you said, if Pakistan is destroyed, it will be destroyed from Punjab, not from – I mean, something that happens in FATA could be the precipitant, but you know.

And we have very, very little clear idea, actually, about what’s happening in Punjab.  You might be entirely right, all the patterns that I’ve described are shifting and disappearing.  But of course, it’s also true that all these youths need a vehicle.  They need something to move into.  And the Jamaat, as I’ve said – I had a wonderful experience.  I went to Faisalabad – actually, I went to Faisalabad specifically to look into this – big industrial capital, huge youth worker population.  And when I was there, in a really angry mood because of power cuts and so forth.  And you know, there were some riots and bus burnings and so forth. 

Well, I went to see the Jamaat there, because I thought here, if anywhere, you’ll have a Jamaat-led working-class organization that could actually aim at revolution on the streets.  And I went to see the naib amir (sp) of the Jamaat and I asked him about working-class mobilization.  And I’m paraphrasing, but he basically said, oh, you know, these people, they’re so uneducated and I mean, they drink all the time and there’s no good talking to them because they can’t understand what we say. 

They can’t read, you know, Maududi and read the Quran, and so forth.  And basically, it would mean getting our hands dirty, dealing with these people, so you know, I mean, we’ll stick to the middle classes, thank you very much.  So I thought probably not Lenin in 1917, you know.  So the question is, you know, where do they go?  Who organizes them?  Who mobilizes them?  And is there the possibility of the generation of a movement like that, which will place its cadres all over the place and act like the Bolsheviks or the people in the Iranian revolution and lead them to victory? 

Well, I would say that if you forced me to put a name on who could do that, it would be Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which gives me, of course, more sympathy with Pakistani soldiers and officials and intelligence officers and policemen who say, crack down on Jamaat-ud-Dawa; you must be mad!  You know, we want to keep them as close to us as we possibly can to prevent them from joining the Taliban and, yes, spreading insurgency and revolution across Punjab.  Oh and by the way, you know, we’ll stop them most of the time from attacking India and we promise we’ll stop them attacking you at home. 

But if you’re trying to persuade us to stop them – anybody from them going to fight in Afghanistan, I’m really sorry, but we can’t do it.  And what’s more, we shouldn’t do it.  You don’t want a revolution in Punjab, you know?  It’s not in your interest, either.  So let’s sort of keep them – I mean, I know that’s a very unpopular argument in this town, but if you’ve spent some time there in Punjab, precisely because you’re quite right – I mean, it’s not a wholly absent threat.  And well, at the very least, they could vastly intensify, you know, terrorist activity in Punjab.

Q:  Stanley Kober with the Cato Institute.  Back to the army.  One of the things that concerns me is what appears to be infiltration – all these attacks that are occurring inside the army cantonments – and you’re nodding; you know what I’m talking about – one after another, a recent one in Peshawar.  Either security has gotten really bad or they’re getting inside help.  And it’s so widespread.  And that’s – you know, if you could say a few words about that, because if they are that infiltrated, you wonder, you know, about the state of the army. 

MR. LIEVEN:  Yes, I mean, they are infiltrated.  It seems to me that on the record so far, it’s fairly low-level, you know.  And after all, when ordered to do so, the army did fight in Swat very hard, and it is fighting in Waziristan.  But in terms of yes, I mean, individuals and small groups, it’s a permanent threat. 

And I mean, undoubtedly, the – well, you know, I described the nightmare scenario of the U.S. moving into FATA and the army mutiny.  And of course, what lies in the background there is simply that the army as a whole shares the basic attitude of the population.  And the basic attitude of the population is deeply hostile to the United States, I’m sorry to say, and regards the occupation – I’m sorry, regards as an occupation the Western military presence in Afghanistan. 

And that is as general in the army as it is in the great mass of the population.  I mean, all of this being summed up in one, I mean, horrifying fact, which I can assure you is a fact, which is that the overwhelming majority of the population, educated and uneducated – and actually, of all ethnic groups – is absolutely genuinely convinced that 9/11 was a plot by the CIA, Mossad or both. 

And you know, I mean, to be fair – do understand, I mean, I regard this as poisonous insanity – but equally, if any of us believed this, well, of course, we wouldn’t support the campaign in Afghanistan or the whatever, because clearly, it would be – and that all this was done – I mean, the attack on 9/11 was done in order to justify American invasion of Afghanistan and domination of the Muslim world. 

Well, clearly, if you have a whole population which believes this, it’s hardly surprising that there’s so little support for cooperation with the Americans.  But I mean, equally, as I say, you are a long step from that to a full-scale mutiny, which would destroy the army, which they can see would destroy the army and the country.  It would take something, I think really, really – as they would see it, a blow to their honor to get them to do that on a large scale.  At least, I pray that, that’s the case. 

The only other thing, though, of course – I mean, sorry, but there is one possibility, yes, which one should talk about.  And that is that if there were a mass movement on the streets – a really, really mass movement on the streets in Punjab, especially in northern Punjab, the other moment at which the army would collapse is if the order were given to fire into the crowds.  The soldiers will not do it, I think. 

But the point is, the army is well aware of that.  That’s why whenever the real serious trouble spreads to northern Punjab, you see a change of government coming very, very quickly, including a military government, by the way, because they are really afraid of that Petersburg 1917.  You know, the soldiers are ordered to open fire and they see their grandmother on the other side and the rifles begin to waver up and down and then they ground them.  But I think the point is that, you know, before you got to that point, the generals would back down in one way or another, precisely because they would not wish to push the soldiers that far.

MR. NAWAZ:  That’s what happened in 1977, when three brigadiers refused to follow the orders and it created a crisis in GHQ and the only solution was to go – (inaudible).  We have a question at the back there.

Q:  Thanks, Moeed Yusuf, USIP.  Sorry, I was late, but I’m sure you won’t have talked about this.  I still haven’t heard anybody mention it, so I will.  I am one who, frankly, clutches at straws to bring some optimism on Pakistan, if there is any.  But one thing that troubles me more than any other about looking into the future – and Dan sort of brought this up – I’ve recently written a chapter on youth in Pakistan. 

And one of the things that come out of the recent surveys, however credible they are, consistently show, is that about 70 to 75 percent are tired of what is happening and want positive change immediately.  About 80 percent are sure that this current, sort of, lot of politicians cannot bring about that change.  And 86 percent say, in the latest survey that I saw – and it was quite a good one – that we want nothing to do with politics.  Politics is dirty business; we don’t want to be part of this. 

So the question, then, is, where is this change going to come from?  And to me, this is the single biggest danger, politics having been made a curse word in Pakistan.  And if you’re going to get the scum to lead you and then hope they’re going to become angels, you’re in trouble.  And that’s what it’s showing.  So I just wanted to sort of throw that out and see if you had a reaction.

MR. LIEVEN:  Yes.  I mean, the thing is, though, that the attitude to politics is very complicated, isn’t it, partly because politics is patronage, to a great extent, and patronage is politics.  So you have, very often, this phenomenon of – I always remember a taxi driver I interviewed in Rawalpindi who was cursing the politicians exactly along these lines, but he turned out to be a regular driver for one of the local politicians, who was part of his baradari, and who was circulating just a bit of patronage down from –that he extracted from the state down towards this very junior member of his baradari, so that even he was in politics, you know, in politics. 

And you know, he was getting paid to drive people during elections, to ferry people to the polls, to act as a sort of messenger, and so forth and so on.  So as I say, I mean, of course, yes, the sentiment there among youth – it’s all there, but I mean, the question is, who is going to mobilize it and lead it in what direction?  And maybe that will happen, but maybe it won’t.  There are extensive parts of the world where, actually, nothing much happens on that, you know? 

Or rather, it happens in terms of this spontaneous bus burning and local protests.  But no, I mean, certainly, I mean, the absolute – on one level, the disillusionment with politics – though of course, the funny thing there is that, you know, I mean, so many of the politicians, at least with any scrap of idealism left, are also completely, in a way, cynical about themselves.  I mean, everybody is cynical and pissed off, but they don’t know what to do about it.  And well, yeah, I mean, the sad thing, of course, is, as I’ve said, that is also the apathy and divisions and so forth and so on are also the basis of whatever stability exists in the country, to a considerable extent.  That’s the sad thing.

MR. NAWAZ:  The problem, also, is quite clearly that the politicians that are in power are not willing to invest in their own system or in the country.  I was showing Anatol, as we came in, this report from The Express Tribune of today, wherein they examined the assets of all the people in government. 

And according to this report, it says Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ameer Haider Hoti, Awami National Party Chief Asfandyar Wali Khan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Chief Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and Interior Minister Rehman Malik are some of those who did not pay a single penny in income tax in the period 2004-2007.  And then they go into other details as to why these people felt they didn’t.  And the presidential spokesman says that under the law, the president is not supposed to share his tax information, so you don’t need to know.

MR. LIEVEN:  (Chuckles.)  In fact, it’s les magister (sp) even to ask for it.

MR. NAWAZ:  Yes, so there is a kind of a lack of – (audio break) – on the part of the political leadership in their own system, which leads me to believe that maybe there’s going to be a steady decline, rather than the apocalyptic that people are fearing for Pakistan.  Maybe you could end on that?

MR. LIEVEN:  Yes, there is a very interesting twist to this, in terms of reinvesting in the system, which could be due to the fact that Pakistan – I don’t know how many of you know what I mean by the Gini coefficient of measuring social inequality – Pakistan’s is remarkably low, compared to the U.S., but also compared to India and various places.  Now, why is that? 

Well, I’ve developed a theory, on which I very much value comments, which I’ve set out in the book – and it’s only a theory, you know – very difficult to know how to work this into something more sophisticated – which is that in this world outside the sort of metropolises of America, Western Europe, Japan and increasingly, China, if you want to make a lot of money, you need to have something that the metropolises want to buy, that you can actually sell to the metropolises.

Now, that can be, as in Russia, stuff you take out of the ground, or in the gulf; it can be, as in Colombia and, to an extent, Afghanistan, something that you grow and that the West is prepared to buy; or if you’re really lucky and dynamic, as in China in the past, India to a degree, South Korea, of course, it can be something you make.  The point is that the people with lots of – well, bloody obvious, isn’t it – the people with lots of money have to be willing to buy it. 

Now, if you don’t have any of these things, how do you get rich or relatively rich, in a system?  Well, it seems to me you get rich from the way that you always got rich, to a great extent, which is that you milk the state.  It’s tax farming.  The state raises the revenue and the elites then extract it, which is, to a great extent, what happens in Pakistan. 

I mean, again and again, if you look at the biographies of local politicians, very often, you know, they’re called fuedals, but they turn out, actually, to be relatively new families, but behaving, of course, in a feudal way.  But they are relatively new.  And almost as a general rule, the real breakthrough has been, you know, they’ve made a certain amount of money locally through business and so forth, but the real breakthrough is when they get into politics, get into government and steal large amounts of money. 

But there seems, to me, a very interested aspect of this, which is that in Pakistan, in order to get into politics and government, you do have to have followers.  You know, you have to have enough followers to get you elected, to fight for you, occasionally, to defend you.  You need a bloc of followers.  And that’s true, after all – and every military government has also ended up compromising with the political forces, because the military – you know, the state is weak; the military is weak. 

Now, how do you keep your – and this starts, usually, with a kinship group and then it extends into a faction – how do you hold that together?  Through patronage.  In other words, what you extract from the state, some reasonable proportion of it, I mean, until you get to the really stop – not mentioning any names – and can steal enormous amounts, simply transfer it into estates in England, or whatever – but until then, a lot of what you get from the state, you have to redistribute to your followers because otherwise, they won’t follow you anymore. 

This also, of course, is closer, really, to the nature of kinship in Pakistan, as in much of India – not autocratic kinship groups.  There’s always a cousin waiting in the wings of the leadership if they feel that you have failed them.  And so you hear, again – I mean you ask people, you know, why did you vote for so-and-so?  Well, because you know, he’s part of my baradari; he’s – (inaudible) – and respect, and because he’s done things for us and promised to do things for us. 

So you know, because he’s of your baradari.  If he shows us respect and gives us certain things; if not, there are other chieftains of the – (inaudible) – we could fight for, you see?  And that doesn’t get down to anywhere near the huge mass of the population, but it does spread, you know, fairly far.  And it is integral to the nature of the system that it should do so, is the interesting thing.  It’s not a matter of altruism.  It’s a matter of actually continuing to get access to the cow. 

So the thing is, you know, that oddly enough, so many of these Pakistani politicians are – I mean, they’re grotesquely rich by the standards of Pakistan, but they are not actually grotesquely rich by international standards.  And one of the reasons – well, one of the reasons is the money.  And just another of the reasons is you know, it has to be recycled.  The other thing is that, you know – I can end on a really correct note – in terms of aid to Pakistan, Pakistan is not the poorest country in the world by any manner or means. 

If what you want to do is to relieve poverty, then America should be giving to Africa, not to Pakistan.  Is it – (inaudible)?  Well, no, I mean, that’s pointless.  Is it by limited cooperation?  Yes, but then it’s a question of how far you can reasonably expect the cooperation to go and what kind of cooperation is the most important.  I would say that in the end, yes, I mean, of course we need to get as much help as we can on Afghanistan as possible, but have to recognize the limits – (audio break). 

One thing, which, for me, would be killer, is if the Pakistani state ceased to give serious cooperation against terrorism, against, you know, people coming here to commit – (audio break).  I mean, if the state fails to do that, it cannot be regarded, in any way, as an ally or cooperative.  But you see, the other point is – this is why I stress, you know, Pakistan is a vital interest – if the point is to hold Pakistan together as a – (audio break) – nice if at least some of this aid was spent on development.  I think some of it is, you know.

There are – (audio break) – in place to make sure that more of it is.  We should be asking the Chinese about this, by the way.  They have some – (audio break) – ways of doing this.  But if not, financially supporting the existing, relatively pragmatic elites – I wouldn’t describe it as the second best, but it isn’t an absolutely bad third-best, if you see what I mean.  Because we do have to – you know, I worry that we get so tangled up in our own rhetoric and hypocrisy.  You know, in the end, we’re giving this money for geopolitical reasons. 

We should therefore think seriously about the reasons and what we’re hoping to achieve.  And if, as I say, Pakistan does things which just clearly make it clear that we have no serious stake left in this country, then sure, cut it all off.  I mean, I’m entirely for that.  But otherwise, you know, let’s think seriously about our geopolitical goals and not obsess continuously about whether every cent, or even six out of 10 cents, are going to be spent according to the standards of Chicago.

MR. NAWAZ:  Thank you very much, Anatol.  Obviously, as the author of “Pakistan:  A Hard Country,” you’ve clearly shown that there are no easy answers.  But you’ve given us a lot to think about, and so on behalf of my colleagues at the Atlantic Council and on behalf of this group that has taken the time to join us, thank you very much.  (Applause.)

(END)